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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to compare philosophical and exegetical traditions in 
the writings of Philo of Alexandria and in the Valentinian sources. Although 
Valentinus’ fragments contain some Philonic themes, the closest parallels 
with Philo come from “section C” (chapters 43.2-65) in the Excerpts from 
Theodotus by Clement of Alexandria, which parallels teachings of Ptolemy’s 
disciples attested in Irenaeus’ Valentinian account in Iren. Haer. 1.1-7. I will 
argue in this study that Valentinian theology in these sources cannot be 
properly understood without recourse to Philo’s inventions in the allegorical 
exegesis of the Book of Genesis. On the one hand, the Valentinians 
elaborated the allegories attested in Philo’s writings in the light of the myth 
of Sophia. On the other hand, the Valentinian theologians reformed the 
preceding Gnostic myth in the light of teachings that they found in Philo’s 
writings. 
The Valentinian protological model system developed on the grounds of a 
Platonizing interpretation of the prologue of the Gospel of John. The 
Valentinian teachers twisted the semantic and logical structure of the 
prologue of John’s gospel in a way which indicates that they also knew some 
of Philo’s protological innovations. In the Valentinian accounts, Wisdom has 
manifold associations, which are related to the dyadic and monadic aspects 
of the divine world. These associations are found in an initial stage in Philo’s 
texts. Philo and Valentinians were also dependent on the ancient theory of 
diakrisis according to which cosmic matter was divided into four cosmic 
elements.  Taking into account all these protological and cosmological 
parallels, it is reasonable to suggest that the Valentinian teachers were 
working in the allegorical tradition in which many of Philo’s interpretations 
were adopted, rejected and reformed.  
In anthropology, Philo and Valentinian teachers were dependent on the 
Middle Platonic anthropological theories, which formed the philosophical 
background for the allegorical interpretations of Gen. 1:26-27 and Gen. 2:7. 
The closest parallels with Philo are found in the anthropological 
interpretations of Genesis, which form the basis for soteriology and ethics. 
The allegory of Israel and the allegory of Cain, Abel and Seth attested in the 
Valentinian sources were derived from Philo’s works.  
On the grounds of this study, it is reasonable to suggest that there was a 
historical relationship between Philo and the Valentinians. The relation was 
restricted, however, to one group of Valentinians whose teachings go back to 
the school of Ptolemy in Alexandria and Rome. This study shows that it is 
probable that some Valentinian teachers belonged to the circle of 
Alexandrian Christian Platonists who saw Philo’s works as valuable and 
preserved them after the revolt before they became the property of the 
Alexandrian Catechetical School, that is, at the end of the second century. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The aim of this study 
The aim of this study is to compare philosophical and exegetical traditions in 
the writings of Philo of Alexandria and in Valentinian sources. I will compare 
these writings systematically in the light of the Valentinian system of 
thought, which contains protological, cosmological and anthropological 
dimensions. The affinities between Philo and Valentinian theology can be 
found in all these themes. I will argue in this study that Valentinian theology 
drew upon Philo's and cannot be properly understood without recourse to his 
inventions in the allegorical exegesis of the Book of Genesis. Although the 
origin of Gnosticism is not the main concern of this study, the comparison of 
the Valentinian accounts with various Hellenstic Jewish and Platonic sources 
will shed new light in the study on the origins and development of the 
ancient Gnostic traditions. 
Philo (ca. 20 BCE – 50 CE) was the most profilic author of Hellenistic 
Judaism, specifically in Alexandria, which was the Diaspora’s main center. 
Belonging to a wealthy Jewish family with close ties to rulers of Judea and 
Rome Philo had exceptional opportunities to engage literary activity.1 Philo’s 
family belonged to wealthy aristocracy and he inherited the multiple 
citizenship from his father being a citizen of the Jewish politeuma of 
Alexandria, the Greek city of Alexandria, and Rome. Although Philo received 
                                                 
1 The Jews of Alexandria had a long history as citizens of Alexandria with legal autonomy, although 
their privileged status began to weaken during the Roman administration. During the reign of 
Claudius, the participation of the Jews in gymnasia was restricted. It is possible that Philo had some 
judicial status in the Jewish council of elders of Alexandria, because he was a member of the legation to 
Galicula in 38 CE. The pogroms against Jews were reported by Philo in his writings Against Flaccus 
and The Legation to Gaius. Philo’s brother Caius Julius Alexander was an ethnarch (or alabarch) of 
Alexandria, and he had close relations with both Agrippa I, the grandson of Herod the Great, and to the 
Julio-Claudian dynasty in Rome. Josephus informs us that Alexander’s fortune was enormous and he 
donated nine gates in Jerusalem "overlaid with massive plates of silver and gold.” Alexander had two 
sons. The younger son, Marcus Julius Alexander, was married to Berenice, the daughter of Agrippa I. 
The older son, Tiberius Julius Alexander, abandoned the Jewish religion. He was procurator of Judea 
in 45 CE and prefect of Egypt under Nero. During the siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE he commanded the 
Roman troops. Cf. David Winston, Philo of Alexandria. The Contemplative Life, The Giants, and 
Selections (Translation and Introduction by David Winston; New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1981), 1-7; 
Samuel Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria. An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 3-
16. For the historical background of the pogroms against Jews in Alexandria cf. Pieter Willem van der 
Horst, Philo's Flaccus: The First Pogrom (Translation and commentary by Pieter Willem van der 
Horst; Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, V. 2; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 18-
37. 
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a standard Greek education and advanced training in rhetoric and 
philosophy, he was committed to the observance of Jewish ritual laws and 
religious festivals.  
Philo’s social background might have directed him towards business and 
politics, but he had a remarkable role in politics only at the end of his life 
when he was the leader of the Jewish delegation to Caligula in 39-40 CE. 
Philo’s main interests were focused on the philosophical life. It is possible 
that Philo occasionally withdrew into solitude and spent some time among 
the community of Jewish intellectuals living on the shores of Lake Mareotis. 
Jean Daniélou has pointed out that Philo’s intellectual activity was two-
sided: “part of his activity is directed to believing Jews. It has an esoteric 
character. It is carried on within the community. On the other hand, Philo’s 
activity has an apologetic component. He is careful to present the Jewish 
faith to Greeks so as to make it acceptable.”2 But originally, Philo was an 
interpreter of the Scripture. He was not, however, an isolated exegete but an 
exegete within specific hermeneutic tradition, which he preserved and 
commented in his writings. Without the preservation of Philo’s philosophical 
and exegetical writings our knowledge about Hellenistic Judaism would be 
far more limited. The social setting of Philo’s school is not clear, but the most 
reasonable suggestion is that Philo owned a private school where he taught 
philosophically orientated spiritual exegesis. The survival of Philo’s works 
after his death and during the turbulent years of the Jewish revolt in 115-117 
CE is still an enigma for modern scholarship. Although Clement of 
Alexandria was the first ancient author who began quoting Philo by name at 
the end of the second century, the history of the preservation of Philo’s works 
before Clement is not known.3  
The Valentinian tradition was one of the most influential religious-
philosophical exegetical traditions in Early Christianity. The foundation of 
the school of Valentinus goes back to Valentinus, who was influential during 
mid-second century Alexandria and Rome. His teachings are preserved only 
in some fragments in the patristic sources. We know that Valentinus wrote 
homilies, letters, and psalms, which were used in the communities of the 
later Valentinian disciples. The disciples of Valentinus continued the school 
tradition of Valentinus, and it was vehemently attacked by Irenaeus in his 
multivolume work Against Heresies at the end of the second century. 
According to the patristic evidence, the school of Valentinus was a 
reformation of the preceding Gnostic tradition, although their relationship is 
a matter of scholarly dispute. 
                                                 
2 Jean Daniélou, Philo of Alexandria (Translated by James G. Colbert; Eugene, Oregon: Cascade 
Book, 2014), 1-10; cf. also David T. Runia, Exegesis and Philosophy: Studies on Philo of 
Alexandria (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), 4-5. 
3 Gregory Sterling, “Philo,” in The Eedrmans Dictionary of Early Judaism (Edited by John J. 
Collins & Danie C. Harlow; Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 1064-1065. 
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All those who have read Philo’s writings together with the Valentinian 
texts have noticed parallel allegorical interpretations and biblical themes 
between these texts. The consensus is that both Philo and Valentinian 
belonged to the Alexandrian exegetical tradition, which intended to integrate 
the Platonic worldview with the revelation of the Bible through the allegorical 
method of interpretation. Despite the apparent thematic continuity of 
thought between Philo and the Valentinian sources, there is no scholarly 
consensus whether Valentinian teachers had direct access to Philo’s writings. 
I argue in this study that the Valentinian tradition formed a distinct school of 
thought in early Christianity in which the preceding Gnostic teachings 
including the myth of Sophia were refined in the light of Hellenistic Jewish 
allegorical teachings attested in Philo’s works.  
1.2 The Valentinian tradition and Sethian Gnosticism 
The definition of Gnosticism is a highly disputed issue in modern 
scholarship. Since the international colloquium held in Messina, Italy, in 
1966, no scholarly consensus has been reached regarding the essence and 
origin of Gnosticism.4 The study of the Nag Hammadi Gnostic writings has 
shown that the narrow definition of the term “Gnosticism” as a second-
century dualist and deterministic Christian heresy based on the myth of 
Sophia is not suitable to depict all the texts of the Nag Hammadi Library. It is 
also noted that the term “Gnostic” does not appear as the self-designated 
name in the writings of the Nag Hammadi Library, but it is given as a group 
designation by second-century patristic authors. Therefore, there have been 
proposals that we should forgo using the term “Gnosticism” because it is a 
dubious category which is based on the late second-century discourse of 
orthodoxy and heresy. As soon as we talk about Gnosticism we decide to talk 
about something “other” and apart from original and “pure” Christianity, i.e. 
something that is not a part of our religious and cultural tradition. Karen 
King has pointed out that in that way “a rhetorical term has been confused 
with a historical entity.”5  
                                                 
4 The Messina colloquium proposed that the term “Gnosticism” should refer specifically to a 
certain group of systems of the second century CE described by the patristic authors. The Messina 
proposal maintains that “Gnosticism” is a system of thought, which contains the idea of “the divine 
spark in man, deriving from the divine realm, fallen into this world of fate, birth, and death, and 
needing to be awakened by the divine counterpart of the self in order to be finally reintegrated.” 
Gnostic cosmology is based on the double movement of “devolution and reintegration.” This world has 
its basis in a crisis within the divine realm. The term “gnosis” is given a broad definition as “knowledge 
of the divine mysteries reserved for an elite.” Cf. Ugo Bianchi (ed.), Le origini dello gnosticismo 
Colloquio di Messina 13-18 Aprile 1966 (Studies in the History of Religions; Leiden: Brill, 1967). 
5 Karen King, What is Gnosticism? Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2003, 2-3. Ismo Dunderberg maintains that the situation does not get any better if the terms 
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In his essay “Prolegomena to the Study of Ancient Gnosticism” (1995) 
Bentley Layton intended to define the category of Gnostic texts, rather than 
the essence or origin of Gnosticism. Layton argues that the definition of the 
category of Gnostic writings should be based on the direct testimonials of 
ancient authors. Layton’s starting point is Irenaeus’s summary of the Gnostic 
teaching in Iren. Haer. 1.29-30, which parallels the Secret Book According to 
John in the Nag Hammadi Library. In addition, Porphyry mentions three 
books found in the Nag Hammadi Library (Zostrianos, the Foreigner and the 
Book of Zoroaster), which were discussed in Plotinus’ seminar in Rome 
between 262-270 CE. Layton proposes that on the grounds of the content of 
these books, the bulk of Gnostic writings can be expanded to all other 
writings, which contain a similar kind of cosmography, philosophical 
creation myth and cast of characters (e.g. the Hypostasis of the Archons, the 
Trimorphic Protennoia, the Three Steles of Seth and Marsanes). Hence, 
Layton coins the term Gnostic or “Classic Gnostic” to signify what Hans-
Martin Schenke and most other scholars called the Sethian Gnostic system.6 
According to Pearson, Sethian Gnosticism consists of the following elements: 
“a focus on Seth as a  Savior figure and spiritual ancestor of the Gnostic elect; 
a primal divine triad of an ineffable Father, a Mother called Barbelo, and Son 
referred to as Autogenes; four emanated luminaries named Harmozel, 
Oroaiel, Daveithe, and Eleleth and other superterrestial beings related to 
them; a salvation history thought of as three descents of the Savior, or three 
                                                                                                                                          
”Gnostic” or ”hairesis” are replaced by other terms which are less loaded with theological meaning, 
such as ”sect” or ”splinter group.” Also, these terms are based on the same discourse of orthodoxy and 
heresy. Cf. Ismo Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, 18-19. 
For a summary of the scholarly discussion concerning Gnosticism, see also Antti Marjanen (ed.) Was 
There a Gnostic Religion? (The Finnish Exegetical Society in Helsinki; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht), 2005. 
6 Bentley Layton, “The Prolegomena to the Study of Ancient Gnosticism,” in The Social World of 
the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne A. Meeks (eds. White & Yarbrough; Minneapolis MN: 
Fortress, 1995.  For the Sethian Gnosticism cf. Hans-Martin Schenke, “The Phenomenon and 
Significance of Gnostic Sethianism,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale New Haven, Connecticut, March 28-31, 1978 (edited 
by B. Layton; Volume 2; Leiden: Brill, 1981), 588-616. Many scholars regard Layton’s proposal for the 
definition of Gnosticism as too narrow because it exclueds the Valentinian texts from the the category 
of Gnostic writings. Antti Marjanen has balanced Layton’s proposal in Antti Marjanen, “Gnosticism,” 
in (eds. Harvey & Hunter), The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, Oxford Universtiy Press, 
2008). Marjanen proposes a bipolar definition of Gnosticism, which serves a means by which one can 
group ancient religious texts and thinkers for closer analysis and comparison. The two characteristics 
which create the prerequisite for classifying a text or a doctrine “Gnostic” are according to Marjanen’s 
definition: 1. A notion of evil or ignorant world creator(s) separate from the highest divinity. 2. A 
presupposition that the human soul or spirit originates from a transcendental world and has the 
potential of returning there after a life in this world.  
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critical periods marked by flood, fire, and final judgement; and rituals of 
baptism and ascent.”7 
Layton maintains that the Valentinians should be kept apart “as a distinct 
mutation or reformed offshoot” of these original Gnostics. He assumes, 
however, that some Sethian texts may have influenced on Valentinus’s 
followers but they elaborated these Gnostic traditions remarkably. Layton’s 
solution was adopted by David Dawson, who describes Valentinus as a 
reformer of the Sethian myth in the Apocryphon of John and in the 
Hypostasis of the Archons.8 Ismo Dunderberg also suggests that Valentinus 
may have adopted the creation myth of Adam from Sethian sources, although 
he elaborated these teachings in the light of Hellenistic Jewish models 
attested in the Book of Wisdom.9 
Christoph Markschies has argued, however, that Valentinus’s teachings 
were independent of mythological Gnostic traditions, but his followers may 
have been representatives of the Gnostic “mythological heresy.” This would 
mean that there was a drastic chasm between the teachings of Valentinus and 
those disciples who may have adopted some Gnostic influences from Sethian 
sources. Markschies’s radical solution, which makes a distinction between 
Valentinus’s teaching and the systems of his followers, is not commonly 
accepted. Although Valentinus’s fragments do not contain any explicit 
reference to the fall and restoration of Sophia, there is nothing in them which 
would make Valentinus’s teachings incompatible with the teachings of his 
followers. It is not credible either that Valentinus’s followers would have 
distorted the teachings of the foster-father of their school in such a radical 
manner. It is more likely that Valentinus also taught some kind of 
protological myth of Sophia, although it may have differed in detail from the 
preceding Gnostic myth and the systems of the later Valentinian 
theologians.10   
Dunderberg points out that “the significance of Markschies’s study no 
longer lies so much in its conclusion that Valentinus was not Gnostic as it 
does in the way Markschies carefully located Valentinus in the intellectual 
milieu of second century Alexandria, colored by Platonism and Hellenistic 
                                                 
7 Birger Pearson, Ancient Gnosticism. Traditions and Literature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2007), 60-61. 
8 David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Oxford: 
University of California Press, 1992), 132-133. 
9 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 51, 104. Dunderberg says, however, that despite common 
motifs, there is no positive evidence that Valentinus used the story of Adam’s creation in the 
Apocryphon of John.  
10 Irenaeus describes in Iren. Haer. 1.11.1 a version of Sophia myth, which goes back to Valentinus 
himself. Also, Tertullian says that Valentinus taught some kind of protological myth, although this 
myth differed from the later Valentinian systems (Adv. Val. 4.3). 
12 
Judaism.”11 Karen King has proposed that the myth of Sophia’s fall and 
restoration can be seen as “a logical result of the inter-textual reading of 
Platonic cosmology, Genesis and Wisdom literature.”12 Also Birger Pearson 
suggests that the Gnostic woldview is dependent upon Platonism, although 
the Platonist elements have been reinterpreted in a non-Platonic direction in 
the light of apocalyptically oriented Judaism. Both Gnosticism and the 
Jewish apocalypses emphasized a special kind of knowledge revealed from 
high. While the latter focused on the coming end of the visible cosmos and 
the beginning of the new world order ruled by the saints, the former stressed 
merely the return of the individual soul to its divine origin.13 However, we do 
not have any evidence of the Sophia myth outside of Christian literature. This 
would mean that the inter-textual reading of these sources was actualized 
within the Christian tradition, possibly in Alexandria.14 Although the fall of 
heavenly Wisdom could be explained in the light of Platonic archetypes, 
Sophia’s redemption by the Savior is barely conceivable apart from Christian 
tradition.15 It seems that the Gnostics inherited the apocalyptic world view 
from the Pauline Christianity and Johannine theology.  
It is noticeable that there is not merely one account that can be called the 
Gnostic Wisdom myth, but a number of accounts which differ significantly 
from each other. Irenaeus informs us that in addition to the Valentinian 
sources, an account of Sophia’s fall and restoration forms the basis for the 
cosmological model in Ophite, Barbeloite, and Sethian accounts.16 Alastair 
                                                 
11 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 20. Dunderberg maintains that Markschies’s view forms a 
solid basis for all subsequent study of Valentinus’s theology, even though he does not agree in all cases 
with Markschies’s radical view. 
12 Karen King, The Secret Revelation (Cambridge MA; London; Harvard University Press, 2006), 
221-224, 233.    
13 Birger Pearson, Ancient Gnosticism, 15-19. 
14 For the Christian origin of the Gnostic myth see Simone Pétrement, Separate God. The Christian 
Origin of Gnosticism (trans. C. Harrison; New York: Harper Collins, 1984), 212; Alastair H. B. Logan, 
Gnostic Truth and Christian Heresy. A Study in the History of Gnosticism (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1996), 19-23; Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 20-21; Ronald McL. Wilson, “The Half Century of 
Gnosisforschung,” in Recent Studies in Early Christianity. A Collection of Scholarly Essays (ed. E. 
Ferguson; vol. 4; New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 95-105; Edwin Yamauchi, “The Issue of Pre-
Christian Gnosticism Reviewed in the Light of the Nag Hammadi Texts,” in The Nag Hammadi 
Library after fifty years (ed. John Turner & Anne McGuire; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 72-88, David Brakke, 
The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010), 29-51 
15 Stead states that the idea of the fallen heavenly Sophia, as Universal Soul, may have its archetype 
in the Platonic idea of the fall of the individual soul before its incarnation. Although the fall of Sophia 
could have been derived form Platonic archetypes, the idea of redemption of Sophia is hardly derivable 
from the Platonic tradition or the Hellenistic-Jewish Wisdom traditions. Cf. Christoph. G. Stead, “The 
Valentinian Myth of Sophia,” Journal of Theological Studies 20 (1969), 101. 
16 Iren. Haer. 1.29-30. 
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Logan in Gnostic Truth and Christian Heresy proposes that the Valentinian 
school of thought reformed the preceding Gnostic myth of Sophia, but the 
myth in question may have differed from its later “Sethianization.”17 Logan 
suggests that the intellectual basis of the Gnostic myth lies in Platonic-
Pythagorean theology, which was applied to the interpretation of Genesis and 
the Prologue to John’s Gospel by some innovative Christian theologians.  
Logan summarizes his analysis of the origin of Gnosticism: 
The world-view of these Gnostics is undoubtedly Platonic. It reflects 
the attempt to derive the Many from the One, and to explain the 
visible universe as the work of a lower god, the Demiurge, emanated 
from the transcendent One beyond being, in terms of the inexplicable 
self-relevation and unfolding of the supreme God as Father, Mother 
and Son … but as the fundamental concept of the self-relevation of the 
divine triad suggests, it is essentially a Christian scheme. It reflects 
Christian ideas and ways of interpreting the Old Testament in the 
light of the message of Paul and John.18  
 
In this study, the Gnostic movement is located in mid-second-century 
Alexandria, which served as an urban milieu for innovative Christian 
theologians who incorporated Hellenistic-Jewish exegetical patterns and 
Neo-Pythagoren transcendental monism into the interpretation of the purely 
Christian message. John Turner has pointed out, however, that “Gnosticism 
is not phenomenologically reduced to Platonism, nor is Platonism reduced to 
Gnosticism, but each tends to be treated as an index to a single way of 
construing the world and interpreting its received symbols and traditions, be 
they of mythical or of philosophical character.”19  
I suggest that we do not have any historical reason to doubt that there was 
a group of early Platonizing Christian teachers who were called “Gnostics” by 
outsiders and who may have used that name as a term of self-designation. 
The Gnostics were in the first place Platonists and their teachings represent, 
not so much “Christianity gone wild,” but “Platonism gone wild,” as Arthur 
D. Nock has pointed out.20 Although some Gnostic myth of Sophia antedated 
both Valentinian and Sethian versions, it is not excluded that these traditions 
interacted with each other later on.21 With regard to this study, it is crucial to 
notice that the Gnostic theologians, whether Sethians or Valentinians, were 
dependent not only on the Middle Platonic philosophy but also on Hellenistic 
                                                 
17 Logan, Gnostic Truth, 19-23. 
18 Logan, Gnostic Truth, 22. 
19 John D. Turner, Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic tradition (Québec: Presses De 
l’Universitae Laval, 2001), 26. 
20 Cf. Arthur D. Nock, “Gnosticism,” in Harvard Theologial Review 57 (1964), 267.  Ugo Bianchi 
states that rather than “an acute Hellenization of Christianity,” the Gnostic movement can be regarded 
as “an acute Christianization of Hellenism.” 
21 Logan, Gnostic Truth, 48-49. Cf. also the stemma and influence of Gnostic myth on pages 55-56. 
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Jewish traditions of Genesis-exegesis, which may have included some works 
of Philo. However, the main task of this study is to compare the allegorical 
and philosophical parallels between Valentinian sources and Philo. 
Therefore, the parallels with Sethian and other Gnostic texts is discussed in 
passing and I have concentrated on those cases where the Philonic parallels 
explain the differences between Valentinian and Sethian theologians. In 
those cases the Valentinian exegetes downplayed the Gnostic mythopoiesis 
and refined the distinctively Gnostic motifs, such as the denigration of the 
God of the Old Testament. 
1.3 Philo of Alexandria and the Valentinian tradition 
In an article “Philo of Alexandria and Gnosticism,” Robert McL. Wilson 
outlines two options concerning Philo’s relation to ancient Gnosticism which 
are presented in the scholarship. On the one hand, Philo is regarded as part 
of the Gnostic movement. On the other hand, Philo is seen as a precursor of 
the later Gnostic hairesis. Wilson prefers the second option and maintains 
that Philo is not a Gnostic in the strict sense of the term, but his writings 
contain some affinities with Gnosticism, although the Gnostic negation of the 
God of the Old Testament was alien to Philo. Also the radical dualism of the 
Gnostic myth, which suggests a rupture between the Ideal world and the 
visible cosmos, is not compatible with Philo’s moderate Platonic dualism. 
Rather than saying that Philo was a representative of the Gnostic hairesis, it 
is more reasonable to talk about Philo’s gnosis.22  
In his essay “Philo and Gnosticism,” Birger Pearson mainly adopted 
Wilson’s view.23 Pearson conludes that even though there are evident parallel 
themes in Philo and some Gnostic texts, Philo cannot be labeled a “Gnostic” 
or representative of the “proto-Gnostic” system either. Although Philo shared 
the Platonic view, which made a sharp distinction between the world of Ideas 
and the visible cosmos, the Creator God suspends the whole cosmos by the 
all-pervasive Logos and its powers. In the Gnostic system the creator God 
was blind, ignorant and evil, and creates in order to deceive human beings. 
Pearson suggests that it is impossible to derive such a hostile world view 
from the writings of Philo. Pearson thinks, however, that some of Philo’s 
antinomian Jewish opponents may have been predecessors for Gnostic 
theologians, although these Jewish groups cannot not be equated with the 
Gnostic haireseis mentioned by Irenaeus.24  
                                                 
22 Robert McL. Wilson, “Philo of Alexandria and Gnosticism,” in Kairos 14:213-219 (1972); cf. also 
Pearson’s article “Philo, Gnosis, and the New Testament” in Birger Pearson, Gnosticism, Judaism, and 
Egyptian Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006), 165-182. 
23 Birger Pearson, “Philo and Gnosticism,” in (ANRW II 21.1; Berling: De Gruyter, 1984), 295-341. 
24 For the equation of the extreme allegorists of Philo with the proto-Gnostic groups, cf. M. 
Friedländer, Der vorchristliche jüdische Gnosticismus (Göttingen, 1989; reprint Farnborough, 1972). 
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It is notable that both Pearson and Wilson did not make a distinction 
between the systems in the Valentinian sources and the Sethian Gnostic 
texts. The Valentinian tradition forms a more intriguing case because the 
Valentinian teachers have significantly downplayed especially those “Gnostic 
motifs” which distinguished other Gnostic teachers from Philo. In his article 
“The Valentinian Myth of Sophia,” Christopher Stead maintains that “one 
can reconstruct most of the presuppositions of Valentinus merely by 
rearranging Philo’s mental furniture.”25 The main elements of the 
Valentinian myth of Sophia were according to Stead already “in the margins 
of Philo’s writings.” Later Stead elaborated his thesis in another article “In 
Search of Valentinus.” Stead intended to weaken the alleged contradictions 
between the Valentinian and the second-century Platonic tradition to prove 
that the Valentinian myth can be derived from Middle Platonic principles.26 
He locates the Valentinian theory of aeons in the Platonic tradition according 
to which ideas are not only intelligible but intelligent.27 Stead argues that 
Philo and Valentinus have used the same Platonic themes in their biblical 
exegesis. Valentinus’s description of the creation of Adam is similar to Philo’s 
exegesis of Gen. 1:26 referring to the plurality of the creators (Opif. 72) and 
the “ideal man” that is associated with the Logos. Stead also found parallels 
between Philo and the Valentinian three-fold division of humankind in Gig. 
60 (cf. also 12-15).28 
Stead succeeded in proving a certain thematic and intellectual continuity 
between the Valentinian tradition and Philo’s writings. Bentley Layton, for 
his part, supposes that Valentinus’s Platonic attitude towards the Scriptures 
may have come to him through the study of Hellenistic Jewish 
interpretations of the Bible in the writings of Philo. He also suggests that the 
thoughts of God as the plants of paradise in the Valentinian Gospel of Truth 
(36.35-37.2) possibly draws upon the allegorical interpretation of Gen. 2:8 by 
                                                                                                                                          
Although the identification of Philo’s antinomian opponents with some proto-Gnostic groups is 
intriguing, we do not have decisive information to confirm this connection. Pearson writes: “Although 
much of the detail of Friedländer’s argument is open to question, he has been vindicated in his basic 
contention, that Gnosticism is a pre-Christian phenomenon that developed on Jewish soil.” Cf. Birger 
Pearson, “Friedländer Revisited: Alexandrian Judaism and Gnostic Origins,” in Studia Philonica 2, 
1973, 23-39. 
25 C. G. Stead, “The Valentinian Myth of Sophia,” Journal of Theological Studies 20 (1969), 75-104. 
26 C. G. Stead, “In Search of Valentinus,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: The School of 
Valentinus (edited by B. Layton; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 75-95. 
27 Stead refers to Chaldean Oracles fragments 37 and 81. He also mentions Xenocrates, who 
suggested that the ideas were numbers, and they desire unity, which means that they were not only 
archetypes but living beings.  
28 The tripartite division of humankind in Philo was also noticed by Hans Jonas in The Gnostic 
Religion: The Message of the Alien God and Beginnings of Christianity (Third edition; Boston: Beacon 
Press, 2001), 212-214. 
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Philo in Q.G. 1.6.29 David Dawson in Allegorical Readers in Alexandria 
places Valentinus in the same exegetical tradition as Philo, but he does not 
propose any direct historical relation between them.30 Valentinus may have 
been influenced by the same kind of allegorical framework and intellectual 
milieu without knowing the exact works of Philo. Francis T. Fallon also saw 
parallels in the categorizing of the Law of Moses in Philo’s writings and 
Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora. It is rather likely that Ptolemy’s writing reflects the 
use of the hermeneutical traditions of Hellenistic diaspora Judaism, which 
were similar to those of Philo. However, we do not have firm evidence to 
suggest that Ptolemy would have drawn his teachings directly from the works 
of Philo.31 Christoph Markschies, who made a sharp distinction between 
Valentinus and the Gnostic tradition, maintained that there is nothing in 
Valentinus’s fragments which indicate direct contacts with Philo’s works. 
This does not mean, however, that the contacts with Philo’s teachings were 
not possible, for they were even probable. Markschies proposes that 
Valentinus was an intellectual intermediate stage between Philo and Clement 
of Alexandria.32 
Most recently two remarkable studies have been published concerning the 
Valentinian tradition. Einar Thomassen’s The Spiritual Seed came out in 
2006 and two years later Ismo Dunderberg’s study Beyond Gnosticism. 
Thomassen presents a systematic analysis of the Valentinian school 
traditions, although the emphasis is mainly on the so-called eastern branch 
of Valentinianism. Thomassen sees one possible parallel between 
Valentinus’s psalm Harvest (Hipp. Haer. 6. 37:7) and Philo’s Mos. 2.121 
concerning the “cosmic chain” of creation. Although Thomassen detects 
remarkably Neo-Pythagorean influences in the Valentinian sources, he 
stresses more the influence of the Jewish apocalyptic tradition in the 
                                                 
29 Bentley Layton, Gnostic Scriptures (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 217, 262. Layton suggests that 
Valentinus wrote the Gospel of Truth. This is a hypothetical assumption. Irenaeus mentions in Iren. 
Haer. 3.11.9 that the Valentinians read a book called Veritatis Evangelium. Although the Gospel of 
Truth in the Nag Hammadi Codex I does not contain a title for the book, it begins with the words “The 
gospel of truth is a joy for those who have received from the Father of truth the grace of knowing 
him…” Thomassen is of the opinion that incipit can be applied as a title, and it is unlikely that there 
have been two independent Gnostic works with the same title. Therefore, it is probable that the Gospel 
of Truth in the Nag Hammadi Library and the one mentioned by Irenaeus are the same works. Cf. 
Einar Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 146-148. 
30 Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 145-182. 
31 Francis T. Fallon, “The Law in Philo and Ptolemy: A Note on the Letter to Flora,” VC (30) 1976, 
45-51. 
32 Christoph Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis 
mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins (WUNT 65; J. C. B. Mohr: Tübingen, 1992), 406-
407. Markschies writes on page 327: “Von seinem Fragmenten her ist kein zwingender Rückschluß auf 
direkte Kontakte zu alexandrinischen Mittelplatonikern oder dem hellenistischen Judentum der Stadt 
möglich. Sie sind wohl wahrscheinlich.” 
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Valentinian system of thought than the Platonizing Jewish Wisdom theology 
attested in Philo’s writings.33 Dunderberg’s approach is more orientated to 
the social-historical analysis of the Valentinian movement. He sees aspects in 
Valentinus’s school that connect it with ancient philosophical school 
traditions and Hellenistic Jewish Wisdom theology. Valentinus’s view 
concerning immortality (fragment 4) was closer to Philo’s teachings than to 
those early Christian views which connected immortality to the expectation 
of Jesus’s parousia and the resurrection of the dead.34 Dunderberg also 
notices some biblical allegories in the Valentinian sources that may go back 
to the Jewish archetypes attested in Philo’s writings.35  
In Philonic studies the question whether Valentinus or his followers knew 
Philo’s works is discussed by David Runia in Philo of Alexandria in Christian 
literature. Runia argues that despite the apparent thematic continuity of 
thought between the second century Alexandrian Christian communities and 
Jewish communities of Philo’s time, we are unable to create a valid 
argument, whether they had access to Philo’s writings. It was Clement of 
Alexandria who broke the one hundred years of silence and referred 
explicitly to Philo by name. Runia remarks, however, that the closest 
parallels with Philo before Clement can be found with the group of 
Platonizing Christians of Alexandria, who made use of Greek philosophical 
ideas in their attempt to understand the Christian message. An early 
Christian document the Teachings of Silvanus is an example of a work in 
which the common elements with Philo’s thought can be listed as follows36:  
 
i) the conception of the transcendence of God, based on Platonic 
categories of thought 
ii) the doctrine of personified Wisdom 
iii) anthropology based on Platonism, but also showing Stoic features 
iv) stress on the importance of virtue and the struggle against the 
passions, coupled with a decidedly negative attitude towards the body 
v) use of the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture 
 
                                                 
33 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 315-326; 481-482. Thomassen sees in some Valentinian 
documents (e.g. Tri. Trac. 118:14-28; Gos. Truth 20:6-24; Ap. Jas 16:8-11) an idea of the manifestation 
of the saints and the union with angels at the end of days. A similar theme is attested in the Jewish 
apocalyptic literature (cf. 1 En. 38:1; 1QS XI 7-9) 
34 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 40-41. 
35 Dunderberg, “Gnostic Interpretations of Genesis,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Reception 
History of the Bible (ed. Michael Lieb & Emma Mason; Oxford University Press, 2011), 385-389. 
36 David Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 126. The results of 
Zandee’s article are summarized by Pearson in “Philo, Gnosis and the New Testament,” in The New 
Testament and Gnosis: Essays in Honor of Robert McL. Wilson (ed. Logan & Wedderburn; 
Edinburgh, 1983), 73-89. See also J. Zandee “Les enseignements de Silvanos et Philon d’Alexandrie” in 
Mélanges d’histoire des religions offerts á H. C. Puech (Paris, 1974), 337-345. 
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Runia considers that the Christian Gnostics of Alexandria form a separate 
group, which differed from other Platonic Christians. Runia says that 
although the Gnostics shared much in common with Philo and Hellenistic 
Judaism, they “introduced a radical twist” that separated them sharply from 
Philonic thought. This “radical twist” refers to deterministic soteriology and 
an anti-cosmic world view. The possession of gnosis separated humans 
radically into the categories of the elect and other people leading to division 
in the gatherings of ordinary Christians. For Philo, however, the freedom of 
choice was fundamental, and he also held a positive view of the cosmos, 
which was sustained by all-pervasive Logos. The positive view of the cosmos 
differed from the teachings of the Gnostics, who regarded the world as a 
hostile place ruled by the malevolent heavenly archons.37 Therefore, 
according to Runia it is rather unlikely that the Gnostics found anything 
valuable in Philo’s works for their exegesis. 
Runia’s view of the school of Valentinus is stereotypical and he failed to 
make a distinction between Valentinianism and the Sethian Gnostics whose 
“radical twist” was downplayed by the Valentinian teachers. According to the 
findings of recent scholarship, the secretiveness of the Valentinian paideia 
did not differ drastically from other philosophical schools, rabbinical schools 
or the Hermetic tradition. Irenaeus’s information about the Valentinian myth 
reveals that Valentinian teachers were interested in discussing cosmological 
myths with “outsiders” in order to convert them.38 The Valentinian teachers 
were not only mythmakers, but ethical improvement and progression were 
also essential elements of the Valentinian way of life. Ismo Dunderberg has 
pointed out that the goal of the Valentinian myth was to show the world in a 
new light and to change the way the audience perceives the world and the 
way they act.39 Moreover, the view of Valentinian tradition as a deterministic 
and anti-cosmic religion is based on a careless reading of the Valentinian 
accounts in the patristic sources. Although Valentinian teachers saw the body 
and fleshly impulses as evil, as Philo and contemporary Platonists did, the 
attitude towards heavenly powers was in some Valentinian sources rather 
positive, because they were created as images of the aeons of the intelligible 
realm. 
It is noticeable that all the elements, which Runia accepted in the case of 
the Teaching of Silvanus as proofs of continuity in Philo’s thoughts can also 
be found in the Valentinian sources. In addition to the elements mentioned 
above, the Teaching of Silvanus contains the tripartite anthropology which 
parallels Valentinian teaching. The division of humankind is based on three 
                                                 
37 Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, 126. 
38 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 191-195. 
39 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 25. For the importance of ethical improvement in Valentinian 
teaching, see Philip L. Tite, “An Exploration of Valentinian Paraenesis: Rethinking Gnostic Ethics in 
the Interpretation of Knowledge (NHC XI, 1)” in HTR 97 (2004), 275-304 and Minna Heimola, 
Christian Identity in the Gospel of Philip (Helsinki: Suomen Eksegeettinen Seura), 2011, 170-185. 
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“races,” which goes back to the allegorical reading of Gen. 2:7. Pearson 
suggests that this view goes back to Hellenistic Jewish sources, which were 
“well known to Philo, if not in fact derived from him.”40 It is an 
oversimplification, however, to suggest that the Valentinian cosmic myth can 
be derived almost exclusively from the writings of Philo. The parallels 
between Philo and Valentinian teachers may be marginal exegetical 
similarities, without any essential contribution to the origin of the 
Valentinian system or the Sophia myth itself. Moreover, the Valentinian 
tradition was not monolithic, which means that the works of Philo may have 
been known only by the teachers of some specific Valentinian group.  
It is also noticeable that it is not only the positive reception of Philo’s 
allegories, which may indicate the dependency of Valentinians on Philo, but 
also an explicit rejection of certain interpretations, which parallels Philo’s 
exegesis. The Valentinian communities were not isolated groups apart from 
the other early Christian communities in Rome or Alexandria, but they 
participated in the early Christian debate concerning the creation of the 
world, the Law of Moses, the locality of God or the correct interpretation of 
the prologue of the Gospel of John.  
1.4 Methodological Considerations  
In his article “Comparisons Compared: A Methodological Survey of 
Comparisons of Religion from ‘A Magic Dwells’ to A Magic Still Dwell” David 
M. Freidenreich outlines four typological approaches to the comparison of 
religion. These are “comparative focus on similarity,” “comparative focus on 
difference,” “comparative focus on genus-species relationship” and “the use 
of comparison to refocus.” The methodological approach in this study is a 
combination of the first and the fourth approaches, although the comparative 
study is always bilateral because it reveals both similarities and 
dissimilarities.41 
Jonathan Z. Smith has stressed that the similarities, as well as the 
dissimilarities, are not given, but they result from the “mental operations” of 
the observer.42 Smith points out that a comparatist is attracted to a particular 
                                                 
40 Pearson, Gnosticism, Judaism and Egyptian Christianity, 177-181. Cf. also Pearson’s 
introduction to the Teaching of Silvanus in The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, 2007. Pearson writes: “So 
it is not out of the question that the author was familiar with Gnostic writings, such as those of the 
Alexandrian teacher Valentinus.” 
41 David M. Freidenreich, “Comparisons Compared: A Methodological Survey of Comparison of 
Religion from ‘A Magic Dwells’ to A Magic Still Dwells” in Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 80-101. 
42 Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the 
Religions of Late Antiquity (Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion Series 14; London: School of 
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datum “by a sense of its uniqueness” remembering that he has seen 
“something like it” before, which needs an explanation. The comparison is a 
subjective experience, which can be linked to “an objective connection 
through some theory of influence, diffusion, borrowing, or the like.” Smith 
asks: “We are left with a dilemma that can be stated in the stark form: Is 
comparison an enterprise of magic or science?” Thus far, comparison 
appears to be more a matter of memory than a project for inquiry; it is more 
impressionistic than methodical.”43  
William E. Paden stresses the heuristic nature of the comparative 
enterprise in his article “Elements of New Comparativism.” He points out 
that the comparative study is heuristic because it provides instruments for 
further discovery. He says that “Just identifying parallel themes, concepts or 
pattern is not the end matter, but the starting point of investigation.”44 The 
subjective dimension in the process of comparison does not mean that it 
cannot be done scientifically. The mental operations should be subordinated 
to conceptual self-control, which means that the framework of comparison is 
analytically controlled, and the significant aspects of the phenomena in 
question are selected in a theoretically plausible way.  
In this thesis, the study of similarities and dissimilarities is related to the 
interpretations of the biblical text or biblical theme and the use of similar 
kinds of allegorical schemes.45 The similarity may be related to a similar kind 
of philosophical idea, which forms the basis for the allegorical interpretation 
of the text. Comparative scholarship not only presents the similarities 
between the objects of comparison but intends to explain why they are 
similar, which raises the question of the historical or conceptual relationship 
between them. The emphasis of the historical survey can lead, however, to 
parallelomania, which does not only exaggerate the similarities but 
“proceeds to describe source and derivation as if implying literary connection 
flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction.”46 I suggest, however, 
that the opposite attitude, which can be called parallelophobia, is as 
pernicious for comparative study. This kind of attitude means that one 
exaggerates the differences between certain texts to dismiss the mutual 
dependency all together as if all the ancient texts and their traditions were 
developed in isolation without any historical dependency on each other. 
                                                                                                                                          
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1990), 51-52; Niko Huttunen, Paul and Epictetus 
on Law: A Comparison (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 10-19. 
43 Jonathan Z. Smith, “In Comparison A Magic Dwells,” in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative 
Religion in the Postmodern Age (ed. Kimberley C. Patton, Benjamin C. Ray; London: University Press, 
2000), 23-41. 
44 Williman E. Paden, “Elements of New Comparativism,” in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative 
Religion in the Postmodern Age (ed. Kimberley C. Patton, Benjamin C. Ray; London: University Press, 
2000), 182-192. 
45 The allegorical method is defined in chapter 3. 
46 Samuel Sandmel, “Parallelomania” JBL 81 (1962):1-13. 
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The crucial issue in comparing religious issues is the determination of 
how much context should be taken into account. The problem is that the 
more context one considers, the less similar the objects of comparison 
become. It should also be noticed that comparative study is not interested in 
religious events within absolutely similar contexts. It is the dissimilarity of 
the context, which makes the comparison interesting. In this study I use an 
approach according to which the comparison of the elements from different 
religious traditions is made only after examining them in their original 
context.47 This kind of scrutiny may be a rather laborious way of comparing – 
and reading – but this methodological approach is profitable in that it raises 
further questions.  
As I noted above, the objects of comparison in this study are texts that 
contain similar kinds of interpretations of the Bible. The degree of similarity 
between these interpretations does not necessarily define the form of 
dependency. An identifiable quotation can be taken from the secondary 
source material, notebooks or through oral transmission without direct 
contact with the original text itself.48 In his study of Philo of Alexandria and 
Early Christianity David Runia points out that most of the 4th-century 
references to Philo’s texts in Christian literature were not adopted by reading 
Philo himself but from Christian authors such as Origen, Eusebius, and 
Ambrose, who incorporated quotations from Philo in their writings. On the 
other hand, a short reference or allusion that faintly resemblances another 
text can be the result of a careless direct reading or it can be the outcome of 
the ancient scholarly technique of borrowing. This feature becomes apparent 
in Annewies van den Hoek’s study, Clement of Alexandria and his use of 
Philo in STROMATEIS. She describes the quotation method of Clement of 
Alexandria in the following way:  
Another characteristic of his technique is the abrupt way that 
material borrowed from Philo jumps into his text. These 
discontinuities give a strange flavor to his sentences and lead to 
illogical turns of thought. In these various ways, therefore, Philo’s 
text is nearly always presented in a damaged and defective form. 
Repeatedly, confusion and disorder appear; words are shifted 
strangely, and sentences are chopped into cryptic fragments. The 
development of Clement’s thought would be entirely 
incomprehensible in these sections if Philo’s text were not at hand. 
                                                 
47 Freidenreich, “Comparison Compared,” 94-96. Freidenreich mentions Barbara Holdrege’s study 
(Veda and Torah; Transcending the Textuality of Scripture, 1996) as an example of a comparative 
study which used a thoroughly contextual method. 
48 Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, 35, 341.  
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This applies not only to the readers of today but must also have held 
true for his own contemporaries.49  
 
These notions should warn us not to make conclusions too easily concerning 
the form of dependency or historical relationship between ancient texts solely 
on the ground of the degree of literal similarity or dissimilarity. It is clear, 
however, that the degree of similarity correlates with the probability of the 
dependency, although the form of the dependency may remain beyond any 
historical study. The question concerning the historical relation is not the 
only concern of the comparative study. The similarities between religions or 
their literary traditions may also function as a “lens.” This means that the 
comparative analysis may produce data which can be used to refocus issues 
in question. Freidenreich defines this approach in the following way: 
Much as a microscope offers new insights even into specimens that 
can be seen with the naked eye, the religious tradition being brought 
for the purpose of comparison serves to provide a new perspective on 
the tradition being examined, to raise new questions or offer a new 
possible way of understanding the target tradition.50 
 
The “target tradition” in this study is the Valentinian tradition. In this study I 
shall provide new approaches to and perspectives on the interpretation of the 
Valentinian texts on the ground of parallels with Philo. The aim of this study 
is not only to collect parallels between the Valentinian sources and Philo’s 
works but to refocus the Valentinian tradition and learn from the parallel 
cases with Philo.  
1.5 Outline of this study   
Chapter 2 explores the sources of this study and the definition of the category 
of Valentinian literature. The terms “the school of Valentinus” or “the 
Valentinians” do not appear in any of the Valentinian writings in the Nag 
Hammadi library, but the Valentinian group designation comes from the 
patristic sources. The primary sources in the Nag Hammadi writings can be 
labeled “Valentinian” in as much as they possess the characteristics of 
“Valentinianism” attested in the patristic sources. Although the patristic 
sources do not describe the teachings of the Valentinians objectively, the 
category of Valentinian writings can be formed on the grounds of critical 
evaluation of the information attested in the patristic sources.  
                                                 
49 Annewies van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and his use of Philo in STROMATEIS: An Early 
Christian Shaping of a Jewish Model (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 3; Leiden: Brill, 1988), 214-
215. 
50 Freidenreich, “Comparisons Compared,” 91. 
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According to a precursory reading of the Valentinian sources, the closest 
exegetical and thematic parallels with Philo come from the Valentinian 
source that is enclosed in the unfinished eighth book of Stromateis by 
Clement of Alexandria (Exc. Theod. 43.2-65). It is likely that this Valentinian 
teaching goes back to Ptolemy and his disciples in Rome where Irenaeus got 
to know about it. I will present a detailed source-critical analysis of the 
Valentinian accounts in Exc. Theod. 43.2-65 and Iren. Haer. 1.1-7, which 
forms the basis for the comparison with Philo’s texts.  
I will begin chapter 3 by investigating the formation of the school of 
Valentinus and its social-historical contexts in early second-century 
Alexandria. The Jewish revolt and annihilation of the Alexandrian Jewry 
created an urban social setting for the generation of various religious-
philosophical schools, which according to the patristic authors represented 
the so-called Gnostic haireseis. I will argue that Valentinian teachers shared 
with Philo the same philosophical and linguistic basis for the use of the 
allegorical method, which was based on the theory of the corruption of 
language. Both Philo and the Valentinians were proponents of multiple 
exegesis, which means that they could interpret a certain text differently 
according to the intellectual level of the audience. At the end of this chapter, I 
will investigate two case studies, which illustrate the multidimensionality of 
the exegetical tradition of Philo and Valentinians.     
Chapter 4 analyzes the accounts of Philo and Valentinians by comparing 
their protological systems. Both Philo and Valentinians can be regarded as 
“Biblical Middle-Platonists” who integrated Plato’s Timaeus with Aristotle’s 
metaphysics and Neo-Pythagorean principles. I show in this chapter how the 
Valentinian protological model system described in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3 
developed on the grounds of a Platonizing interpretation of the prologue of 
the Gospel of John. It seems that the Valentinian exegetes were aware that 
John 1:1-5 was written as a Platonizing description of the creation account in 
Genesis, which has a parallel in Philo’s allegory of the creation during the 
first day of creation. It was therefore not chosen accidentally as a proof-text 
for protological speculations. I will show that the Valentinian exegetes 
twisted the narrative of John’s prologue in a way that indicates that they were 
familiar with the allegorical patterns used by Philo in his allegory of the 
creation of the intelligible cosmos.  
In chapter 5, the focus shifts from the intelligible realm to the creation of 
the visible cosmos. Firstly, I present a short philosophical introduction to the 
creation of matter in the Neo-Pythagorean tradition, which formed the basis 
for speculations concerning the creation of matter both in Philo and in the 
Valentinian systems. While Philo can be associated with the school of 
Eudorus of Alexandria, the Valentinian view is closer to Moderatus of Gades. 
In the Valentinian accounts, Wisdom has manifold associations, which are 
related to the dyadic and monadic aspects of the divine world. I will show in 
this chapter that these associations are found in an initial stage in Philo’s 
texts. Valentinian exegetes interpreted the creation of heaven and earth (Gen. 
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1:1) as a separation of psychic and hylic matter on the grounds of the ancient 
theory of diakrisis. The same kind of theory concerning the division of 
matter according to its physical characteristics into the four cosmic elements 
can be found in Philo. Moreover, both Philo and the Valentinians interpreted 
Gen. 1:3 as denoting the creation of the essence of light, which served as the 
source for the visible lights of heaven. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the interpretations of the creation of Adam in Gen. 
1:26-27 and Gen. 2:7. Philo worked within an exegetical tradition and he 
evidently used some preceding allegorical teachings as the basis for his 
allegory of the soul and the division of humankind. Both Philo and the 
Valentinians were dependent on Middle Platonic anthropological theories, 
which formed the philosophical background for their allegories. I will argue 
that Valentinian teachers knew similar kinds of anthropological 
interpretations as Philo, although they reformulated them according to the 
Valentinian cosmic myth. At the end of this chapter, I will investigate two 
anthropological fragments of Valentinus, which are evidently influenced by 
Hellenistic Jewish speculations concerning the creation of Adam’s body and 
the structure of the human soul as a symbol of the Temple.  
The discussion in chapter 7 is an expansion of the anthropological issues 
handled in the previous chapter. The tripartite division of humankind was 
one of the main features of Valentinian anthropology. Although the names of 
these categories may have been derived from Paul, the division itself is closer 
to Philo’s division of humankind on the grounds of an allegorical reading of 
Gen. 1:26-27 and Gen. 2:7. The tripartite division of humankind forms the 
basis for the allegories of Abel, Cain and Seth, as well as the allegory of Israel 
as a spiritual human being who sees God, which are also attested in Philo’s 
works. At the end, I compare the theories of the afterlife in Philo and the 
Valentinian sources. Valentinus maintained that the gift of immortality was 
present in the world since the creation of Adam, although it must be 
activated through the practice of philosophy and ascesis. This soteriological 
model parallels the Hellenistic Jewish model attested in Philo. Both the 
Valentinian teachers and Philo suggested that the ultimate telos of the 
human soul was the assimilation with the intelligible cosmos, which means 
the transformation of the soul into an angel.    
In the final chapter, I will make some concluding remarks on the grounds 
of the comparative analysis in chapters 4-7. I will primarily answer two 
questions. Firstly, what kind of historical relationships can be derived on the 
ground of these parallels? Is it possible that some Valentinian teachers knew 
some works of Philo or did they get to know about these teachings indirectly 
e.g. through oral transmission? This historical conclusion also aims to 
provide some new insight into the question of the preservation of Philo’s 
library after his death. Secondly, I will consider what kind of contribution the 
parallels with Philo can make regarding the interpretation of the Valentinian 
texts. Do the parallels with Philo give us some new insight or focal 
perspective into Valentinian source material?    
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2 SOURCE CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS – THE 
VALENTINIAN PRIMARY SOURCE IN CLEMENT’S 
EXCERPTS OF THEODOTUS AND ITS 
RELEVANCE TO THIS STUDY 
The source material used in this study consists of literary sources. The 
Valentinian writings of the Nag Hammadi Library are commonly regarded as 
“primary sources” compared with the “secondary sources” attested in the 
patristic writings.51 Before the finding of the Nag Hammadi scriptures in 
1945, the teachings of the Valentinians were known only through the 
descriptions of their opponents. Research on the Valentinian writings of the 
Nag Hammadi Library has changed the situation remarkably. For the first 
time the voice of the Valentinian communities could be heard directly 
through their writings and documents. Dunderberg maintains that the 
Valentinian texts of the Nag Hammadi Library clearly show that the 
Valentinian teachers were not solely “mythmakers” as they are portrayed in 
the patristic sources, but they have something else to offer to their 
followers.52 
The division between the aforesaid “primary sources” and “secondary 
sources” is problematic.53 It is true that the Valentinian writings in the Nag 
Hammadi Library are primary sources, which means that they authentically 
describe their own belief systems and offer an inside view to the religious 
events. They are not, however, automatically primary sources for the 
religious events that were described in the patristic sources. We cannot know 
for sure, whether Valentinus or his followers, whose teachings are described 
                                                 
51 In this study, the primary source means a written document or its copy, which was created 
during the time under investigation by the representatives of a certain belief system. They offer an 
inside view of a particular event. The secondary sources interpret and analyze these primary sources. 
The secondary sources may be later descriptions or quotations, which are made by outsiders. They are 
one or more steps removed from the event that is under investigation.   
52 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 10.  
53 For the problem of defining the category of the Valentinian source material see Michel R. 
Desjardins, Sin in Valentinianism (SBL Dissertation Series 108; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 3-12. 
We are confronted with Menon’s classical paradox when we try to select Valentinian writings from 
among the Nag Hammadi texts. Plato writes: “If you don’t know what arete is already, you can’t even 
look at it, because if you don’t know what it is already, then even if you look, you won’t know when 
you’ve found it” (Meno 80d). We have already chosen our definition in some form or another when we 
choose the writings which we suspect represent Valentinian teaching. This dilemma was noticed by 
Desjardins, who writes: “…the decision to call a work ‘Valentinian’ rests exclusively on finding 
similarities between its content and the patristic descriptions of that group (cf. Desjardins, Sin in 
Valentinianism, 5). 
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in the second-century patristic sources, ever held opinions about the the 
fourth-century Nag Hammadi texts such as the Gospel of Truth or the Gospel 
of Philip that are commonly regarded as Valentinian.  
It is evident that the patristic sources are hostile sources, and they do not 
describe the Valentinian teachings objectively. Irenaeus’s rhetorical strategy 
was to erect a social boundary against the Valentinians and make the 
Valentinian tradition look like a deviation from the true apostolic church.54 It 
was not only a strategy to create a “heretical church” but to create “the great 
church” as well. However, the correction of second-century patristic sources 
on the grounds of fourth-century documents is problematic. Firstly, the 
writings of the Nag Hammadi Library are classified as “Valentinian” in so far 
as one accepts the characteristics attested in the “secondary sources.” 
Secondly, the characteristics that distinguish the Valentinian writings of the 
Nag Hammadi Library from the patristic information may reflect more the 
social context in which they are written than the belief -systems of the 
second-century Valentinian teachers described by the patristic authors.  
In this study, I will define the category of Valentinian writings on the 
grounds of critical evaluation of the information attested in the patristic 
sources. Although they are hostile secondary sources, we can correct the 
rhetorical bias through a strict reading of the text. The rhetorical slander can 
be detected rather easily and in some cases we have independent 
descriptions of the same Valentinian teaching which give some criteria for an 
evaluation of the reliability of the sources in question. There are also some 
accounts in the patristic sources that can be equated with the primary 
sources. Epiphanius quotes in Panarion the Valentinian Letter of Ptolemy to 
Flora in its entirety and the Valentinian Letter of Instruction. Although the 
quotations of Valentinus are only short fragments, we do not have any reason 
to suspect their authenticity. In this study, I will also argue that section C in 
the Excerpta ex Theodoto by Clement of Alexandria is comparable to the 
primary source text (cf. below). According to the patristic data the main 
criteria for a text to be classified as “Valentinian” are as follows: 
 
i) The protological system, which includes the genealogy of 
the intellectual aeons or other intellectual beings from the 
transcendent One 
ii) The fall and salvation of Sophia 
iii) The notion of the Demiurge as a lower creator God, who 
was used as an instrument in the creation of the visible 
cosmos  
iv) The spiritual seed of Sophia as the highest part of the 
human soul 
v) The tripartite division of humankind into hylic, psychic 
and pneumatic categories  
                                                 
54 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 8-9. 
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The Valentinian source need not contain all these basic premises of the 
Valentinian belief system. In some cases, we have a fragmentary piece of 
information, which contains only some allusions to the Valentinian premises. 
Also, the evolution of the Valentinian school tradition should be taken into 
account: the fragments of Valentinus do not contain the myth of Sophia and 
some later documents, such as the Tripartite Tractate, began to merge with 
the sacramental system of nascent orthodoxy. The text must, however, be 
compatible with all these basic Valentinian premises. In some cases, the 
definition is not clear, and the text in question may be a possible candidate as 
a Valentinian text, or it may contain some influences from the Valentinian 
belief system without being a Valentinian text as such.55 The Valentinian 
influences do not yet make the text “Valentinian” any more than Jewish 
influences make the text “Jewish.”  
The Valentinian sources can be divided into two groups: the quotations of 
Valentinus or his followers, and the summaries of the Valentinian teaching 
collected from various sources. Seven fragments of Valentinus belong to the 
the first category. They are attested in the works of Clement of Alexandria 
(Strom. II 36:2-4, 114:3-6, III 59:3, IV 89:1-3, 89:6-90:1, VI 52:3-53:1) and 
Hippolytus of Rome (Hipp. Haer. VI 37:7).56 Ptolemy’s the Letter to Flora is 
quoted in its entirety in Epiphanius’ Panarion as well as the Valentinian 
Letter of Instruction (“Lehrbrief”). Clement of Alexandria’s book VIII of the 
Stromateis contains the “fragments of Theodotus” and teachings of some 
other unknown Valentinians.57 Origen quotes the teachings of Heracleon in 
his commentary on John’s gospel. In the second category of sources we have 
descriptions of the Valentinian system in Irenaeus’s Adversus Haereses 1.1-8 
                                                 
55 The Authentikos Logos is a good example of the ancient text which contains many themes that 
recall Valentinian language and words such as “fullness,” “bridegroom” and “bridal chamber.” Some 
scholars include the text in the category of Valentinian texts but some others do not find evidence for 
that. The Authentikos Logos can be read in the light of Valentinian myth, but Valentinian myth does 
not motivate the main message of the text in a way which would make it Valentinian. See Ulla 
Tervahauta, A Story of the Soul’s Journey in the Nag Hammadi Library. A Study of the Authenticos 
Logos (NHC VI,3). Academic Dissertation. (University of Helsinki, 2013), 101-108. Also, the Teaching 
of Silvanus contains striking similarities with Valentinian theology and it may have been composed by 
an author who was familiar with Valentinianism. For the discussion concerning the Teaching of 
Silvanus cf. chapter 1.3. 
56 Markschies enumerates 11 fragments of Valentinus. In addition, to the fragments mentioned 
above, he mentions fragments in Hipp. Ref. VI 42.2, X 13.4 and fragments in Ps. –Anthimus/Photius. I 
investigate only those fragments whose authenticity is indisputable. For the study of Valentinus’s 
fragments see Christoph Markshies, Valentinus Gnosticus? Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen 
Gnosis mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1992). 
57 According to Casey, the following sections goes back to Theodotus: Exc. Theod. 1,1-2; 2-3; 17,1; 
21- 24,1; 25-26; 28-30,1; 31-33,1, 3-4; 33-36,1; 37-41 66-86. See Robert Casey (ed.), The Excerpta ex 
Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (London: Christophers, 1935), 5. 
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and 11-20, Clement’s Excerpta ex Theodoto chapters 6-7 and 43.2-65 (so-
called “section C”), Hippolytus’s Refutatio Omnium Haereses VI 29-36 and 
41-42, Tertullian’s Adversus Valentinianos and Epiphanius’ Panarion. 
Tertullian also comments on Valentinian teachings in De Anima and De 
Resurrectione. In addition Adamantius’ Dialogue on the True Faith in God, 
which is part of Methodius’ work On Free Will, is possibly an authentic 
source of Valentinian teaching, which goes back to Valentinus himself.58 
There is also a fragment of Marcellus of Ancyra “On the Holy Church,” which 
mentions Valentinus’s writing called “On the Three Natures.” We are unable 
to confirm that Valentinus wrote a book with that name. Marcellus may have 
thought that the Valentinian Tripartite Tractate was written by Valentinus 
himself and it is also possible that this particular Valentinian document was 
named “On the Three Natures.” However, Marcellus’ statement concerning 
Valentinus’s invention of the three persons of the Godhead may be authentic: 
“Valentinus the heresiarch…was the first to invent three hypostases and three 
persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and he is discovered to have filched 
this from Hermes and Plato”59  
According to the scholarly consensus, the following texts of the Nag 
Hammadi Library can be classified as Valentinian60 or they may contain 
apparent Valentinian influences: The Prayer of Apostle Paul (NHC I,1), The 
Gospel of Truth (NHC I,3), The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I,5), The Treatise 
on the Resurrection (NHC I,4), The Gospel of Philip (NHC II,3), The First 
Apocalypse of James (NHC V, 3), The Interpretation of Knowledge (NHC 
XI,1), and A Valentinian Exposition (NHC XI, 2). Michel Desjardins adds 
The Second Apocalypse of James (NHC V,4) and The Letter of Peter to Philip 
(VIII, 2) to this list. Some scholars regard The Exegesis on the Soul (NHC 
II,6), the Revelation of Paul and Authentikos Logos (NHC VI,3) as possible 
candidates for Valentinian text.61  
                                                 
58 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 67-72. Adamantius’ The Dialogue on the True Faith is part of 
Methodius’ work On Free Will 2-3. Dunberberg maintains that this account has been notoriously 
overlooked in previous scholarship. 
59 Translated by Alistair H. B. Logan. Cf. Alastair H. B. Logan, “Marcellus of Ancrya (Pseudo-
Anthimus), ‘On the Holy Church’: Text, Translation and Commentary,” in Journal of Theological 
Studies (51.1) 2000. Cf. Also Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus?, 264-270. 
60 For the catalog of Valentinian Nag Hammadi writing see Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 10; 
Desjardins, Sin in Valentinianism, 6-7. 
61 Michael Kaler, Flora Tells a Story. The Apocalypse of Paul and Its Context (Ontario: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2008); Ulla Tervahauta, A Story of Soul’s Journey in the Nag Hammadi 
Library. A Study of the Authentikos Logos (NHC VI,3). Academic Dissertation. (University of Helsinki, 
2013), 101-108. Tervahauta says that the author of the Authentikos Logos may have known some 
Valentinian teachings, but she does not regard the text as Valentinian. Philip Tite includes Authentikos 
Logos in the category of Valentinian writings. See Philip Tite, Valentinian Ethics and Paranaetic 
Discourse. Determining the Social Function of Moral Exhortation in Valentinian Christianity 
(NHMS; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 8-15. 
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In this study, the teachings in the Valentinian writings are compared with 
the writings of Philo of Alexandria. It is commonly noted that Philo worked 
within an exegetical tradition. Although Philo was an innovative interpreter, 
his writings also offer a view of the traditions of allegorical exegesis among 
the Jewish exegetes of Alexandria during the first century CE. The corpus of 
Philo’s writings has been preserved to this day in various Greek manuscripts, 
sixth century Armenian translations, and some texts are extant only in Latin. 
The decisive point in the preservation and use of Philo’s writings was in 233 
C.E. when Origen took the copies of the whole Philonic corpus with him and 
deposited them in the library of the Episcopal school of Caesarea.62 Eusebius 
provided a list of Philo’s works in Hist. Eccl. 2.18.1-9 and he mentions many 
works which have been lost. We can also assume that some work is missing 
when there is a significant lacuna in a series of Philo’s alleogical 
commentaries. It is therefore supposed that only two-thirds of Philo’s works 
have been preserved to this day.63 
Philo’s works are divided into three categories: the exegetical treatises, 
the philosophical treatises and the apologetic treatises. In this study the 
                                                 
62 C. H. Roberts argues that Origen took the whole library of Philo’s writings from Egypt to 
Palestine, and there seems to be a break between Origen’s departure from Alexandria and the arrival of 
Philo’s writings back to their Alexandrian hinterland after a decade. This view is supported by the 
papyrus codex found in Lower Egypt in 1889 (dated to the beginning of the 4th century) which, 
according to Cohn-Wendland, represents the Cesarean textual tradition in Alexandria. After Origen, 
the next Christian author in Alexandria, who used Philo extensively and explicitly mentioned his name, 
was Didymus the Blind, the leader of the Catechetical School of Alexandria during the late 4th century. 
Cf. C. H. Roberts, Buried Books in Antiquity, Arundell Esdaile Memorial Lecture 1962 (London: 1963), 
11-15. According to Runia, the papyrus codex mentioned by Cohn-Wendland is a witness to the fact 
that Origen did not take all the copies of Philo with him to Palestine, but some writings of Philo were 
circulating during the late 3rd and early 4th century in Egypt. Runia locates Ps. Justin’s Cohortatio ad 
Graecos at 3rd−century Alexandria, which supports his theory that the writings of Philo had continuing 
presence in Alexandria, even though Origen took his private copies of them to Egypt. Cf. Runia, Philo 
in Early Christianity, 184-189. 
63 For the overview of Philo’s writings cf. Sterling, “Philo,” 1065 and the chart in 1066-1067. The 
writings of Philo are preserved in the medieval and Byzantine manuscripts that are brought together in 
the critical edition of Philo’s works in Cohn, L. – Wendland, P. (and Reiter S. for vol. 6), Philonis 
Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, six vols. Berlin 1896-1915. The main medieval editions of Philo are 
Editio Princeps Turnebus (1552) in Greek and two Latin manuscripts Editio Princeps Iustianianus 
1520 and Sichardus 1527. Some of his texts are known only in 6th-century Armenian translations (QG 
1-4, QE 1-2, De Prov. 1-2, De Anim., two fragments of De Deo and arithmological fragments). Some 
Greek quotations have been preserved by Eusebius (De Prov. 2, Hypoth.). In addition, there are some 
other references and quotations in the exegetical Catenae of patristic writings and Greek anthologies 
(e.g. the Sacra Parallela of John Damascenus). Some books that are mentioned in the writings of Philo 
or by Eusebius are still missing in our present collection of Philo’s works (e.g. On Numbers, On 
Covenants, On Rewards, the Lives of Isaac and Jacob).For the textual transmission of Philo’s works 
during Byzantine and Medieval times see Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, 16-31.  
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comparison with the Valentinian writings is mainly based upon Philo’s 
exegetical writings, which can be divided into i) allegorical commentaries (21 
treatises), ii) exposition of the Law (12 treatises) and iii) questions and 
answers on Genesis and Exodus (6 treatises). Most of the parallels with the 
Valentinian sources are found in the allegorical commentaries, which 
proceed sequentially through the text of Gen. 2:1-41:24. In the allegorical 
commentaries Philo introduces philosophical topics into the discussion of 
biblical texts, although he seems to be confident that he does not have to read 
Plato into Moses, but out of Moses, as Sterling has pointed out.64  
On the grounds of a precursory reading of the Valentinian sources the 
closest exegetical parallels with Philo of Alexandria are found in Clement’s 
Excerpta ex Theodoto in the section 43.2-65, which forms an individual 
block in Clement’s account. This section has many parallel themes and 
interpretations with Irenaeus’s “great account” in Iren. Haer. 1.1-7.65 Exc. 
Theod. 6-7 also contains a protological commentary on the prologue of the 
Gospel of John, which has a close parallel in Iren. Haer. 1.8.5. This primitive 
protological account served as the basis for the Valentinian model system 
described in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3. The starting point for the comparison with 
Philo’s writings in this study is the allegorical interpretations of Genesis in 
Exc. Theod. 43.2-65. I will expand, however, my investigation to other 
Valentinian sources and to those Valentinian writings in the Nag Hammadi 
Library which are valuable for comparison purposes. In addition to 
Valentinus’s fragments, the Tripartite Tractate is an important document, 
because it is the only extant Valentinian primary source that presents the 
                                                 
64 Sterling, “Philo,” 1070-1072. Eusebius mentions that Philo himself gave the title Allegory of the 
Sacred Laws to the distinct group of texts (Hist. Eccl. 2.18.1) 
65 In this study, the Greek text of Irenaeus’s Adversus Haereses come from A.Rousseau and L. 
Doutreleau (eds.), Irénée de Lyon, Contre les heresies:Livre I (vol.2; Sources chrétiennes, no. 264; 
Paris: Le Cerf, 1979), 18-137. I follow mainly the the translation attested in St. Irenaeus of Lyons 
Against Heresies (Ancient Christian Writers; Translated and annotated by Dominic J. Unger with 
further revisions by John J. Dillon; Volume 1. Book 1; New York: Paulist Press), 1992. The Greek text 
and the translation of the Excerpta ex Theodoto is based on the edition of Robert Casey (ed.), The 
Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (London: Christophers, 1935). The Greek text of 
Philo’s works is based on The Works of Philo. Greek Text with morphology. Peder Borgen, Kåre 
Fuglseth, Roald Skarsten. Logos Research Systems, Inc. 2005. Translations of Philo’s texts come from 
Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes), vols. I-X and Supplements I & II. Loeb 
Classical Library. F. H. Colson & G. H. Whitaker. London: William Heinemann Ltd & Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959-1969, unless otherwise stated. The Greek text of the Bible is 
based on Novum Testamentum Graece (Nestle-Aland; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft) 2006 and 
Septuaginta (Edited by Alfred Rahlfs; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgeschellsaft), 2006. The separate 
Biblical references, if not included in citations, are from the Revised Standard Version (The British & 
Foreign Bible Society; Glasgow: HarperCollins), 1967. The citations from Nag Hammadi Scriptures are 
from The Nag Hammadi Scriptures (Edited by Marvin Meyer; New York: HarperCollins), 2007, unless 
otherwise mentioned.  
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Valentinian belief system and protological myth in its entirety. In addition, 
the Valentinian blocks in the Gospel of Philip provide interesting elements in 
comparison with Philo’s works especially concerning the basis for the 
allegorical method. 
2.1 The Valentinian source in Exc. Theod. 43.2-65 
The basis for the comparison with Philo in this study is “section C” (chapters 
43.2-65) in the Excerpts from Theodotus by Clement of Alexandria, which is 
a part of the unfinished book VIII of the Stromateis.66 The closest exegetical 
parallels with Philo can be detected in this Valentinian source. The tentative 
list of the parallels are as follows: 
 
- the association of biblical Wisdom with pre-cosmic matter 
- the creation of light in Gen. 1:3 as an essence of the lights of the 
heavenly bodies 
- the creation of Adam in Gen. 2:7 as a description of the earthly mind  
- the use of “metaphysics of prepositions” in the description of the 
descendants of Adam 
- the allegories of Cain, Abel and Seth and the division of humankind 
- the allegory of Israel as a spiritual human being who sees God 
 
There are apparent similarities between Clement’s Exc. Theod. 43.2-65 and 
Irenaeus’s Valentinian account in Adversus Haereses 1.1-7. It is commonly 
assumed that both accounts represent the so-called Italian school tradition of 
Valentinianism. Although there are evident similarities between Clement’s 
and Irenaeus’s accounts, there are also some remarkable differences, which 
are not commonly noticed. I will next present a thorough source critical 
investigation of these texts, which forms the basis for the comparison with 
Philo’s writings. 
2.1.1 General remarks  
The unfinished book VIII of Clement’s Stromateis contains two collections of 
fragmentary excerpts. The title of the first fragmentary section is ΕΚ ΤΩΝ 
ΘΕΟΔΟΤΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΗΣ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ ΚΑΤΑ 
ΤΟΥΣ ΟΥΑΛΕΝΤΙΝΟΥ ΧΡΟΝΟΥΣ ΕΠΙΤΟΜΑΙ (“Excerpts from the works of 
Theodotus and the so-called oriental teachings, contemporary with 
                                                 
66 Sagnard divides Clement’s account into four parts. Section A contains chapters 1-28, B chapters 
29-42, C chapters 43-65 and D chapters 66-86. Francois Sagnard, Clément D´Alexandrie Extraits De 
Théodote. Texte Grec, Introduction, Traduction et Notes, Paris Éditions Du Cerf, 1948, 28-29. 
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Valentinus”).67  The title of the book indicates that Clement is presenting 
Valentinian teachings that came from the east, i.e. from Syria or Palestine. If 
the chronological information attested in the title is correct, it would mean 
that the teachings presented in the book belong to an early eastern phase of 
the Valentinian tradition during the lifetime of Valentinus (up until ca. 150-
160 CE). Even though the chronology of Clement’s writings has been a 
subject of controversy, the consensus is that parts VI-VII of the Stromateis 
together with the unfinished book VIII were written after his departure from 
Alexandria at the beginning of the 3rd century, possibly in Jerusalem.68  
Clement’s excerpts contain a loose collection of teachings that are picked 
up from various sources.69 Despite the apparent literal discontinuity of the 
book, there is, however, a block of Valentinian teaching that forms a distinct 
unit compared with the other parts of the text. The reader can quite easily 
observe that the so-called section C in Exc. Theod. 43.2-65 stands out from 
the other parts of Clement’s work regarding literary style and content. The 
main differences compared to the other parts of Clement’s account are: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Book VIII of the Stromateis (the name of the book comes from the full title at the end of the 
books I, III, V and VI κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνηάτων Στρωματεύς) consists of an 
unfinished beginning, which investigates logical analysis based on Plato and Aristotle. The beginning of 
the book is followed by two sections. The title of the first is “Excerpts from Theodotus…” and the 
second is named Eclogae propheticae, which presents Clement as a biblical commentator, who sees a 
prophetic trend running through the Scriptures. There has been some doubt concerning the 
authenticity of book VIII because it lacks a title and the name of the author (ΚΛΗΜΕΝΤΟΣ 
ΣΤΡΩΜΑΤΕΩΝ). Also, the Byzantine patriarch Photios has seen the manuscript of the Stromateis in 
which the book VIII was missing. Christoph Markschies has proposed that whether Clement was truly 
the author of the present text should be examined once again. See Christoph Markschies “Valentinian 
Gnosticism: Toward Anatomy of the School,” in The Nag Hammadi Library After Fifty Years (ed. J. 
Turner & Anne McGuire; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 401-438. It is noteworthy that the name of the author 
does not appear in book VI or VII which evidently bear all the marks of Clement as their author. The 
consensus is, however, that the author of book VIII is Clement, although the material used in the 
fragmentary section comes from various sources. It is also possible that some part of the fragments 
have been included in the unfinished book later by the some redactor of Clement’s writings. See John 
Ferguson, Clement of Alexandria (New York: Twayne Publisher, 1974), 154-161; Ibid, Clement of 
Alexandria Stromateis: Books One to Three (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1991), 3-16. 
68 Runia’s chronology of Clement’s works is based on A. Méhat, Études sur les ’Stromates’ de 
Clement d’Alexandrie (Patristica Sorbonensia 7; Paris, 1966), 42-54. See Runia, Philo in Early 
Christian Literature, 144 and Ferguson, Clement of Alexandria, 106-108.  
69 For the sources of Clement’s excerpts see Casey, The Excerpta ex Theodoto, 5-16. 
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1. The group names “hylics” (ὑλικοί), “psychics”(ψυχικοί) and 
“pneumatics” (πνευματικοί) are only used in section 43.2-65, 
whereas the group designation “the called”(ἡ κλῆσις), “the 
elect” (ἡ ἐκλογή), “dispersed seed” (τὸ διαφέρον σπέρμα) and  
the speculation concerning the “name” (τὸ ὄνομα), are used 
only in other part of the excerpts.   
2. The incoherent and fragmentary structure of Excerpta ex 
Theodoto changes in 43.2-65 to a coherent narrative 
proceeding logically from protology and cosmology to the 
anthropological, soteriological and eschatological dimensions 
of Valentinian myth.   
3. Section 43.2-65 does not contain any of Clement’s critical 
comments or citation formulas such as “Theodotus says” (ὥς 
φησιν ὁ θεόδοτος), “he says” (φησί) “they say” (φασί),  
“according to the Valentinians” (κατὰ τοὺς Οὐαλεντινιανούς), 
“the Valentinians say” (οἱ  Οὐαλεντινιανοί λέγουσιν), “followers 
of Valentinus say” (οἱ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου λέγουσιν), which 
frequently appear  in other parts of the text before and after 
this section  
 
It is also noticeable that the section 43.2-65 interrupts the discussion 
concerning the incarnation of the dispersed seed in 41.1-4 that is continued 
in 66 by an allegorical interpretation of the words of Jesus in the Gospel of 
Egyptians concerning the birth of the previously reckoned seed.  The reader 
could thus easily jump straight from chapter 41 to 66 without perusing the 
section 43.2-65, which interrupts not only the thematic coherence of the 
excerpts but also the literal “disunity” of the text. If section 43.2-65 is left out 
from Clement’s book, it makes more sense to see it as a private “notebook,” 
where Clement discusses and comments on the teachings of Theodotus and 
other Valentinian groups and presents his own teachings.70 
                                                 
70 Notebooks were common phenomena in Antiquity. Plutarch and Galen composed memorandum 
(τὰ ὑπομνήματα) and Pliny the Younger described how his uncle Pliny the Elder made notes and 
excerpts from books that were read aloud to him. The purpose of a notebook could be different. Private 
notebooks were made by authors before composing the final version of the book. Notes may serve as 
memory aids for lectures or rituals or magical practices. On some occasions, a notebook may contain a 
description (ἀπὸ φωνῆς), which means that the notes were made according to auditory teaching. There 
were also “well-edited” notebooks which were used for pedagogical instruction or philosophical 
contemplation. Clement’s Stromateis can be regarded as a “well-edited” notebook, which collects 
material from various sources. The term τὰ ὑπομνήματα (“memorials”) appears in the full title of the 
books in the Stromateis: κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνηάτων Στρωματεύς. Cf. Annewies 
van den Hoek, “Techniques of Quotation in Clement of Alexandria. A View of Ancient Literary Working 
Methods,” in VC 50 (1996), 238, note 18. The Gospel of Philip in the Nag Hammadi Library can also be 
defined as a notebook which may have been used in ritual practices. See Martha Turner, The Gospel of 
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It seems that section 43.2-65 forms an independent Valentinian block in 
the middle of Clement’s notes. It is also highly plausible to suggest that the 
section in Exc. Theod 43.2-65 is not Clement’s own description of the 
Valentinian system, but represents an extant copy of the primary source 
text itself. I assume that Clement’s book existed originally without section 
43.2-65, which was later included in the unfinished book VIII of the 
Stromateis. Whether it was Clement who may have later included this 
independent block in its present stage or some later redactor of Clement’s 
unfinished book VIII, we do not know for sure. In my opinion, the latter 
option is more probable because it is hard to find any reason for the inclusion 
of section 43.2-65 by Clement himself. I will refer in this study to this 
particular section of Clement’s Excerpta ex Theodoto as Exc. C.  
2.1.2 The relation between Exc. C and Iren. Haer. 1.1-7 
Irenaeus’s great account in Iren. Haer. 1.1-7 has been put together from 
various Valentinian sources.71 He says at the beginning of his work that he 
“came across the commentaries of, as they claim, the disciples of Valentinus.” 
Irenaeus calls these people “the disciples of Ptolemy, an offshoot of the 
Valentinian School.”72 Irenaeus may have also used earlier heresiological 
works, especially Justin’s Syntagma, which is now lost.73 The parallels 
between Iren. Haer. 1.1-7 and Exc. C vary from the exact word-to-word 
similarities to more general parallel ideas concerning Valentinian myth.  It is 
noticeable that Irenaeus’s account follows the same thematic and 
chronological logical sequence as Exc. C.  
The Valentinian account in Exc. C begins in interrupted fashion by 
describing the generation of the Savior as an “angel of the Pleroma” and his 
descent to suffering Sophia.74 It is reasonable to suggest, however, that Exc. C 
originally contained some protological narrative, although we cannot say for 
sure whether it was similar to the one presented by Irenaeus in Iren. Haer. 
1.1.1-3.75 However, we do not have decisive evidence to suggest that the 
                                                                                                                                          
Philip. The Sources & Coherence of an Early Christian Collection (Nag Hammadi and Manichean 
Studies 38; Leiden: Brill, 1996).  
71 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 197-201. 
72 Iren. Haer. 1. praef. 
73 The use of preceding hereriological sources can be assumed in Iren. Haer. 1.11-12, 23-27. Cf.  
Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 19. 
74 In Casey’s division section C begins already in Exc. Theod. 42. The quotation formula φησί 
appears, however, in Exc. Theod. 43.1, which means that it may belong to teaching that goes back to 
Theodotus. Cf. Casey, The Excerpta ex Theodoto, 22-25. I follow Sagnard, who makes the division line 
of section C in Exc. Theod. at 43.2. Cf. Sagnard, Clément D´Alexandrie Extraits De Théodote, 30-31. 
75 In Clement’s account, the realm of Sophia is called the Ogdoad, which is the fundamental 
protological term in the protological account in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3 and other Valentinian sources as 
well. It is mentioned in Exc. Theod. 63.1 that faithful souls will ascend to the mediate place called 
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protological account in Exc. C would have been remarkably different from 
the one attested in Irenaeus’s account. Although the accounts in Exc. C and 
Irenaeus contain many parallel themes and interpretations, there are also 
some crucial differences. These discrepancies can be listed as follows: 
 
i) Sophia is not called “Achamoth” in Exc. C as it is in Irenaeus’s 
account (Iren. Haer. 1.4.1). Both versions seem to represent, 
however, a system with “two Sophias.”76 
ii) Exc. C does not mention the psychic essence as an outcome of 
Sophia’s conversion. Although Exc. C mentions the psychic essence 
(e.g. in Exc.Theod. 47.3), there is no explanation of its pre-cosmic 
origin as there is in Irenaeus (Iren. Haer. 1.4.1). 
iii) In Exc. C the Demiurge was created by Sophia as an image of the 
Father of All (Exc. Theod. 47.2-3), but Irenaeus maintains that the 
Demiurge was an image of the Only-Begotten Son (Iren. Haer. 
1.5.1). 
iv) In Irenaeus’s account, the seeds of Sophia are created as images of 
the angels of the Savior (Iren. Haer. 1.4.5). In Exc. C the angels are 
mediators of the seeds, but not their archetypes (Exc. Theod. 53.3). 
                                                                                                                                          
Ogdoad before entering with Sophia and accompanying angels into the Pleroma. This indicates that the 
author of Exc. C was familiar with the same kind of protological terminology as is asttested in Iren. 
Haer. 1.1-3. 
76 It is commonly noticed that there are two versions of the Sophia myth in Irenaeus’s book, which 
are called version A (Iren. Haer. 1.2.2) and version B (Iren. Haer. 1.2.3). Version B is also described by 
Hippolytus (Hipp. Ref. 30.6-9). The main difference between these versions concerns the reason for 
Sophia’s pernicious action. In version A Sophia wanted to comprehend the greatness of the Father, 
whereas in version B Sophia tried to imitate the Father by creating something of her own. The 
difference between these versions is also related to another question, whether the Father of All 
produces the aeons together with his female consort, or whether he is solitary and produces Pleroma by 
himself. Also, the outcome of Sophia’s action is different: in version A, it is the personified “intention” 
of Sophia who was expelled from Pleroma and transformed into the lower Sophia figure called 
Achamoth, whereas in version B it is the formless offspring of Sophia who was cast out from the divine 
realm. The Valentinian myths of Sophia can also be divided into two groups on the ground of the 
destiny of Sophia herself. There are systems which consist of one Sophia and systems with two Sophia 
figures. In the former systems, it is Sophia herself who is excluded from the Pleroma and who produces 
her Son, i.e. Christ, there. Eventually, the Son of Sophia abandons his mother and ascends to the 
Pleroma as an adopted Son of the aeons. This view is attested in Tri.Trac., Val.Ex., Exc. Theod. 32.3-
33.2, and Iren. Haer. 1.11.1. In the latter version with two Sophias, it is the amorphous offspring of 
Sophia or her Intention which are expelled from the Pleroma, not Sophia herself. This means that 
Sophia is split into higher and lower Sophias, which is described in Iren. Haer. 1.2.2; Hipp. Ref. 30.6-9; 
Exc. Theod. 43.2-65. We can conclude, thus, that versions A and B described above are subcategories of 
the system with two Sophias. Cf. Stead, “The Valentinian Myth”, 77-78, 84-85; Thomassen, The 
Spiritual Seed, 248-261; Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 98-99. 
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v) The spiritual seed is inserted in Irenaeus’s account into Adam’s 
soul through the instrumentality of the Demiurge (Iren. Haer. 
1.5.6), whereas in Exc. C the seed is inserted directly into Adam’s 
soul by Sophia (Exc. Theod. 53.2).  
vi) Irenaeus’s account lacks all the proof texts taken from Gen. 1:1-3 
that are mentioned in Exc. C (Exc. Theod. 47.1-48.1) 
vii) Sophia is not identified with biblical Wisdom in Irenaeus’s account 
as it is in Exc. C (Exc. Theod. 47.1) 
 
The most reasonable explanation for these discrepancies is that Irenaeus was 
dependent on the reworked version of Exc. C.77 It seems, however, that at 
least in some cases the modifications to the source material were made by 
Irenaeus himself. He detached some passages from their logical context. For 
example, the teachings concerning the incarnation and the suffering of the 
Savior were inserted into the polemical discussion in Iren. Haer. 1.1.6, which 
contains material from different sources.  Also, the idea of the threefold 
division of humanity represented by Cain, Abel and Seth is not handled in the 
anthropological context, as it is in Exc. C, but at the end of the account Iren. 
Haer. 1.7.5. It is not credible that any Valentinian author would have 
reworked the source material by deleting all biblical proof texts which were 
related to the allegory of Gen. 1:1-3 in Exc. C.78 The most credible solution is 
that it was Irenaeus himself who omitted these biblical references to combine 
these teachings with material from other sources.  
There are, however, some elements in Irenaeus’s account, which indicate 
that Exc. C was elaborated before Irenaeus got to know of it. The reworking 
of the source becomes evident in the comparison between Exc. Theod. 46.1-2 
and Iren. Haer. 1.4.5, which describe the separation of the emotions of 
Sophia and the creation of pre-cosmic matter by the Savior. The parallel 
terms in these accounts are in bold, and the thesis concerning the origin of 
the psychic essence that is missing in Exc. C is marked in grey. 
 
 
                                                 
77 Einar Thomassen has pointed out that the apparent differences between these documents 
indicate that they are more likely to be based on two independent re-workings of the same Valentinian 
source, rather than a common source. See Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 62, 258. I agree with 
Thomassen, but I consider Clement’s account in Exc. Theod. 43.2-65 to be an exact copy of the source 
text which was reworked by the disciples of Ptolemy.  
78 If we assume that Exc. Theod. 43.2-65 was actually Clement’s own description of the Valentinian 
system, it would be unlikely that Clement would have been dependent on Irenaeus’s account. It is not 
reasonable to suggest that Clement would have borrowed the description of the Valentinian myth from 
Irenaeus’s account and invented all the scriptural proof texts, which are lacking in Irenaeus’s account.   
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Exc. Theod. 46.1-2 
 
Πρῶτον οὖν ἐξ ἀσωμάτου πάθους καὶ 
συμβεβηκότος εἰς ἀσώματον ἔτι τὴν 
ὕλην αὐτὰ μετήντλησεν καὶ 
μετέβαλεν· εἶθ’ οὕτως εἰς 
συγκρίματα καὶ σώματα· ἀθρόως γὰρ 
οὐσίαν ποιῆσαι τὰ πάθη οὐκ ἐνῆν· καὶ 
τοῖς σώμασι κατὰ φύσιν 
ἐπιτηδειότητα ἐνεποίησεν. Πρῶτος 
μὲν οὖν Δημιουργὸς ὁ Σωτὴρ γίνεται 
καθολικός.  
 
 
Iren. Haer. 1.4.5 
 
ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίναντα χωρὶς συγχέαι καὶ 
πῆξαι, καὶ ἐξ ἀσωμάτου πάθους εἰς 
ἀσώματον τὴν ὕλην μεταβαλεῖν αὐτά· 
εἶθ’ οὕτως ἐπιτηδειότητα καὶ φύσιν 
ἐμπεποιηκέναι αὐτοῖς, ὥστε εἰς 
συγκρίματα καὶ σώματα ἐλθεῖν, πρὸς τὸ 
γενέσθαι δύο οὐσίας, τὴν φαύλην τῶν 
παθῶν, τήν τε τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς ἐμπαθῆ· 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμει τὸν Σωτῆρα 
δεδημιουργηκέναι φάσκουσι.  
Although there are some minor terminological differences between these 
passages, the main teaching is the same: the Savior healed the emotions of 
Sophia by transforming them into unstructured matter. The common terms 
and the structure of the passage are close enough to argue that Irenaeus’s 
sources were dependent on the teaching attested in Exc. C. Irenaeus’s 
account contains, however, the theory concerning the origin of the psychic 
essence that is based on Sophia’s will to turn back (ἐπιστροφῆς ἐμπαθῆ), 
which is lacking in Exc. C. It is not credible that Irenaeus would have 
invented the theory of the origin of the psychic essence, which he integrated 
into the text as part of the description of the Valentinian source. It is 
noticeable that the theory of the origin of the psychic essences is also attested 
in Iren. Haer. 1.4.1 and 1.5.1. The “two essences” and the separation of the 
psychic essence of the hylic matter is also mentioned in Exc. C (cf. Exc. 
Theod. 47.1-3). However, the psychic essence is not associated with Sophia’s 
will to turn back but it is simply presupposed as a luminous essence out of 
which the essences of the angels and the heavenly lights were made. The 
most probable explanation is that the theory of the origin of psychic essence 
was already in the source material, which was used by Irenaeus in Iren. 
Haer. 1.4.5.  
2.2 Conclusions 
The analysis of Exc. Theod. 43.2-65 (= Exc. C) suggests that it forms a 
distinct unit in Clement’s Excerpta ex Theodoto. This block of Valentinian 
teaching does not contain any of Clement’s source critical markers or his 
comments on Valentinian teaching. We have good reason to believe that Exc. 
C is not Clement’s description of the Valentinian myth, but it is the exact 
copy of the primary source itself. I suggest that it was some later redactor of 
Clement's unfinished book VIII of the Stromateis who included the text in 
the middle of Clement’s fragments from Theodotus. It is then, the oldest 
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surviving exposition of Valentinian myth and it must predate the account of 
Irenaeus in Iren. Haer. 1.1-7, because Irenaeus evidently knew a somewhat 
elaborated version of it, which was made by the disciples of Ptolemy in 
Rome.  
Although the title of the Excerpta ex Theodoto refers to the eastern origin 
of the source material, it is likely that Exc. C goes back to the Valentinian 
traditions of Alexandria. The other material in Clement’s excerpts may go 
back to the eastern traditions which Clement got to know during his stay in 
Palestine or Syria where he may have met Theodotus and some other 
Valentinian teachers. We do not have enough information to confirm the 
author of Exc. C. The fact that the disciples of Ptolemy preserved and 
elaborated teachings attested in Exc. C indicates that the best candidate 
would be Ptolemy himself. Although Hippolytus locates Ptolemy in Rome, it 
is possible that he came to Rome from Alexandria where he got to know 
Philo’s allegorical teachings. 
In the following chapter, I will show that there are also some other 
remarkable parallels with Philo which go back to Ptolemy. Ptolemy’s Letter 
to Flora contains teachings concerning the division of Mosaic Law and 
allegorical interpretations of the cultic commandments that are parallel with 
Philo. Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 (par. Exc. Theod. 6-7) includes Ptolemys’ protological 
commentary on the prologue of the Gospel of John, which contains many 
themes and hermeneutical patterns, which are attested in Philo’s protological 
accounts. We can conclude, thus, that the Valentinian texts that contain the 
closest parallels with Philo go back in one way or another to Ptolemy or his 
disciples. I suggest that particularly these Valentinian teachers were 
interested in the allegorical interpretations of Genesis and Neo-Pythagorean 
transcendental monism, which go back to the traditions of the Hellenistic 
Judaism of Alexandria and the exegetical traditions attested in the writings 
of Philo of Alexandria. 
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3 THE FOUNDATIONS OF ALLEGORICAL 
INTERPRETATION IN PHILO AND AMONG THE 
VALENTINIANS  
In this chapter, I will locate the formation of the school of Valentinus in its 
religious-historical context in the aftermath of the Jewish revolt in 115-117 CE 
in Alexandria. According to patristic information, Valentinus was influential 
in Alexandria in mid-second-century Alexandria where he founded a school 
of his own. Irenaeus reports that Valentinus adopted the principles of his 
teaching from the so-called Gnostic school of thought (γνωστική αἵρησις).79  
He complained that the Gnostics (γνωστικοί) “sprung up out of the ground 
like mushrooms” and their teachings deviated from from the rule of faith of 
the apostolic church.80 I will show in the following chapters that the 
Valentinian teachers reformed and refined the preceding Gnostic traditions 
in the light of Hellenistic Jewish allegories attested in the works of Philo. The 
Valentinian allegorical interpretation differed from the Gnostic mythopoiesis 
in that it was based more closely on biblical texts, which were given a 
philosophically articulated meaning. The Gnostic myth was instead 
“constructed with an attitude of absolute sovereignty over the biblical text, to 
the point of explicitly refuting it.”81 Philo and the Valentinian teachers were 
also proponents of multiple exegesis, which means that the text in question 
may have different levels of interpretation depending on the audience. In an 
initial stage, the communities of Valentinian teachers can be equated with 
the schools of popular philosophers, although later the Valentinian tradition 
became more like a church-movement. 
3.1 The Jewish revolt in Egypt and its implications for 
the Jewish and Christian traditions of Alexandria  
The political, social, and economic structure of first-century Egypt differed 
from all other regions of the Greco-Roman world. While Alexandria, the 
major city, was the leading cultural center and the second-largest city of the 
Roman Empire, the rest of the country was mostly rural. The contrast 
between Alexandria and the Egyptian hinterland was sharpened by 
differences in language and education. The Greek-speaking population, 
including the Jewish politeuma, was centered in Alexandria, but the native 
population of the rural areas spoke several Egyptian dialects and was mostly 
                                                 
79 Iren. Haer. 1.11.1 
80 Iren. Haer. 1.10.1-3; 1.29.1. 
81 Pearson, “Philo and Gnosticism,” 338. 
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illiterate.82 First-century Alexandria provided an urban setting for the revival 
of Neo-Pythagoreanism and the formation of various Middle Platonic 
traditions. The writings of Philo indicate that these philosophical traditions 
shaped the intellectual milieu of Alexandrian Judaism and the mindset of 
Philo himself. However, Philo’s Against Flaccus and The Legation to Gaius 
inform us also about long-standing tensions among the Jewish and Greek 
population of Alexandria and the harsh anti-semitic attitudes of Roman 
authorites in the first decades of the Common Era.83 It is notable that 
although Philo could interpret the Mosaic Law and the worship in the 
Temple of Jerusalem allegorically as denoting the spiritual ascent of the soul, 
he did not reject the idea of a political Israel as the best commonwealth for all 
humankind.84 Philo taught the ultimate redemption of the Jewish people and 
the restoration of all humankind, although it was not based on the military 
might of the Messiah but on three supreme virtues of God’s holy ones, 
namely dignity, serenity, and benevolence.85 Although these elements of the 
Jewish faith were seen as suspicious, they caused admiration and curiosity as 
well. It is likely that some of Philo’s texts were directed to the non-Jews who 
were interested in the Jewish way of life and who had taken “a journey to a 
better home, from idle fables to the clear vision of truth.”86  
It is commonly suggested that the traditions of early Christianity were 
brought to Egypt by the Jewish missionaries from Jerusalem when 
persecution caused the dispersion of the Greek-speaking Jews. It is stated in 
Acts 11 that some of them travelled to Phoenicia, Cyprus and Antioch 
spreading the gospel among the Jews and Greek-speaking Gentiles. In 
Alexandria these early Christian communities were not organized as a 
distinct community, but were assimilated with the Jewish politeuma of 
Alexandria up until the Jewish revolt in 115 CE.87 The Apollos episode in Acts 
                                                 
82 Helmut Koester, Introduction to the New Testament. Vol. 2. History and Literature of Early 
Christianity (New York; Walter De Gruyter, 2000), 225-228. 
83 For the historical background of the pogroms against Jews in Alexandria cf. Pieter Willem van 
der Horst, Philo's Flaccus: The First Pogrom (Translation and commentary by Pieter Willem van der 
Horst; Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, V. 2; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 18-
37.  
84 Wolfson, Philo II, 374-395. 
85 Praem. 163-172. Cf. Winston, Logos, 55-58. Pearson suggests that although Philo’s works 
contain end-time exceptations (Virt. 75; Mos. 2.44, Opif. 79-81), he was clearly a proponent of 
“realized eschatology.” Cf. Pearson, Gnosticism and Christianity, 82-87.  
86 Spec. 1. 49. Cf. Wolfson, Philo II, 352-364. 
87 Birger Pearson, “Pre-Valentinian Gnosticism in Alexandria,” in The Future of Early 
Christianity: Essays in Honor of Helmut Koester (ed. by Birger Pearson; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1991), 455-466; Birger Pearson, “Earliest Christianity in Egypt. Further Observations,” in The World of 
Early Egyptian Christianity. Language, Literature, and Social Context. Essays in Honor of David W. 
Johnson (ed. by James E. Goehring and Janet A. Timbie; Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2007), 97-107. 
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presents some evidence that the earliest Christianity in Alexandria was not 
perfectly compatible with the Pauline mission. Apollos, who was educated in 
his hometown in Alexandria, only knew initially about the way of the Lord 
and the baptism of John, being taught the way of the Lord more fully in 
Ephesus by the Pauline missionaries.88 Although the historical reliability of 
this information is not certain, it seems that the author of the Acts was aware 
that the Pauline mission in Syria and Asia Minor was not perfectly 
compatible with the earlier Christian traditions in Alexandria. Eusebius 
reports that the ascetic community of the Therapeutae mentioned by Philo 
consisted of proto-orthodox Christian monks converted by Apostle Mark. 
Although this information is evidently not authentic, it may contain some 
information about the earliest Christian communities in Alexandria, who 
lived a contemplative life in a similar way as the Jewish philosophers 
mentioned by Philo in De Vita Contemplativa.89 In the beginning of the 
second century, the teachings of Paul were combined in Alexandria with 
Platonizing Judaism and Middle Platonic metaphysics in a way which paved 
way for the predominantly Gnostic Christianity. 
The destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem during the first Jewish war 
(66-73 CE) sharpened the anti-Roman attitudes among the Jews in the 
Diaspora which is documented in many apocalyptic and prophetic texts 
during that time. The Jews updated the Sibylline Oracles to serve anti-
Roman propaganda in the Diaspora. The Fifth Sibylline book (lines 414-27) 
refers in its Danielic oracle to the blessed man from the skies who will burn 
up the cities of the enemy and rebuild the Temple.90 Thus, the first Jewish 
war formed the religious and political background for the Jewish rebellion in 
Egypt in 115-117 CE, which had a remarkable effect on the social and religious 
milieu of Alexandria. Eusebius informs that at first the turbulence was 
separatist strife (stasis) between Jews and Greek neighbours, but in the next 
year stasis escalated into war (polemos).91 The focus in this study is not so 
                                                 
88 C. W. Griggs, Early Egyptian Christianity: From its Origins to 451 CE (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 16-
17. The Codex Bezae (D) adds to the manuscript the words “he has been instructed in his hometown” 
(κατηχημένος ἐν τῇ πατρίδι). 
89 Eusebius Ecc. Hist. 2.16, 24; 3.14, 21; 5.9. See Robert Grant, “Theological Education in 
Alexandria,” in The Roots of Egyptian Christianity (ed. B. A. Pearson and J. E. Goehring; Studies in 
Antiquity and Christianity; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 180. It is possible that some of the 
literary traditions of the non-Pauline communities were preserved in such documents as the Gospel of 
the Hebrews, the Gospel of the Egyptians, and the Gospel of Thomas. Cf. Koester, Introduction, 228-
229; Griggs, Early Egyptian Christianity, 29-32. 
90 William Horbury, Jewish War under Trajan and Hadrian (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 270-273; Koester, Introduction I, 253-254. 
91 The events of the Jewish revolt in Egypt are documented in the various sources. The most 
extensive report is attested by the church historian Eusebius of Caesarea (Ecc. Hist. 4:2.1-2), but also, 
Dio Cassius (Roman History, Epitome of Book 68:32.1-2) and Appian of Alexandria (Civil Wars 2: 
90.380 and Frg. 19) preserved some descriptions of the revolt. For descriptions of the revolt cf. Josef 
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much on the background of the revolt in Egypt but its implications to the 
religious and social conditions of Alexandria. During the revolt, the Jewish 
community of Alexandria was practically destroyed, and it was only towards 
the end of the 3rd century when the Jewish community began to recover.92 
The devastation of the city itself was also extremely great.  Several papyri 
inform that Hadrian had to launch a rebuilding program and reconstruct 
Alexandria “demolished by the Jews.”93 Josef Modrzejevski summarizes the 
effects of the revolt upon the Egyptian Jewry as follows:94  
Under these conditions, the Jewish community in Egypt had 
practically no chance of recovery. The rare survivors, stunned by the 
harsh verdict of imperial justice, had become totally impoverished. 
Deprived of their homes and their lands, they could no longer form a 
nucleus for a possible reconstruction. The accounts of Roman 
provincial administration in Egypt throw a cold light on the tragic 
balance sheet of the revolt. In Alexandria and all the rest of the 
country, the days of Hellenized Jewry had come to an end.  
 
After the revolt the traditions of Hellenistic Judaism continued within the 
Gentile Christian communities of Alexandria.95 The preservation and use of 
Philo’s writings by the second-century Christian teachers of Alexandria 
indicate that the relationship between the Christian communities and 
                                                                                                                                          
Modrzejevski, The Jews of Egypt from Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995), 207-225, Viktor Tcherikover, “The Decline of the Jewish Diaspora in Egypt in the Roman 
Period”, JJS 14 (1963), 1-32; Peder Borgen, “Judaism in Egypt,” in Early Christianity and Hellenistic 
Judaism (ed. Peder Borgen; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 93-94 and Carl B. Smith, No Longer Jews: 
The Search for Gnostic Origins (Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 72-112; Horbury, 
Jewish War, 209-222. 
92 Christopher Haas, Alexandria in Late Antiquity. Topography and Social Conflict (Baltimore 
and London: 1997), 99-109. It is possible that a small amount of Jews were able to remain in the city. 
Cf. Horbury, Jewish War, 228, 233-234. 
93 Hadrian’s rebuilding program is attested in several papyri (P.Oxy. 7.1045; BGU 1084; SB 7239, 
7561) and in the Syriac Notitia Urbis Alexandrinae. There is also an inscription found in one of the 
bathhouses of Cyrene commemorates how the city was rebuilt after the tumulto Iudaico. It is possible 
that a quarter in Alexandria which was built after the revolt around a temple dedicated to an imperial 
cult (an inscription dated to 170 CE) can be located in the same place in northeast Alexandria where 
the Jews were supposed to live before the revolt.  See Haas, Alexandria in Late Antiquity, 407-408, 
note 32; Alon Gedaliah, The Jews in Their Land in the Talmudic Age: 70-640 C.E (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 382-404. 
94 Modrzejevski, The Jews of Egypt, 222. Many papyri inform us that the land and property owned 
by the Jews were confiscated according to the Roman law of confiscatio bonurum. See, Modrzejevski, 
The Jews of Egypt, 214-222. 
95 Roeloef van den Broek, “Juden und Christen in Alexandrien im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert,” in Juden 
und Christen in der Antike (ed. Kampen J. van Amersfoort and J. van Oort; 1990), 108-111; King, The 
Secret Revelation, 9-17.  
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Alexandrian Jewry must have been close even before the revolt. The 
repression of Alexandrian Jewry formed an arena for the innovative early 
Christian intellectuals.96 These first Gnostics were educated and innovative 
Christian Platonists, who learned the skill of theologizing and allegorizing 
from the Jewish Platonists of Alexandria. 
It is an oversimplification, however, to suppose that the development of 
Early Christianity in Alexandria would have been solely Gnostic in 
character.97 The Epistle of Barnabas, which can be located in second century 
Alexandria, continued the Jewish apocalyptic tendencies and reflects the 
existence of other Christian groups, not only Platonizing Gnostics, but 
ascetically-orientated Christians as well. Although the Barnabas’s letter 
contains harsh anti-Jewish polemic, its author had a thorough acquaintance 
with Hellenistic Jewish exegetical traditions.98 Thus, the Christianity in 
Alexandrian was not purely “gnostic” but there existed all the varieties of 
Jewish and Jewish Christian traditions and they were continued among the 
Gentile Christian communities of Alexandria.99  
It is true, however, that Gnostic Christians dominated the intellectual life 
in Alexandria after the revolt in 115-117 CE. The Gnostic traditions spread 
from Alexandria also to other regions of the Empire, which led to harsh 
attack from the prominent teachers of nascent orthodoxy. Irenaeus wrote his 
multivolume book attacking Gnostic heresies, but the main target of his 
criticism was the school of Valentinus. Irenaeus’s book also circulated in 
Alexandria, which implies that the “heresy-hunting” of the nascent orthodoxy 
was not restricted merely to Rome, but spread to Alexandria as well.100 At the 
end of the second century, the Catechetical School was founded in 
Alexandria, and Demetrius was nominated Bishop of Alexandria which 
                                                 
96 For the relation of the Jewish revolt to the origin of Gnosticism see Smith, No Longer Jews, 244-
252. Smith argues that Judaism, Christianity and Platonism were all needed – in that order - for the 
generation of Gnosticism. Smith derived the origin of Gnosticism from Judaism. The crucial point for 
the birth of Gnosticism was the disappointment of the Jews after their Messianic expectations failed.. 
In my opinion, it is not reasonable to suggest that the disappointment of the Jews would have been the 
“big bang” of Gnostic thought. The first Gnostics were educated Christian Platonists, who learned the 
skill of theology from the Hellenistic Jewish Platonists.  
97 It has been assumed since Walter Bauer’s study that the earliest Christianity in Egypt was 
“gnostic” in character and it was formed in opposition to the nascent orthodoxy. Cf. Walter Bauer, 
Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity (transl. and ed. by R. A. Kraft and G. Krodel; 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 44-60. 
98 Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, 90-93. See also Koester, Introduction, 280-282. 
99 Pearson, “Earliest Christianity in Egypt,” 120-121. 
100 Papyrus P.Oxy.405 (dated around about 200 CE in Egypt) contains a part of the Greek text of 
Irenaeus’s Adversus Haereses. C. H. Roberts considers it to be “evidence of the immediate circulation 
of Irenaeus’s attack on Gnosticism among the Egyptian churches and yet another witness to the close 
relationship subsisting between the Church of Alexandria and the West.”  See C. H. Roberts, “Early 
Christianity in Egypt: Three Notes,” JEA 40 (1954), 94; Griggs, Early Egyptian Christianity, 33. 
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caused the foundation of a more centralized chuch organization in Egypt and 
the suppression of the preceding Gnostic school traditions. 
3.2 The founding of the School of Valentinus 
Valentinus may have been born about 100-110 CE. His birthplace is based on 
the “rumors” heard by Epiphanius according to which Valentinus was born in 
the Egyptian Delta, at Phrebonis. Valentinus received a Greek education in 
the metropolis of Alexandria (Epiph. Pan. 31.2:2-3), where he may also have 
converted to Christianity. Clement of Alexandria tells us that Valentinus was 
a pupil of a Christian teacher called Theudas, who had himself been the 
disciple of Paul (Strom. VII. 106:4). Although we the historicity of Theudas is 
questionable, he may have come to Alexandria from Corinth, where he 
became familiar with the Pauline Christianity through Apollos or perhaps 
Paul himself. In the Valentinian sources, the Apostle Paul represents a sort of 
super-sage similar to Moses in Philo’s writings: Paul is simply called “the 
Apostle,” or “the Apostle of Resurrection” or “Parakletos.”101  
Irenaeus reports that Valentinus came to Rome during the time of Bishop 
Hyginus, and he remained in the city until the time of Anictetus (Iren. Haer. 
3.4.3). Tertullian situates Valentinus’s stay in Rome during the reign of 
Antonius Pius (Praescr. 30:2).102 This means that the activity of Valentinus 
in Rome falls between the years 136-160 CE, and he was already in Rome 
when Justin mentioned Valentinians in his list of heresies (Dial. 35:6).103 
Epiphanius reports that Valentinus preached first in Alexandria before he 
came to Rome, which would mean that he founded his school in Alexandria 
not long after the end of the Jewish revolt (Epiph. Pan. 7:1-2). It is commonly 
suggested that Valentinus knew Basilides, who was another Christian 
philosopher in Alexandria during that time.104  
Valentinus acquired some gifted disciples in Rome, whose teachings are 
reported by the patristic authors.105 One of the most prominent Valentinian 
                                                 
101 Cf. e.g. Exc. Theod. 22.1, 23.3-4. 
102 Thomassen, The Spritual Seed, 417-418, Ismo Dunderberg, “The Valentinian Teachers in 
Rome,” in Christians as a Religious Minority in a Multicultural City (ed. Zangenberg&Labahn; 
London: T & T Clark, 2004), 157-159. 
103 Justin’s reaction was not based on the authority of ecclesiastical officials but was more likely his 
personal opinion. During the time of Valentinus’s activity, there was not yet any centralized church 
organization in Rome. Einar Thomassen, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Second-Century Rome,” in HTW 
97 (2004), 241-256; Dunderberg, “The Valentinian teachers,” 168-169; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 
421. 
104 Layton, The Gnostic Scriptures, 417-419. Basilides’ system is attested in Iren. Haer. 1.24.3-7. 
Fragments of Basilides’ teaching are also found in the writings of Clement of Alexandria and Origen.     
105 The Valentinian school movement expanded quite rapidly to the eastern part of the Empire and 
to western Gaul. Tertullian mentions Axionicus as a follower of Valentinus and places him in Antioch 
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teachers was Ptolemy, who represented the so-called “Italian” school of 
Valentinianism. (Hipp. Haer. 6.35.6). Irenaeus got to know the teachings of 
Ptolemy’s disciples in Rome, which formed the basis for Irenaeus’s 
description of the protological model system (Iren. Haer. 1. pref., 1.1.1-3). 
Another famous Valentinian was Heracleon but contrary to Hippolytus’s 
report he can more likely be located in Alexandria since Origen knew his 
commentary on the Gospel of John during his career in Alexandria. It is 
possible, however, that at some point of time Heracleon taught also in 
Rome.106 It is evident that the importance of Alexandria as the center of the 
Valentinian School remained strong even though the school expanded to the 
eastern and western part of the Roman Empire. Most fragments of 
Valentinus’s teachings are preserved in the writings of Clement of 
Alexandria. It is also possible that Valentinus went back to his home city after 
he left Rome.107  
3.2.1 The school of Valentinus as a Christianized Middle Platonic 
cult 
Irenaeus mentions that Valentinus approved of the principles of “Gnostic 
heresy” (γνωστικὴ αἵρησις) and founded a school (διδασκαλεῖον).108 It is not 
clear whether the term “Gnostic” was ever used as a designation of a school 
of thought by the disciples of Valentinus themselves, or whether it was a 
rhetorical stigma given by the church fathers and professional philosophers 
                                                                                                                                          
(Val. 4:3; cf. also Hipp. Haer. 6.35.7). In the list of heresies of Ephrem Syrus (Contra Hereses XXII,2) 
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106 For the location of Ptolemy and Heracleon see A. Wucherpfennig, Heracleon Philologus. 
Gnostische Johannesexegese im zweiten Jahrhundert (Wunt, 142; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2001), 
360-371; Dunderberg, “The Valentinian Teachers,” 158-159, 163. 
107 Dunderberg “Valentinian Teachers,” 160. Epiphanius reports that Valentinus finally left Rome, 
traveled to Cyprus and there went mad (Epiph. Pan. 31.7.2). Although this information lacks historical 
reliability, it is not farfetched to suggest that Valentinus left Rome at some point in his career and 
possibly returned to his home country. 
108 Iren. Haer. 1.11.1. 
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to the group of Christian Platonists. The term hairesis, however, had a long 
history as a designation for a philosophical school of thought. 
John Glucker has argued in his study Antiochus and the Late Academy 
that from the 2nd century BCE onwards the term αἵρησις refers to 
philosophical schools of thought or persuasion. The technical terms for 
institutionalized philosophical schools were σχολῆ, διατριβή or διδασκαλεῖον, 
whereas the term αἵρησις denotes a school of thought in a more abstract and 
general manner. The difference between αἵρησις and σχολῆ is, thus, that 
αἵρησις designates philosophical opinions or doctrines held by some group of 
people, whereas σχολῆ is a locally institutionalized philosophical association 
with an identifiable membership.109 The Neo-Platonic philosopher Elias 
wrote in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories that αἵρησις is “the opinion 
of educated men, agreeing among themselves and disagreeing with others.”110 
For example, the four great Hellenistic schools (Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, 
and Epicurean) represented haireseis, and there were many “sub-haireseis” 
in these schools of thought that originated from divisions of opinions.  
David Runia has listed some characteristics of Greco-Roman haireseis. 
Firstly, there was in each hairesis a founder figure (πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου). 
Secondly, the haireseis had a body of distinctive doctrines (δόγματα) 
attributed to their founder. Thirdly, haireseis were concentrated on the 
creative exegesis of their founder’s writings. Fourthly, each hairesis had its 
                                                 
109 John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978), 
174-192, esp. 181-182. In addition to the “classical” philosophical haireseis, the term hairesis was also 
related to other ancient associations as well, e.g. to the ancient medical schools. The 
institutionalization of the Alexandrian medical hairesis of Herophilus happened some two hundred 
and fifty years after the founding of hairesis and when it was then called διδασκαλεῖον. Cf. Heinrich von 
Staden, “Hairesis and Heresy: The Case of the haireseis iatrikai,” in Jewish and Christian Self-
Definition (ed. Ben E. Myer and E. P. Sanders; Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World; Vol. 3; 
London: SCM Press, 1982), 76-100. Layton has argued that the term hairesis “primarily denotes a 
member of a distinct social group or professional school of thought, not a kind of doctrine…their 
literary artifacts can be called Gnostic only in a secondary way, by reference to the name of the ancient 
group.” See Layton, “The Prolegomena to the Study of Ancient Gnosticism,” 334-350. In fact, according 
to Glucker’s analysis the situation is just the opposite: the term hairesis denotes in the first place a 
doctrine or doctrinal identity, not a socially identifiable group of people, and only secondarily refers to 
a group identity. In the context of the second-century intellectual milieu the term hairesis is always 
understood as a designation of certain opinion, without any qualification of group -identity. This 
means that a person might have been called a representative of Platonic hairesis without being a 
member of any Platonic school. 
110 Opus cited in Glucker, Antiochus, 181. Glucker suggests that the definition of hairesis presented 
by Elias goes back to Proclus. Philo of Alexandria defines the practitioners of haireseis in a strikingly 
similar manner in the fragment of Questiones in Exodum: “Here is clear proof, namely the 
disagreements and discords and doctrinal difference of the practitioners of each hairesis who refute 
each other and are refuted in turn” (translated by Davia Runia in “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek 
Hairesis-model,” 126). 
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succession (διαδοχή) of teachers, whose authority went back to the beginning 
of the movement. Fifthly, the membership in each hairesis was based on 
loyalty or affiliation. The membership of a hairesis involved a publicly 
recognized commitment to a particular school of thought.111  
The Greek hairesis-model was also adopted in describing the Hellenistic 
Jewish traditions. Josephus described the Pharisees, the Sadducees and the 
Essenes as representing the three persuasions of Judaism (φιλοσοφίαι or 
αἱρέσεις). He compared the Pharisees with the Stoics and the Essenes with 
the Pythagoreans. The Jewish group led by Judas Galilean was not according 
to Josephus a hairesis in a real sense because Judas was not a philosopher 
but a sophist who started a hairesis of his own. Although Josephus says that 
he had himself joined the Pharisees, this does not necessarily mean joining 
the institutionalized group of Pharisees, but that he may have shared certain 
Pharisaic doctrines.112   
In New Testament writings, the word hairesis is used both as a neutral 
designation of an opinion and pejoratively as a synonym for a false belief. 
Luke mentions the haireseis of the Nazarenes, Sadducees and Pharisees as 
three belief -systems or sects within Judaism.113 In Luke’s Acts, there are also 
the famous words of Paul: προγινώσκοντές με ἄνωθεν, ἐὰν θέλωσιν μαρτυρεῖν, 
ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αἵρεσιν τῆς ἡμετέρας θρησκείας ἔζησα Φαρισαῖος.114 In 
Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, the term hairesis is referred to as an opinion:  
there must be different “opinions” within the Christian congregation since 
the faithfulness of believers is tested by them.115 Although Paul did not 
restrict the meaning of the term hairesis solely to false teaching, in the 
Pastoral Epistles hairesis is used pejoratively as group designation of false 
teachers (ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι) or erroneous human beings (αἱρετικοὶ 
ἀνθρωποι).116  
According to Glucker’s analysis, the shift from the hairesis-model to the 
school model means a shift from the level of abstract opinions to an 
institutionalized and localized school setting. While Gnostic hairesis refers to 
a philosophical school of thought, a distinct Gnostic school represents a 
socially identifiable group of members. Clement of Alexandria reports 
(Strom. 4.71.1) that Heracleon, a student of Valentinus himself, comes from 
Valentinus’s school (τῆς Οὐαλεντίνου σχολῆς). Hippolytus mentions (Hipp. 
Haer. 6.42.2) those who are “from the school of Valentinus” (οἱ ἀπο τῆς 
                                                 
111 Cf. David Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and Greek Hairesis-Model,” VC 53 (1999), 119-120. 
112 Josephus the Jewish War 2.119-62, Antiquities 13.171-3; 18.11-22 and Vita 12. Cf. Glucker, 
Antiochus, 184. 
113 Acts 5.17, 15.5, 24.5, 24.14, 28.22 
114 Acts 26.5. “They have known for a long time, if they are willing to testify, that according to the 
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115 1 Cor 11:19. In Gal 5:20 hairesis is mentioned in the list of works of the flesh in the sense of a 
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Οὐαλεντίνου σχολῆς) and reports on two schools (διδασκαλία) among the 
Valentinians themselves (Hipp. Haer. 6.35.5). Tertullian mentions the “two 
Valentinian schools” (schola) in an analogy with the philosophical schools of 
Plato and Epicurus (Val. 11.2, 33.1).  Irenaeus has met some people who 
regarded themselves as disciples of Valentinus: ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν Οὐαλεντίνου 
μαθητῶν (Iren. Haer. 1, pref. 2) who can be identified with the disciples 
around Ptolemy: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον ἐμπειρότεροι (Iren. Haer. 1.21.1).117  
Although the term hairesis can depict various kinds of ancient 
associations, according to patristic information the Valentinian-Gnostic 
hairesis was predominantly a philosophical persuasion. Irenaeus accused the 
Valentinians of deriving the theory of the emanations of Pleroma from 
Pythagoras (Iren. Haer. 1.1.1). Hippolytus said that Valentinian Gnostics 
were disciples of Pythagoras and Plato (Hipp. Ref. 24). Tertullian argued that 
the best way to refute Valentinian teachers was to refute Plato, who was their 
teacher (Tert. De Anima XXII). The Neoplatonic teachers condemned the 
Gnostics for deviating from authentic Platonism. Plotinus maintains in En. 
II. 9 that these teachers have built up the school of thought of their own (ἡ 
ἴδια αἴρεσις) from Greek philosophy and Plato. Porphyry argued in Vita 
Plotini 16 that the Gnostics were inauthentic Platonists, who have parted 
ways from the ancient philosophical tradition (ἐκ τῆς παλαιᾶς φιλοσοφίας 
ἀνηγμένοι). Origen declares in Contra Celsum 5.61 that there are some 
Christians who called themselves Gnostics in a similar manner as the 
Epicureans called themselves “philosophers.”  
There has been some doubt about the authenticity of the information 
attested in the patristic sources that the Gnostic hairesis can be compared 
with the philosophical persuasion. Barbara Aland has pointed out that the 
role of philosophy in Gnostic schools was rather artificial. She maintains that 
Gnostic hairesis was not philosophy, not even corrupted philosophy, but “a 
religion of revelation and redemption.”118 Einar Thomassen has also argued 
that the school of Valentinus was not a “school” comparable to the 
philosophical schools, but a representative of Christian ecclesia. According to 
Thomassen, “the vision of a salvation process that unfolds in time and history 
does not derive from Greek philosophy, but from the heritage of Judeo-
Christian soteriology.” Thomassen maintains that “school terminology” 
belongs to the same rhetorical tool box of heresiologists as “hairesis 
terminology.”119  
                                                 
117 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 17-22. Markschies points out that since Aristoteles and 
Teophrastus the word μαθητής has been used in Greek literature (but not exclusively) to refer to 
students of philosophers or to members of the same philosophical school of thought. Cf. Markschies, 
“Valentinian Gnosticism,” 420, 404. 
118 Barbara Aland, “Gnosis und Philosophie,” in Proceedings of the International Colloquium on 
Gnosticism, Stockholm, August 20-25, 1973 (ed. G. Widengren; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1977), 
34-73. 
119 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 5, 315, 491-2. 
 49 
I suggest, however, that the main premises of the Valentinian system of 
thought did not solely come from early Christian beliefs but from the 
transcendental Platonism which was integrated with the Johannine and 
Pauline theology. The Valentinian Gnostic myth become conceivable only as 
a part of Platonic-Pythagorean world view. It is also noticeable that Gnostics 
were not only rejected by some early Christian teachers but also by teachers 
of the philosophical schools. Gnosticism not only caused conflict within early 
Christian communities but among the philosophical schools as well. The 
Gnostic movement was not merely part of an inner-Christian debate.  
The school of Valentinus can be regarded as a representative of Greco-
Roman hairesis. Valentinus was the founding figure (πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου) of the 
Platonic school tradition whose succession (διαδοχή) went back to Paul via 
Theudas.120 There were distinctively doctrines (δόγματα), such as the theory 
of the structure of the intelligible world, the tripartite division of humankind 
and the therapy of emotions, which made Valentinian Gnosticism discernible 
from the other Platonic schools and congregations of the nascent orthodoxy 
as well. In addition, Valentinus’s disciples continued and elaborated the 
teachings of their foster father. The psalms and homilies composed by 
Valentinus were used in the worship of the Valentinian communities.121 
The social theory of religious groups employed by R. Stark and W. 
Bainbridge can help us describe the social setting of the Valentinian school of 
thought.122 According to this model religious communities can be defined as 
“cult-movements” or “sect-movements” which have deviated from their 
parent body, i.e. the mother religion. While the sect splinters from the parent 
body to re-establish the old, authentic and purged religion, the cult is the 
beginning of a new religion, based on a new revelation or new insight which 
changes the original tradition. The sects and cults also differed from the 
parent body regarding tension towards the values of society. While sects and 
cults have higher tension towards the values and moral rules of the social 
environment, the parent body has low tension towards common moral values 
or might even represent the sociocultural environment in toto.123  
The rhetorical strategy of the patristic teachers was to demonstrate that 
the Valentinian movement was a cult which had deviated from its parent 
body, i.e. the Church. The Valentinian teachings broke the apostolic faith 
though innovations and fables that were derived from Greco-Roman 
                                                 
120 Strom. VII.105.5. 
121 Tert. Carn. 17.1. 
122 The sociological analysis of different religious groups and their relation to their “parent body” 
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Routledge, 1997) and Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge, The Future of Religion − Secularization, 
Revival and Cult Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
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philosophy and myths. The problem is, however, that during the second-
century a “church” did not exist, which could have served as a “parent body” 
for the school of Valentinus or any other Christian group. There was no 
church from which the school of Valentinus could have splintered. This 
means that the teachers of the nascent orthodoxy not only created the 
“heretic” but the “church” as well.124  
I suggest, then, that the school of Valentinus was a deviation from the the 
Platonic-Pythagorean hairesis, which served as its intellectual parent body. 
Although the social context of the school of Valentinus was the Christian 
ecclesia, the Valentinian teachers did not intend to revitalize the doctrines of 
the nascent orthodoxy, but the Platonic philosophy in the light of the new 
revelation of Christ. In this study, the school of Valentinus is compared with 
a Christianized cult within the Platonic-Pythagorean parent body. 
Valentinian teachers were Middle Platonic intellectuals, a fairly rich and 
privileged elite who had been converted to Christianity and provided their 
students with guidance towards the right way of life as non-Christian 
philosophers did.125  
Bentley Layton has proposed that “the Valentinian movement had the 
character of a philosophical school or network of schools, rather than a 
distinct religious sect.”126 Christoph Markschies has also argued that the 
school of Valentinus is comparable with the ancient philosophical schools. It 
is not clear, however, whether the Valentinian teachers were more like 
popular or professional philosophers. Markschies refers to the study made by 
Johannes Hahn according to which the phenomenon of forming a “school” 
was not restricted to professional philosophical schools only. Also, popular 
philosophers, like the Platonist Maximus of Tyre, who taught in Rome during 
the time of Valentinus, offered regular lectures, while students took notes 
and engaged in discussion. Questions about what life one ought to live played 
an important role. Markschies states that the difference between popular and 
                                                 
124 Kimberly Buell’s study Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of 
Legitimacy reveals how Clement bolstered his his version of Christian truth rhetorically by using terms 
such as procreation, lactation, paternity, maternity, and sexul difference. Buell stresses that it is crucial 
to interpret Clement’s writings as arguments for a particular vision of Christian identity, not 
articulations of already-determined doctrinal position.  Cf. Kimberly Buell, Making Christians: 
Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Universtiy 
Press, 1999), 10-14, 180-184. 
125 Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus, 292-315, esp. 299-313 
126 Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 267. John Dillon locates the Valentinian school of thought to the 
“Platonic underworld” together with the Chaldean Oracles and the Hermetic tradition. Cf. Dillon, The 
Middle Platonism, 384-389. The term “Platonic Underworld” may contain a somewhat dismissive 
connotation. 
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professional philosophers lay mainly in the degree of formal-logical 
argumentation in the philosophical curriculum. 127  
I suggest that the Valentinian teachers can be equated with the Greco-
Roman popular philosophers who had both a Neo-Pythagorean and Christian 
orientation. Although some theologically well-written Valentinian 
documents, such as Ptolemy’s the Letter to Flora or Valentinus’s psalm, bear 
all the marks of philosophical competence, the colorful myth of Sophia does 
not belong to the same level of philosophical sophistication, although it may 
have had – as Markschies has stated - its own philosophical quality and 
charm in the Valentinian paideia.128  
3.2.2 Valentinian tradition and rituals − Early Christian theurgy vs. 
religio mentis 
During the first three centuries CE Platonism increasingly attained the forms 
of religion. The realms of philosophical schools and religious cults began to 
merge, although this development reached its peak in the writings of late 
Neoplatonic teachers.129 Gregory Shaw has pointed out that the attitude 
towards rituals varied in the Platonic tradition. There was a tendency to 
combine theologia (god-talk) and theurgia (god-work) and place rituals at 
the center of philosophical paideia. Plato himself was claimed to have 
participated in the Egyptian or Chaldean mysteries, and his writings were 
sometimes regarded as a propaideia to these deeper mysteries.130 There were 
also some other Platonists who completely rejected ritual practices. Porphyry 
advised the philosopher to forgo ritual activities because the philosopher is 
the savior of himself. The rituals may serve merely as propaideia for 
philosophical wisdom.131 
Shaw maintains that the different attitudes towards rituals were based on 
a more fundamental difference concerning the degree of the descent of the 
soul in the body. Those Platonists who valued rituals maintained that the 
soul has been fully incarnated into the body. The material elements of rituals 
                                                 
127 J. Hahn, Der Philosoph und die Gesellschatft: Selbstverständis, öffentliches Auftreten und 
populäre Erwartungen in der hohen Kaiserzeit (HABES 7; Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987. 
128 Markschies, “Valentinian Gnosticism,” 436-438. 
129 John Turner, “The Curious Philosophical World of Later Religious Gnosticism: The Symbiosis 
of Late Antique Philosophy and Religion,” in Religion and Philosophy in the Platonic and Neoplatonic 
Traditions: From Antiquity to the Early Medieval Period (ed. Kevin Corrigan & John Turner; Sankt 
Augustin: Academia, 2012), 180-181.  
130 Plato maintains that the deeper mysteries cannot be achieved through written documents. This 
was the reason why Plato did not write them down himself (Letter VII of Plato, 341c-d). Some 
Platonists took Plato’s various references to the Oriental or Egyptian mysteries (Statesman 290c-e, 
Timaeus 21, Phaedrus 275b, Laws 819b, Philebus 18b) as references to these deeper mysteries which 
are necessary for the illumination of the mind. 
131 De. Abst. II, 49,2. 
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provide a necessary tool for the liberation of the soul from the body. Those, 
who rejected the rituals were of the opinion that the highest part of the soul 
did not incarnate, but only its image. Therefore, its perfection was not 
dependent on rituals, but the undescended soul served as a “savior” of the 
individual soul.132  
It is rather likely that the division among the Platonists about the role of 
rituals also had an influence on Valentinian teachers and their attitude 
towards Christian rituals. Hippolytus maintained that the division into the 
“eastern” and the “Italian” branch of Valentinianism reflected different views 
concerning the body of the Savior (Hipp. Ref.  35.5-7). While the Italian 
school taught that the Savior had both a spiritual and psychic body, the 
eastern school maintained that the body of the Savior was spiritual. I suggest, 
however, that behind the Christological division a more essential 
disagreement concerning the degree of the incarnation of the soul may have 
existed.133 The Italian school taught that the spiritual seed did not incarnate 
in the flesh, but only in the psychic soul. The eastern view, on the other hand, 
maintained, that the spiritual seed incarnated absolutely in fleshly existence. 
It was depicted as a formless aborted fetus (cf. Exc. Theod. 68). 
This division of opinions had an impact on the degree of the incarnation 
of the Savior and the role of rituals as well. If the spiritual seed was 
incarnated fully in the flesh, this meant that the Savior must also adopt the 
same bodily existence to be able to save them. As a result, the eastern view 
held a more positive view towards rituals because the soul was trapped in the 
body and it could not the released without material sacraments. In the Italian 
school the rituals were seen merely as a propaideia for the deeper mysteries, 
which were given through intellectual enlightenment. These differences may 
explain the division of the Valentinian traditions into the “school movement” 
and the “cult movement.”134 
The ritual practices of the Valentinian School are discussed in Irenaeus’s 
testimonies concerning the prophetical society of the Marcosians (Iren. 
Haer. 1.13-22 cf. also Hipp.Ref. 6:41). The Marcosians made a distinction 
between the psychic aspect of Jesus’s baptism (ascending to the water) and 
spiritual redemption (descending of the Spirit) which they called 
ἀπολύτρωσις. The former mediates the forgiveness of sins, but the latter 
represents a conjugal union, a sort of spiritual marriage, with the powers of 
                                                 
132 Shaw, The Theurgy of the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (Pensylvania: The Pensylvania 
State University Press, 1995), 1-17; Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes − A Historical Approach to 
the Late Pagan Mind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 142-153. Cf. also Birger Pearson’s 
article “Gnostic Ritual and Iamblichus’s Treatise On the Mysteries of Egypt,” in Birger Pearson, 
Gnosticism and Christianity in Roman and Coptic Egypt (New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 224-248.  
133 Anthropological issues are handled in detail in chapter 6. 
134 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 3. Dunderberg points out that the terminology that Irenaeus 
uses for his opponents implies that there were two branches within ancient Valentinianism, one 
tending toward as separate cult movement and one tendind toward a school movement. 
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the Pleroma. There were also some teachers in the sect of Marcus who 
abandoned the ritual practices altogether. The spiritual seed did not have any 
participation in material creation, and therefore, its reception and formation 
could not be channeled through ritual practices. Rituals were only images of 
spiritual reality, and the use of them was a trivial matter. They were seen 
merely as signs of spiritual reality and propaideia for the transformation of 
the self through knowledge.135  
The Valentinian Exposition, which is one of the Valentinian writings of 
the Nag Hammadi Library, differs from the Marcosian community 
concerning the attitude towards baptism. It contains five Liturgical Readings 
(one on anointing, two on baptism and one on the Eucharist) as a kind of 
appendix to the main document. On Bap. B 41.21 and 42.39 refer to the “first 
baptism,” which has been interpreted in the light of Irenaeus’s testimony 
concerning the distinction between ordinary church practice and the second 
spiritual rite of redemption.136 Thomassen maintains, however, that there is 
nothing incomplete or psychic about the first baptism mentioned in that 
document. In this tradition, the “bridal chamber” was not a separate rite 
apart from baptism and anointing, but it refers to the invisible nature of 
baptism itself.137 Antti Marjanen also suggests that the first baptism 
mentioned in the liturgical readings of the Valentinian Exposition 
transforms the status of the participant from material existence to the 
spiritual. Therefore, this particular document has a very optimistic view 
concerning the transformative power of baptism, which differed from the 
view attested in Iren. Haer. 1.21.138 
It is not contrary to reason to suggest that the different attitudes among 
Valentinian teachers were an outcome of different anthropological views in 
the Middle Platonic tradition. The Valentinian writings of the Nag Hammadi 
Library represent mainly the view, which saw in the cultic rituals 
                                                 
135 In addition to the conventional Christian rituals (baptism, anointing, the Eucharist), the 
Valentinians may have had a distinct ritual (the use of water, oil and invocations) as a sign of conjugal 
union with the spiritual reality and redemption. It is possible that the ritual of redemption was a 
mortuary rite. For the evidence of the Valentinian deathbed ritual cf. H. Gregory Snyder, “The 
Discovery and Interpretation of the Flavia Sophe Inscription: New Results” in VC 68 (2014), 1-59. 
Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 113-117. Thomassen suggests that the deathbed ritual was not a 
distinct ritual of redemption, but a sort of baptismal anamnesis for the dying person. See Thomassen, 
The Spiritual Seed, 350-353. 
136 Turner, “Ritual in Gnosticism,” in Gnosticism and Later Platonism. Themes, Figures, and Texts 
(ed. John D. Turner & Ruth Majercik; Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 97-102; Desjardins, Sin in Valentinianism, 
95-96; Elaine Pagels, “A Valentinian Interpretation of Baptism and Eucharist: And Its Critique of 
“Orthodox” Sacramental Theology and Practice,” in The Harvard Theological Review (1972), 157.  
137 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 355, 357-376. 
138 Antti Marjanen,”A Salvific Act of Transformation or a Symbol of Defilement,” in Gnosticism, 
Platonism and the Late Ancient World (ed. Kevin Corrigan and Tuomas Rasimus; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 
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transformative power. In these texts, the early Christian rituals are converted 
into Platonic theurgy and are means to spiritual redemption. The Valentinian 
tradition that is preserved in the account of the patristic authors mainly 
belongs to the Italian tradition (esp. Iren. Haer. 1.1-8 and Exc. C). In this 
tradition, the spiritual part of the human soul was not incarnated in the flesh 
but only within psychic soul, which means that the role of ritual practices was 
not essential to the process of the transformation of the self, but were seen 
merely as propaideia without any transformative power. In all cases, 
however, the Valentinian teachers understood the Christian rituals in the 
light of Valentinian protological myth.139 Irenaeus complained that the 
Valentinians speak the same language as other members of the church, but 
they thought differently.140 
The Valentinian sources used in this study mainly belong to the Italian 
school of Valentinianism. The closest parallel with this tradition is the religio 
mentis of the philosophical Hermetica. Garth Fowden describes how the 
charismatic teachers of the Hermetic school of thought were surrounded by 
disciples who sought philosophical understanding of the divine realm and 
longed for a personal illumination through the study of religious texts, 
instruction, question and answer, prayer, the singing of hymns and the 
enjoyment of other sorts of close fellowship between master and pupils. The 
ritual practices were propaideia for the intellectual enlightenment which was 
achieved through education and gnosis.141 The Canon Muratori, which is 
perhaps the oldest Early Christian list of canonical texts among the Roman 
congregation at the end of the second century, mentions a liber psalmorum 
by Valentinus, which is explicitly excluded from the canonical texts. It is 
rather likely that this information is authentic and Valentinus wrote psalms, 
which were used in worship in the Valentinian gatherings.142 This recalls the 
role of singing in the community of the Jewish philosopers and their 
nocturnal choral practices, which Philo describes in detail in De Vita 
Contemplativa (83-89). 
3.3 Allegorical Readers of Alexandria 
The Valentinian teachers were early Christian Platonists who were keen on 
religious texts, not only the ones that were read by early Christian 
communities, but also those, which were studied by the Jewish Platonists of 
                                                 
139 Iren. Haer. 3.15.4; 4.33.3. 
140 Iren. Haer. 1. praef. 
141 Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes, 95-115. 
142 Einar Thomassen, “Going to Church with the Valentinians,” in Practicing Gnosis. Ritual, 
Magic, Theurgy and Liturgy in Nag Hammadi, Manichean and Other Ancient Literature. Essays in 
Honor of Birger A. Pearson (Edited by April DeConick, Gregory Shaw and John Turner; Leiden: Brill, 
2013), 185-188. 
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Alexandria. Valentinus himself maintained that there was much valuable 
teaching in the non-Christian books (ἐν ταῖς δεμοσίαις βίβλοις) in addition to 
those that were written in the church (γεγραμμένα ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησία).143 The 
Valentinian teachers adopted the allegorical method from the preceding 
Jewish Platonists of Alexandria and Hellenistic philosophers. Valentinian did 
not only reform the purely Gnostic motifs in the Sophia myth but also the 
tendency of mythopoiesis by integrating the cosmic myth more closely to the 
textual basis of the Bible. A good example of Valentinian reformation of the 
Gnostic myth is the creation of the first human being in which the purely 
Gnostic motifs of fear and jealousy of the creator angels have faded away. In 
Valentinus’s fragment the angels possessed some tenets of the preceding 
myth, but in the later Valentinian anthropology the angels are not malevolent 
archons but co-creators and archetypes of the soul of Adam.144  
The allegorical method was discussed in rhetorical textbooks by the 
Hellenistic philosophers. An allegory was defined as “to mean something 
other than one says.” The famous rhetorician Quintilian maintained that 
“continuous metaphor makes an allegory, which was related to the 
personification of abstract qualities.”145 The origin of the allegorical exegesis 
of Greco-Roman myths was not in Plato, but in Aristotle, who said that the 
lover of myths is the lover of wisdom, for myth is composed of wonder, and 
the experience of wonder is the root of philosophy.146 Aristotle also maintains 
that the ancient myths are metaphysical, i.e. they contain hidden 
philosophical truths.147 Aristotle regarded the figure of Zeus as a symbol of 
the Prime Mover who challenged all the other gods. Zeus hung down from 
heaven a golden chain, which gods would grab and pull their way, but Zeus 
was able to pull them up to him. Thus, the metaphysical doctrine of the 
Prime Mover was hidden in the myth.148 Also the Stoics were famous for their 
allegorical readings of Homer and Hesiod. They argued that the ancient poets 
had unknowingly written down the wisdom of an earlier stage of history, 
which can be revealed in the text through the allegorical method.   
It became common in the Middle Platonic tradition to assume that 
philosophy was concealed by gods in symbolical poetry and religious 
                                                 
143 Valentinus’s fragment 6 in Clement’s Strom. 6.52.3. This is opposite to the teaching attested in 
the Tripartite Tractate, which condemns not only the philosophical search for wisdom but the 
elementary studies as well. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 181-185. 
144 For details, cf. chapter 6.3.3. 
145 Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 176-177. 
146 Luc Brisson, How Philosophers Saved Myths. Allegorical Interpretation and Classical 
Mythology (Transl. Catherine Tihanyi; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 
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revelations, which could be grasped by allegorical exegesis. 149 The writing of 
Philo are a testimony to the Hellenistic Jewish allegorical tradition, which 
intended to integrate the Greco-Roman philosophical traditions with the 
revelation of the Scriptures. For Philo, the Scriptures had a two-fold 
meaning: a literal (ῥητή) or obvious meaning (φανερά) and an underlying 
meaning (ὑπόνοια). The underlying level of the text Philo calls allegorical 
(ἀλληγορία). Philo declares that it is “obscure to the many,” and clear only to 
“those who can contemplate bodiless and naked facts” and to “men who are 
capable of seeing.”150 Allegory is the “one which likes to hide” and into which 
one has to be “initiated.”151  
Philo was, however, a proponent of “multiple exegesis.” This procedure 
means that the text can be handled at different levels depending on the 
reader’s spiritual capability or the context of the interpretation. Although the 
migrations of the patriarchs were seen as symbols of a spiritual journey and 
their marriages as symbols for unification with Wisdom, Philo did not neglect 
the historicity of the biblical narratives or the importance of the role of Israel 
as a political commonwealth.152  
In some cases, however, the allegorical interpretation was obligatory. For 
Philo, the literal interpretations of the anthropomorphic descriptions of God 
would have been blasphemous. Moreover, the passages that were irrational, 
such as the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib, must be interpreted 
allegorically. The allegorical method also had an apologetic function. The 
Jewish people of Alexandria should not be ashamed of their cultural and 
                                                 
149  The Stoics were not the only allegorical interpreters of the Greek myths, for some Platonists 
saw in Homer’s writings allegories and symbols of intellectual search. The adventures of Odysseus, for 
example, could be seen as descriptions of the soul’s journey to its true homeland in heaven. In Pl. 
Quest. Conv. 9.14.6 Plutarch’s teacher M. Annius Ammonius discusses the interpretation of the 
encounter between Odysseus and the Sirens. The music of the Sirens attracts the soul upward after its 
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150 Cont. 28; Abr. 200, 236; Plant. 36; Migr. 205; Fug. 179. Cf. also Wolfson, Philo I, 115 ff. 
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152 Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union 
College Press, 1985), 57-58; Harry Wolfson, Philo. Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, 
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religious heritage because it contained the highest level of human wisdom 
exceeding even the Greek philosophical tradition.153  
It is clear that Philo was working within the Jewish exegetical tradition, 
and he frequently refers to other Jewish allegorical readers of the Bible. 
Philo’s allegorical commentaries are not a testimony to the one solid 
allegorical school tradition or Philo’s innovative spirit, but a compendium of 
exegetical traditions, which he brought together in his writings.154 The 
allegorical readers of Alexandria can be divided according to Philo’s 
references into three sub-groups:155 
 
1. The extreme allegorists whom Philo dislikes because they 
seem to have neglected the prescriptions of the Law. 
2. Moderate or non-mystical allegorists who did not follow 
Philo’s path and are more bound to the literal meaning of the 
text. 
3. Mystical allegorists described in Vita Contemplativa who are 
models for Philo’s allegorical reading. 
 
It is noticeable that Philo never used the terms σχολῆ or διατριβή as references 
to his “school.” He used, however, the verb σχολάζειν to denote philosophical 
investigations during the Sabbath156 and the term διδασκαλεῖον in the sense of 
a school.157 Although the most natural context for Philo’s teaching would 
have been the synagogue, it is difficult to imagine, how Philo’s rather 
complicated allegorical teachings could have functioned in that kind of public 
context. The most probable context for Philo’s school was a private school in 
Philo’s home or a personally owned structure for advanced students who had 
the capability of coping with the extended philosophical expositions of the 
                                                 
153 Runia, “Philo, Alexandrian and Jew,” 4-5; Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 73-129. The Letter of 
Aristeas can be dated to the beginning of the second century BCE, and it contains the High Priest 
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Bible.158 It is rather likely that Philo’s private school was not a sect or cult, 
but an institution that functioned within the Jewish parent body.159  
For Philo, the ideal social setting for the study of the Law of Moses was 
the esoteric community of the Therapeutae, who lived on the shores of Lake 
Mareotis. They were totally devoted to spiritual exercise (ἄσκησις), which is 
defined as “philosophizing” (φιλοσοφεῖν) and interpreting allegorically the 
ancestral philosophy (φιλοσοφία) of the Scriptures.160 The community used 
memorials (μνημεῖα), a sort of allegorical notebook, which had been written 
by “the founders of their school of thought” (αἵρεσις). The Therapeutae 
considered the Law of Moses to be a “living organism.” 161 While the literal 
level parallels the body, the spiritual meaning of the text is its soul. 
And these explanations of the sacred scriptures are delivered by inner 
meaning in allegories. For the whole legislation appears to these men 
a living being, and the literal commandments is the body, the soul is 
an invisible mind laid up in its wording, in which the rational soul 
begins to contemplate through discriminating the things of its own 
order as through the mirror the extraordinary beauties of the 
concepts removing and unfolding the symbols, and bringing to light 
the naked thoughts for those who, with only a little reminding are 
able to contemplate the hidden through what is visible.  
 
The mystical or philosophical allegorists received spiritual vision as they 
studied the written text. The extreme allegorists, however, abandoned the 
literal level altogether, being like “bodiless souls.”  
There are some who, taking the laws in their literal sense as symbols 
of intelligible realities extremely accurate (ἄγαν ἠκρίβωσαν) in their 
investigation of the symbol, while frivolously neglecting the letter. 
                                                 
158 Sterling, “The School of Sacred Law,” 149-151; Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek 
Hairesis-Model,” 128. For the synagogue setting of Philo’s school, see R. Allan Culpepper, The 
Johannine School (SBL Dissertation Series 26; Missoula, Montana: Scholar Press, 1975), 212-214. 
Harry Wolfson has maintained that Philo worked in the synagogue schools of higher education for 
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organized long before Philo as a “mystery cult.” See Erwin Goodenough, By Light Light. The Mystic 
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160 Cont. 28-30. 
161 Cont. 78. Translated by David Winston in Philo of Alexandria. Winston has pointed out that 
Philo was influenced by Plato’s Phaedrus 264c where Socrates says that “every discourse must be 
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Such people I, for my part, should blame for their cool indifference, 
for they ought to have cultivated both a more precise investigation of 
things invisible and an unexceptionable stewardship of things visible. 
As it is, as if living alone by themselves in a wilderness, or as if they 
had become discarnate souls (ἀσώματοι ψυχαὶ γεγονότες), knowing 
neither city nor village nor household nor any company of humans at 
all, transcending what is approved by the crown, they track the 
absolute truth in its naked self.162  
 
It is not easy to define the difference between Philo’s allegorical method and 
the extremism of other allegorists. It seems that the allegorical radicals 
neglected any literal interpretation of the Bible, which may, however, have 
been relevant for Jewish communal living. The biblical text functioned solely 
as a tool for individual and spiritual revelation. Although Philo may have 
owed much to the allegorical inventions of the pure allegorists, this did not 
lead to separation from Jewish religious observances.163 The cultic 
observances of Judaism were important for Philo’s spiritual life. 
It is noticeable that Philo’s allegorical exegesis differed from the approach 
of the Hellenistic philosophers. Philo assumed that Moses wrote 
intentionally in allegorical language. The allegorical level was not artificially 
added by the reader of the text, but the original message of the Law of Moses 
was hidden in the symbols, numbers, and etymologies. The biblical text itself 
was originally an allegorical presentation of the reality of the cosmos or 
human being. David Dawson has pointed out that the Philo’s allegorical 
method was based on the theory of the corruption of language.164 God 
confused the languages to prevent wickedness from reaching its goal as 
humankind tried to build the Tower of Babel. As a result, the language lost its 
capacity to mediate real meanings. The theory of language in the Valentinian 
Gospel of Philip (NHC II, 3) is strikingly similar.   
The names of worldly things are utterly deceptive, for they turn the 
heart from what is real to what is unreal. Whoever hears the word 
“God” thinks not of what is real but rather of what is unreal. So also 
with the words “father”, “son,” holy spirit,” “life,” “light,” 
“resurrection,” “church,” and all the rest, people do not think of what 
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is real but of what is unreal, [though] the words refer to what is real. 
The words [that are] heard belong to his world. [Do not be] deceived. 
If word belonged to the eternal realm, they would never be 
pronounced in this world, nor would they designate worldly things. 
They would refer to what is in the eternal realm.165  
 
It is stated in the Gos.Phil 67, 9-27 that truth did not come into the world 
naked, but in “symbols and images” because the world could not receive 
truth in another way. The “resurrection” was seen as an image of “rebirth” in 
the bridal chamber, i.e. the spiritual awakening and enlightenment. The 
bodily resurrection described in the gospels was not an object of belief but a 
spiritual symbol of the individual’s “rebirth.” Gos.Phil. 54, 13-31 explains how 
the archons corrupted language so that it became a method of deception. 
Truth brought forth names in the world for us, and no one can refer 
to truth without names. The truth is one and many, for our sakes, to 
teach us about the one, in love, through the many. The rulers wanted 
to fool people since they saw that people have a kinship with what is 
truly good. They took the name of the good and assigned them to 
what is not good, to fool people with names and link the names to 
what is not good. So, as if they are doing people a favor, they take 
names from what is not good and transfer them to the good, in their 
way of thinking. For they wished to take free people and enslave them 
forever. 
 
The theme of language as a tool for deception is also found in Philo, who 
explains the confusion of languages at Babel. Philo writes in Conf. 190: 
This is our explanation, but those who merely follow the outward and 
obvious think that we have at his point a reference to the origin of the 
Greek and barbarian languages. I would not censure such persons, 
for perhaps the truth is with them also. Still I would exhort them not 
to halt there, but to press on to allegorical interpretation and to 
recognize that the letter is to the Oracle but as a shadow to the 
substance and that the higher values therein revealed are what really 
and truly exist. Indeed, the lawgiver himself gives openings for this 
kind of treatment to those whose understanding is not blinded as he 
certainly does in the case now under discussion when he calls what 
was then taking place a “confusion.” 
 
Philo’s view is evidently based on the Platonic notion of the sense-perceptible 
world as shadows of the ideal world. God not only divided the language into 
“Greek and barbarian languages” as is commonly suggested, but he confused 
languages semantically. Philo makes a distinction between “confusion” and 
“separation.” God did not merely separate languages but confused their 
                                                 
165 Gos.Phil. 53,23-54,5. Translated by Marvin Meyer in Nag Hammadi Scriptures. 
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semantic apparatus. This means that the confusion concerns all human 
languages, which are like shadows of the bodily appearances. At a literal level 
language contains “prodigies and marvels, one serpent emitting a human 
voice and using quibbling arguments to an utterly guileless character, and 
cheating a woman with seductive plausibility” but to those who interpret 
words according to allegory “all that is mythical is removed out of our way, 
and the real sense becomes as clear as daylight.”166  
For Philo, the allegorical interpretation was not an isolated enterprise to 
find proofs for philosophical opinions, but was an instrument of spiritual 
ascent. The fusion of the allegorical reading of the visible text and the 
contemplation of the invisible cosmos is attested explicitly in Spec. 3.1-6. The 
spiritual goal of allegorical interpretation is to “see the invisible through the 
visible” (τὰ ἀφανῆ διὰ τῶν φανερῶν θεωρεῖν).167 In this method the ascension of 
Moses was paradigmatic. All allegorists were able to reach the same noetic 
vision. Moses ascended “in thick clouds” to the spiritual realm, where bodily 
eyesight was not involved, and he was shown “the forms of the intelligible 
things and the measures of all things by which the world was made.”168  
When Moses wrote out the Law, he had to use “fallen language,” and it 
had to be “decrypted” through the allegorical method to mediate real 
meanings. Moses left, however, clues and “invitations” that pointed to the 
vision of the Logos beyond the written text. Philo and other allegorists were 
able to find these clues in the peculiarities of words, etymologies, numerical 
codes, phraseology, grammar, and syntax.169 Through the allegorical method 
God’s voice could be “seen” once again: 
 
For what life is better than a contemplative life, or more appropriate 
to a rational being? For this reason, whereas the voice of mortal 
beings is judged by hearing, the sacred oracles intimate that the 
words of God are seen as light is seen; for we are told that “all the 
people saw the Voice (Ex. 20.18), not that they heard it; for what was 
happening was not an impact on air made by the organs of mouth 
and tongue, but virtue shining with intense brilliance, wholly 
resembling a fountain of reason and this is also indicated elsewhere 
on this wise: “You have seen that I have spoken to you out of Heaven.” 
(Ex. 20.22), not “you heard,” for the same cause as before.170 
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The Valentinian allegorists belong to the same hermeneutical trajectory with 
the Alexandrian Jewish allegorists. The Valentinian teachers did not use the 
allegorical method only with the Jewish Scriptures, but also with the early 
Christian texts. This method of reading biblical texts was vehemently 
criticized by Irenaeus and other early Christian teachers. Irenaeus accused 
the Valentinian teachers that they “subvert Scriptures according to their own 
intention” and “arrive at their contrived exegeses,” whereas the truthful 
interpretation follows a “clear and open sense of Scripture” and builds the 
interpretations on the “clear and unambiguous parts.”171  
Despite Irenaeus’s harsh criticism, the allegorical interpretation was not 
an unknown method for patristic authors and not for Irenaeus himself.172 
The problem with the Valentinian teachers was not the allegorical method as 
such but the philosophical myth which formed the basis for the 
interpretations. Origen and Clement criticized Valentinian teachers for 
deriving allegorical interpretations from the philosophical myth without any 
connection to the context of the text.173 Strikingly, Origen faced almost the 
same criticism from the Antiochian bishop Eustathius, who criticized 
Alexandrian allegorists for neglecting history and paying too much attention 
to names and terms instead of deeds. It would seem that the criticism that 
Irenaeus leveled against the Valentinian teachers was repeated by the 
principals of the church of Antioch against Alexandrian allegorists, such as 
Origen and Clement, who broke the coherence of the texts and twisted its 
original intention.174 The teachers of Antioch and Irenaeus stressed that the 
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text must be read as a literary unit, which forms an “iconic” starting point 
even for its hidden intention. Instead, the allegorical approach was based on 
the “inspiring Spirit,” which could only enlighten readers so that they can 
reach the deeper spiritual meaning of the text. The difference between Origen 
and the Valentinian exegetes was not so much about the method, but the 
content of the “Spirit” which revealed the hidden meaning of the text.  
Before entering into a detailed comparison of the allegories of Philo and 
the Valentinians, I will investigate two case studies which illustrate the 
multidimensionality of the method used by these teachers. Whereas the first 
example illustrates an extreme case, the latter case serves as an example of a 
moderate allegorical reading of the text.  
3.3.1 Allegorical interpretation of Ex.13:2 in Philo’s Her. 117-119 and 
Iren. Haer. 1.3.4 
At first glance it seems that Philo as well as the Valentinian exegetes brought 
allegorical interpretations into the text artificially. There were, however, 
some signs in the texts which served as “indicators” for the opportunity to 
“ascend” from the literal level to the level where the spiritual vision could be 
reached. Philo calls these textual details “invitations” and “clues” (ἀφορμαί) 
concerning the use of allegory, which is “dear to men with their eyes 
opened.”175 These textual clues can be of various sorts. Some are etymological 
(Det. 15-17), some are based on factual errors in the literal text (Somn. 2.246) 
and some others are based on absurd details in the text (Agr. 130-131). Also, 
repetitions of the same word or double narratives were “invitations” for 
allegorical interpretations. As certain terms, names or themes were given an 
allegorical meaning, they functioned as new “invitations” to interpret 
allegorically other texts where these terms appeared.176  
The first example is related to the allegorical interpretation of Ex. 13:2, 
which describes the law concerning sanctifying firstlings: “Consecrate to me 
                                                                                                                                          
The difference between allegory and typology is not clear. In both cases, the texts say something that 
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175 Plant. 36. 
176 Tobin, The Creation of Man, 144-145.  
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION IN PHILO AND AMONG 
THE VALENTINIANS 
64 
every firstborn (πρωτότοκος) male. The first offspring (πρωτογενές) of every 
womb among the Israelites belongs to me, whether human or animal.” The 
double mentioning of words with the same meaning (πρωτότοκος and 
πρωτογενές) in these sentences served as an “invitation” for the allegorists to 
postulate a theory of the two-fold opening of the womb. I will present first 
the Valentinian interpretation of the text that is included in the protological 
myth of Sophia in Iren. Haer. 1.3.4. 
But the Savior is from the All [of the Aeons] and himself is the All 
according to the following passage: “All males that opens the womb.” 
For he, being the All, opened the womb of the Intention of the 
suffering Aeon, who had been expelled from the Pleroma and who is 
called the second Ogdoad as we will speak later on.177 
 
It is clear that Irenaeus’s quotation of this Valentinian myth is an allusion to 
the sanctification of the firstborn mentioned in Ex. 13:2, although the proof-
text stems from Luke’s gospel. The verse Πᾶν ἄρρεν διανοῖγον μήτραν is a 
direct quotation from Luke 2:23, which describes how Jesus was brought 
into the Temple according to Mosaic Law. Every first-born boy that “opens 
his mother’s womb” should be dedicated to God.  
In the Valentinian interpretation, the sanctification of the firstborn and 
opening the womb of the mother was projected into the spiritual realm as 
part of protological myth. Firstly, the Savior was identified with “all males” 
because he was the male offspring of the Pleroma. Secondly, the Savior did 
not open the womb of Sophia from “inside” through his birth, but he opened 
the womb of the suffering Sophia from the outside by healing her emotions 
through knowledge in order to make Sophia capable of procreating spiritual 
offspring as her firstborn (Iren. Haer. 1.4.5).  
Strikingly, Philo has a similar kind of allegorical reading of Ex. 13:12 in 
Her. 117-119, although the context of the interpretation is different. Philo’s 
allegory is part of the preceding discussion in Her. 105-110 in which he 
criticized those, who maintain that the human mental and sense faculties are 
not attributed to God. Philo says that this kind of view represents a selfish 
attitude towards God’s gifts because God's immaterial power fundamentally 
energizes all the activities of mind, speech, and sense perceptions. Philo finds 
a proof-text for his view in an allegorical reading of Ex. 13:12:   
And elsewhere he says “The Lord spoke to Moses saying: “Sanctify to 
me all the first-born, those that are generated first, all that open the 
womb among the children of Israel, whether of human beings or 
animals belong to me.” (Ex. 13.1-2). Thus, it is also admitted here that 
the first in time and value are God’s possessions and especially the 
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first in a generation. For since genus is in every case indestructible, to 
the indestructible God will it be justly assigned.178 
 
Philo notices the repetition of the words πρωτότοκος and πρωτογενές in Ex. 
13:2. In some other passages, Philo suggests that the term “firstborn” 
(πρωτογενές) is the name of the Logos (e.g. Conf. 146) or those, who can be 
equated with the sons of God like Isaac (e.g. Fug. 208). Therefore, the 
meaning of πρωτογενές can be shifted to the new context and the biblical 
passage in question could be read as if it refers to two distinct beings, i.e. the 
one who is brought forth from the womb (πρωτότοκος) and the one who opens 
the womb for them (πρωτογενές). The term firstborn (πρωτότοκος) is 
associated with reason and speech, which are brought forth when the Logos 
(πρωτογενές) opens the human mind like a womb. The human mental 
activities should be attributed to God, because their cause, the Logos, is the 
firstborn dedicated to Father. Therefore, Philo can write:    
And that is true too of one who opens the womb of all from man; that 
is reason and speech, to the beast; that is sense and body. For he that 
opens the womb of each of these, of mind, to mental apprehensions, of 
speech, to the activities of the voice, of the sense, to receive the 
pictures presented to it by objects, of the body, to the movements and 
postures proper to it, is the invisible, seminal artificer, the divine 
Logos, which will be fitly dedicated to its Father.179 
 
Although the context of the allegory in Ex. 13:2 in Philo’s text differs from 
Iren. Haer. 1.3.4, the rather awkward logic when reading the passage is 
strikingly similar: it is not the firstborn (πρωτότοκος) only who opens the 
womb from the “inside” through birth, but there is another being dedicated 
to the Father as his firstborn (πρωτογενές) which opens the womb from the 
“outside.” In Philo, the “womb” is the mind, speech or the body, the offspring 
are the activities of these capacities (understanding, voice, sense perception 
and bodily motions), and the one that opens the womb is the Logos dedicated 
to the Father. In the Valentinian allegory, it is the emotions of Sophia that 
are referred to as the womb, the offspring is Sophia’s spiritual seed, and the 
one who opens her womb through knowledge is the Savior being the All, i.e. 
the perfect fruit of the Pleroma. Despite the apparent differences in the 
context of the allegorical interpretation, the Valentinian reading of the text 
evidently requires the allegorical “double reading” of Ex. 13:12, which is 
similar to that of Philo’s in Her. 117-119. 
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3.3.2 A moderate allegorical teaching in Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora 
The second example of Valentinian allegorical exegesis represents a more 
moderate approach. It comes from Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora that is 
preserved as a whole in Greek in Epiphanius’s Panarion (33.3-7). The letter 
is didactic, and it is composed stylistically according to the pattern of Greco-
Roman public speeches.180 The argumentative technique of the letter follows 
the philosophical method of διαίρεσις according to which the subject matter is 
divided into subcategories and the specific differences between terms are 
made explicit.  
Although the letter is addressed to Flora, who is called in the letter “my 
honorable sister,” the epistle in not a private letter in a strict sense, but it can 
be compared with the philsophical letter written by Epicurus or Porphyry.181 
We can conclude, however, that the recipient of the letter is part of the inner 
circle of the Valentinian community, but she would be in need of further 
instruction to “prove worthy of the apostolic tradition.”  
The consensus is that the intellectual background of Ptolemy’s letter was 
the Marcionite schism in Rome in the middle of the second century. Ptolemy 
intended to solve one main problem, which was related to the two errenous 
opinions of the origin of the Mosaic Law. On the one hand, Ptolemy’s 
opponents were those “ordinary” Christians, who suggested that Moses’s Law 
came from the highest God. On the other hand, some radical Marcionites 
thought that the Law of Moses came from the Devil.182 Ptolemy represents a 
sophisticated middle way between these extreme options. He argues that the 
Law of Moses does not come from the perfect God or the Devil, but from God 
of the Hebrew Bible, who although not perfect but is just. 
The identity of the author of Ptolemy’s letter and his relation to the 
teachings described by Irenaeus in Iren. Haer. 1.1-8 is a somewhat debated 
issue in scholarship. There have been attempts to connect the author of the 
letter to the incident mentioned by Justin in the Second Apology. Justin tells 
about a Christian teacher in Rome called Ptolemy whose female disciple 
converted to Christianity and left her husband on account of his debauchery. 
Justin mentions that Ptolemy was arrested and eventually executed for being 
a Christian under the prefect Urbinus (144-160 CE). Although it cannot be 
said with certainty whether Ptolemy in Justin’s Apology is identical with the 
Valentinian Ptolemy, it is interesting that the Letter to Flora handles the 
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question of permission to divorce under certain conditions and the ethics of 
revenge. These issues were also present in Justin’s story about Ptolemy and 
his female disciple.183 I suggest, however, that we do not have enough 
information to identify Ptolemy in Justin’s Apology with the Valentinian 
Ptolemy who wrote the letter to Flora. Moreover, Jesus’ prohibition of 
divorce was central to Marcion’s argumentation and therefore the topic of the 
letter may have been part of Anti-Marcionite polemics rather than the 
personal circumstances of the recipient of the letter.184 
Also, Ptolemy’s relation to the descriptions of the Valentinian teaching in 
Iren. Haer. 1.1-8 is problematic.  Markschies has argued that in Iren. Haer. 
1.1-7 Irenaeus describes mainly the teachings of the “followers of Valentinus,” 
who are a different group than the “disciples of Ptolemy” or those “around 
Ptolemy” mentioned in Iren. Haer. 1. praef. and 1.21. In addition, it is not 
evident that the protological commentary on John. 1:1-3 attested in Iren. 
Haer. 1.8.5 goes back to Ptolemy, because its ascription (et Ptolemaeus 
quidem ita) exists only in the Latin translation of Irenaeus’s work but is 
missing in Epiphanius’ Greek text. Markschies says that the ascription in the 
Latin texts of Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 is an error, and therefore, Ptolemy’s Letter to 
Flora is the only reliable source for a reconstruction of his teaching, which 
does not contain any cosmological myth. 185  
I suggest that Markschies’s argumentation goes too far. Firstly, the 
distinction between “the disciples of Valentinus” and “the disciples of 
Ptolemy” is artificial. There is no reason to suggest that the teachings of 
Ptolemy’s disciples are not included in Irenaeus’s source material mentioned 
in Iren. Haer. 1. praef.186 Secondly, we do not have any explanation why the 
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Latin redactor of Irenaeus’s text would have added the erroneous ascription 
to the Valentinian protological commentary. Thirdly, Ptolemy’s letter is not 
protreptic, as Markschies correctly points out. Therefore, it is 
comprehensible that Ptolemy did not present the whole doctrine concerning 
the first principle in his letter, but concentrated on one acute topic. The 
omission of protology in Ptolemy’s letter is not a mark of deviancy from 
Irenaeus’s description of the Valentinian myth. It is also possible that the 
protological commentary does not represent an authentic teaching of 
Ptolemy, but goes back to his disciples in Rome who may have elaborated 
Ptolemy’s teaching.  
Ptolemy gives, however, a significantly different kind of interpretation of 
John’s prologue in his letter of Flora than in the protological commentary in 
Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 (par. Exc. Theod. 6-7). In the Letter to Flora, Ptolemy 
explains that “the all” (τὰ παντά) in John 1:3 refers to the creation of the 
visible cosmos by the Demiurge, while in the protological commentary it 
refers to the creation of the intelligible cosmos by the Logos. Irenaeus 
criticized the latter view and argued that “the all” must refer to the creation 
of the visible cosmos by the Logos because it stated in the Gospel of John that 
the Savior came to his own world, “but according to Marcion and those like 
him, neither was the world made by him nor did he come to his own things, 
but to those of another.”187 Strikingly, in the Letter to Flora Ptolemy presents 
an interpretation, which is parallel with Irenaeus’s critical view. 
For our Savior has declared that “A house or city divided against 
itself cannot stand” [Matt. 12:25]. And further, to deprive the liars 
beforehand of their unfounded wisdom, the apostle says that “the 
creation of the world belongs to him.” [John 1:10-11] and that “all 
things were made by him and nothing is made without him” [1:3], 
that is by a just God, who hates iniquity, not a god of corruption.188  
 
The demiurgic agent in this passage is the Savior, who entered into the world 
on his own (John 1:11) and the just God, i.e. the Demiurge, is in another 
agent through whom all things in the world were made (John 1.3).189 Ptolemy 
argued that thus the apostle “took away in advance the baseless wisdom of 
the false accusers, and shows that the creation is not due to a God, who 
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brings corruption, but to the one who is just and hates evil.”190 Although “the 
all” is not created by the Logos in Ptolemy’s letter, but by the just creator 
God, “the all” refers, however, to the creation of the visible world, not to the 
creation of the intelligible cosmos as in Ptolemy’s protological commentary 
in Iren. Haer. 1.8.5. 
It seems that both Irenaeus and Ptolemy have used a common anti-
Marcionite argumentation, which circulated among Christian teachers in 
Rome. Ptolemy’s view differed, however, from Irenaeus in that in addition to 
the Savior, who was the principal creative agent, there was another agent, the 
just Demiurge, through whom the Savior created the world. From Ptolemy’s 
point of view, Irenaeus represented the other extreme view according to 
which the creation, as well as the Mosaic Law, came from a perfect God. 
Ptolemy could use, however, practically the same method as Irenaeus in 
rejecting some radical opponents, who thought that the Devil created the 
cosmos.191  
It seems that Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora was an introductory teaching that 
followed a more elaborated protological teaching about the first principles 
and the origin of the cosmos. This may have been part of the further 
teaching, which would explain “how different natures evolved from the 
Father of All.”192 We can conlude that the Valentinian exegesis was not as 
radical as Irenaeus tried to show, but it was instead multidimensional. There 
may be different levels of interpretation of the same biblical texts, and the 
level of interpretation depended on the intellectual level of the audience. 
Valentinian exegesis parallels Philo, who was also a proponent of “multiple 
exegesis,” which means that the text can be handled at different levels 
depending on the reader’s spiritual capability or the context of the 
interpretation.   
There are also some other allegorical teachings in Ptolemy’s Letter to 
Flora, which parallel Philo’s teachings concerning the division of Mosaic Law 
and spiritual interpretation of its cultic observances. Ptolemy divided the 
Mosaic Law into two parts. Firstly, there is the law of God, which comes from 
the Demiurge; and secondly the commandments, which contain human 
additions by Moses or the elders. In addition, Ptolemy divided the law, which 
was purified of human additions, into three sub-categories. Firstly, the pure 
law, i.e. the Ten Commandments, which contains both commands 
(πρόσταξεις) and prohibitions (ἀπαγόρευσεις). This is the law which was made 
perfect by the Savior. Secondly, the cultic law, which is typical and symbolic, 
                                                 
190 ἔτι τε τὴν τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργίαν ἰδίαν λέγει εἶναι τὰ τε πάντα δι᾽αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ 
γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ὁ ἀπόστλος προαποστερήσας τὴν τῶν ψευδηγορούντων ἀνυπόστατον σοφίαν καὶ οὐ 
φθοροποιοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ δικαίου καὶ μισοπονήρου. 
191 Rasimus, “Ptolemaeus and the Prologues’ Valentinian Exegesis,” 149-154. 
192 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 263-268. Dunderberg maintains that we cannot be sure 
whether the cosmological myth Ptolemy had in mind was identical with what we now find in Iren. 
Haer. 1.1.1-3. See Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 79. 
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and is enacted according to the image of the spiritual level (τυπικὸν καὶ 
συμβολικὸν τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τῶν πνευματικῶν). Thirdly, the law that is based 
upon retaliation and has been abolished absolutely by the Savior.193  
In most cases, Philo divided the Law into the historical part and the 
legislative part. The historical part contains the history of the families as well 
as the punishments and rewards of wicked and virtuous human beings. The 
legislative part, i.e. the Ten Commandments and particulars laws, is divided 
into the commandments (πρόσταξεις) and the prohibitions (ἀπαγόρευσεις).194 
Ptolemy’s tripartite division of the Law (the Law of God himself, the 
legislation of Moses and the commandments of the elders) parallels 
Josephus, Jewish-Christian and rabbinical sources.195 It is noticeable, 
however, that the division of the Law into the “commands and prohibitions” 
is not distinctive in the Septuagint, Josephus or the New Testament. It seems 
that Ptolemy knew of similar categorizing of the legislative part of the Mosaic 
Law in to the “commandments and prohibitions” as Philo had done.196  
Philo made also a distinction concerning the distribution of the Law. 
While the Ten Commandments were dictated directly by God, the particular 
laws came through Moses, whom God filled with the Spirit in order to 
become capable of interpreting his will.197 Philo regarded, however, the whole 
Law as perfect regardless of the means through which it was distributed to 
humankind. Philo saw only some problem in the execution of the penalties of 
the Law. It was intolerable that a good God could himself have been 
responsible for the execution of penalties for breaking the law of God. 
Therefore, God delegated the punishments to his subordinate punitive 
powers or angels. Ptolemy’s criticism of the law was harsher than Philo’s. It 
was not only the execution of the death penalty but the law of retaliation 
itself, which was mixed with evil and must be rejected altogether. 
In addition to the theory concerning the division of the law, Ptolemy 
presents in his letter allegorical and spiritual interpretations of the cultic 
commandments. Animal sacrifices were not allowed, but the Christians 
should offer only spiritual sacrifices such as praise, fellowship and 
beneficence. In the same manner, circumcision does not mean a fleshly, 
outward ritual, but a circumcision of the heart. The Sabbath and fasting 
                                                 
193 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 82; Francis T. Fallon, “The Law in Philo and Ptolemy: A Note 
on the Letter to Flora,” VC (30) 1976, 46-47. 
194 Philo’s view concerning the division of the Law is not consistent. In Mos. 2.45-48 the creation of 
the world is included in the historical part of the Law, whereas in Abr. 2-5 and Praem. 1-3 Philo sees 
the creation of the world as a distinct part of the Law. In Abr. 2-5 the lives of the patriarchs served as 
archetypes for the particular laws, which apparently also contain the Ten Commandments. In Mos. 
2.45-48 and Praem. 1-3 the historical part is separated from the legislative part, which is divided in 
Mos. 2.45-48 into commandments and prohibitions. 
195 Markschies, “New Research,” 233-234. 
196 Fallon, “The Law in Philo and Ptolemy,” 49. 
197 Dec. 175-176. 
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mean rest and abstention from evil deeds.198 The symbolic interpretation of 
the Law of Moses is attested in various Jewish and early Christian sources 
(cf. e.g. the Epistle of Barnabas). Also, circumcision as a symbol of spiritual 
improvement and excision of pleasures was commonplace in Hellenistic 
Jewish teaching.199 Philo mentions this interpretation but also Paul, who 
made a distinction between the external sign and the spiritual significance of 
the covenant.200 Philo also mentions the metaphor of sacrifice as the “piety of 
the soul who loves God” and “the thanksgiving of the sages,” which parallels 
Paul, who taught that piety is the real sacrifice of the believer.201 It is likely 
that Ptolemy’s source for these interpretations was not Philo but Paul. 
There are, however, some allegories of cultic law in Ptolemy’s letter that 
do not have exact parallels in the New Testament but in Philo. Paul does not 
mention the spiritual interpretation of the Sabbath as avoiding evil deeds as 
Ptolemy does, nor does he allegorize the Jewish dietary laws. Philo says, 
however, that the Sabbath is not only the day of philosophizing and 
contemplation of the creation but also the day for repentance and ethical 
improvement.202 In addition, fasting is not solely abstinence or avoidance of 
certain foods, but a symbol of the fight against bodily passions together with 
the holy prayers, “in which they are wont to ask that their old sins may be 
forgiven and new blessings gained and enjoyed.”203 These notions bring 
Ptolemy’s spiritual interpretations of the Mosaic Law rather close to the 
allegorical patterns that are found in the writings of Philo.  
This second case study concerning allegorical interpretation in Ptolemy’s 
Letter to Flora shows that Valentinian allegorical exegesis was 
multidimensional. The Valentinian allegories were not only extreme 
symbolism about the spiritual realm, which were comprehensible only in the 
light of Valentinian protological myth. The Valentinian sources also contain 
moderate interpretations of the law which recall Philo’s division of the 
Mosaic Law and allegorical interpretations of its cultic commandments.  
3.4  Conclusions 
The origin of the Valentinian tradition can be traced back to the years after 
the Jewish revolt in Alexandria during the first half of the second century CE. 
                                                 
198 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 83. 
199 Abraham’s circumcision as a symbol of excision of pleasures is mentioned also in the Gospel of 
Philip: “When Abraham [was able] to see what he was to see, [he] circumcised the flesh of the foreskin, 
thus teaching us that it is necessary to destroy the flesh.” (Gos.Phil. 82, 26-29). Translated by Marvin 
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The religious and intellectual milieu of Alexandria served as an urban setting 
for the birth of various Gnostic school traditions, which continued the 
traditions of philosophical Judaism combined with Pauline theology. Rather 
than a sect or cult within early Christianity, the school of Valentinus can be 
regarded as a Christianized cult within the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition. 
The Valentinian teachers taught Pythagorean transcendental monism in the 
guise of Christian religiosity. They can be equated with the popular 
philosophers, even though the social setting of the school of Valentinus was 
the Christian ecclesia. The attitude of the Valentinians towards Christian 
cultic observances was twofold. On the one hand, the Christian rituals were 
seen merely as propaidea for the deeper mysteries without any 
transformative power. On the other hand, the sacraments were converted 
into Platonic theurgy and were the means to gain spiritual redemption from 
the bondage of the flesh. It is rather likely that the different views concerning 
the rituals were related to the more profound anthropological disagreement 
concerning the degree of the incarnation of the soul.  
The Valentinian teachers were famous for their allegorical interpretation 
of the Bible. Although the allegorical method was used by the Hellenistic 
philosophers as a hermeneutical tool in interpreting Greco-Roman myths 
and poetry, the Valentinian teachers and Philo differed from them in that the 
allegorical method had its basis in the linguistic theory about the confusion 
of language. This means that the allegorical level was not artificially added to 
the text, but the religious texts were intentionally written allegorically, and, 
therefore, must be decoded through the allegorical method. In many cases 
the Valentinian exegetes reformed the preceding Gnostic mythopoiesis on 
the grounds of Hellenistic Jewish allegorical methods by integrating the 
Gnostic myth more closely to the actual biblical text and downplaying the 
distinctively Gnostic motifs in the myth.  
The two case studies handled at the end of this chapter demonstrate that 
the Valentinian exegesis was multidimensional. The degree of allegorical 
symbolism depended on the intellectual level of the audience and the context 
of the texts, which parallels Philo, who was also a proponent of “multiple 
exegesis.” Valentinian exegesis was based on a careful reading of the text, 
which contains clues and invites the use of the allegorical method. The 
allegorical meaning was not added artificially to the text, but it followed 
certain rules of interpretation. Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora proves that the 
author of the letter was familiar with the categorization of Mosaic Law and 
the symbolical interpretation of Jewish cultic law, which are also found in 
Philo.  
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4 PROTOLOGY: THE CREATION OF THE 
INTELLIGIBLE COSMOS  
In this chapter, I will investigate issues that are related to the conception of 
God and the creation of the so-called “intelligible cosmos” − κόσμος νοητός – 
a concept first mentioned by Philo of Alexandria. The Valentinian 
protological account becomes comprehensible in the light of Middle Platonic 
philosophy, which intended to harmonize the Platonic two-world model with 
Aristotelian transcendent philosophy and Pythagorean first principles. Philo 
of Alexandria can be located in the initial stage of this same Platonic-
Pythagorean tradition. David Winston has pointed out that the 
philosophical-mystical tradition of Plato was “the first intellectual love for 
Philo” and I would suggest that this goes for the Valentinian teachers as 
well.204 Just as Lady Philosophy revealed herself to Boethius, it was the 
Pythagorean Tetrad who revealed himself to Marcus the Magician in the 
shape of a woman or the Logos who spoke to Valentinus in the voice of a 
child.205 Although the common Middle Platonic intellectual background 
explains many parallels between Philo and the Valentinian tradition, 
Valentinian teachers were also dependent on Hellenistic Jewish allegorical 
inventions similar to those attested in Philo’s writings. I will begin this 
chapter with a brief sketch of the philosophical background of Valentinian 
protology. 
4.1 Philo of Alexandria, Valentinian teachers and the 
transcendental monotheism 
The birth of the Middle Platonic tradition is related to the return of dogmatic 
Platonism and the renaissance of Pythagoreanism. In the period between the 
first century BCE and the first CE, the Academy and the Lyceum were closed, 
Aristotle’s school treatises were put into circulation, and there was a revival 
of interest in Pythagorean pseudepigrapha. Aristotle’s philosophy became a 
tool to discuss philosophical issues, which were related to interpreting Plato’s 
writings.206 It was Eudorus of Alexandria (ca. 30 BCE), who revised Plato’s 
                                                 
204 Winston, Logos, 13. 
205 The conversation with Lady Philosophy is a well-known theme in Boethius’s work Consolation 
of Philosophy. For Boethius, Lady Philosophy is both the healer and nurturer who reveals Boethius’s 
intellectual disease. For the mystical experiences of Marcus and Valentinus, see Iren. Haer. 1.14.1; 
Hipp. Ref. 6.42.2. 
206 Mauro Bonazzi, “Eudorus of Alexandria and Early Imperial Platonism,” in The Bulletin of the 
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cosmological model in the Timaeus in the light of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and 
Neo-Pythagorean principles in a way which became standard among Middle 
Platonic teachers, although Eudorus’s extreme monism was not favored by 
all later Middle Platonists. Bonazzi maintains that “Eudorus’s doctrine 
appears as one of the first attempts to break with Stoic tradition, with the aim 
of promoting a turn (or return) to a transcendent principle.”207 The 
Pythagorean turn in Eudorus had a significant impact on the intellectual 
milieu, especially in Alexandria. During this development, some pseudo-
Pythagorean works (e.g. pseudo-Archytas and pseudo-Timaeus’s On the 
Nature of the World) were written in Eudorus’s circle in order to emphasize 
the Pythagorean nature of the Old Academy.208 
The discussion concerning Pythagorean protology started during the Old 
Academy. Plato had already in Parmenides taken up the problem of how the 
world of multiplicity could be derived from unity, which “cannot have a name 
or be spoken of, nor can there be any knowledge or perception of opinion of 
it” (Parm. 141e-142a; cf. also Philebus 26e-30e). Also, the systematic 
development of the series of paired principles had already been introduced 
by Plato’s immediate successors (Speusippus, Xenocrates), but it was based 
on dualistic philosophy. Eudorus first time articulated the idea of the 
transcendent One above the Monad and the Dyad, which brings these 
opposite principles together.209 
The most influential critic of Plato’s Timaeus was Aristotle, whose 
supreme God was a transcendent and meta-cosmic intellect who did not 
engage in any practical activity. Rather than an efficient cause of the changes 
of the visible world, he is an unmoved mover, who moves everything through 
attraction (ὄρεξις) like a magnet.210 Eudorus’ innovation was to identify the 
Aristotelian prime mover with the Platonic Demiurge, who became the 
highest God (ὁ ὑπεράνω θεός). The transcendent God was associated with the 
Pythagorean “one” (τὸ ἕν) and Ideas, which had in Plato’s cosmology an 
                                                 
207 Bonazzi, “Eudorus of Alexandria,” 373; Turner, Sethian Gnosticism, 345-355. 
208 Riccardo Chiaradonna “Platonist Approaches to Aristotle: from Antiochus of Ascalon to 
Eudorus of Alexandria,” in Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC (ed. Malcolm Schofield; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2013. 
209 Alexander Polyhistor, who was writing a few decades earlier than Eudorus, knew nothing of this 
teaching in his summary of Pythagorean thought. Eudorus’ss system is preserved in the 6th -century 
Neo-Platonist Simplicius’ In Phys. 181.10 ff. Diels. See Mauro Bonazzi, “Pythagoreanizing Aristotle: 
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independent existence, became the thoughts of God. As the Ideas 
externalized from God’s mind, they became the Monad (μονάς), which was 
commonly associated with the rational aspect of Plato’s World Soul. Besides 
the Monad was the Dyad (δυάς), which also was derived from the One to 
become the principle of matter and multiplicity. In Pseudo-Archytas’s 
Principles the first pair of principles (the Monad and the Dyad) are equated 
with Aristotelian form and matter, but there is the third principle above 
them, the highest God, which could bring them together.211  
In the various Middle Platonic systems the discussion concerning the first 
principles was related to these basic ontological structures, the One, the 
Monad, and the Dyad, although the systems differed in details. In some 
systems, the demiurgic activity of the transcendent God was delegated to the 
Monad, which was divided and “infected” as it came in contact with pre-
existent matter.212 In some other systems, the opposition of the first 
principles (the Monad and the Dyad) was stressed in a manner that led to a 
strict cosmological dualism.213  
The Valentinian protological myth can be located in the Neo-Pythagoren 
tradition, which saw the intelligible cosmos as a combination of form (active, 
male) and matter (passive, female) and above them is located the 
transcendent One, who possesses the characteristics of the Aristotelian self-
thinking God. The Middle Platonic doxographer Aetius described Plato’s view 
about God in the following way: 
 
                                                 
211 Bonazzi, “Eurodorus of Alexandria,” 376. The author of Pseudo-Archytas is not the early 
Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum, although in antiquity Iamblichus, followed by others within the 
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Jan Opsomer, “Plutarch on the One and the Dyad,” in The Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. 
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Plato affirms that God is the One, the single natured and the self-
natured, the monadic, true Being, and the Good. All such names refer 
to the intellect. God therefore is intellect, a separate form…Of this 
Father and Maker the cosmos the other divine beings are offspring. 
Some are intelligible, the so-called intelligible cosmos <and the 
ideas>. These are paradigms of the visible cosmos.214 
 
The main tenets in this description can also be found in the writings of Philo, 
who may have been a contemporary of Aetius. Although it is not likely that 
Philo would have been a member of any philosophical school, his 
philosophical commentaries on the Scriptures bear all the marks of the 
Middle Platonic tradition, which was influenced by Neo-Pythagoreanism. 
Philo can be located within the earliest phase of Middle Platonic tradition 
that goes back to the circle of Eudorus of Alexandria.215 For Philo, Moses was 
a Platonic philosopher, who crypted Neo-Pythagorean principles in numbers, 
etymologies, and symbols.216 This means that the Scriptures contain 
                                                 
214 Translation is taken from David Runia’s article “The beginnings of the end: Philo of Alexandria 
and Hellenistic Theology,” in Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background 
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Mut. 11-14 (cf. also Post. 171). Cf. Gregory Sterling, “The Theft of Philosophy: Philo of Alexandria and 
Numenius of Apamea,” in The Studia Philonicia Annual XXVII (Atlanta: SBL, 2015), 71-85. 
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philosophical truths, which can be revealed through the allegorical method of 
interpretation. Philo’s cosmological or anthropological theories become 
comprehensible on the grounds of philosophical discussion within the 
Middle Platonic tradition. As John Dillon has pointed out: 
Certainly, God is in heaven, and he is the creator of our world, but he 
did not create it according to a pattern laid up in his mind, which is 
co-extensive with his heaven. If we find such a concept in a Jewish 
thinker such as Philo, or later Christian theorists such as Clement or 
Origen, we reckon that it has been imported from somewhere else; 
and the same is the case if we come upon it in a document of 
Gnosticism, Christian or otherwise.217 
 
Philo was a representative of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, which owed 
much to the Pythagorean revival within the philosophical circles of 
Alexandria.218 The three main topics – ideas, matter and the role of the 
Demiurge − which were discussed within Middle Platonic circles and 
presented in the quotation of Aetius above were also fundamental in Philo’s 
philosophical exegesis. The main principles of the Middle Platonic tradition 
can be found in Philo’s writings.  
 
1. The postulation of the unknowable and transcendent first principle 
called the One, or God, or the first Monad, who is also the Creator of 
All. 
2. The use of the Pythagorean principle in the conceptualizing of the first 
principles of the cosmos. 
3. The postulation of the second Monad, which derived from the first 
Monad and was identified with the Logos and associated with the 
Platonic world soul.  
4. The postulation of ideas as the thoughts of God, which were located in 
the second Monad. 
5. The postulation of the pre-cosmic principle of matter, i.e. the Dyad, 
which was derived from the Logos. 
 
In a fragment that contains a discussion of Philo and his nephew Alexander, 
Philo says that he is not a teacher but an interpreter.219 This would mean that 
Philo was an interpreter of ancient philosophical teachings, but he was not a 
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teacher of a philosophical school, who initiated others. But originally, Philo 
was an interpreter of the Scripture. In his exegetical treatises, Philo did not 
present philosophical teachings systematically, as the ancient doxographers 
did, but philosophical premises were revealed from the Scriptures through 
spiritual exegesis. Philo also wrote philosophical works in which he 
systematically discusses some fundamental philosophical questions, such as 
the eternity of the world or providence. 
Philo is one of the earliest imperial philosophers who explicitly articulated 
many of those theories which became dominant in the first- and second-
century Platonic tradition. Philo says clearly that the ineffable and 
transcendent God is “the One who is greater than the Good, antecedent to the 
Monad, purer than the One, impossible to see by another being since he is 
apprehensible to himself alone.”220 Philo’s theory concerning the origin of 
matter was influenced by Platonic-Pythagorean teachings which supposedly 
went back to Eurodorus of Alexandria.221 Also, the theory of ideas as God’s 
thoughts and the externalization of God’s thinking as his Logos (= Monad) is 
first found in Philo.222 It would be farfetched to suppose, however, that this 
teaching originated from Philo.223 The most credible explanation is that Philo 
adapted the conception of ideas as God’s thought(s) from the Platonic circles 
of Alexandria, possibly from Eudorus, which he integrated into his Logos -
theology. The two phases of the existence of Logos in Philo are summarized 
by Harry Wolfson as follows:  
                                                 
220 Praem. 40; Cont. 2; Leg. 5; QG 2:44.  
221 W. Theiler has suggested that Philo drew his teachings from the commentary by Eudorus on 
Plato’s Timaeus. See “Philo von Alexandria und der hellenisierteTimaeus,” in Philomathes: Studies 
and Essays in the Humanities in Honour of Philip Merlan (ed. R. B. Palmer and R. G. Hammerton-
Kelly; Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 25-35. The theory of the creation of matter is investigated in 
chapter 5.   
222 Opif. 16-20. 
223 In Plato’s Timaeus the Ideas existed independently besides the Demiurge and the Receptacle as 
the third arche of creation. It became common within the Middle Platonic tradition to locate the Ideas 
in the mind of God. The Ideas have their origin in the mind of God, but in two subsequent phases: 
firstly collectively in the mind of the transcendent One, and in the second phase as the objects of his 
thought. This is attested in the Placita of Aetius in 1.3.21: Πλάτων τρεῖς ἀρχάς, τὸν θεὸν τὴν ἰδέαν· ὁ δὲ 
θεὸς ἐστι τοῦ κόσμου, ὕλη δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ, ἰδέα δὲ οὐσία ἀσώματος ἐν τοῖς 
νοήμασιν καὶ φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ. (cf. Jones, “The Ideas,” 321). Radice agreed with Wolfson, who 
suggested that Philo was the inventor of the conception that the Ideas are the thoughts of God. This 
view was adopted by the later Middle Platonists (cf. R. Radice, “Observations on the Theory of the 
Ideas as Thoughts of God in Philo of Alexandria,” in The Studia Philonica Annual 3 (ed. by D. T. Runia, 
D. M. Hay and D. Winston; Atlanta: SBL: 1991), 128. Actually, Varro (116 – 27 BCE) attested the same 
concept in the allegory of Minerva springing from the head of Jupiter as the Ideas spring from the 
mind of God (Aug. Civ. Dei VII, 28). See Dillon, “Pleroma and Noetic Cosmos,” 101. 
 79 
The Logos, therefore, which started its career as the mind of God or 
as the thinking power of God, and hence is identical with the essence 
of God, now enters upon a second stage of its existence, as an 
incorporeal mind created by God, having existence outside of God’s 
essence, and containing within itself the intelligible world and the 
myriad of ideas of which the latter consists.224  
 
Aristotle’s conception of God as a self-thinking Nous may have influenced 
Philo’s theory of God.225 In Philo, however, God is not thinking of himself 
solely, as Aristotle’s prime mover does, but the object of thinking is both God 
himself and his thoughts, νοήματα, i.e. the Ideas.226 In the intelligible realm 
God is identical with his thought, and the moment he thinks something 
distinct from himself these thoughts, i.e. the Ideas, are externalized from 
himself. Therefore, the Ideas did not have an existence of their own, but were 
created by God, who began to think about them. 
The objects of God’s thoughts are the archetypes of the visible cosmos.227 
David Winston has pointed out that “the Logos is not a second entity by the 
side of God acting on his behalf, nor is it an empty abstraction, but rather a 
vivid and living hypostatization of an essential aspect of the Deity, the face of 
God turned toward creation.”228  
Philo was aware that the Ideas were according to Plato not only patterns, 
or representations, but also causes (αἰτίαι) and powers (δύναμεις).229 Philo 
intends to show that this teaching was presented already by Moses: the glory 
that surrounds God consists of the powers of God which refer, according to 
Philo, to the Ideas in their pre-created stage. These ideas emanated like rays 
of light from the light giving God.230 Philo can also say that the intelligible 
                                                 
224 Wolfson, Philo I, 232.  
225 Harry Wolfson, “Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas,” in Journal of 
History of Ideas (22) 1961, 5; Roger Jones, “The Ideas as the Thoughts of God,” in Classical Philology 
(21) 1926, 323-324. 
226 Ar. Met. XII 9, 1074b, 34; 1075a, 3-5; Albinus, Didaskalos, 9. See Jones, “Ideas,” 324. 
227 It was rather difficult for Philo to find biblical proofs for the theory that the Logos of God is a 
pattern according to which the visible cosmos is created. Philo infers this idea from Gen. 1:26-27, 
according to which the human being was created according to the image of God. This image of God was 
the Logos, and it served as the archetype for the creation of the soul of the first human being, or, at 
least, its rational part. Philo inferred that if the human soul is an image of Logos, there is no reason to 
reject the idea that the whole visible cosmos is also fashioned according to Logos, which contained all 
the archetypical patterns of the visible world. See David Runia, On the Creation of the Cosmos 
according to Moses. Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Atlanta: SBL, 2001), 149-150. 
228 Winston, Logos, 49-50.  
229 Plato presents the conception of ideas as powers and causes in Phaedo 95 e ff.; Sophist 247 d-e, 
which is referred to by Philo in Mut. 122 and Spec. Leg. I 45-48. 
230 Spec. 1. 45-48, Cher. 31.106; Immut. 17.78; Wolfson, Philo, 217-219; Winston, Logos, 19. 
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world has been brought together using powers.231 The powers have a role in 
structuring matter because God cannot shape shapeless matter directly by 
himself but through the agency of incorporeal powers that are also called 
ideas.232 The Ideas do not have, thus, in Philo an independent existence as in 
Plato, but they are inseparable from God, whose thinking (“Ideas”) and 
acting (“powers”) are simultaneous. To sum up: Philo’s God creates the world 
by thinking about it, and if He stopped thinking, the whole world would 
collapse. 
In Philo’s transcendental monism, the whole world was interralated 
through the Logos, which was a cosmic bond holding all things together. 
There were several tiers of cosmic forces, which were all derived from the 
One. At the top was the supreme God, whose essence is not definable, but 
only his existence. At the second level is the “second god,” the Logos, which 
takes in the world of becoming the form of the Ruling Power (Lord) and the 
Creative Power (God). These powers can be equated with Plato’s two 
principles, peras and apeiron (Philebus 23C-31A). Although the essence of 
God and his powers is not knowable, they show a kind of impressions 
(ἐκμαγεῖα) of their energy to the minds, which are created as images of the 
Logos.233     
4.2 The outline of the Valentinian myth  
It became rather common in the first century Middle Platonism to depict God 
in an apophatic manner, which stressed the transcendence of God. There was 
nothing that can define the transcendent One because this would mean that 
there is a more profound principle which can determine the primal God.234 
Alcinous said that the first God is “eternal, ineffable and the summit of all 
perfections, the source of all goodness being the object of desire.”235 Philo 
also stated that God was unutterable and absolutely without physical 
                                                 
231 Conf. 172; Winston, Logos, 19, note 40. 
232 Spec. 1.329. I will investigate Philo’s theory of the Logos-tomeus in the following chapter. 
According to his theory, the Logos is not only an archetype but a cutting power, dividing pre-cosmic 
matter according to its physical characteristics. (cf. Her. 133ff.) 
233 Cf. David Winston, “Philo’s Conception of the Divine Nature,” in Neoplatonism and Jewish 
Thought (ed. Lenn E. Goodman; Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 21-23; M. David Litwa, “The Deification 
of Moses in Philo of Alexandria,” in The Studia Philonica Annual 26 (2014). 
234 John Peter Kenney,”Ancient Apophatic Theology,” in Gnosticism and Later Platonism: 
Themes, Figures and Texts (ed. by John D. Turner & Ruth Majercik, Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 260-264. 
Although Aristotle did not say that God’s essence is unknowable, he maintained that God is 
incorporeal, simple, indivisible and indefinable. Ar. Phys. VIII, 10, 267b; Met. XII, 7, 1072a. See also 
Richard Norman, “Aristotle’s Philosopher-God,” in Articles on Aristotle (eds. Barnes, Schofied, 
Sorabji; London: Duckworth, 1979), 92-102. 
235 Alc. Did. 10.164.30. See Wolfson, Philo I, 115.  
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qualities. One can know only the existence of God through his Logos and 
powers, but the essence of God is incomprehensible.236 For that reason, Philo 
uses a method called κατ' ἀφαίρεσιν in describing God according to which God 
is dissociated from all sensible predicates.237  
In the Valentinian myth the primal God is “invisible and unknowable, 
eternal and unbegotten who remained in throughout innumerable cycles of 
ages in profound serenity and quiescence.”238 In the Tripartite Tractate the 
Father of All “is the one who has been born by no one, but who, on the 
contrary, has given birth to the All and has brought it into being.” He is “also 
unchangeable in his eternal being, in that which he is, in that which makes 
him immutable and that which makes him great” and he does not have a 
partner as he creates, because this would imply a limitation. The eternal 
Father has no name that suits him, and his essence is not comprehensible.239 
The primal God cannot be known except through his hypostasized Mind, who 
only has the capability to contemplate Father’s immeasurable greatness, 
which surpasses all definitions and limits of understanding.240  
The Valentinian account of Clement in Exc.Theod. 43.2-65 (= Exc. C) 
begins abruptly without any description of the creation of the intelligible 
realm. The first thing that is mentioned is the descent of the Savior to Sophia, 
who has been cast out from the Pleroma (Exc. Theod. 43.2). It is clear, 
however, that Exc. C presupposed some preceding protological narrative, but 
we do not know for sure, whether it was similar to that of Irenaeus’s model 
system in Iren. Haer. 1.1-3. We do not have any reason to suppose that the 
accounts of Irenaeus and Clement would have differed significantly from 
each other, although there may have been differences in the terms and 
concepts used in their protologies. I will begin the investigation of 
Valentinian protology by presenting the outline of the myth in Iren. Haer. 
1.1-3, which will be compared with the accounts in Iren. Haer. 1.12.1; Hipp. 
Ref. 6.29.3-4, Exc. Theod. 6-7, and Iren. Haer. 1.8.5.  
   
1. The ultimate transcendent deity Profundity (Βυθός), which is also called 
First-Beginning and First-Father (Προαρχή, Προπάτωρ) possesses Thought 
(Ἔννοια), which is also called Grace and Silence (Χάρις, Σιγή), which depicts 
the primal Deity as a self-thinking Unity.   
2. The First-Father duplicates himself by exteriorization of his Thought and 
generates Mind (Νοῦς). He is also called the Only-Begotten, Father and the 
Beginning (Μονογενής, Πατήρ, Ἀρχή). He emits the “Beginning” of all things 
                                                 
236 Cher. 67; Somn, 1.67; Immut. 62; Praem. 40.  
237 Deus 55-56. The same method is used in Alcinous in Did. X 165.15 and Clement of Alexandria in 
Strom. 5.71.2-3.  
238 Iren. Haer. 1.1-2. 
239 Tri.Trac. 51.8-54.35. Translation by Einar Thomassen in The Nag Hammadi Scripture. 
240 Iren. Haer. 1.1-2. 
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as a “seed” in the womb of Silence, who becomes pregnant and gives birth to 
“Mind.”  
3. Mind (Νοῦς) is the manifested double of the First-Father, whereas Thought 
(Ἔννοια) is the hidden double of the Father. The Mind is “like and equal to 
the one who projected him, and who alone comprehended the greatness of 
the Father.” As a copy of the primal unity in duality, the Mind is joined to his 
pair called Truth (Ἀλήθεια). Thus, these four (Profundity, Silence, Mind and 
Truth) generate the principal Pythagorean Tetrad, which is the root of all 
things. 
4. The Only-Begotten and Truth produced Logos and Life (Λόγος, Ζωή), which 
in turn brought forth the conjugal pair Man and Church (Ἄνθρωπος, 
Ἐκκλησία).  Out of this first-begotten Ogdoad (Bythos-Monogenes-Logos-
Anthropos + their female conjugal pairs the whole Pleroma consisting of 30 
aeons is brought forth.241 
5. The youngest of the aeons, Sophia, intended to know the greatness of the 
Father of All, but she was prevented by an aeon called Limit (Ὅρος), who was 
produced by the Father as a guardian. His task was to prevent the aeons from 
knowing the Father. The Limit was a limiting principle of the divine world 
and he kept the unlimited female aspect of the intelligible world in control.242 
                                                 
241 The ten aeons emitted by Logos and Life are Profound and Mingling, Ageless and Union, Self-
Producing and Pleasure, Immobile and Blending, Only-Begotten and Happiness. The twelve aeons 
emitted by Man and Church are Advocate and Faith, Paternal and Hope, Maternal and Love, Praise 
and Understanding, Ecclesiastic and Blessedness, Desired and Wisdom. 
242 In the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, the term Limit (πέρας) describes the process in which 
unlimited matter was kept in check. In Valentinian theology this principle was called the Boundary 
(ὅρος), but also, the Cross (σταυρός), the Redeemer (λυτρωτής), the Emancipator (καρπίστης), the 
Boundary-setter, (ὁροθέτης) and the Guide (μεταγωγεύς). Irenaeus maintains in Iren. Haer. 1.3.5 that 
the function of the Limit is twofold: when it strengthens the unity is it called σταυρός, but when it 
separates multiplicity it is called ὅρος. In Exc. C the Cross plays a double role: it both separates and 
strengthens (Exc. Theod. 42.1-3). The fan mentioned by John the Baptist (Mt. 3:12) is explained to be 
the Cross, which both purifies the saved and consumes the wicked. These notions are based on the 
allegorical reading of the Gospel of Matthew. The strengthening power of the Cross is depicted in the 
words of Jesus according to which “whoever does not take his cross cannot be my disciple” (Mt. 10:38) 
and the separating power of the Savior is depicted when Jesus says “I came not to send peace, but a 
sword”, i.e. the Cross (Mt. 10:34). The Cross and the Crucifixion were thus associated with the 
Pythagorean metaphysical principle of separation and unification. In this process, the Cross became a 
symbol of the two-fold process in which the lower essences (the Dyad) are separated from the higher 
ones, and at the same time, the purer essences are strengthened into a unity (the Monad). At the 
protological level, the separation of Sophia’s erroneous thought from the Pleroma was seen as a 
“crucifixion”. Matter was crucified out of the Pleroma, but at the same time the Pleroma was unified 
through the Cross. In the same vein, Jesus’s crucifixion was not seen in the gospel narratives as an 
atonement for sins but as a separation of the spiritual and psychic essences from the Savior’s material 
existence. The Valentinians transformed the Pauline theology of the Cross into the metaphysical theory 
of separation. 
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The passion for knowing the Father began already with Mind and Truth, but 
it spread like an infection to Sophia under the deception of love that was 
directed to the Father without a conjugal partner. 
6. The presumptuous thought of Sophia, called Intention, was separated from 
her, and it was cast out of Pleroma by the Limit. In the realm below the 
Pleroma, the Intention became the lower Sophia, called Achamoth. After the 
separation in the divine realm, the Only-Begotten produced another conjugal 
pair Christ and the Holy Spirit (Χριστός - Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον), whose task was to 
inform the other aeons that the First-Father was not able to be 
comprehended except by the Only-Begotten alone.  
7. Finally, all the aeons were strengthened and rectified by the Christ - Holy 
Spirit and the whole Pleroma was brought to rest. All the aeons were made 
equal in form and mind (μορφᾖ καὶ γνωμῄ ἴσους κατασταθῆναι τοὺς Αἰῶνας): all 
became Mind, Logos, etc. and Truth, Life, etc. As a result, all the aeons 
produced together the perfect fruit of Pleroma Jesus, who contains all the 
aeons within himself. Jesus is called “the Savior,” “Christ,” “Logos” and “All.” 
At the same time, the aeons emanated angels to be the bodyguards of the 
Savior. 
8. Sophia Achamoth, who now outside the Pleroma, was saved in two 
subsequent phases that parallel the rectification of Sophia in the Pleroma (cf. 
stages 5-6 above). In the first phase Christ gave form to Sophia, who was 
amorphous and shapeless, but he did it without recourse to perfect 
knowledge. However, Christ left with Sophia the fragrance of immortality 
and perfection. After Christ left her, she started to feel various emotions, 
such as fear, consternation, perplexity and ignorance, but also the emotion of 
“returning” or “repentance” (ἐπιστροφή) to the Light, who had deserted 
her.243 In the second phase of salvation, the Savior descended to Sophia and 
gave her form according to the knowledge and healed her emotions: ὁ Σωτὴρ 
ἐπιφέρει αὐτῇ μόρφωσιν τὴν κατὰ γνῶσιν καὶ ἴασιν τῶν παθῶν.  
9. The Savior separated the emotions of Sophia, which became the origin of 
cosmic matter. The Savior bestowed capability upon the unformed matter 
that was formed into cosmic elements and compounds of the visible cosmos 
by the Demiurge. The psychic and luminous essence was created out of 
Sophia’s will to return to the Light, and the four cosmic elements (earth, 
water, air, fire) were created out of Sophia’s negative emotions. Sophia 
herself was transformed from the hylic-psychic stage into a spiritual being. 
She began to feel joy as she contemplated the Savior and his angels. As a 
                                                 
243 The term ἐπιστροφή (conversion) was not only an essential soteriological term used in the 
gospels and religious texts in general, but in the Valentinian system it became a key technical term that 
also appears in the texts of later Neo-Platonists. Sophia’s will to return to the Light became the source 
of all psychic essences of the world that have an innate desire to return to the Light and to know God. 
This parallels later Neo-Platonic epistemology in which all souls that have come into being from the 
One have an innate desire to revert (ἐπιστροφή) to that from which they have proceeded (cf. Proclus, 
Elements 31-32, Simplicius, Phys. 147.9). 
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product of joy, she produced offspring according to the images of the angels 
of the Savior. The following scheme presents the general structure of the 
Valentinian cosmological system. It also contains the realms of psychic and 
material essences, which are investigated later in the following chapters. 
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4.3 The origin of Valentinian protology 
Einar Thomassen has argued that the Valentinian protologies can be divided 
into two main groups. There are theories that give the aeons an existence in 
the supra-mundane divinity but do not name the particular aeons. The aeons 
are derived from the primal Unity in two subsequent phases: firstly in the 
thought of the Father, and secondly as independent beings when they are 
manifested from Him. The same kind of idea of generative exteriorization is 
the basis for the theories of the second group, but in these accounts the 
names and the number of the aeons are detailed, and the totality of the aeons 
is organized according to the pairs of syzygies. The protological system 
described above (Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3) belongs to the latter model. The main 
representative of the former system is the Tripartite Tractate, but it also lies 
behind the Gospel of Truth and other so-called eastern Valentinian 
documents.244 The difference between the various protological versions lies 
mainly in the concepts, which were chosen for the description of the same 
generation of the first principles from the unitary source. Thomassen points 
out, however, that fundamentally the Valentinian protologies seek to express 
the one and the same truth, namely how the world of multiplicity could 
generate from the unitary whole.245 This means that the Father of All 
                                                 
244 Thomassen maintains that the other writings whose protology can be placed together with 
Ireanaus’ account (Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3) in the same group are Iren. Haer. 1.8.5, Hipp. Haer. VI 29:2-
30:5, Epiph. Pan. XXXI 5-6 and Exc. Theod. 6-7.3. Also, the variations described in Iren. Haer. 1.11-12 
are representations of the same main group. Val. Exp. (NHC XI,2) 22:19-31:34 is the only extant 
surviving document of a protology similar to Irenaeus’s Haer. 1.1.1-3. It belongs to the phase of the 
Valentinian system where the protologies similar to Irenaeus Haer. 1.1-3 (pages 29-30 in the 
document) are combined with protology that parallels the Tripartite Tractate (pages 17-24). This 
notion indicates the importance of the system described by Irenaeus until the latter part of the 3rd 
century, when the document was presumably written. For details, see Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 
194, 236-241.     
245 Einar Thomassen is of the opinion that the protology of Irenaeus’s system represents a 
secondary elaboration of a more primitive theory and the theories in the Tripartite Tractate and the 
Gospel of Truth stand near this primitive theory. Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 200. It should be 
noted that the Valentinian accounts attested in Irenaeus and Exc. C were written at the latest only a few 
decades after the death of Valentinus. This would mean that the elaboration of the Valentinian 
protology according to the Neo-Pythagorean arithmology was made at a rather early phase, possibly in 
Rome within the circle of the disciples of Ptolemy or by Ptolemy himself. Kenney suggests that the 
Tripartite Tractate is a more philosophical version of the Valentinian myth compared to that 
presented by Irenaeus in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3. It should be observed, however, that the Neo-Pythagorean 
and philosophical terminology is more clearly postulated in Irenaeus’s version of the Valentinian myth. 
However, the protological system of the Tripartite Tractate does not contain any explicit references to 
John’s prologue or to Genesis. This would mean that the Valentinians behind the accounts of Irenaeus 
and Exc. C were more interested in the biblical formulation of the Middle Platonic cosmic myth. It is 
possibly that the protological myth in the Tripartite Tractate and the Gospel of Truth belong to the 
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externalized His intention to be known in the form of emanations, i.e. 
intellectual beings called aeons, who have their origin in the mind of God as 
His thoughts. These aeons desired to see the one who emitted them and to be 
informed about their root, which was without beginning.246 It is noticeable 
that the protological model in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3 is based on the protological 
commentary on the prologue of the Gospel of John that is attested in Iren. 
Haer. 1.8.5 having parallel in Clement’s Exc. Theod. 6-7. I will begin the 
examination of the protological commentary with Clement’s version, which 
represents, in my opinion, a more original version of the Valentinian 
commentary on John’s prologue. 
The words “In the Beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with 
God, and the Logos was God” are interpreted by the Valentinians as 
follows: They say that “the Beginning” is the Only-Begotten, whom 
they also call God. Just as he is also explicitly said to be God in the 
following [sentence]: “The only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of 
the Father, he has explained him.” The “Logos” who is in “the 
Beginning” – that is, in the Only-Begotten and Mind and Truth – 
reveals the Christ, being Logos and the Life. Therefore, he too with 
just cause is called God because he is in God and Mind. “That which 
came into being through him” – through Logos – “was the Life” – his 
partner. That is why the Lord also says: “I am the Life.”247  
  
The starting point for the protological theory is the allegorical reading of the 
prologue of the Gospel of John. The expression Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος is an 
ontological rather than a temporal definition: it depicted how the Logos had 
its origin in “the Beginning” or was inside “the Beginning.” At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                          
later phase of the Valentinian tradition, which brought the Valentinian protology closer to 4th-century 
proto-orthodox dogma and the Neo-Platonic speculations of the first principles. Cf. John Peter Kenney, 
“The Platonism of the Tripartite Tractate (NH 1,5),” in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism (edited by Rich 
T. Wallis and Jay Bregman; Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 199, 201-203. 
Pheme Perkins has argued that the Platonic features of the Gnostic myth came from the church fathers, 
who intended to make Valentinians look like Platonists. Cf. Pheme Perkins, “Christologies in the Nag 
Hammadi Codices,” VC 35 (1981), 379 ff. Perkins’s view is not compelling. It would mean that both 
Irenaeus and Clement would have chosen independently the same kind of rhetorical strategy and 
labelled the Valentinian system a deviation from Platonism. It is also noticeable that Platonic or 
Pythagorean opinions were not the marks of a heretic for Clement, who admired Philo as a 
Pythagorean.  
246 Iren. Haer. 1.2.1. Cf. also Tri.Trac. 54-35-57.23. 
247 Exc.Theod. 6-7.3. My translation. Τὸ “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ 
λόγος” οἱ ἀπὸ Οὐλαντινίνου οὕτως ἐκδέχονται. ἀρχὴν μὲν γαρ τὸν Μονογενῆ λέγουσιν, ὃν καὶ θεὸν 
προσαγορεύεσθαι, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἄντικρυς θεὸν αὐτὸν δηλοῖ λέγων· “ὁ μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εις τὸν κόλπον 
τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.” τὸν δὲ λόγον τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, τοῦτον τὸν ἐν τῷ Μονογενεῖ, ἐν τῷ Νῷ καὶ τῇ 
Ἀληθείᾳ, μηνύει τὸν Χριστόν, τὸν Λόγον καὶ τὴν Ζωήν· ὅθεν εἰκότως καὶ αὐτὸν θεὸν λέγει τὸν ἐν τῷ θεῷ τῷ Νῷ 
ὄντα. “ο γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ” τῷ λόγῳ, “ζωὴ ἦν,” ἡ σύζυγος· διὸ καὶ φησιν ὁ κύριος· “εγώ εἰμι ἡ ζωή.” 
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“the Beginning” was personified as the Only-Begotten, which was produced 
by the Father. The Only-Begotten contained within himself the Logos and the 
Life. Moreover, the Only-Begotten was called the “Mind”, and he has as his 
partner the “Truth”. The relations of these beings are explained in the 
following manner: 
Now, being unknown, the Father desired to become known to the 
aeons. And through his Intention - knowing himself as it were − and 
through the spirit of knowledge, which is in the [Spirit of] knowledge, 
he emitted the Only-Begotten. Thus, the one who came forth from 
knowledge − that is the Son − himself became knowledge, for 
“through the Son the Father has become known.” Moreover, the spirit 
of love mingled with the [the Spirit of] knowledge, as the Father with 
the Son and Intention with Truth and it [i.e. the Spirit of love] came 
forth from Truth, just as [the Spirit of] knowledge did from Intention. 
And the one who remained as “the Only-Begotten Son in the bosom of 
the Father” explains the Intention using [the Spirit of] knowledge to 
the aeons, having also been emitted from his bosom.” The one who 
appeared here below, however, is no longer called “the Only-
Begotten” by the apostle, but “as an Only-Begotten”: “glory as of the 
Only-Begotten.”248 
 
Valentinian protology contains an epistemological dimension: the unknown 
God intended to be known by creating other intellectual beings. The Father 
emanated intellectual beings because he wanted to be known through 
them.249 The Father possessed an “intention” (Ἐνθύμησις) to be known, which 
caused the generation of the entirety of the intellectual beings. The 
intelligible realm was not, however, an archetype of the visible world, but it 
                                                 
248 Exc. Theod. 7.1-4. My translation. Ἄγνωστος οὖν ὁ πατὴρ ὢν ἠθέλεσεν γνωσθῆναι τοῖς αἰῶσι, καὶ διὰ 
τῆς ἐνθυμήσεως τῆς ἐαυτοῦ, ὡς ἂν ἐαυτὸν ἐγνωκώς, πνεῦμα γνώσεως οὔσης ἐν γνώσει προέβαλε τὸν Μονογενῆ. 
γέγονεν οὖν καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ γνώσεως, τουτέστι τῆς πατρικῆς ἐνθυμήσεως, προελθὼν γνῶσις, τουέστιν ὁ υἱός, ὅτι “δι’ 
υἱοῦ ὁ πατῆρ ἐγνώσθη.” τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀγάπης πνεῦμα κέκραται τῷ τῆς γνώσεως, ὡς πατὴρ υἱῷ καὶ ἐνθύμησις 
Ἀληθείᾳ, ἀπ’ ἀληθείας προελθὼν ὡς ἀπὸ ἐνθυμήσεως ἡ γνῶσις. καὶ ὁ μὲν μείνας “μονογενὴς υἱὸς εἰς τὸν κόλπον 
τοῦ πατρὸς” τὴν ἐνθύμησιν διὰ τῆς γνώσεως ἐξηγεῖται τοῖς αἰῶσιν, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κόλπου αὐτοῦ προβληθείς, 
ὁ δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὀφθεὶς οὐκέτι “μονογενής,” ἀλλ’ “ὡς μονογενὴς” [πρὸς τοῦ ἀποστόλου προσαγορεύεται, “δόξαν 
ὡς μονογενοῦς,” ὅτι εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν ἐν μὲν τῇ κτίσει “πρωτότοκός” ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς, ἐν δὲ πληρώματι 
μονογενής, ὁ δὲ αὐτος ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἑκαστῳ τόπῳ οἷος κεχωρῆσθαι δύναται. καὶ οὐδέποτε τοῦ μείναντος ὁ 
καταβὰς μερίζεται. φησὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀπόστολος· “ὁ γὰρ ἀναβὰς αὐτός ἐστι καὶ ὁ καταβάς.”] 
249 Casey and Thomassen translate Ἐνθύμησις as Thought. A better translation, however, is 
Intention. Thomassen is of the opinion that it parallels Ἔννοια in Irenaeus’s accounts (Ir. Haer. 1.1.1; 
1.12.1; 1.12;3). The translation of Ἔννοια as “Thought” is not perfectly correct, and should be translated 
“Concept”. It is mentioned in the Stoic epistemological sequence as being a concept: phantasia-
katalepsis-ennoia. Cf. Dillon, St. Irenaeus of Lyons, 138 note 11. Philo also uses the term Ἔννοια when 
he refers to the term “concept” (cf. e.g. Opif. 36). I would use, however, the translation “Thought” for 
Ἔννοια, but “Intention” for Ἐνθύμησις.  
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was an instrument through which the Father could be known. The Father 
could be known through the two Spirits proceeding from him, which were 
mingled together. These spirits are the Spirit of knowledge (πνεῦμα γνώσεως) 
and the Spirit of love (πνεῦμα ἀγάπης).250  
Irenaeus’s version of the protological commentary (Iren. Haer. 1.8.5) 
mainly follows the same logic as Clement’s account, but its author has made 
some modifications. The emission of the beings is described using metaphors 
of sexual union. The Father emitted all things through the Son as through a 
seed (ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα ὁ Πατὴρ προέβαλε σπερματικῶς). This theme is lacking in 
Exc. Theod. 6-7. As in Clement’s commentary, the phrase “he was at the 
beginning with God” was not a temporal expression, but it “shows the order 
of emission” (ἔδειξε τὴν τῆς προβολῆς τάξιν). The distinction is made, however, 
between things, which are made through the Logos and the things that are 
made in the Logos (John 1:3). The Logos formed all the aeons after him and 
became their cause, but what was made in him was the Life (πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς μετ᾽ 
αὐτὸν Αἰῶσι μορφώσεως καὶ γενέσεως αἴτιος ὁ Λόγος ἐγένετο. Ἀλλ᾽ ὃ γέγονεν ἐν 
αὐτῷ φησί Ζωή ἐστιν). Thus, the Life was the conjugal partner of Logos, and 
they emitted the last pair of the second Tetrad, i.e. the Man and the Church. 
The Life was associated with the Light (John 1:4), but the Light was not a 
distinct being for the whole intelligible cosmos was depicted as Light. The 
Savior is the fruit of the whole Pleroma and the Light, which shines in the 
darkness, i.e. in the realm outside the Pleroma. 
In Exc. Theod. 6-7, the principal Tetrad consisted of the Mind, the Truth, 
the Logos, and the Life but the Father was not counted as a member of the 
Pleroma. He was the source of intellectual beings, not part of them. In 
Irenaeus’s account, the Grace is mentioned as the conjugal pair of the Father, 
and they form together with the Mind and Truth the first Tetrad. In addition 
to the Logos and the Life, another pair, i.e. the Man and the Church, must be 
added in order to generate the second Tetrad. Consequently, the whole 
Ogdoad was completed, and it served as the Mother of all Aeons. The Savior 
was according to Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 the fruit of the entire Pleroma.  
It is rather likely that Exc. Theod. 6-7.3 and Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 were two 
reworkings of the same protological commentary that goes back to Ptolemy 
or his disciples. It served as the basis for the elaborated version of the 
protology in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3. Although Exc. Theod. 6-7 may be closer to 
the original version of the commentary, it is not clear, whether Clement 
presents it accurately. The following schema illustrates the Valentinian 
model system attested in Iren. Haer. 1.1-3, which developed on the ground of 
                                                 
250 The conceptual background of this primitive Valentinian protology is more Aristotelian than 
Platonic because it stresses the synergy of intention and knowledge, not merely knowledge. It is stated 
in Irenaus’ account that Sophia intended to know the Father, and she acted under the pretense of love, 
but in reality in temerity (τόλμῃ) without union with his consort Desired (Iren. Haer. 1.2.2.) This would 
mean that Sophia did not function according to the Spirit of knowledge and the Spirit of love, but only 
according to her intention to love.   
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allegorical reading of the prologue of the Gospel of John. I have marked the 
protology of Exc.Theod. 6-7 in grey and the elements that were added in Iren. 
Haer. 1.8.5 are bolded.                                    
                            
                     Πατήρ + Χάρις      
                                               ------------------------------------------------  
                
 
                                                                John 1:1 
                                                 [Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἠν ὁ λόγος ]       
   
           Ὅρος = Σταυρός           Μονογενής + Ἀλήθεια   
              
 
                                                                  
Λόγος + Ζωή                    Χριστός +                                           
                                   Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον 
                                                   
           
           Ἄνθρωπος + Ἐκκλησία   
 
     
    Βύθιος + Μίξις                      Παράκλητος + Πίστις 
    Ἀγήρατος + Ἕνωσις                      Πατρικός + Ἐλπίς 
    Αὐτοφυής + Ἡδονή                      Μητρικός + Ἀγαπή 
    Ἀκίνητος + Σύγκρασις                     Ἀείνους + Ζύνεσις 
Μονογενής + Μακαρία                                 Ἐκκλησιαστικός + Μακαριότης                               
                                                                   Θελητός + Σοφία 
              
         
 
 
 Φῶς (John. 1:5) = Σωτήρ  
 
 
Hans Krämer has pointed out that in the Valentinian model system described 
above the aeons of the Pleroma correspond to the world of Platonic ideas, 
conceived as paradigmatic virtues (Σοφία, Ζύνεσις, Πίστις, Ἐλπίς, Ἀγαπή) and 
qualities (Μίξις, Ἕνωσις, Ἀκίνητος etc.). The things outside the Pleroma, 
separated by the boundary (Horos), are called images or shadows of the 
Pleromatic realities. It seems that the Valentinian system derives from a 
Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine of ideal numbers, which were personified by 
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the Valentinians.251 In Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3 the names of the “unknown God” 
are Προπάτωρ or Προαρχή, which are derived from the primitive version of the 
protological account. In Exc. Theod. 6-7 and Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 the Only-
Begotten is called ἀρχή which would mean that God out of which the Only-
Begotten was emitted can be called Προαρχή.  In Iren. Haer. 1.1.1 the conjugal 
partner of the First-Father is called Χάρις, which appeared earlier in the 
commentary in Iren. Haer. 1.8.5. She is also called the Silence (Σιγή), a term 
which frequently appears in the Valentinian sources as a conjugal partner for 
the Father. The First-Father is also called the Profundity (Βυθός). In the 
elaborated model system in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3 the aeons were in the first 
place in the thought of the Father as in the “womb” out of which they were 
generated as the seed.252 This embryological feature of protology goes back to 
Neo-Pythagorean sources according to which the Monad contains within 
itself potentially all numbers like the seed inside the womb.253 The Neo-
Pythagorean source forms also the basis of Neoplatonist Syrian’s 
commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics:  
“For the divine number ‘proceeds from the hiding-place of the pure 
Monad, until one comes to the sacred Tetrad; she, then, bore the 
mother of all things, all-containing, old, setting a boundary around 
all things, unchangeable, inexhaustible; they call her pure Decad, the 
immortal gods and earthborn men.”254  
 
The same kind of embryological model can also be found in the Chaldean 
Oracles, which speaks about the Monad as the Father and the womb that 
contains the all. Also, the name Βυθός for the Father appears in the Chaldean 
Oracles, which speaks about πατρικὸς βυθός. In addition, the name Σιγή, 
which is attested in many Valentinian sources, occurs also in the Chaldean 
Oracles. It refers to the womb from which the aeons are born.255   
                                                 
251 Hans Krämer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des 
Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin (Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1964, 2nd edition 1967), 241-249; 
Turner, Sethian Gnosticism, 34-36. 
252 Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 295-298.  
253 Thomassen refers to the Neo-Pythagorean Pseudo-Iamblichus’s The Theology of Arithmetic. 
See Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 293-294. For the details of the embryological model, see ibid. 307-
313. 
254 Syrian, in Metaph. M 4, 1078b12, 106.17 ed. Kroll. Quotation is taken from Arco den Heijer, 
“Cosmic Mothers in Philo of Alexandria and Neopythagoreanism,” in The Studia Philonica Annual 
XXVII (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015), 64. 
255 Chaldean Oracles frg. 16, 18, 30. The protological system of the Chaldean Oracles is similar to 
that of Numenius. The role of the feminine principle Hecate in the emanation of the Father and the 
demiurgic intellect in the Oracles parallels not only the Valentinian protologies but some Sethian texts 
(the Steles of Seth, the Allogenes, the Zostrianos and the Marsanes). Chaldean theology may have 
formed the background for the unknown commentary on Parmenides. Pierre Hadot has argued that 
Porphyry was the author of the commentary. Not only did he repeat the teachings of Plotinus but he 
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It is commonly noticed that the Valentinian protological system parallels 
some Classic Gnostic texts, such as the Apocryphon of John (BG 24,20-25,1), 
Zostrianos (64,14-16) and Allogenes (49,26-38; 65,32-36). The “Depth” 
(Βυθός) also occurs in Eugnostos (V 6,20) and Irenaeus’s description of 
Ophite mythology in Iren. Haer. 1.30.1. The “Silence” (Σιγή) is found in the 
Eugnostos (V 15,21; III 88, 8-9) as well as in the related Sophia of Jesus 
Christ (III 112,8; 117,17.21) and the Apocryphon of John (III 10,15).256 In 
these texts, the first principle is depicted in an apophatic manner existing 
beyond being, or having undetermined essence.257 Although it became 
common among the Middle Platonic philosophers to use apophatic language 
in describing the radical transcendence of the first principle, the Apocryphon 
of John and some other Gnostic texts also used kataphatic language to stress 
the gulf between the divine world and material creation. The Demiurge called 
Yaldabaoth was no longer the representative of the good and ordered 
cosmos, whose providence guided the rational souls of the planetary gods, 
but an amorphous and chaotic figure who created in order to deceive and 
whose fiery rulers of heaven intended to enslave humanity.258  
It seems that the Valentinian cosmological model represents a more 
positive world view than the Classic Gnostic accounts mentioned above.259 
Although the material world did not have a firm place in the divine world, 
but originated as a result of the conflict in the divine world, the Demiurge 
and the heavenly rulers were created as images of the aeons longing for the 
                                                                                                                                          
combined them with Chaldean theology in an innovative manner by creating a hierarchy triads: father-
power-intellect. See John Turner, “The Chaldean Oracles and the Sethian Platonizing Treatises,” in 
Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage, Volume 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to 
Later Platonism and Gnosticism (ed. John Turner and Kevin Korrigan; Atlanta: SBL, 2010), 213-233. 
Rasimus has pointed out that the anonymous commentary on Parmenides contains fragments which 
parallel pre-Plotinan Sethian texts, such as the Apocryphon of John and the Zostrianos. Rasimus 
concludes that “in light of the Sethian evidence, we must reassess Pierre Hadot’s theory and conclude 
that it was the Sethian Gnostics rather than Porphyry who were the innovators and that the role of the 
Sethian Gnostics in the development of Neoplatonism has been greatly underestimated in previous 
scholarship.” For the detailed investigation of the Sethian material and its relation to the Neoplatonic 
system of thought, see Tuomas Rasimus “Porphyry and the Gnostics: Reassessing Pierre Hadot’s 
Thesis in Light of the Secondand Third-Century Sethian Treatises,” in Plato’s Parmenides and It’s 
Heritage Volume 2: Its Reception in Neoplatonic, Jewish, and Christian Texts, (ed. John Turner and 
Kevin Corrigan; Atlanta: SBL, 2010), 81-110. Thomassen is of the opinion that Valentinian theologians 
were dependent on the same sources as Porphyry and the later Neoplatonists, Marius Victorinus, 
Synesius, and the Platonizing Sethians. See Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 298-307. 
256 Rasimus, “Ptolemaeus and the Prologues’ Valentinian Exegesis,” 164. 
257 Rasimus, “Ptolemaeus and the Prologues’ Valentinian Exegesis,” 159, note 60. 
258 King, The Secret Revelation, 199-214. 
259 It is not clear, however, whether the pessimistic world view was part of the Gnostic myth, which 
was reformed by the Valentinian theologians, or whether the pessimistic motif in the Gnostic myth 
resulted from its later “Sethianization.” 
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heavenly light. Hence, the Valentinian theologians were closer to 
cosmological dualism in Plato’s Timaeus and the protological teachings 
attested in Philo’s works. The Marcosians, who may have formed a distinct 
sect within Valentinian tradition, taught that the creation of the visible world 
in Gen. 1 follows the numerological order of the Pleroma. Not only the 
heavenly sphere but the creation of the dry land, the sea, the plants, and the 
animals, are manifestations of the Tetrad, the Ogdoad, the Decad, and the 
Dodecad.260   
It is noticeable that Hippolytus presents in Hipp. Ref. 6.29.3-4 a version 
of the Valentinian protological myth, which differs from the one attested in 
Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3. The main differences between these accounts concern the 
reason for Sophia’s fall and the essence of the Father. In Irenaeus’s system 
Sophia intended to know the Father who is unknowable, whereas in 
Hippolytus’s system Sophia attempts to imitate the creative power of the 
Father by generating without her consort. In addition, Hippolytus maintains 
that the Father is “unfeminine, unwedded and solitary” without a partner, 
whereas Irenaeus linked, as we noticed above, the Father with a female 
consort called “Grace” or “Silence.” Hippolytus suggested that the system in 
which the Father was solitary was closer to Pythagorean doctrine and the 
version which says that the Father cannot exist without a female consort 
represents a later development of the protological myth.261  
Thomassen is of the opinion that Hippolytus’s version is a revision of the 
original theory, which was based on the 30 aeons. In Hippolytus’s system, 
the Father is not included among the Ogdoad, which results in the Pleroma 
only having 28 aeons. According to Thomassen, this breaks the structure of 
30 aeons, and the pair of aeons “Anthropos-Ecclesia” has no apparent 
function in the system. Stead points out, however, that Hippolytus’s version, 
which stressed an ultimate Monad, is closer to the traditions of the Jewish 
and Christian views of God, whereas an ultimate Dyad in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1 
seems to deviate from these views. It is also notable that the number 28 
parallels the numerological speculations in Philo.262 
Hippolytus’s version of the Valentinian myth in Ref. 6.29.3-4 contains 
some elements which connect it to the primitive version of the Valentinian 
                                                 
260 Iren. Haer. 1.18.  
261 Stead, “The Valentinian Myth,” 77-81; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 203. 
262 For Philo, the number 28 is a perfect number, because it is a sum of its factors (1+2+4+7+14), 
the sum of its digits 1 to 7 and the product of 4 x 7 being related to the phases of the moon. Cf. Stead, 
“The Valentinian Myth,” 80. Also, ten and twelve are important numbers for Philo referring to the 
twelve tribes, the twelve signs of the Zodiac, and the twelve stones of the high priest’s breastplate 
(Praem. 65; Spec. 1.87; Mos. 2.124; Q.E. 112-117). Philo does not have a special interest in the 
symbolism of the number eight (Ogdoad), but in Opificio Mundi he devotes an extremely long section 
to speculation concerning the protological and cosmological significance of the number seven 
(Hebdomad), which is treated by the Pythagoreans as a symbol of God Himself (cf. Opif. 100). For 
Philo’s discussion concerning the Monad and Hebdomad, cf. Runia, On the Creation, 260 ff. 
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cosmological myth in Exc. Theod. 6-7. In these accounts, the Father is 
solitary whose intention was not only to love but to be known and loved. In 
Hippolytus’s system, the Father was solitary and subsisted in a state of 
quietude and isolation within himself and the transition from oneness to 
duality is related to the concept of love: 
Since he was a productive being, he decided once to generate and 
bring forth the fairest and most perfect that he had in himself, for he 
was not fond of solitariness. Indeed, he was all love, but love is not 
love if there is nothing beloved. Thus, the Father himself, being alone, 
projected and generated Mind and Truth, a Dyad…263 
 
Strikingly, Exc. Theod. 6-7 and Hippolytus’s account parallel the protology in 
Iren. Haer. 1.12.1, which according to Irenaeus goes back to “the more expert 
followers of Ptolemy.” In Iren. Haer. 1.12.1 the Father is without a consort, 
and he has two dispositions (διαθέσεις), thought (Ἔννοια) and will (Θέλησις), 
which recall the two Spirits in Exc. Theod. 6-7.264 The fact that the accounts 
in Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 (par. Exc. Theod. 6-7) and Iren. Haer. 1.12.1 go back to 
Ptolemy or his “more expert followers” confirms that the elaborated 
protological model system in Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3 has its origin in the circle of 
Ptolemy’s disciples. The protological systems in these accounts can be 
derived from the allegorical interpretation of the prologue of the Gospel of 
John, which contains some striking parallels with Philo’s exegesis on Gen. 
1:1-5.  
4.4 The Philonic interpretation of the prologue of the 
Gospel of John 
The origin of the Valentinian protology and the Gnostic myth of Sophia lies 
in the Neo-Pythagorean transcendental monotheism. In the Valentinian 
protological systems decribed above, the myth of Sophia was integrated into 
the prologue of John’s Gospel. The Valentinian commentators intended to 
show that their philosophical-cosmological myth enjoyed apostolic authority 
because it can already be found in the Gospel of John. I suggest that the 
Johannine prologue was not chosen accidentally as a proof text for the 
protological myth. Valentinian commentators – and their Gnostic 
predecessors − may have had good reason to believe that it was written as a 
Platonizing description of the creation of the intelligible world. The 
speculation concerning the metaphysical structure of the prologue was a 
                                                 
263 Hipp. Ref. 6.29.5-6. Translated by Thomassen in The Spiritual Seed, 202. 
264 Thomassen points out that Exc. Theod. 6-7 parallels the protology in the Tripartite Tractate 
(55:3-27, 56:23-57:8) and the idea that the Father possesses a Will in addition to his Thought is a 
theme that can be found in the Gospel of Truth and the Tripartite Tractate.  Cf. Thomassen, The 
Spiritual Seed, 208, 212. 
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debated issue among Alexandrian exegetes. Origen criticized Heracleon in 
Comm. John 2.72-99 for arbitrarily limiting the creation activity of the 
Logos, because Heracleon considered that “the all” (John 1.3) refers to the 
visible creation. Origen identified “the beginning” with the divine Wisdom, 
which preceded the Logos. The life and light were inside the Logos, which 
means that these could not be created through the Logos.265  
Gregory Sterling has pointed out that the prologue of the Gospel of John 
can be placed together with Philo’s Opif. 26-35 in the same trajectory of 
Platonizing interpretation of Gen. 1:1-5.266 Sterling notes that the author of 
John’s prologue took certain catchwords (ἐν ἀρχῇ - ἦν - ὁ θεός - ἐγένετο - τὸ 
φῶς - τὸ σκότος) in the same order as they appear in Gen. 1:1-5. In addition, 
he used a Semitic “staircase parallelism” to interlock the pair of clauses in the 
prologue poetically. The comparison between Gen. 1:1-5 and John. 1:1-5 is 
presented below. The keywords in common are bolded:267   
Gen. 1:1-5 
1. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν 2. ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος 
καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος, καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ 
ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος. 3.  καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός Γενηθήτω φῶς. καὶ ἐγένετο 
φῶς. 4.  καὶ εἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ὅτι καλόν. καὶ διεχώρισεν ὁ θεὸς ἀνὰ μέσον 
τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους. 5.  καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς 
ἡμέραν καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐκάλεσεν νύκτα. καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένετο πρωί, 
ἡμέρα μία.  
John 1:1-5 
1. Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. 2. 
οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. 3. πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, και χωρὶς αὐτοῦ 
ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν ὃ γέγονεν· 4. ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦ τὸ φῶς τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων· 5. καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαινει, και ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ 
κατέλαβεν. 
 
There is in John’s prologue a definite logic in the use of the verbs ἦν (“to be”) 
and ἐγένετο (“to become”), which mark in Plato’s Tim. 27d-28b the 
                                                 
265 See Thomassen, “Heracleon,” 178-179. 
266 Peder Borgen regards John 1:1-5 as a Targumic interpretation of Gen. 1:1-5.  He concludes that 
Gen. 1:3 forms the basis for the re-writing of John’s protological account. The Logos was seen as the 
“true light” and it was the light which came into existence through God’s words “let there be light.” The 
Logos, the light and God’s words were thus brought together. Cf. Peder Borgen, “Observations on the 
Targumic Character of the Prologue of John,” in NTS 16 (1970), 288-29. Also, Thomas Tobin, “The 
Prologue of John and Hellenistic Jewish Speculation,” in CBQ 52 (1990), 262 and John Painter, 
“Rereading Genesis in the Prologue of John?” in Neotestamentica et Philonica. Studies in Honor of 
Peder Borgen (ed. David E. Aune, Torrey Seland et.al. Leiden: Brill, 2003), 179-201.  
267 Gregory E. Sterling, “Day One: Platonizing Exegetical Traditions of Genesis 1:1-5 in John and 
Jewish Authors,” in SPA XVII (ed. David T. Runia and Gregory E. Sterling; Brown University, 2005), 
123-130. 
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distinction between the eternally existing intelligible world of being (τὶ τὸ ὂν 
ἀεί) and the visible world of becoming (τὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί).  The four 
repetitions of ἦν are contrasted with two appearances of ἐγένετο. The 
temporal distinction is made in verse 3, which divided the prologue into two 
section. Verses 1-2 describe the genealogy of the Logos and verses 4-5 the 
manifestation of the Logos in the creation. Also, the author has adapted the 
terminus technicus from the Middle Platonic tradition in assigning the role 
of instrumentality to the Logos through which (δι’ αὐτοῦ) the world came into 
being.268 
Evidently, the Valentinian interpreters of John’s prologue understood 
that it represented a Platonizing interpretation of the creation narrative. It 
was not, thus, a coincidence that they selected it as a proof-text for the 
genealogy of the aeons of the Pleroma. It is not clear whether the Valentinian 
teachers invented their peculiar interpretation of John’s prologue or whether 
it was already a part of the preceding Gnostic myth. However, the 
Valentinian exegetes twisted the temporal and ontological structure of the 
prologue in a way that indicates that they were also familiar with Philo’s 
allegorical interpretion of Gen. 1:1-5 in Opificio Mundi.269  
Philo maintained that God created the intelligible cosmos, i.e. the Platonic 
world of ideas, during the first day of creation (Gen. 1:1-5). Creation during 
days 2-6 describes the creation of the visible copies of eternal ideas (Gen.1:6-
2:4).270 Philo explains that God acted like an architect who is about to build a 
city. First he makes a model in his mind which will be given to the building 
master who is in charge of the building program. In the same manner, the 
ideas of the intelligible cosmos were first in the mind of God before they were 
                                                 
268 Prepositional metaphysics go back to the distinction between different kinds causes in 
Aristotelian logic. The Hellenistic philosophers elaborated these causes and assigned prepositions to 
them. Philo of Alexandria is an important witness to the Middle Platonic metaphysics of prepositions 
(cf. esp. Cher. 124-127). Philo connected the instrumental cause of creation to the Logos through which 
(δι’ οὗ) the cosmos came into being. The metaphysics of prepositions and their relation of Christ is 
attested also in 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:16; Heb. 1:2. Cf. Gregory E. Sterling, “Prepositional Metaphysics in 
Jewish Wisdom Speculations and Early Christian Liturgical Texts,” in The Studia Philonica Annual. 
Studies in Hellenistic Judaism. Volume IX (eds. David T. Runia and Gregory E. Sterling: Brown 
University, 1997),219-238; Tobin, The Creation of Man, 68 ff. 
269 Raymond E. Brown suggests that the original protological hymn behind John’s prologue is 
found in John. 1:1-5, 10-12b, 14 and 16. The verses about John the Baptist clearly disrupt the content 
and style of the text. Brown argued that the first reference to the incarnation of the Logos is found in 
John. 1:14.Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel According to John (2 vols; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1966-70), 1.3-37. Valentinian exegesis concentrated on the first part of the prologue verses 1-5.  
270 Philo knew another tradition which draws the dividing line between intelligible cosmos and 
visible world in Gen. 2:4. See Tobin, The Creation of Man, 20-35, 59-60; Runia, On the Creation, 19-
20.  
PROTOLOGY: THE CREATION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE COSMOS 
96 
conveyed to the Logos through which the world came into being.271 The sum-
total of ideas which God placed in the Logos constitutes “the intelligible 
cosmos” (κόσμος νοητός), which was distinguished from the “sense-
perceptible cosmos” (κόσμος αἰσθητός).272 In this sense, Philo called the Logos 
an “idea of ideas” (ἰδέα ἱδεῶν) because it contains all the ideal world within 
himself.273  
A special feature of Opificio Mundi is the role of number symbolism. The 
order of the creation follows a certain numerological logic.274 The expression 
Ἐν ἀρχῇ in Gen. 1:1 was not according to Philo a temporal definition because 
time was created together with the cosmos. Time was related to the motion of 
the celestial bodies, and there could not be motion before they were created. 
Therefore “in the beginning” should be understood as “according to the 
number” (κατ’ ἀριθμόν), which depicts the ontological predominance of the 
creation during “the day one” compared with the creation of the visible 
cosmos during days 2-6. Therefore, the first day of creation is called “day 
                                                 
271 Opif. 17-19…τὰ παραπλήσια δὴ καὶ περὶ θεοῦ δοξαστέον, ὡς ἄρα τὴν μεγαλόπολιν κτίζειν διανοηθεὶς 
ἐνενόησε πρότερον τοὺς τύπους αὐτῆς, ἐξ ὧν κόσμον νοητὸν συστησάμενος ἀπετέλει καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν 
παραδείγματι χρώμενος ἐκείνῳ. 
272 Philo was the first philosopher who explicitly used the term κόσμος νοητός but it has, however, 
some Platonic antecedents. In Timaeus (39e) Plato speaks about “the intelligible living being” (τὸ 
νοητὸν ζῶον) as a model for the sensible world and in the Republic (508b13) he draws an analogy 
between the sun and the idea of the Good, which is in the “noetic place” (ἐν τῶ νοητῶ τόπω). A similar 
phrase occurs in the Timaeus Locrus, which speaks about ὁ ἰδανικὸς κόσμος. See David Runia, “A Brief 
History of the Term Kosmos Noétos from Plato to Plotinus,” in Traditions of Platonism. Essays in 
Honour of John Dillon (ed. John J. Cleary; Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 152-158; ibid, On the Creation, 
136.  
273 Opif. 25; Mig. 18.103. Runia notes a similar kind of theory of “idea which includes itself all 
ideas” is attested in Arius Didymus, mentioned in Eusebius Prep. Ev. 11.23.6. Cf. Runia, On the 
Creation, 151. Wolfson sees the expression of Logos as “the idea of ideas” is based upon Aristotle’s 
description of the human mind as the form of forms, εἶδος εἰδῶν (De Anima III, 8, 432a, 2). See 
Wolfson, Philo I, 233. 
274 Philo refers in his writings to his work On Numbers, which is also mentioned by Eusebius in his 
catalogue on Philo’s works. Runia is of the opinion that Philo’s numerological work was a collection of 
arithmological material from various sources for allegorical purposes. In Opif. Philo explains the 
relevance of the number of days it took to create the world. Strikingly, the number five and the number 
six are related to the creation narrative, but in the case of the number four and seven he speaks only 
about their arithomological importance without any explicit references to the days of creation. Philo 
even devotes a long excursus in Opif. 89-128 to the significance of the number seven but does not 
handle its significance for the seventh day. Cf. Runia, On the Creation, 25-29. Irenaeus describes the 
Marcosian system, which is based on the mystical union of numbers and letters. The Marcosian system 
saw the creation narrative in Gen. 1:1-5 as a visible manifestation of the Tetrad, the Ogdoad, the Decad, 
and the Dodeced (Iren. Haer. 1.13-21).     
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one,” not the “first day,” because of the Monadic essence of the intelligible 
cosmos.275  
The Valentinian exegetes used Philo’s allegorical innovations in their 
protological allegory of the prologue of the Gospel of John in Exc. Theod. 6-7 
and Iren. Haer. 1.8.5. They interpreted the phrase “in the beginning” (John. 
1:1) as a non-temporal ontological expression. “The Beginning” (ἀρχή) refers 
to the Only-Begotten, who was emitted from the Father of All. Thus, the 
“Beginning” was hypostasized, and the preposition (ἐν) was interpreted as a 
reference to the ontological relation of the Logos and subsequently the other 
intelligible beings who had their origin “in the Only-Begotten.” The 
expression “in the beginning” does not refer to the temporal order, but to the 
“the order of emanations” (ἔδειξε τὴν τῆς προβολῆς τάξιν). This parallels Philo, 
who maintained that “in the beginning” (Gen. 1:1) does not refer to temporal 
order, but to the ontological predominance of the creation of the intelligible 
cosmos over the visible cosmos.276  
While in Philo the ontological predominance of the first day of creation 
concerned the relation between the intelligible cosmos (day one) and the rest 
of the creation (days 2-6), in the Valentinian protology ἐν ἀρχῇ refers to the 
order of emanations in the intelligible realm. According to the Valentinian 
interpretation, the Logos was “in the Beginning,” through which “all things” 
in the Pleroma were created. Thus, John 1:3 does not refer to the creation of 
the visible cosmos, but to the foundation of the intelligible cosmos.277 While 
in John’s prologue the demarcation line between the ideal world and the 
visible cosmos was in verse 3, the Valentinian commentators saw the whole 
passage (verses 1-5) as a description of the genesis of the beings in the 
intelligible cosmos. The Logos was the instrument through which the whole 
intelligible cosmos was created. 
It is clear that the Valentinians were able to find the terms “the 
Beginning,” “the Only-Begotten,” “the Logos,” and “the Light” directly by 
                                                 
275 Opif. 26-28. καὶ ἡμέραν οὐχὶ πρώτην, ἀλλὰ μίαν, ἣ λέλεκται διὰ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου μόνωσιν 
μοναδικὴν ἔχοντος φύσιν. 
276 The terms which define the order in Philo declare that everything should develop in the right 
sequence. See Runia, On the Creation, 160. 
277 Irenaeus attacked in Iren. Haer. 3.11.7 this Valentinian interpretation and said that “all things” 
in John 1:3 does not refer to the generation of the aeons of Pleroma, but to “this world and to 
everything in it.” Irenaeus also referred to John 1:11 which says that the Savior entered as “his own” 
(John. 1.11). Clement also saw the Valentinian interpretation of John’s prologue as untenable, but he 
did not criticize the Valentinian exegesis as such but only its metaphysical teaching, which threatened 
the oneness of God. Strikingly, Ptolemy in his Letter to Flora offers an interpretation of John 1:3 which 
is similar to that of Irenaeus’s view. The explanation for the apparent discrepancy between Ptolemy’s 
teaching in his Letter to Flora and the commentary on John’s prologue is that the Valentinian exegesis 
was multidimensional. Ptolemy’s commentary represents the spiritual exegesis according to which it is 
not the visible world that is created through Logos, but the intelligible cosmos. For a detailed 
investigation of Ptolemy's Letter to Flora, see chapter 3.  
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reading John’s prologue. However, in Valentinian protology they were given 
a logical pattern, which cannot be derived directly from the Gospel of John. 
“The Beginning” was hypostasized as referring to the Only-Begotten, and the 
Logos was seen as an instrument of the creation, not the visible cosmos, but 
the intelligible world of aeons, which was identified with the Savior and the 
intelligible Light. Strikingly, these terms can also be found in Philo’s Conf. 
146, who not only mentions them but identifies them with each other by 
comparing them.  
But if there be any as yet unfit to be called a son of God, let him press 
to take his place under First-Born Logos, who holds the eldership 
among the angels, their ruler as it were. And many names is his, for 
he is called “Beginning,” and the Name of God and his Logos, and the 
Man after his image and “he that sees,” that is Israel.278 
 
Philo identified the Beginning, the First-Born and the Logos with each other. 
These were the names for the same intellectual being, who was generated 
from the transcendent One. Although the Beginning (= the Only-Begotten) 
and the Logos are not exactly the same intellectual being in the Valentinian 
protology, the Logos is “inside” the Beginning, which served as the root for 
the Aeons. In Philo, the creation of the Logos was at the same time the 
creation of the intelligible cosmos, because the Ideas were placed in the 
Logos. This model parallels Valentinian protology according to which the 
Aeons were created through the Logos, who had its origin in the Beginning, 
i.e. the Only-Begotten. In Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 the Savior was depicted as the 
fruit of the entire Pleroma. The Savior contained all the Aeons within himself 
and as an image of the Pleroma he was also called the Light. These notions 
parallel Philo, who explains in Somn. 1.75, how the creation of light in Gen. 
1:3 describes the creation of the Logos, who was associated with the Savior, 
i.e. the Light (cf. also Leg. All. 3.96). 
In the first place: God is light, for there is a verse in one of the psalms, 
“the Lord is my illumination and my Savior” And He is not only light, 
but the archetype of every other light, nay, prior to and high above 
every archetype, holding the position of the model of a model. For the 
model or pattern was the Logos, which contained all His fullness – 
light, in fact; for, as the Lawgiver tells us, “God said ‘let light come 
into being’” whereas He Himself resembles none of the things that 
have come into being. Secondly: as the sun makes day and night 
distinct, so Moses says that God kept apart light and darkness; for 
“God,” he tells us, “separated between the light and between the 
darkness.” And above all, as the sun when it rises makes visible 
                                                 
278 Conf. 146. κἂν μηδέπω μέντοι τυγχάνῃ τις ἀξιόχρεως ὢν υἱὸς θεοῦ προσαγορεύεσθαι, σπουδαζέτω 
κοσμεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν πρωτόγονον αὐτοῦ λόγον, τὸν ἀγγέλων πρεσβύτατον, ὡς ἂν ἀρχάγγελον, πολυώνυμον 
ὑπάρχοντα· καὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὄνομα θεοῦ καὶ λόγος καὶ ὁ κατ’ εἰκόνα ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ὁρῶν, Ἰσραήλ, 
προσαγορεύεται. 
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objects, which had been hidden, so God when He gave birth to all 
things not only brought them into sight, but also made things that 
before were not, not just handling material as an artificer, but being 
Himself its creator.279 
 
Philo says that the creation of light refers to the creation of the Logos and the 
whole intelligible cosmos. Philo also calls the intelligible realm, i.e. the 
Logos, “the most completed model” (παράδειγμα ὁ πληρέστατος), because it is 
filled with all ideas including the idea of light. The Pleroma (πληρώμα) was a 
key technical term in Valentinian protology. It is also mentioned in John 
1:16: ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐλάβομεν καὶ χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος. 
Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 the whole Pleroma dwells in the Savior, which is a reference 
to phrase in Paul’s Colossians: ἐν αὐτῷ εὐδόκησεν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα 
κατοικῆσαι.280  
It is not likely that the term Pleroma in the Valentinian myth would have 
been derived solely from John’s Gospel, Pseudo-Pauline literature or Philo’s 
texts. The term Pleroma has its basis in Pythagorean numerological 
speculations. It refers to the fulfillment of the number of beings in the 
intelligible world.281 Valentinian exegetes found the Pythagorean term 
“Pleroma” or its equivalents in the Gospel of John and the Colossians, which 
permitted a protological interpretation of these passages. It seems, however, 
that in addition to the prologue of the Gospel of John, the Valentinians knew 
some other Hellenistic Jewish exegetical traditions in which the protological 
narratives of Genesis were interpreted in the light of Middle Platonic 
transcendental monism. It is not contrary to reason to suggest that Philo’s 
protological speculations in Opif. 26-28, Conf. 146 and Somn. 1.75 have been 
                                                 
279 ἐπειδὴ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστι “κύριος γὰρ φωτισμός μου καὶ σωτήρ μου” ἐν ὕμνοις ᾄδεται καὶ οὐ 
μόνον φῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὸς ἑτέρου φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον, μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς ἀρχετύπου πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἀνώτερον, 
λόγον ἔχον παραδείγματος < παραδείγματος > τὸ μὲν γὰρ παράδειγμα ὁ πληρέστατος ἦν αὐτοῦ λόγος, φῶς 
“εἶπε” γάρ φησιν “ὁ θεός· γενέσθω φῶς”, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων ὅμοιος  ἔπειθʼ ὡς ἥλιος ἡμέραν καὶ 
νύκτα διακρίνει, οὕτως φησὶ Μωυσῆς τὸν θεὸν φῶς καὶ σκότος διατειχίσαι· “διεχώρισε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀνὰ μέσον 
τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους” ἄλλως τε ὡς ἥλιος ἀνατείλας τὰ κεκρυμμένα τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιδείκνυται, 
οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα γεννήσας οὐ μόνον εἰς τοὐμφανὲς ἤγαγεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν, ἐποίησεν, οὐ 
δημιουργὸς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίστης αὐτὸς ὤν. The insertion παραδείγματος comes from Colson. I do not 
think that the insertion is necessary, although it may be compatible with what Philo says elsewhere 
about the Logos as a paradigm.  
280 The parallels between Philo’s Somn. 1.75, John 1:16 and Col. 2:16 is also noticed by Matthew E. 
Gordley in The Colossian Hymn in Context (WUNT; Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2007), 224-225.  
281 The realm of aeons became perfect as the number of intelligible beings was fulfilled. Sophia was 
the last aeon of the Dodecad (2+4+6) as well as the Triacontad (2+4+6+8+10=30). See Jean-Marc 
Narbonne, “The Neopythagorean Backdrop to the Fall of the Soul,” in Gnosticism, Platonism and the 
Late Ancient World. Essays in Honour of John D. Turner (ed. Kevin Corrigan and Tuomas Rasimus; 
Boston: Brill, 2012), 414-419. 
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exegetical source material for Valentinian theologians in their commentary 
on the prologue of the Gospel of John.  
Philo maintains in Somn. 1.75 that God did not only reveal Light, i.e. the 
Logos, but he also made a separation between light and darkness. Although 
this distinction may refer to the distinction between intelligible light, i.e. the 
Logos, and visible lights, Philo’s exegesis in Opif. 29-35 indicates that it 
depicts the conflict within intelligible realm. This parallels Valentinian 
protology in which the Light that shone in the darkness (John. 1:5) does not 
refer to the earthly darkness, as in the Gospel of John, but to the darkness in 
the intelligible realm which was separated out of the Pleroma by the Limit 
before the foundation of the visible cosmos. I will next investigate more 
thoroughly Philo’s exegesis on the creation of the intelligible cosmos during 
“the day one.” 
4.5 Philo’s interpretation of day one and traditions of 
cosmic creation in Opif. 29-35 
Philo’s description of the creation of the ideal world begins in Opif. 26-28, 
which describes the meaning of the phrase “in the beginning” and the 
numerological predominance of the day one. I have investigated these 
subjects and the parallels with the Valentinian accounts above. In Opif. 29-
30 Philo gives an allegorical account of the structure of the intelligible realm 
which God placed in the Logos. Although Philo says that the number of ideas 
is uncountable, he intended to find in Gen. 1:1-5 the most fundamental ideas 
according to the sacred number seven. In Opif. 29 Philo maintained that God 
created in the first day the incorporeal heaven, the invisible earth, the idea of 
air, the idea of void, the incorporeal substance of water, the incorporeal 
substance of the spirit and the incorporeal light which served as a paradigm 
for all celestial lights. 
First, therefore, the maker made an incorporeal heaven and an 
invisible earth and a form of air and the void. To the former he 
assigned the name darkness, since the air is black by nature, to the 
latter the name abyss, because the void is indeed full of depths and 
gaping. He then made the incorporeal being of water and spirit and 
as seventh and last of all of the light, which once again was 
incorporeal and was also the intelligible model of the sun and all the 
other light-bearing stars which were to be established in heaven.282 
 
                                                 
282 Opif. 29. πρῶτον οὖν ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίησεν οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀέρος ἰδέαν καὶ κενοῦ• 
ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπεφήμισε σκότος, ἐπειδὴ μέλας ὁ ἀὴρ τῇ φύσει, τὴν δʼ ἄβυσσον, πολύβυθον γὰρ τό γε κενὸν καὶ 
ἀχανές• εἶθʼ ὕδατος ἀσώματον οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἑβδόμου φωτός,ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν καὶ 
νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα καὶ πάντων ὅσα φωσφόρα ἄστρα κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔμελλε συνίστασθαι. Translated 
by David Runia in On the Creation.  
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In Opif. 30 Philo writes that the ideas of light and spirit were given 
predominance in the intelligible cosmos, and the idea of light was associated 
with the idea of life.  
Both spirit and light were considered deserving of a special privilege. 
The former he named of God because the spirit is highly important 
for life and God is the cause of life. The light he describes as 
exceedingly beautiful, for the intelligible surpasses the visible in 
brilliance and brightness.283  
 
Professional philosophers may have regarded Philo’s description of the 
intelligible cosmos as rather peculiar.284 The content of the ideal world and 
the relations between its elements were composed artificially on the grounds 
of biblical narrative. Harry Wolfson has proposed, however, that in Opif. 29 
Philo tried to describe the creation of the ideas of the four cosmic elements 
(water, air, earth and heaven, i.e. fire) and the ideas of the void, spirit and 
light. The idea of the void refers to the Platonic Receptacle.285 Wolfson’s 
interpretation of Philo’s exegesis has not gained large support. It is not likely 
that the ideas of heaven, earth, air and water referred to the four cosmic 
elements, as Wolfson proposed, but to the regions of the cosmos. The view 
that heaven would have depicted the element of fire contradicts what Philo 
taught elsewhere about the essence of heaven. In most cases, Philo agreed 
with the common Middle Platonic view according to which the heavenly 
sphere were made out of ether. Also, the idea of the void does not refer to the 
Platonic Receptacle, as Wolfson suggested, but to the region between the 
moon and earth, which is filled with air. Philo may have criticized the 
Epicureans, who postulated the existence of the cosmic void.286 Philo 
explains these notions in the following passage in Opif. 32: 
Well said too is the statement that there was darkness above the 
abyss, for in a way the air is over the void since it is mounted on and 
has filled up the entire gaping, empty and void space that extends 
from the region of the moon to us.  
 
Philo’s exegesis on Gen. 1:3 concerning the creation of light is not consistent. 
In Somn. 1.75 Philo interprets the creation of light (Gen. 1:3) as denoting the 
                                                 
283 Προνομίας δὲ τό τε πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ φῶς ἠξιοῦτο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὠνόμασε θεοῦ, διότι ζωτικώτατον τὸ πνεῦμα, 
ζωῆς δὲ θεὸς αἴτιος, τὸ δὲ φῶς φησιν ὅτι ὑπερβαλλόντως καλόν· τοσούτῳ γὰρ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ ὁρατοῦ 
λαμπρότερόν τε καὶ αὐγοειδέστερον. For the translation, see Runia, On the Creation, 53. 
284 Runia, On the Creation, 163-164. 
285 Wolfson, Philo I, 309-310. 
286 Runia, On the Creation, 171-172. Runia maintains that the idea of spirit may refer to the 
pneuma in its Aristotelian sense as the instrument which allows the soul to affect the body (ibid. 166). 
For the criticism of Wolfson’s interpretation see also Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 9-13. The problem 
of the creation of matter in Philo is investigated in detail in chapter 5. 
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creation of the Logos, which is an image of God, the Light. In Opif. 31 Philo 
says, however, that the invisible and intelligible light (τὸ ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν 
φῶς), in Gen. 1:3 is an “image of the Logos,” who communicated its genesis 
(διερμηνεύσαντο τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ).287 It is not the Logos, which was created in 
Gen.1:3, but its image. Strikingly, Opif. 31 contradicts not only the passage in 
Somn. 1.75, but also Opif. 29, which states that the idea of light is a part of 
the Logos, not an image of it.288  
It seems that in Opif. 31 Philo is dependent on the exegetical tradition 
according to which light in Gen. 1:3 does not refer to the intelligible light in 
the “world of being,” but to the creation of the essence of the cosmic intellects 
in the “world of becoming” as an image of the Logos.289 The light in Opif. 31 
is not the paradigm (παράδειγμα) as in Opif. 29, but the source (πηγή) of all 
cosmic lights. In addition, in Opif. 31 the intelligible light is called “all-
brightness” (παναύγειαν), which does not appear elsewhere in Philo’s texts. 
Opif. 31 breaks with Philo’s account concerning the creation of the intelligible 
world, i.e. the Logos, and it describes the creation of the essence of the visible 
lights of heaven as images of the Logos. These notions are important 
concerning the comparison of Opif. 31 with the Valentinian cosmological 
account, which I will investigate in the following chapter. 
After a short reference to the ideas of air and void in Opif. 32, Philo 
explains in Opif. 33-34 the consequences of the manifestation of the 
intelligible light, i.e. the Logos, and its rivalry darkness. Although the 
manifestation of light, the yielding of darkness and the setting of morning 
                                                 
287 The phrase διερμηνεύσαντο τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ evidently refers to Gen. 1:3 “God said…” Philo 
thought in Greek terms. The verb εἶπεν (“said”) is the second aorist of λέγω, which is derived from the 
noun λόγος (= word). The word of God as an instrument of creation is also attested in Ps. 33:6 and in 
the proclamation of the prophets (Isa. 2:1; Jer. 1:2; Ezek. 3:16) and in the revelation of the Torah (Ex. 
34:27-28; Deut. 10:4). In Philo’s allegorical exegesis the term “logos” does not only refer to the “word” 
or “speech” of God attested in these biblical passages, but has a “philosophical” meaning as an external 
manifestation of God’s thinking-acting. The connection between “philosophical Logos” and its biblical 
equivalent as “God’s word” enabled Philo to read the Bible in the light of philosophical reasoning. Cf. 
Winston, Logos, 15; Wolfson, Philo I, 254; Sterling, “Platonizing Exegetical Traditions,” 133-134. 
288 Logically, Opif. 29 can be integrated to the account in Somn. 1.75. This would mean that the 
idea of light in Opif. 29 does not depict only one single idea, but as a seventh element created during 
day one, it represented the entirety of all ideas. The creation of the idea of light completes the creation 
of the whole intelligible world, i.e. the Logos. Runia suggests that the passage in Opif. 31 might be 
corrupted. He does not see any logical solution for the conflicting statements in Opif. 29, 31 and Somn. 
1.75. Also, Sterling says that Opif. 31 is very difficult text. Cf. Sterling, “Platonizing Exegetical 
Traditions,” 132-133; Runia, On the Creation, 168. 
289 Runia refers to Boyancé, who suggested that Philo must be dependent on some philosophical 
source in Opif. 31, but is himself sceptical. See Runia, On the Creation, 169. Opif. 31 is an important 
passage concerning the comparison with Valentinian exegesis on Gen. 1:3. It is likely that the 
commentator in Exc. Theod. 47-48 knew of a similar kind of interpretation in Gen. 1:3 as attested in 
Opif. 31.  
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and evening were events in the visible cosmos in Genesis, in Philo’s exegesis 
they became processes within the intelligible realm. In Opif. 34 Philo had to 
stress that these elements and boundaries belonged in the class of 
incorporeal things and they are entirely “ideas, symbols and seals” (ἰδέαι καὶ 
τύποι καὶ σφραγῖδες). It is striking that according to Philo, there was some 
discord within the intelligible cosmos between the Logos and its rival, i.e. 
darkness. I will quote the passage in Opif. 33 in its entirety: 
As soon as the intelligible light, which existed before the sun, was 
ignited, its rival darkness proceeded to withdraw. God built a wall 
between them and kept them separate, for he well knew their 
oppositions and the conflict resulting from their natures. Therefore, 
in order to ensure that they would not continually interact and be in 
strife with each other, and that war would not gain the upper hand 
over peace and ring about disorder in the cosmos, he not only 
separated light and darkness, but also placed boundaries in the 
extended space between them by means of which he kept the two 
extremes apart.290  
 
In Opif. 34 Philo says that the intelligible boundaries (ὅροι) which were 
between the light and darkness, were evening and morning.291 They were set 
in the middle, which may mean that they are two sides of the same boundary. 
The intelligible darkness must be fenced and controlled by these boundaries, 
which were set in the middle of them. The conflict within the intelligible 
realm in Philo’s account may reflect Middle Platonic speculation concerning 
Plato’s list of opposites in Sophist 254d-255a (same, different, movement and 
rest). In Plato, these opposites describe the characteristics of two distinct 
realms of creation (the world of being and the world of becoming), but the 
                                                 
290 Opif. 33. Translated by David Runia in On the Creation, 53-54. μετὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ φωτὸς 
ἀνάλαμψιν, ὃ πρὸ ἡλίου γέγονεν, ὑπεχώρει τὸ ἀντίπαλον σκότος, διατειχίζοντος ἀπʼ ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ καὶ 
διιστάντος θεοῦ τοῦ τὰς ἐναντιότητας εὖ εἰδότος καὶ τὴν ἐκ φύσεως αὐτῶν διαμάχην ἵνʼ οὖν μὴ αἰεὶ 
συμφερόμεναι στασιάζωσι καὶ πόλεμος ἀντʼ εἰρήνης ἐπικρατῇ τὴν ἀκοσμίαν ἐν κόσμῳ τιθείς, οὐ μόνον ἐχώρισε 
φῶς καὶ σκότος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅρους ἐν μέσοις ἔθετο διαστήμασιν, οἷς ἀνεῖρξε τῶν ἄκρων ἑκάτερον.  
291 The conflict between light and darkness may parallel Plato’s description of the relation of the 
ideas in the intelligible realm. In Sophist 254-256 Plato listed five major relations, namely being, 
similarity, difference, movement and rest. Runia points out that four of these kinds are opposites, 
which may represent a similar problem between light and darkness, as attested in Philo. See Runia, On 
the Creation, 164. Darkness is mentioned twice in Gen. 1.1-5. This possibly gave room for allegorical 
speculation. The first instance in Gen. 1:2 refers in Philo’s allegory to the idea of air, because air is by 
nature dark. For Philo, the air is black or hyacinth blue and this had parallels in many ancient texts. 
The second instance in Gen. 1:4 refers to some other darkness because it came into being as a rival to 
light, i.e. the Logos. 
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Middle Platonic teachers projected this distinction to the intelligible 
cosmos.292 
The conflict within the intelligible realm and the separation of darkness in 
Philo’s exegesis of day one parallel Valentinian protological accounts. The 
principle of matter and the creation of the visible cosmos were an outcome of 
the conflict within the divine world.  The separation of the erroneous 
Intention of Sophia from the realm of Light into the realm of shadow and the 
void parallels the separation of intelligible darkness and the Logos in Philo’s 
account.293 In the Valentinian accounts it was the Savior, as the Light of the 
Pleroma, who shone in the darkness, but darkness, i.e. the realm of Sophia 
outside the Pleroma, could not understand it.294 In Philo, the Light is also 
depicted as the Savior, and it was associated with the Logos. Both in Philo 
and in Valentinian accounts the rivalry of the Logos was fenced by the Limit, 
which was a standard Pythagorean term for the separation of the principle of 
multiplicity and matter from the One. 295 In the Valentinian protology the 
Limit had a double role: on the one hand it separated, and on the other hand 
it strengthened. The duality of the “limit” parallels Philo’s account according 
to which Limit had a double function in the form of “morning” and “evening”. 
In the Valentinian protology the conflict within the intelligible cosmos 
was the basis for the creation of matter and the visible cosmos. The 
erroneous intention of Sophia was separated from the intelligible realm and 
transformed into cosmic matter. Philo does not explicitly equate the 
                                                 
292 In Numenius (fr. 15) the difference between the first and the second God is related to 
movement. Whereas the essence of the first God is in rest, movement is related to the second God. The 
distinction between rest and movement does not depict the distinction between the intelligible realm 
and the visible cosmos as in Plato’s Sophist, but the distinction is already made between beings within 
the intelligible cosmos. See Dillon, “Numenius,” 198-199.   
293 Iren. Haer. 1.1.3; 1.4.1; 1.8.5. In Hipp. Ref. VI 25 Hippolytus also refers to Gen. 1:2 as a proof-
text for the amorphous nature of Sophia’s creation which was cast out of Pleroma: “Sophia, therefore, 
prepared to project that only which she was capable, viz., a formless and undigested substance. And 
this he says is what Moses asserts: ‘The earth was invisible and unfashioned’” (Gen.1:2). The 
conception that it was not Sophia’s erroneous “thought” – as in Irenaeus’s and Clement’s accounts 
described above − but her amorphous creation that was separated from the Pleroma comes a distinct 
source. In one passage Irenaeus refers to this same teaching in Iren. Haer. 1.2.3. Ismo Dunderberg, 
however, is skeptical whether Hippolytus’s biblical allusions are taken from any Valentinian source. 
Dunderberg has pointed out that Hippolytus has a tendency to add biblical references to his 
descriptions of Valentinian teachings. It is possible that the reference to Gen. 1:2 in the case of the 
expulsion of Sophia’s creation out of Pleroma attested in Hipp. Ref. VI 25 comes from Hippolytus’s 
pen, not from some separate Valentinian source. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 199-201. 
294 Iren. Haer. 1.1.3; 1.8.5. 
295 The Limit (Horos) is a standard metaphysical term in Neo-Pythagorean logic which is attested 
widely in Valentinian texts. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 238-240. In the Valentinian accounts the 
Limit has a double role: on the one hand, it strengthens and on the other hand it separates. This would 
parallel the double function (evening-morning) of the Boundary in Opif. 34. 
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intelligible darkness with matter. It is possible, however, that in Philo’s 
systems matter has its origin in conflict within the intelligible realm. This 
interpretation is compatible with Philo’s theory of creatio aeterna according 
to which matter came into being as a by-product of the creation of the 
intelligible cosmos, i.e. the Logos. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Philo of Alexandria and the Valentinian teachers can be located in the 
trajectory of the Platonic tradition, which integrated Plato’s Timaeus into 
Aristotelian trancendental monism and Neo-Pythagorean first principles. 
Philo interpreted the creation narrative in Gen. 1:1-5 as a description of the 
intelligible cosmos, while the Valentinians based the description of the 
creation of the intelligible cosmos on the prologue of John’s Gospel. The 
Valentinian teacher may have been aware that John’s prologue was written 
as a Platonizing commentary on Gen. 1:1-5 similar to Philo’s account in Opif. 
25-36. It was not, thus, a coincidence that the Valentinians selected John’s 
prologue as a proof-text for their protological account (Exc. Theod. 6-7, Iren. 
Haer. 1.8.5). 
The Valentinian exegetes intended to give the impression that their 
Platonizing protological myth was already present in John’s prologue. It is 
unlikely, however, that the protological myth was derived solely from the 
prologue of the Gospel of John. The myth of Sophia had its basis in 
Christianized Neo-Pythagorean philosophy and it was evidently a part of the 
preceding Gnostic myth, which was reformed by the Valentinian theologians. 
The Valentinian teachers were also familiar with the Hellenistic Jewish 
exegetical traditions attested in the writings of Philo. Philo’s protological 
speculations in Opif. 25-36, Conf. 146 and Somn. 1.75 may have been part of 
the exegetical source material for the Valentinian theologians in their 
commentaries on John’s prologue. 
It is noticeable that in Philo the intelligible cosmos already contains a 
conflict between intelligible light, i.e. the Logos, and intelligible darkness, 
which must be confined in order to sustain the harmony of the cosmos. The 
monadic and dyadic aspects of the Godhead are present already in Philo’s 
exegesis on “day one.”  Although Philo did not elaborate this conflict further 
in his text, these motifs were elaborated, however, by the Valentinian 
teachers, who considered the separation of the light and darkness as the 
separation of the principle of matter from the Pleroma. Thus, the conflict 
between intelligible light and darkness served as a biblical basis for the 
derivation of matter from the transcendent One.  
Despite the similarities concerning the terms and patterns of 
interpretation, there were also fundamental philosophical differences 
between the accounts of Philo and those of the Valentinians. In Philo, the 
creation of the intelligible world served as an archetype for the creation of the 
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visible cosmos. The visible creation was sustained by the powers of the Logos 
of God. In the Valentinian accounts the Father of All created spiritual and 
intellectual beings in order to be known and loved by them. Thus, the 
Platonic ideas were personified as aeons. The ideas were not only intelligible 
but intelligent. They desired unity, which means that they were not only 
archetypes, but living beings. The visible cosmos was the outcome of an error 
in this epistemological process. Therefore, the elements and bodies of the 
visible cosmos do not have a firm place in the intelligible realm, but they 
came into being as a result of an erroneous thought of the youngest of the 
intellectual beings called Sophia. These notions are further investigated in 
the following chapter. 
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5 THE CREATION OF MATTER AND THE WISDOM 
OF GOD 
In the preceding chapter, I investigated the generation of the intelligible 
world in the systems of the Valentinians and Philo. In both traditions the 
divine world generated by the transcendent One was seen as an elaboration 
of the Platonic ideal world. While Philo saw Gen. 1-5 as the basis for the 
discussion concerning the creation of the intelligible cosmos, Valentinians 
used the prologue of John’s Gospel as a proof-text of the protological 
account. The Valentinian teachers saw Gen. 1:1-5 as a description of the 
creation of the visible cosmos. Also, the intelligible cosmos was not according 
to the Valentinians an archetype of the visible world, as in Philo’s system, but 
the unknown God created it to be known by intelligible beings called aeons. 
The creation of the visible cosmos had its origin in the epistemological 
rupture among the divine being and the fall of the youngest of the aeon called 
Sophia. I will show in this chapter that in the Valentinian system the chasm 
between the intelligible cosmos and the visible world was not absolute: the 
psychic heaven, i.e. the realm of the heavenly bodies, was ruled by the 
psychic “intellects,” who had their archetypes in the Pleroma.   
The creation of matter was one of the most debated questions within 
Hellenistic philosophical schools. The Valentinian teachers drew their theory 
of matter from the Neo-Pythagorean tradition, which derived the principle of 
multiplicity and matter from the transcendent One through deprivation. 
Although Philo did not present a detailed theory about the origin of matter, 
the most logical conclusion is that he supported a metaphysical-ontological 
interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus, which went back to Eudorus of Alexandria. 
Philo and the Valentinians can be located in the hermeneutical tradition, 
which interpreted Plato’s Timaeus, as well as the creation narrative of 
Genesis, metaphorically in the light of Pythagorean and Aristotelian views. 
Strikingly, both Philo and the Valentinian teachers associated biblical 
Wisdom with pre-cosmic matter, which represented the dyadic aspect of 
God’s creative power. 
5.1 The philosophical background of the creation of 
matter 
Plato’s Timaeus formed the cosmological basis for further speculations 
among the Middle Platonic philosophers. In the Timaeus the basic causes of 
the universe were the mind (νοῦς) and necessity (ἀνάγκη), which interacted 
with each other as the Demiurge created the visible copies of eternally living 
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beings (τὰ νοητὰ ζῶα).296 In addition to the eternal model, i.e. the world of 
Ideas and the Demiurge, there existed according to Plato the Receptacle, 
which received the images of the cosmic elements, earth, water, air and fire. 
In Tim. 50 Plato explains that the Receptacle was like a mirror which 
reflected images of the cosmic elements without having qualities of its own. 
He also compared the Receptacle with an ointment that was a neutral base 
for various fragrances. Although the Receptacle itself was neutral, the powers 
(δυνάμεις) of the elements began to interact with each other. They put the 
Receptacle into a chaotic motion, which generates the cosmic principle of 
necessity (ἀνάγκη). 297 According to Plato, the qualities of the four cosmic 
elements in the Receptacle were in constant motion like seeds that shake and 
sway in a winnowing-basket (πλόκανον).298  
The task of the Demiurge, who functioned as the cosmic Mind, was to 
bring order into this pre-cosmic chaos by contemplating the eternal Ideas as 
models. For that reason, the Demiurge created the World Soul as a mediating 
entity, which forces the randomly moving elements of the Receptacle to rest 
according to divine reason. The visible cosmos is thus a combination of 
necessity and nous.299 On the one hand, the Receptacle was a neutral 
recipient “in which” genesis took place, but, on the other hand, it was a 
chaotic essence “out of which” the four elements of the world were brought 
forth by the Demiurge. It should be noted that the Receptacle in its chaotic 
stage was not corporeal until the Demiurge persuaded the four cosmic 
elements to rest.  
Some Middle Platonic teachers reformed the creation narrative of the 
Timaeus by combining it with the transcendental monism of Aristotle and 
the Neo-Pythagorean first principles. The primary premises for the genesis of 
the cosmos were no longer “mind and necessity,” but the triad of the 
                                                 
296 Tim. 29, 30c. The Timaeus was divided into three sections, which look the premises of mind 
and necessity from three different points of view. The first section (Tim. 29d-47e) describes the 
ordering of the universe through the mind (νοῦς). The second section (Tim. 47e-69a) describes the 
same process from the point of necessity (ἀνάγκη). The third section (Tim. 69a-92c) discusses the 
interaction of the mind and necessity, especially at an anthropological level. Cf. Thomas Tobin, 
Timaios of Locri, On the Nature of the World and the Soul. Text, Translation and Notes (ed. Hans 
Dieter Betz & Edward N. O’Neil; SBL Texts and Translations 26; Greco-Roman Religion series 8; 
Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1985, 11-12. 
297 See Francis Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato (Cambridge: Hacket Publishing 
Company, 1937, repr. 1997), 197-210. 
298 Plato’s parable of the winnowing-basket is attested in Tim. 52e. Since bodily motion cannot 
exist without the self-motion of the soul, some commentators of Plato (e.g. Plutarch) postulated an 
irrational world soul that was responsible for pre-cosmic chaos. Plato himself left the reason for pre-
cosmic chaos unanswered. 
299 Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 191-203.  
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principles: the Ideas, matter and God.300 The Ideas did not exist any longer 
independently, but they were seen as the thoughts of God, who was identified 
as the prime mover of Aristotle. Aristotle associated Plato’s notion of space 
with his concept of matter (ὕλη), which was a recipient (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) of 
each thing and had the capacity to receive form.301 Thus, Aristotelian ὕλη 
parallels Plato’s Receptacle in its neutral stage, before the reflection of the 
qualities of the primary bodies occurred in it. Even though the Middle 
Platonic teachers took the term ὕλη from Aristotle, they do not connect it to 
the Platonic Receptacle in its neutral form, but in its chaotic stage.302 Chaotic 
matter was not fundamentally evil, but it had an innate tendency to escape 
rationality. It became the principle of disorder and necessity (ἀνάγκη) which 
must be persuaded by the Logos.303 Some Middle Platonic writers like 
Plutarch postulated an evil world-soul which was responsible for disorder in 
the world.304 
The existence of matter was also related to another more fundamental 
problem, namely the question of the eternity of the cosmos. Plato had 
maintained in Tim. 28b that “the primary question which has to be 
investigated at the outset in every case, − namely, whether it [the cosmos] 
has always existed, having no beginning of generation, or whether it has 
come into existence having begun from some beginning.” The latter option 
seems to be compatible with the narrative in the Timaeus, which describes 
how the Demiurge created the cosmos out of the pre-existent elements of the 
world. This conflicts, however, with Plato’s view according to which time 
itself came into being together with the creation and movement of the 
heavenly bodies. How, then, should the chronologically definable beginning 
                                                 
300 The doxological pattern of the three ἀρχαί is attested e.g. in Placita of Aetius (1.3.21) and 
Timaios of Locri, according to which “before the heaven came to be, the idea and matter, as well as the 
God, who is the fashioner of the better, already existed” (94c). Runia has pointed out that the system of 
three archai  (God, matter, ideas) attested in the various Middle Platonic texts was an elaboration of 
the preceding model which consisted of only two first principles (nous-ideas and matter). Runia refers 
to Theophrastus’ fragment (230), and the Platonic doxography of Diogenes Laertius (3.67-80), where 
only two archai are mentioned. See Runia, “Philo and Middle Platonism Revisited,” 135; Tobin, 
Timaios of Locri,, 14-16. 
301 Ar. Phys. 192a, 31; 209b, 11-17. It is rather likely that the identification of matter and Plato’s 
Receptacle was not invented by Aristotle, but it came from the scholastic tradition of the Old Academy. 
It appears already in the teaching of Speusippus. Cf. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 14. 
302 Kevin Corrigan, “Positive and Negative Matter in Later Platonism: The Uncovering of Plotinus’s 
Dialogue with the Gnostics,” in Gnosticism and Later Platonism. Themes, Figures, and Texts (ed. John 
D. Turner & Ruth Majercik; Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 19-56. 
303 It should be noted that the term necessity (ἀνάγκη) does not mean some deterministic natural 
law in its modern scientific meaning, but instead it refers in Plato to contingent motion without 
purpose or intention. It denotes the irrationality of the cosmos. Cf. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 159-
177; Tobin, Timaios of Locri, 14-16.   
304 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 202-204. 
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of the cosmos in the Timaeus be understood if time did not exist before the 
world came into being?  
One solution to the aforesaid problems was to interpret Plato’s 
cosmological narrative in the Timaeus metaphorically.305 Some followers of 
Plato were of the opinion that Plato articulated the creation of the world by 
the Demiurge out of pre-existent chaotic matter in the Timaeus for 
pedagogical reasons and only in order to explain the logical structure of the 
world. Rather than a historical real divine being or God, the Demiurge can be 
understood as a symbolical figure, which could in reality be identified with 
the cosmic mind or the rational part of the world soul.306 This would mean 
that the definable point of time of the creation was also part of the 
metaphorical cosmic myth. In reality, both the realm of being, i.e. the world 
of ideas, and the realm of becoming, i.e. the visible cosmos, have existed ever 
since without beginning or end (creatio aeterna).307 
The symbolical interpretation of the Timaeus may have been a reaction 
towards Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s cosmic myth.308 Aristotle took Plato’s 
                                                 
305 This was the view of some prominent teachers of the Old Academy, such as Speusippus (ca. 
407-339), Xenocrates (ca. 396-314) and Crantor (ca. 335-275).   
306 In some cases Plato identified the Demiurge with the nous explicitly. In the Laws (967b5-6) 
Plato maintains that it is nous that has ordered everything in heaven and in the Philebus (29c6-8) he 
says that “all the wise agree…that Nous is king for us of heaven and earth.”  Plato also maintains that 
nous cannot exist without a soul (Philebus 30c9-10, par. Tim. 30b1-3). Therefore, the Demiurge-Nous 
could be identified with the rational part of the world soul. See R. Hackford, “Plato’s Theism,” in 
Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics (ed. R. E. Allen; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 439-447; 
Stephen Menn, Plato on God as Nous (ed. Richard A. Watson and Charles M. Young; The Journal of 
the History of Philosophy Series; Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1995), 6-13. 
307 In addition to Eudorus of Alexandria (c. 1st century BCE), the main proponents of creatio 
aeterna were Alcinoos (c. 150 CE), Apuleius, Albinus (c. 150 CE), and an Athenian Platonist Calvenus 
Taurus (c. 150 CE). The eternity of the cosmos is also attested in the pseudo-Pythagorean Timaois of 
Locri (c. 1st century CE). Also, Neo-Pythagorean Proclus adopted the theory of eternal creation and 
maintained that the world is constantly in a process of creation…ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ γεγενημένον (Proc. In 
Plat. Tim. 209.3-25). Proclus criticized the teachers of the Old Acadaemy for the conceptual and 
figurative interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus. Proclus says that if the creation is only taken symbolically, 
then the Demiurge also is a symbolic being. There were, however, some Middle Platonic 
commentators– such as Plutarch (c. 45-120 CE) and Atticus (c. 150-200 CE) – who took Plato’s 
cosmological myth literally: the visible world came into being at some point of time when the Demiurge 
started to shape chaotic, pre-existent matter. The literalist interpretation of the Timaeus was the 
dominant view mainly concerning the dualistic systems. Cf. Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 14; Sterling, 
“Creatio Temporalis,” 28-29; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 242-244. 
308 Aristotle mentions the non-literal reading of the Timaeus in De Cael. 279b30. Aristotle says that 
some teachers of the Old Academy, e.g. Speusippus and Xenocrates, suggested that creation in time 
and the role of the Demiurge can be interpreted “didactically” like mathematician constructs diagrams. 
The non-literal reading of Plato’s Timaeus must have been popular since Aristotle’s disciple 
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Timaeus literally and argued that it was absurd to suppose that the 
immaterial Demiurge could have created the material world. For Aristotle, 
the causation between beings at ontologically different levels was impossible. 
Also, the conception that the world was both created and eternal was 
irrational, because all things which were created were also destructible. 
Therefore, Aristotle stated that the world was uncreated and 
indestructible.309 This means that the cosmos was a closed system in which 
the elements of the world were constantly changing their accidental qualities 
and forming the next generation of bodies. The term genesis describes the 
process of change and generation within an eternal and non-changing 
substratum, which served the basis for genesis.310 
Some Middle Platonic philosophers revitalized the non-literal reading of 
Timaeus’s account of the creation of the world, but they combined it with 
Aristotelian transcendental theology and Pythagorean first principles. A 
theory of the creation of the world began to emerge according to which God 
is not solely a symbolical figure, but the source of the Ideas (the Monad) and 
the principle of multiplicity and matter (the Dyad) as well. According to this 
model “to be created” means metaphysical-ontological dependency on the 
transcendent One. Also, matter does not exist independently as an arche – 
like the Receptacle in the Timaeus − but it is derived from God. As the Ideas 
are located within God’s mind as his thoughts, the principle of has its origin 
in the transcendent One as a dyadic shadow projection of the Monad or a 
deprived aspect of the monadic Logos.  
5.2 The creation of matter in the writings of Philo   
Unfortunately, Philo does not give a clear answer whether he supported the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo or creation out of pre-existent matter, and 
whether he saw the creation as a temporal act (creatio temporalis) or an 
eternal process (creatio aeterna). On the one hand, Philo seems to suppose 
the existence of matter before the Creator started to form the elements of the 
world. Philo states that there are two basic principles out of which the world 
is created. One is the pure universal and active mind, and the other is the 
passive, lifeless and motionless principle, which is full of discord and 
disharmony.311 The latter, passive element of the creation, is depicted as ὕλη 
                                                                                                                                          
Theophrastus opposed his teacher and read the Timaeus non-literally in accordance with the teachers 
of the Old Academy. Cf. Gregory Sterling, “Creatio Temporalis, Aeterna, vel Continua? An Analysis of 
the Thought of Philo of Alexandria,” in SPA (IV) 1992, 15-41. 
309 For the view that the world is not created and is not destructible cf. Ar. De Caelo 1.10-12. 
310 For Aristotle’s view on genesis cf. Ar. De gen et corr. I 317a; II 331a, 334-335a, 337a. 
311 Opif. 7-9. 
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or οὐσία or simply μὴ ὄν, i.e. “non-being”.312  On the other hand, Philo may 
say that God generates all things, not only making them visible, but bringing 
into being that which did not exist before, acting not only as the artificer 
(δημιουργός), but also as the creator (κτίστης).313 Philo clearly says that there 
is only one arche of the world and that God is the cause of everything that 
exists and matter is not excluded from the “everything.”314  
Harry Wolfson tried to prove that Philo was the first religious-
philosophical teacher who taught creation ex nihilo.315 In his analysis of 
Philo’s theory of the creation of the intelligible cosmos, Wolfson argued that 
Philo postulated in Opif. 29 the creation of the ideas of the four cosmic 
elements, i.e. the ideas of earth, water, air and fire (= heaven). The “abyss” in 
Gen. 1:2 referred to the “idea of the void,” which Wolfson equated with the 
idea of the Platonic Receptacle. Moreover, Wolfson suggested that God not 
only created the Ideas but the cosmic copies of them, which means that God 
also created the cosmic copy of the idea of the Receptacle. Wolfson’s analysis 
of the content of the intelligible cosmos is not compelling. Rather than ideas 
of the cosmic bodies, Philo in Opif. 29 explained archetypical paradigms of 
the regions of the cosmos. The idea of the void referred to the region between 
moon and earth, which was filled with air, not to the idea of the Platonic 
Receptacle. In addition, the idea of heaven in Opif. 29 could not refer to the 
idea of the fourth cosmic element, i.e. fire, because Philo explicitly denies 
that the substance of the heaven is fire.316   
On the grounds of these discrepancies Wolfson’s thesis about creation ex 
nihilo has not received large support.317 In addition, it is not reasonable to 
suggest that God would have created something which he could not himself 
contact without intermediaries. Philo mentions explicitly that God created all 
things in the world out of matter “without laying hold of it himself, since it 
was not lawful for the happy and blessed One to touch limitless chaotic 
matter.” God had to use his incorporeal powers in order to shape shapeless 
matter.318 Also, the separation of pre-existent matter into four cosmic 
                                                 
312 The term “non-being” parallels mannah or offspring which were brought from non-being to 
being from pre-existent matter. The former had its origin in the element of air (Mos. 2.267) and the 
latter in parents who were the midway between divine and human nature (Spec. 2.225). Cf. Winston, 
Philo of Alexandria, 7-8. 
313 Somn. 1.76, Opif. 22, Plant. 3, Heres 233-136. 
314 Leg. 3.29, Heres 36, Decal. 41, 52, 64, Spec. 1. 20, 30, Legat 3. 
315 Wolfson, Philo I, 308-309.  
316 Cf. Runia. On the Creation, 171-173; Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 9-13.  
317 For the same kind of interpretation see Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the Continuum: 
Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: New York, 1983), 203-9. David Winston has 
pointed out that creation ex nihilo was an unknown doctrine within Judaism during the time of Philo. 
It is rather unlikely that Philo would have postulated such an innovative theory concerning the creation 
of matter without formulating this doctrine explicitly. 
318 Spec. 1.328. 
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elements (air, fire, earth, water) was delegated to the Logos, which was 
depicted as a “cutter.”319 Philo’s statement according to which “nothing 
comes into being from the nonexistent and nothing is destroyed into the non-
existent” seems to oppose the theory of creation ex nihilo.320  
If creation ex nihilo is rejected as Philo’s model for the creation of matter, 
there are two remaining options which could explain Philo’s theory 
concerning the origin of matter. These options are i) matter has existed 
eternally as an independent principle besides God or ii) matter came into 
being indirectly as a result of the creation process. The former option is 
related to the theory of creatio temporalis, according to which the world 
came into being at the moment God began to shape pre-existent matter.321 
The latter represents creatio aeterna, which became, as I noted above, the 
standard view among the Middle Platonists since Eudorus of Alexandria. 
According to creatio aeterna, the temporal expressions in the creation myth 
of the Timeaus should be taken metaphorically as descriptions of the 
ontological dependence of the world on its primary arche.  
Philo was evidently aware of the philosophical discussion and the 
different views concerning the creation of the world and the origin of matter. 
In On the Eternity of the world he enumerates three philosophical solutions 
concerning the creation of the world. Firstly, the Aristotelian view according 
to which the world is uncreated and indestructible. Secondly, the Stoic view, 
which postulated a succession of created and destructible worlds. The third 
was the Platonic view which according to Philo was anticipated by Moses: the 
world was created, but its indestructibility was sustained by God’s 
providence.  
                                                 
319 Her. 134-140. 
320 Aet. 5; Spec. 1.266. See Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 11-13. 
321 Gerhard May argues that Philo interpreted the Timaeus literally. This would mean that the 
cosmos came into being at a definite point of time as a result of God’s will, and it will last eternally on 
the grounds of God’s omnipotence. Philo agreed with Plato in that matter exists eternally beside God as 
the second arche. Cf. Gerhard May, Creatio ex Nihilo. The Doctrine of Creation out of Nothing in 
Early Christian Thought (Transl. A. S. Worral; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 6-21. A similar kind of 
interpretation can be found in Hans-Friedrich Weiss, Unterschuchungen zur Kosmologie des 
hellenistischen und palästinischen Judentums (TU 97; Berling, 1966), 18-74. Cf. also James 
Drummond, Philo Judaeus: The Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion. 
2 Vols. (London: 1888), 297-307. Lilla argues that Clement believed in the existence of matter prior to 
the origin of the world. The same doctrine can also be found in Wisdom of Salomon, in Philo, and in 
Justin. Cf. Salvatore Lilla, Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Platonisim and Gnosticism 
(Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 1971), 193-199. Runia is of the opinion that Philo does not give a 
clear answer to the problem of matter because his primary aim is exegetical and ethical. According to 
Runia, Philo taught the pre-existence of matter, which existed independently of God. Matter is not, 
however, the second arche similar to God, because God is constantly forming matter. Cf. Runia, Philo 
of Alexandria, 435-455. 
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In Aet. 1-19 Philo was not, however, perfectly pleased with the various 
Platonic interpretations of the Timaeus.322 On the one hand, he rejected the 
sophisticated Platonic interpretation, which may refer to the symbolical 
reading of the Timaeus by the teachers of the Old Academy. On the other 
hand, he strikingly admired the Aristotelian view according to which Plato 
proved in the Timaeus that the world is both uncreated and indestructible. 
Philo did not say, however, that he accepted the latter opinion, but it was 
better and truer (βέλτιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον) than the former theory because it 
did not challenge the activity of God in the creation.323 Philo formulates his 
own thesis in Prov. 1.7.9-20 as follows:  
God is continuously ordering matter by his thought. His thinking was 
not anterior to his creating, and there never was a time when he did 
not create, the ideas themselves having been with him from the 
beginning. For God’s will is not posterior to him, but is always with 
him, for natural motions never give out. Thus ever thinking he 
creates, and furnishes to sensible things the principle of their 
existence, so that both should exist together: the ever-creating Divine 
Mind and the sense-perceptible things to which beginning of being is 
given.”324 
 
Sterling points out that in Prov. 1.7.9-20 Philo may have modified his 
thoughts concerning the creation of matter found in Opif. 7, 9-11, which was 
closer to Plato’s view in the Timaeus.325 In Prov. Philo states that the visible 
world cannot be distinguished from the eternally existing Ideas. Thus, there 
is only one arche of the world, which means that God must be indirectly also 
the arche of matter. The creation of the visible world is eternal (creatio 
aeterna) because God creates the world simultaneously (creatio simultanea) 
by thinking about its eternal Ideas. The existence of the world is dependent 
                                                 
322 Aet. 13, 14. Philo mentions that the view which regards the world as uncreated and 
indestructible was not an invention of Aristotle, but Pythagoreans. He mentions in Aet. 12 a work of 
Ocellus called A Treatise on the Nature of the Universe (Περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως) in which the 
author asserts that the world is indestructible and proves some demonstrative proofs. Philo does not 
explicitly reject this possibly Neo-Pythagorean teaching concerning the eternity of the world. He argues 
(Aet. 21-22) that the world can be destroyed only by external causes or by the powers within itself. Both 
of these causes are not compelling for Philo. Therefore, the world is indestructible. 
323 The argumentation in Aet. 8-19 is rather complicated. Sterling agrees with Baltes that Philo may 
have used some Peripatetic source as he presents views from different philosophical schools of 
thought. Cf. Sterling, “Creatio Temporalis,” 36-37. I would suggest that Philo’s view was not absolutely 
Platonic, and it was not absolutely anti-Aristotelian either, which created a tension in Philo’s 
statements in Aet. 8-19. For Philo, the main problem in various philosophical theories was that they 
were infected by the charge of the inactivity of God.  
324 Translated by David Winston in Philo of Alexandria, 15.  
325 Sterling, “Creatio Temporalis,” 39-41. 
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on God’s active and all-pervasive will to create through his thinking.326 
Therefore, primordial matter does not have an independent and real 
existence of its own, as Plato taught in the Timaeus, or God is not merely 
ordering it, but matter came into being as a by-product or “shadow 
reflection” of the creation of the intelligible world. David Winston has stated 
that for Philo matter is “a logical moment rather than a temporal reality.”327  
It seems that Philo did not accept Platonic or Aristotelian theories of the 
creation uncritically. Although Philo drew his teaching from the Neo-
Pythagorean and Platonic tradition and he read the Timaeus metaphorically, 
this should not diminish the activity of God in the process of creation as was 
the case in the purely symbolical view of some sophisticated Platonists.328 
The term genesis was not according to Philo a temporal expression, but it 
means metaphysical-ontological dependence on God’s creative activity. Philo 
followed Plato in that the cosmos was not created in time, but time was 
created together with the world (γὰρ οὐκ ἦν πρὸ κόσμου, ἀλλʼ ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ 
γέγονεν ἢ μετʼ αὐτόν). For Philo, the six days of creation does not mean that 
God needed time for the creation, but he created the whole world 
instantaneously by thinking about it.329 The number of days represents the 
logical structure of the visible world that is made simultaneously as a copy of 
the intelligible model, not the chronological interval between the days of 
creation. 
The consensus of opinion among the Philonic scholars is that matter does 
have an intelligible archetype in the world of Ideas. Wolfson’s thesis 
according to which God also created the idea of the Receptacle is apparently 
erroneous. However, there are – as I noted in the previous chapter – some 
elements in Philo’s protological accounts, which may refer to the conflict 
within the intelligible world. In Opif. 33-34 (par. Somn. 1.75) Philo describes 
how darkness came into being as a rival to light, when the intelligible 
                                                 
326 Sac. 65-68; Mos. 1.283.  
327 Winston, Logos, 17-18. The Wisdom of Solomon, another representative text of Alexandrian 
Hellenistic Judaism, says that God “created the world out of formless matter” (Wisdom. 11.17) without 
mentioning the origin of matter. Winston stresses that there is not evidence for the doctrine of creatio 
ex nihilo in Jewish or Greek tradition in the time of Philo. The creation in the Wisdom of Solomon was 
understood as a continuous process. Matter was not created out of nothing, but it came into being as a 
by-product of creation. According to Winston, this which was also the opinion of Philo. It is therefore 
possible that the Wisdom of Solomon was influenced by Philo’s writings. Cf. David Winston, The 
Wisdom of Solomon. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary by David Winston (The 
Anchor Bible 43; New York: Doubleday, 1979), 39-40. 
328 Sterling, “Creatio Temporalis,” 40-41. 
329 ἐπειδὴ προσεδεῖτο χρόνων μήκους ὁ ποιῶν ἅμα γὰρ πάντα δρᾶν εἰκὸς θεόν, οὐ προστάττοντα μόνον 
ἀλλὰ καὶ διανοούμενον ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τοῖς γινομένοις ἔδει τάξεως. (Opif. 13) Philo says that the number six is 
an arithmetically perfect number containing the male (number 3) and female (number 2) aspects of 
creation (3 x 2 = 6; 2+2+2 = 6; 3 + 3 = 6), and the creation in six days describes the perfection of the 
created cosmos metaphorically. 
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cosmos, i.e. the Logos, was created. Darkness must be fenced by Limits, i.e. 
the morning and the evening, which belonged according to Philo to the 
intelligible cosmos. The Limit is a standard Neo-Pythagorean principle as a 
controller of the principle of multiplicity and matter.330 Although God did not 
create matter, it came into existence as a counter-element to the Logos and 
opposed the ordered cosmos. Matter was, however, a necessary cosmic 
element for the creation of the visible world. In Philo’s cosmological system 
matter is not evil, although it may become the source of evilness if rationality 
does not control it. There is not, however, such a thing as cosmic evil or 
chaotic matter in Philo’s cosmology that has an existence of its own. God 
sends even chaotic natural catastrophes to benefit humankind in general, 
and if something evil happens as a result of them, it is not caused by God’s 
will but these effects are produced by their natural causes (Prov. 42-44, 52-
54). It seems that chaotic materiality can be “experienced” in the world only 
in the microcosmic realm when the human mind loses its rationality and is 
captured by irrational passions and love of material things. 
5.3 The creation of matter in the Valentinian sources 
Einar Thomassen has argued convincingly that the generation of matter in 
the Valentinian sources parallels theories in the school tradition of the Neo-
Pythagorean Moderatus of Gades. According to Moderatus’s theory 
“Quantity,” i.e. the principle of multiplicity and matter, was derived from the 
“unitary Logos” by depriving it of its rationality.331 Thomassen notices that in 
Valentinian cosmological myth the whole Pleroma, i.e. the sum -total of 
aeons below the primal God, can be equated with the second Monad or 
unitary Logos of Moderatus’s system and Sophia with Quantity, which was 
deprived of its rationality.  
Thomassen lists some instances of shared vocabulary that unify the 
Valentinian protological account and Moderatus’s account. Extension 
(ἐκθείνεσθαι, ἔκτασις) is employed to describe Sophia as well as Quantity in 
Moderatus’s account. Sophia extends herself to reach the One, and she would 
have been absorbed and dissolved in the totality of being had she not 
encountered the power, i.e. the Limit, which supports the Pleroma. In 
Moderatus’s systems, Quantity is restricted by “boundaries.”  Also, Sophia’s 
                                                 
330 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 279-283. 
331 Simplicius In Phys.230:34-231:27. The quotation comes from Porphyry’s lost work Περὶ ὕλης. 
Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 270-275; Thomassen, “The Derivation of Matter,” in Gnosticism 
and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts (eds. John D. Turner & Ruth Majercik; Atlanta: SBL, 
2000), 4. For the system of Moderatus cf. also Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 347; Merlan, “Greek 
Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medival 
Philosophy (ed. A. H. Armstrong; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1967), 91-92. 
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Intention to extend herself is separated and excluded in the same way as 
Quantity is “torn off” in Moderatus’s system.332  
Although the Valentinian protological model fits nicely with Moderatus’s 
description of the derivation of matter, there are various allusions in the 
Valentinian accounts that connect them directly to Plato’s Timaeus in which 
the creation of the cosmos results from the synergy of Nous and Necessity. In 
Valentinian protology, the “Mind” (Νοῦς) emanates from God, and it contains 
all the aeons as the seed.333 However, the Intention of the youngest of the 
aeons, Sophia, is cast out “by necessity into the region of shadow and void” 
(ἐν σκιᾶς καὶ κενώματος τόποις ἐκβεβράσθαι κατὰ ἀνάγκην).334 Thus, the 
Valentinian theologians followed Plato in that the generation of the 
intelligible world was generated through the nous (τὰ διὰ νοῦ 
δεδημιουργημένα), whereas the creation of the visible world that follows from 
Sophia’s exclusion from the Pleroma is what came out of necessity (τὰ δι᾽ 
ἀνάγκης γινομένα).335 The Intention of Sophia was depicted as “shapeless and 
devoid of form” (ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεος), which parallels Plato’s description of 
the Receptacle in the Timaeus which was “invisible and unshaped” (ἀνόρατον 
εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον).336 
It is noteworthy that Sophia’s Intention (ἐνθύμησις) is also connected with 
ignorance. Sophia’s Intention was shapeless because she has not understood 
that the Father of All is incomprehensible. Therefore, the fall of Sophia from 
the divine realm had epistemological significance. The reference to “the 
places of shadow and emptiness” (ἐν σκιᾶς καὶ κενώματος τόποις) into which 
Sophia’s Intention was thrown is an allusion to Plato’s allegory of the cave.337 
Like prisoners in a cave looking at shadows projected on the wall, Sophia is 
bound to the realm of the emptiness of knowledge and mere shadows until 
the Savior comes from above and enlightens her with perfect knowledge. 
These notions are also attested in the Valentinian account preserved by 
                                                 
332 Thomassen’s comparison is based on Iren. Haer. 1.2.2-4; 1.4.1. It is noticeable, however, that it 
was the last aeon, Sophia, who became the source of matter, although it is stated that the intention to 
know the unknown Father had infected the other aeons too (Iren. Haer. 1.2.2). The intention of the last 
aeon was fatal. This was based on the Pythagorean theory of the number 30 (2+4+6+8+10=30), which 
is also the total number of aeons in the Pleroma. Sophia was the last aeon of the Dodecad as well as the 
Triacontad. The creation of Sophia moved necessarily beyond the Limit (ὅρος) of the Pleroma, and it 
was therefore imperfect. The fall of Sophia has a numerological basis, which is also attested in the 
allegory of the parable of the lost sheep (Luke 15:4-7) by Marcus (Iren. Haer. 1.16.1.)  See Jean-Marc 
Narbonne, “The Neopythagorean Backdrop to the Fall of the Soul,” in Gnosticism, Platonism and the 
Late Ancient World. Essays in Honour of John D. Turner (ed. Kevin Corrigan and Tuomas Rasimus; 
Boston: Brill, 2012), 414-419.  
333 Iren. Haer. 1.1.1; Exc.Theod. 6-7; Iren. Haer. 1.8.5. 
334 Iren. Haer. 1.4.1.  
335 Tim. 47e-48a. 
336 Iren. Haer. 1.2.2-4; Tim. 51b.  
337 Republic 563 ff.  
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Clement, which goes back to Theodotus. In that passage Sophia – although 
the text does not mention her name explicitly – fell into ignorance and 
formlessness (ἐν ἀγνωσίᾳ καὶ ἀμορφίᾳ ἐγένετο) when she wished to grasp that 
which is beyond knowledge. This led Sophia into the void of knowledge 
(κένωμα γνώσεως) and the shadow of the Name (σκιὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος), i.e. the 
perfect form of the aeons.338  
The salvation of Sophia, who was living in the place of shadows and “the 
cave of ignorance,” is actualized in two subsequent phases which parallel the 
salvation of the prisoners in Plato’s allegory of the cave. In the first phase, 
Christ descended from the intelligible realm of Light and visited Sophia 
Achamoth and bestowed upon her form, but not in accordance with perfect 
knowledge. Christ left her only a fragrance of immortality and a desire to 
return to the Light. When Sophia tried to follow Christ to the Pleroma, she 
was prevented by the Limit.339 Therefore, Sophia began to experience various 
kinds of emotions such as fear, perplexity, consternation, distress and 
ignorance, which served as the basis for incorporeal matter. It is noticeable 
that it was the light of Christ which revealed to Sophia her fallen condition 
and activated her emotions. Sophia did not experience bad emotion when she 
lived in the world of shadows but only after she got to know that something 
better exists. In the second phase the Savior, i.e. the Light, descended on 
Sophia and gave her form according to knowledge. The Savior taught Sophia 
the emanations of the Father of All and that the Father is beyond 
understanding.  
The salvation of Sophia from the shadows of ignorance was part of the 
cosmic drama which led to the creation of matter and the visible cosmos. The 
Savior not only healed Sophia’s emotions through knowledge but separated 
them and converted them from incorporeal passions into incorporeal matter 
(ἐξ ἀσωμάτου πάθους εἰς ἀσώματον τὴν ὕλην). The Savior bestowed capability 
upon matter to be later formed by the Demiurge into bodily structures and 
compounds.340 It seems that there was no consensus concerning Sophia’s 
emotions in the Valentinian sources. This becomes evident if the various 
theories of the passions of Sophia in Exc. C and Iren. Haer. 1.1-7 are 
compared with each other. It seems that Irenaeus has combined different 
Valentinian sources in his account of the Valentinian myth. The following 
table illustrates the inconsistencies between Valentinian sources concerning 
the analysis of Sophia’s emotions.341  
 
 
 
                                                 
338 Exc.Theod. 31. 
339 Iren. Haer. 1.4.1. 
340 Iren. Haer. 1.4.5; Exc. Theod. 46.1. 
341 For the fourfold division of the passions in Valentinian, Stoic and Sethian sources, see 
Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 112.  
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Iren. 1.4.1 Iren. 1.4.2 Iren. 1.5.4 Exc. C 
conversion conversion: 
the psychic 
essence 
conversion + fear: 
the psychic essence 
conversion: the 
Demiurge 
origin of the psychic 
essence is not 
mentioned 
fear fear: rest of the 
psychic arche 
fear: water + 
irrational souls 
fear: irrational souls 
 
distress distress: rest of 
the psychic 
arche + 
corporeal 
elements 
distress: air + evil 
spirits and the 
Devil 
 
distress:  
evil spirits 
perplexity - perplexity: 
elements of the 
world 
perplexity and 
consternation: 
elements of the 
world 
 
ignorance - ignorance: fire 
[inherited in the 
earth, water & air] 
 [fire inherited in the 
earth, water & air] 
origin not mentioned 
terror and 
consternation: 
corporeal 
elements 
consternation: earth  
tears: water   
smile: light   
 
It is quite likely that the teachings attested in Iren. Haer. 1.5.4 and Exc. C 
parallel each other. In these passages fear and grief are seen as the source of 
irrational souls and evil spirits, and the elements of the world (earth, water, 
air) are based on terror and perplexity. Strikingly, the idea of the conversion 
of Sophia as the source of psychic essence is not mentioned in Exc. C. It is 
likely, as I have pointed out earlier, that it was an innovation of the 
Valentinian teaching, which goes back to the disciples of Ptolemy in Rome.  
In the Timaeus Plato says that the projection of the ideas of the cosmic 
bodies into the Receptacle is “most perplexing and very hard to apprehend.” 
The Receptacle is the “all-receiver,” which reflects like a mirror the random 
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toing and froing of the qualities of the four cosmic elements, but Plato could 
not explain the cause of the reflections.342 The Valentinians intended to give 
an answer to this “perplexing problem,” and explained not only how the pre-
cosmic matter was derived from the transcendent One, but also how the 
cosmic elements are projected into the incorporeal matter. Just as the 
Platonic Receptacle had no qualities of its own before the cosmic bodies were 
projected into it, Sophia did not have any qualities of her own until Christ, 
i.e. the Light, deserted Sophia and put her emotions into chaotic motion. 
These emotions of Sophia became the basis for incorporeal matter and the 
elements of the world. They can be equated with the randomly reflecting 
qualities (ἴχνη) of the cosmic elements in the Receptacle. The emotions of 
Sophia were like the ideas of the cosmic elements, which became the pre-
cosmic matter as the Savior separated them and transformed them into 
unstructured proto-matter and gave this proto-matter the capability of 
becoming corporeal structures.343 
The myth of Sophia was not, however, only a paradigm of the origin of 
matter and the cosmic elements, but also the paradigm of the enlightenment 
of the human mind from the shadows of ignorance. Matter does not have its 
origin in the ideal world. It has its basis in the “emotional” surplus which 
resulted from the fixation of the ignorance of the one corrupted aeon who 
was saved from the “shadows of ignorance.” This “waste product” was 
transformed into the cosmic matter out of which the visible cosmos was 
created. Some part of matter possesses, however, a sort of innate inclination 
towards incorruptibility, which had its origin in Sophia’s will to escape from 
the “cave of ignorance” and return to the Light. This part of matter is called 
“psychic” and it served as “raw material” not only for the psychic part of the 
human soul but for the heavenly cosmos. The ruler of the seven heavens, the 
Demiurge and his angelic powers were made out of “luminous,” psychic 
essence.344  
                                                 
342 Tim. 51b.  
343 The emotions of the fallen aeon, Sophia, served as a basis for pre-cosmic matter. Matter did not 
have its firm basis in the intelligible realm because it resulted from a conflict within Pleroma. The two 
phases of the Platonic Receptacle − i.e. matter in rest and matter in motion − can be found in the 
Valentinian myth of Sophia. In the first phase, the Intention of Sophia called Achamoth was excluded 
from the Pleroma. This parallels Plato’s Receptacle in its neutral stage before the images of the cosmic 
elements were projected into it. In the second phase, after the departure of the Christ, Sophia 
Achamoth began to suffer various emotions which can be equated with Plato’s Receptacle in its chaotic 
stage as the images of the cosmic elements were projected into the Receptacle. 
344 Iren. Haer. 1.5.1; Exc. Theod. 47-48. 
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5.4 Wisdom as mother and matter in Philo and 
Valentinian sources 
In the Valentinian protological account pre-cosmic matter and the principle 
of multiplicity were associated with Biblical Wisdom, i.e. Sophia. This view 
can be found already in Philo, who transformed Hellenistic Jewish Wisdom 
theology into Logos -theology. Philo describes the role of the Logos in almost 
all the senses as Wisdom in Jewish Wisdom literature. In Hellenistic Jewish 
Wisdom Theology, Wisdom possessed existence before the creation of the 
world (Prov. 8.22-31); the world was established by Wisdom (Jer. 10.12; 
Prov. 3.19) and in Wisdom all the works of God are performed (Ps. 104.24). 
Wisdom is imparted to men by God (Prov. 2.6); it is personified (Prov. 8.1), 
and it is identified with the Torah (Sirach 24.23) and linked to the 
“reasoning” of God (Wisdom 9:9). All these characteristics of Wisdom are 
applied to the Logos in Philo’s writings.345 
Although in most cases the Logos substituted Wisdom in Philo, it did not 
exhaust all the characteristics of personified Wisdom. In some cases, the 
Logos and Wisdom seem to be causally linked to each other. In Fug. 97 the 
Logos is said to be the fountain of Wisdom, but in Fug.109, it is Wisdom that 
is the mother of the Logos. In the allegory of the river of Eden and its four 
heads, Philo says in Somn. 2.242-3 that it is “right reason,” i.e. the Logos, 
which descends from the fountain of Wisdom like a river and waters the 
“virtue-loving souls.” In Leg. All. 1.65 Philo interprets this same verse 
differently: the river is the “idea of virtue,” which comes forth from the 
Wisdom of God that is identified with the Logos. In the first passage the 
Logos is compared with a river that has its origin in Wisdom, but in the latter 
passage, the Logos and Wisdom are identified with each other.  
It is rather difficult to balance these contradictory statements of Philo 
concerning the relation between the Logos and Wisdom. Wolfson has 
proposed that the relations between Wisdom and the Logos described the 
same God’s thinking power from different points of view. In those instances, 
where the Logos is said to spring forth from Wisdom, the Logos represents 
the immanent stage of the Logos, whereas Wisdom represents its pre-cosmic 
stage. In those instances, where the Logos is the fountain of Wisdom, the 
situation is reversed: Wisdom is seen as an immanent representation of the 
pre-cosmic Logos. It is, however, the same stream of Logos-Wisdom, which is 
depicted in some cases as the Logos and in some other cases as Wisdom.346 
In some cases, Wisdom is called by Philo the “mother.” In Fug. 109 
Wisdom is called mother (μήτηρ) “through which all came into existence” (διʼ 
ἧς τὰ ὅλα ἦλθεν εἰς γένεσιν) and in Det. 54 Wisdom is the “mother through 
                                                 
345 It is noteworthy that Plato also speaks in Philebus 30c about wisdom (σοφία) and mind (νοῦς) as 
equivalent terms, which may have supported Philo’s tendency to assimilate the Logos (= nous) and 
Wisdom.  
346 Cf. Wolfson, Philo I, 258-261. 
THE CREATION OF MATTER AND THE WISDOM OF GOD 
122 
which all things were brought to completion” (μητέρα δὲ τὴν σοφίαν, διʼ ἧς 
ἀπετελέσθη τὸ πᾶν). Thus, Wisdom is not only called the “instrument”, like the 
Logos, but “mother.” In Ebr. 31 Philo describes Wisdom also as “the mother 
and nurse” (μήτηρ καὶ τιθήνη), who is made fertile by the seed of God and 
gives birth to her son, the visible world.  
Father and mother have different meanings, though the words are 
the same. For we shall rightly say that the Craftsman who made this 
universe is also the father of that which had thus come into being, and 
that the Maker’s knowledge is the mother. When God had intercourse 
with her, not in the manner of a human, he sowed coming-to-be. And 
she, having received the seeds of God, with productive birth pangs 
gave birth to her only and beloved visible son, this cosmos. Now, by 
one member of the divine choir, wisdom is presented as speaking 
about herself in this way, “God acquired me as the first of his works, 
and before the ages he founded me” [Prov 8:22]. For it was necessary 
that all that which came into being should be younger than the 
mother and nurse of the whole. 
 
It is evident that Philo derives these characteristics from Plato’s Timaeus, 
which calls the Receptacle the “mother and nurse.”347 The generative 
terminology used by Plato depicts the Receptacle in which the creation took 
place. This idea goes back to an ancient theory according to which the mother 
does not produce the child but only gives nutrition and room for an embryo. 
Aristotle says that the female does not contribute anything to generation but 
only gives place (τόπος) for an embryo.348 In the Timaeus the Father is the 
model, i.e. the world of forms, the mother is the Receptacle, and their 
offspring is the world of Becoming.349 In Philo, the Father is God, who unites 
with the Mother, and the Son is their offspring, the visible cosmos, which is 
produced from the seed of the Father. 
It is striking that Philo associates Wisdom with the “the mother and 
nurse,” which are descriptions of the Receptacle in Plato. David Runia 
suggests, however, that there “is insufficient evidence to prove a 
philosophical rationale behind the similar description of ὕλη and σοφία.” 
Runia maintains that in Philo there is plasticity of symbols and images. 
Therefore, the symbols of father, mother, daughter, nurse etc. can be used 
rather freely by Philo without any need to make drastic philosophical 
conclusion from them.350 John Dillon suggests that Philo may have found the 
idea of the female life -principle in the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, which 
he applied to the figure of Wisdom from the Bible. This led to a conflict in 
Philo’s general system of thought according to which Wisdom and the 
                                                 
347 Tim. 49a, 51a. 
348 Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 187. Ar. De gen. anim. A 19, B 1 763b, 30. 
349 Tim. 50c-d. 
350 Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 284-285. 
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intelligible cosmos were seen as virtually opposite to matter. The concept of 
wisdom as mother and nurse was not elaborated any further by Philo because 
he noticed that it would lead to inconsistencies concerning his overall theory 
of creation.351 David Winston has pointed out that Philo was evidently aware 
of a Neo-Pythagorean formulation according to which an aspect of the 
Nous/Logos could be described as the feminine Unlimited Dyad or 
Intelligible Matter. 352  
The association of biblical Wisdom with matter was exceptional in 
Hellenistic Jewish and Early Christian literature. Evidently, it was also a 
marginal feature in Philo’s Logos -theology. It is possible, however, that Philo 
may have integrated some preceding allegorical traditions in his works, 
which did not fit perfectly well in his overall theological system. Significantly, 
the Gnostics and the Valentinian teachers also knew these traditions which 
they integrated into the myth of Sophia. The stages of Sophia’s pre-cosmic 
salvation formed not only the origin of matter, but also served as the 
paradigm for the salvation of human beings. At an anthropological level the 
ordo salutis of Sophia played a threefold role. Firstly, she was an archetype of 
the imperfect soul who has assimilated with sense perceptions and passion. 
Secondly, she was a paradigm for those who were searching for immortality. 
Thirdly, Sophia was the mother of those whose souls were healed and formed 
according to perfect knowledge.  
A similar kind of parallelism between Wisdom as a nurturer of cosmic 
matter and the paradigm of the cultivation of the human soul is also attested 
also in Philo. In Ebr. 59-61 Philo describes the formation of the soul of Sarah 
from femininity to the perfect male. Philo explains that the words of 
Abraham in Gen. 20:12 “she really is my sister, the daughter of my father 
though not of my mother” mean allegorically that Sarah does not have 
Wisdom as a mother, because she has rejected the customs of women, i.e. the 
passionate sense perceptions, and become an offspring of the seed of the 
Father of All. 
She is not born of that material substance perceptible to our senses, 
ever in a state of formation and dissolution, the material which is 
called mother or foster-mother or nurse of created things by those in 
                                                 
351 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 164. Most recently, Arco den Heijer has argued that Wisdom as 
“mother” does not necessarily depict the Platonic Receptacle or the Pythagorean unlimited Dyad but it 
has in Philo its basis in the Pythagorean Tetrad, which is referred to as “the mother of all.” Heijer 
points out that in Philo Wisdom as mother is not a passive all-receiver but she also has an active and 
emanative role in the cosmic harmony as well as in the harmony of the soul. Cf. Arco den Heijer, 
“Cosmic Mothers in Philo of Alexandria and in Neopythagoreanism,” in The Studia Philonica Annual 
XXVII (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015). 
352 Winston, Logos, 20-21. There is also an analogous attempt by Plutarch (Is. et Os. 371e, 374a) to 
fuse Egyptian mythology with Platonic philosophy by allegorizing the Receptacle in Timaeus as the 
goddess Isis. 
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whom first the young plant of wisdom grew; she is born of the Father 
and Cause of all things.353  
 
It could not be a coincidence that Philo depicts the sense-perceptible matter 
(ὕλης τῆς αἰσθητῆς) in terms that were used by Plato in the Timaeus for the 
Receptacle - μήτηρ (50d3), τιθήνη (49a6, 52d5, 88d6), τροφός (88d6). It is of 
note that Philo says that the young plant of wisdom grew from matter, which 
is contrasted to Sarah, who was born from the seed of the Father of All. We 
can conclude, thus, that Philo compares the imperfect soul to the sense-
perceptible matter and Wisdom. In Det. 115 the Platonic Receptacle-
terminology is also associated with the education of the human soul. Philo 
says that Wisdom is an educator, a foster-mother and a nurse of those who 
seek incorruptible food of God from the Scriptures (πέτραν τὴν στερεὰν καὶ 
ἀδιάκοπον ἐμφαίνων σοφίαν θεοῦ, τὴν τροφὸν καὶ τιθηνοκόμον καὶ κουροτρόφον 
τῶν ἀφθάρτου διαίτης ἐφιεμένων.) In Her. 53 Philo personifies Wisdom and 
calls her the mother of all who are living to God: 
“For Adam,” it says, “called the name of his wife ‘Life,’ because she is 
the mother of all things living,” that is doubtless of those who are in 
truth dead to the life of the soul. But those who are really living have 
Wisdom for their mother, but Sense they take for a bond-woman, the 
handiwork of nature made to minister to knowledge.354 
 
The association of Wisdom with matter does not necessarily contain a 
negative meaning in Philo. The earthly soul is the neutral “all-receiver” or 
“the nurse of becoming,” in which the formation of the perfect soul can be 
actualized. At an anthropological level, the earthly soul is depicted negatively 
only if right reason does not control it and the soul dissolves into the realm 
the sense perceptions and flesh. Without right reason, the soul is comparable 
to restless matter, which randomly reflects the images of the sense 
perceptions. It is, however, the earthly soul in which the formation of the 
perfect soul can take place and therefore it can also be depicted as “mother” 
and “nurse.” Philo did not associate Wisdom solely with the soul, which is 
only potentially perfect, but also with the soul, which had been perfected by 
the seed of virtue. Those, who obey right reason have Wisdom as their 
mother, similar to the soul of Sarah, which was formed and made fertile by 
the seed of Logos.355  
These multiple associations of Wisdom with “mother” and with “matter” 
in Philo’s texts can also be found in the Valentinian accounts.  On the one 
                                                 
353 οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὕλης τῆς αἰσθητῆς συνισταμένης ἀεὶ καὶ λυομένης, ἣν μητέρα καὶ τροφὸν καὶ τιθήνην τῶν 
ποιητῶν ἔφασαν, οἷς πρώτοις σοφίας ἀνεβλάστησεν ἔρνος, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου καὶ πατρός. 
354 «ἐκάλεσε» γάρ φησιν «Ἀδὰμ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ ζωή, ὅτι αὕτη μήτηρ πάντων τῶν ζώντων», 
τῶν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τὸν ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων δήπου βίον. οἱ δὲ ζῶντες ὄντως μητέρα μὲν ἔχουσι σοφίαν, αἴσθησιν 
δὲ δούλην πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐπιστήμης ὑπὸ φύσεως δημιουργηθεῖσαν.    
355 Leg. All 2.82, Cher. 43-45, 49-50, Mut. 137, Sac. 78-79 
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hand, Sophia – or her negative emotions − represented the pre-cosmic 
matter out of which the Demiurge creates the visible world. On the other 
hand, Sophia’s negative emotions served as a paradigm for the irrational soul 
infected by passions. It seems that the Gnostic myth of Sophia was based on 
Hellenistic Jewish speculations concerning the relations of Wisdom and the 
Platonic Receptacle that were articulated in an initial stage in the writings of 
Philo, even though they do not fit perfectly well with Philo’s overall theology. 
The Gnostic theologians incorporated the myth of Sophia’s fall and salvation 
into Neo-Pythagorean protology. Sophia became the principle of multiplicity 
and matter, which was derived from the transcendent One. The 
epistemological dimension of the myth connects it to the anthropological 
level and Plato’s allegory of the Cave in the Republic. Sophia also became an 
archetype of the formation of the human soul which seeks freedom from the 
shadows of ignorance through knowledge.  
5.5 The separation of matter  
In the Valentinian protological myth it was not until the advent of the Savior 
that Sophia’s emotions were healed through knowledge and separated from 
her to become incorporeal matter. The Savior bestowed upon matter the 
capability of forming into two essences (hylic and psychic essences) and the 
elements of the world (earth, water, air and fire). The Savior left matter in a 
confused stage to be separated by the Demiurge into structures and bodies. 
This parallels Plato’s Timaeus in which chaotic matter did not become stable 
corporeal structures until the Demiurge started to organize it using shapes 
and numbers.356 The formation of matter out of Sophia’s emotions is attested 
in the accounts of Irenaeus and Exc. C in the following way:   
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Exc. Theod. 46.1 Iren. Haer. 1.4.5 
Πρῶτον οὖν ἐξ ἀσωμάτου πάθους καὶ 
συμβεβηκότος εἰς ἀσώματον ἔτι τὴν 
ὕλην αὐτὰ μετήντλησεν καὶ μετέβαλεν· 
εἶθ’ οὕτως εἰς συγκρίματα καὶ 
σώματα (ἀθρόως γὰρ οὐσίαν ποιῆσαι τὰ 
πάθη οὐκ ἐνῆν)· καὶ τοῖς σώμασι κατὰ 
φύσιν ἐπιτηδειότητα ἐνεποίησεν. 
Πρῶτος μὲν οὖν Δημιουργὸς ὁ Σωτὴρ 
γίνεται καθολικός· 
 
ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίναντα χωρήσει τοῦ 
[χωρὶς, εἶτα] συγχέαι καὶ πῆξαι, καὶ ἐξ 
ἀσωμάτου πάθους εἰς ἀσώματον τὴν 
ὕλην μεταβαλεῖν αὐτά· εἶθ’ οὕτως 
ἐπιτηδειότητα καὶ φύσιν 
ἐμπεποιηκέναι αὐτοῖς, ὥστε εἰς 
συγκρίματα καὶ σώματα ἐλθεῖν, πρὸς τὸ 
γενέσθαι δύο οὐσίας, τὴν φαύλην τῶν 
παθῶν, τήν τε τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς ἐμπαθῆ· 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμει τὸν Σωτῆρα 
δεδημιουργηκέναι φάσκουσι. 
 
 
And first he poured into another 
place and transformed the 
incorporeal and accidental emotions 
into incorporeal matter (and) in this 
way into compounds and bodies. For 
it was not possible all at once to 
make an essence from sufferings. 
And he bestowed propensity upon 
bodies according to their nature. 
Therefore, the Saviour becomes the 
first general creator.   
 
But he (the Savior) separated them, 
poured them together and fixed them 
and transformed them from 
incorporeal emotions into 
incorporeal matter. In this way, he 
bestowed upon them capability and 
nature to become compounds and 
bodies so that two essences will 
emerge, the bad one from emotions 
and the passionate from conversion. 
For this reason, they say that the 
Savior has virtually created (these 
things).  
 
The accounts in Exc. C and Iren. Haer. 1.4.5 are not totally identical. In Exc. 
C the clause after εἶθ’ οὕτως does not speak about bestowing predisposition 
upon the passions of Sophia, as in Irenaeus, but about the generation of 
structures and bodies (συγκρίματα καὶ σώματα). Irenaeus’s account also 
contains the second result clause (πρὸς τό) concerning the two essences (δύο 
οὐσίας) that are not mentioned in the account of Exc. C. However, the two 
essences are mentioned later in Clement’s account, which describes the 
separation of the psychic and hylic essences.357 Dunderberg points out that 
the terms used in these passages refer to potentiality and determination. The 
term πήγνυμι is used in the passive to denote something that is irrevocably 
fixed, and the term ἐπιτητειότης refers to capability or potentiality.358 The 
term συμβεβηκός in Clement’s account was a term in ancient physics – 
especially in Peripatetic philosophy – which referred to an accidental 
                                                 
357 Cf. Exc. Theod. 48. 
358 Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 124-125 
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attribute which does not define the essence of the subject. 359 These notions 
imply that the passions of Sophia were in “an accidental state” before the 
Savior fixed them. The most important difference between these Valentinian 
accounts is that Exc. C nowhere mentions the theory concerning Sophia’s 
emotion of returning (ἐπιστροφῆς ἐμπαθῆ) as a basis for psychic essence.360 
Despite these differences, the main content of these accounts is rather 
similar. The Savior healed the emotions of Sophia by separating them and 
transmuting them into unstructured pre-cosmic matter to be formed by the 
Demiurge. 
In the Valentinian accounts, the Demiurge is not working independently, 
but Sophia controls him. Thus, creative activity is shared by three beings: the 
Savior, Sophia and the Demiurge. The Savior is called “the first and universal 
creator” (Πρῶτος μὲν οὖν Δημιουργὸς ὁ Σωτὴρ γίνεται καθολικός) who created 
the material and psychic essences of the world. Through the Savior’s 
instrumentality, Sophia came into existence and virtually it is the Savior who 
created the world because he fixed and separated Sophia’s emotions.361 
Sophia was the second creator who builds a house (= the Demiurge) and 
based it on seven pillars, which refers to the seven heavenly spheres. The task 
of the Demiurge, in turn, is to separate psychic essence from matter and 
divide this matter into the four cosmic elements. The following scheme 
illustrates the relations of the Savior, Sophia and the Demiurge in the 
Valentinian accounts. 
 
The Savior is a manifestation of the Pleroma,  
who is contemplated by  
 
    Sophia who uses  
                                    
              the Demiurge as an instrument in:  
  
1. the creation of heavenly intellects out of psychic 
and luminous essence according to the model of 
the aeons and 
2. the separation of matter into four cosmic 
elements. 
 
                                                 
359  Cf. Ar. Met. 1025a, and Ar. Top. I. 
360The psychic essence had its origin in the conversion of Sophia and it became the origin of the 
essences of the Demiurge and angels, but also of the Devil, because her conversion contained an 
element of fear. Unlike the Demiurge who is ignorant of the spiritual realm, the Devil knows the divine 
realm above the psychic heaven (Iren. Haer. 1.5.4). 
361 In the Valentinian Exposition, it is the Savior himself who also acts in the role of the “dividing 
Demiurge” (Val. Exp. 35.30-34). See Thomassen, “The Derivation of Matter,” 16-17. 
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In Philo’s writings, the Logos is not only the pattern according to which the 
world was created (ἀρχέτυπος, παράδειγμα) or place (τόπος) for the Ideas, but 
also an instrument (ὄργανον) through which (δι’ οὗ) God created the world. 
The Logos also functioned as a cutter (τομεύς) that divided matter and 
shaped the cosmic elements (earth, water, air and water) out of it.362 Philo 
identifies God with the Platonic Demiurge, who uses the Logos as his 
instrument, whereas it is Sophia who uses the Demiurge as her instrument in 
the Valentinian systems. The functions of the Logos in Philo as a “pattern” 
and an “instrument” is distributed in the Valentinian myth to the Savior (the 
pattern) and the Demiurge (the instrument). Although Sophia intended to do 
everything in honor of the aeons, it is only the psychic realm that had the 
capability of reflecting the ideal world of the aeons. The psychic essence had 
its ontological basis in Sophia’s repentance and seeking for the light. This 
implies that only the beings of the psychic realm, which rule the seven 
heavens, are copies of the intelligible cosmos.  
5.5.1 The creation as diakrisis in Iren. Haer. 1.5.1-2 and Exc. C  
According to Iren. Haer. 1.5.1 and Exc. Theod. 47-48, the creation of heaven 
and earth in Gen. 1:1 does not describe the creation of the intelligible heaven 
and earth as in Philo, but the separation of the psychic (= heaven) and hylic 
(earth) essences, which were in confusion before the Demiurge began to 
shape them. In Iren. Haer. 1.5.1 the separation of heaven and earth is 
depicted in the following way:  
Thus, they say that he is the Father and God of the beings outside the 
Pleroma, and he is the Maker of all psychic and hylic essences; he 
discriminated the two essences that had been poured together, and he 
made bodies out of incorporeal things, being the maker of heavenly 
and earthly things. He became the Demiurge of the hylic and the 
psychic essences, the things on the right and the left, light and heavy, 
those tending upwards and those tending downwards. He 
constructed the seven heavens, and they say that the Demiurge is 
above them and for that reason they call him Hebdomad, but the 
mother Achamoth is called Ogdoad preserving the number of the 
primal Ogdoad of the Pleroma. They say that that the seven heavens 
are intellectual, and they are angels, and the Demiurge himself is an 
angel. And Paradise is above third heaven and is the fourth archangel 
and Adam got something from there when he passed time within it.363   
                                                 
362 Opif. 25; Her. 140. See Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 446-451. 
363 Πατέρα οὖν καὶ Θεὸν λέγουσιν αὐτὸν γεγνέναι τῶν ἐκτὸς τοῦ πληρώματος, ποιητὴν ὄντα πάντων 
ψυχικῶν τε καὶ ὑλικῶν· διακρίναντα γὰρ τὰς δύο οὐσίας συγκεχυμένας, καὶ ἐξ ἀσωμάτων σωματοποιήσαντα, 
δεδημιουργηκέναι τά τε οὐράνια καὶ τὰ γήϊνα, καὶ γεγονέναι ὑλικῶν καὶ ψυχικῶν, δεξιῶν καὶ ἀριστερῶν 
δημιουργὸν, κούφων καὶ βαρέων, ἀνωφερῶν καὶ κατωφερῶν· ἑπτὰ γὰρ [l. καὶ] οὐρανοὺς κατεσκευακέναι, ὧν 
ἐπάνω τὸν Δημιουργὸν εἶναι λέγουσι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἑβδομάδα καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν, τὴν δὲ μητέρα τὴν Ἀχαμὼθ 
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The Creator God made “heavenly and earthly things” (τά οὐράνια καὶ τὰ γήϊνα) 
by separating (διακρινεῖν) the psychic and hylic essences each other. The 
creation of heaven and earth in Gen. 1:1 was seen as a separation of 
primordial matter. The Demiurge is called the “Father” and “God” outside 
the Pleroma and the “Maker” of all psychic and hylic things (Πατέρα οὖν καὶ 
Θεὸν λέγουσιν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι τῶν ἐκτὸς τοῦ Πληρώματος, Ποιητὴν ὄντα πάντων 
ψυχικῶν τε καὶ ὑλικῶν). Although the Demiurge gave form to all things that 
exist after him, he was in reality prompted by Sophia.364 Irenaeus may have 
collected the account in Iren. Haer. 1.5.1 from various sources. A more 
nuanced description of the creation of heaven and earth is found in Exc. C, 
which contains a detailed allegorical commentary on Gen. 1:1-3. The text in 
Exc. Theod. 47-48 is as follows: 
Therefore, the Savior becomes the first general creator. “But Sophia” 
is the second and she “built a house for herself and erected seven 
pillars.” And first of all, she put forth the image of God the Father, 
and through him, she made “the heaven and the earth”, that is “the 
heavenly and earthly things,” the things on the right and the left. He, 
as an image of the Father, became the father, and he first put forth 
the psychic Christ as an image of the Son. Then he created the 
Archangels as images of the Aeons, and the angels of the Archangels, 
out of psychic and luminous substance, as the prophetic word speaks: 
“And the Spirit of God was superimposed upon the water.” This 
speaks of the engagement of the two essences made by him; the pure 
and unmixed was superimposed and the heavy and hylic, the dirty 
and coarse were put under it. But it is suggested that it (the earth) 
was, in the beginning, incorporeal by saying “invisible” (but) it was 
never invisible to any human nor God, but (this means that) he 
created it without form, shape and design as it is somehow declared. 
As the Demiurge discriminates pure things from the coarse (heavy), 
since he perceives each nature, he made light, that is he manifested 
and brought forth the idea of light, but the heavenly light of the sun 
(i.e. physical sun) was made much later.  
 
The content of the allegorical commentary becomes clearer if it is presented 
besides the Greek text of Gen. 1:1-3. The key words are bolded. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Ὀγδοάδα, ἀποσώζουσαν τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ [τῆς] ἀρχεγόνου, καὶ πρὸ τῆς [πρώτης] τοῦ πληρώματος Ὀγδοάδος. 
Τοὺς δὲ ἑπτὰ οὐρανοὺς οὐκ [d. οὐκ] εἶναι νοητούς [f. l. νοερούς] φασιν· Ἀγγέλους δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑποτίθενται, καὶ 
τὸν δημιουργὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἄγγελον Θεῷ ἐοικότα· 
364 Iren. Haer. 1.5.1. Philo also uses the demiurgic (“technical”) and procreative (“biological”) 
metaphors of the creation. In Opif. 7, 10 Philo stresses that the Creator of the universe is not only the 
Maker but also the Father who cares about the safety of his children. Cf. Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 
421-423 and On the Creation, 113-114.       
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Gen. 1:1-3 
 
1.Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν 
οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν.  
 
Exc. Theod. 47-48 
 
Πρῶτος μὲν οὖν Δημιουργὸς ὁ 
Σωτὴρ γίνεται καθολικός· ”ἡ δὲ  Σοφία” 
δευτέρα ”οἰκοδομεῖ οἶκον ἑαυτῇ καὶ 
ὑπήρεισεν στύλους ἑπτά.” Καὶ πρῶτον 
πάντων προβάλλεται εἰκόνα τοῦ 
Πατρὸς Θεόν, δι’ οὗ ἐποίησεν ”τὸν 
οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν”,τουτέστι ”τὰ 
οὐράνια καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια”, τὰ δεξιὰ καὶ 
τὰ ἀριστερά. Οὗτος ὡς εἰκὼν Πατρὸς 
πατὴρ γίνεται καὶ προβάλλει πρῶτον 
τὸν ψυχικὸν Χριστόν, Υἱοῦ  εἰκόνα· 
ἔπειτα, τοὺς Ἀρχαγγέλους, Αἰώνων 
εἰκόνας· εἶτα, Ἀγγέλους <Ἀρχ> 
αγγέλων… 
2. ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ 
ἀκατασκεύαστος, καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω 
τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ 
ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος.  
 
…ἐκ τῆς ψυχικῆς καὶ φωτεινῆς 
οὐσίας ἥν φησιν ὁ προφητικὸς 
λόγος·”Καὶ Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο 
ἐπάνω τῶν ὑδάτων”, κατὰ τὴν 
συμπλοκὴν τῶν δύο οὐσιῶν τῶν αὐτῷ 
πεποιημένων, τὸ εἰλικρινὲς” 
ἐπιφέρεσθαι” εἰπών, τὸ δὲ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ 
ὑλικὸν ὑποφέρεσθαι, τὸ θολερὸν καὶ 
παχυμερές. —Ἀσώματον δὲ καὶ ταύτην 
ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰνίσσεται τῷ φάσκειν 
“ἀόρατον”· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ 
μηδέπω ὄντι ἀόρατος ἦν, οὔτε τῷ Θεῷ· 
ἐδημιούργει γάρ· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄμορφον καὶ 
νείδεον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον αὐτῆς 
ὧδέ πως ἐξεφώνησεν. 
3.  καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός Γενηθήτω φῶς. 
καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς. 4.  καὶ εἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ 
φῶς ὅτι καλόν. καὶ διεχώρισεν ὁ θεὸς 
ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον 
τοῦ σκότους. 5.  καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς 
τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν καὶ τὸ σκότος ἐκάλεσεν 
νύκτα. καὶ ἐγένετο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένετο 
πρωί, ἡμέρα μία.  
 
Διακρίνας δὲ ὁ Δημιουργὸς τὰ 
καθαρὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμβριθοῦς, ὡς ἂν 
ἐνιδὼν τὴν ἑκατέρου φύσιν, φῶς 
ἐποίησεν, τουτέστιν ἐφανέρωσεν καὶ εἰς 
φῶς καὶ ἰδέαν προσήγαγεν, ἐπεὶ τό γε 
ἡλιακὸν καὶ οὐράνιον φῶς πολλῷ 
ὕστερον ἐργάζεται.  
 
It is possible that the account in Exc. Theod. 47-48 is part of a longer 
allegorical commentary on Genesis, which was integrated into the 
protological account. After the Savior separated Sophia’s negative emotions 
and transformed them into pre-cosmic matter, she created the Demiurge 
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through whom she separated heaven and earth. This parallels Irenaeus’s 
account according to which Sophia could not give form to anything spiritual, 
but she intended to make something which she was capable of doing. She 
began to form beings out of psychic essence in order to honor the aeons, 
though in fact they were made through her by the Savior.365 Sophia made the 
Demiurge as an image of the Father of All, who in turn made the psychic 
Christ as an image of the Only-Begotten Son and the angels and archangels 
out of “psychic and luminous essence” as images of the rest of the aeons.366  
Notably, Sophia is not identified explicitly anywhere in Irenaeus’s account 
with Biblical Wisdom. However, in Exc. C it is stated that “Sophia built a 
house for herself and erected seven pillars,” which refers to Wisdom in the 
Proverbs: Ἡ σοφία ᾠκοδόμησεν ἑαυτῇ οἶκον καὶ ὑπήρεισεν στύλους ἑπτά.367 In 
the Valentinian allegory, the house refers the “cosmic house,” i.e. the psychic 
region of the Demiurge or the Demiurge himself, who is called in many 
Valentinian sources topos, i.e. the place.368 The seven pillars depict the seven 
heavenly spheres, which are ruled by the Demiurge and his angels, while the 
Demiurge himself is placed above them. The seven heavens are intellectual 
beings, and they form the invisible “psychic heaven,” which was created first 
by Sophia through the Demiurge (Gen. 1.1).369  
The Demiurge made the other intellectual beings, i.e. the Christ and the 
angels, out of “psychic and luminous essence” (ἐκ τῇ ψυχικῇ καὶ φωτεινῇ 
οὐσίᾳ). The psychic essence is referred to in the context of the “prophetical 
world” in Gen. 1:2: “Καὶ Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τῶν ὑδάτων”. This 
describes allegorically the “engagement of the two essences”. In Irenaeus’s 
account the “two essences” was a conventional expression to depict the 
psychic and hylic essences (cf. Iren. Haer. 1.5.2, 1.4.5).  In Exc. C the spirit 
                                                 
365 Iren. Haer. 1.5.1. 
366 In Irenaeus’s version Sophia imitates the invisible Father and keeps herself concealed from the 
Demiurge, who is identified with the Only-Begotten (Iren. Haer. 1.5.1). I would suggest that this 
statement comes from Irenaeus, because it contradicts what he tells elsewhere in his account of the 
relation of the Father and the Son in the Pleroma. It is explicitly stated that the Son, i.e. the Only-
Begotten, is the only aeon who knows the Father and is not concealed by him. Therefore, the idea that 
Sophia imitates the Father by concealing herself from the Demiurge does not make sense. 
367 Prov. 9:1 
368 The term Topos has more than one meaning in the Valentinian accounts. It can refer to the 
region of Sophia, i.e. the Ogdoad, which in Irenaeus’s account is also called ὁ μεσότητος τόπος (Tri. 
Trac. 92:26, Iren. Haer. 1. 5.3). In some Valentinian texts it is depicted as the final place of salvation 
for the Demiurge and the righteous ones (Iren. Haer. 1.7.1). The Topos can, however, also refer to the 
Demiurge himself or to Hebdomad, i.e. the region of the Demiurge, as is the case in Hippolytus account 
in Hipp. Haer. 6.32:7-9. Hippolytus describes the Valentinian teaching according to which the essence 
of the Demiurge is of a “fiery nature, and is also termed by them the super-celestial Topos, and 
Hebdomad.” The identification of the Demiurge with the Topos is quite likely also attested in 
Heracleon’s fragment 35. See also Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 116. 
369 Iren. Haer. 1.5.2 
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refers to the psychic essence, which is intertwined with watery-matter. 
Although the temporal sequence is not clear, the most logical interpretation 
would be that the separation of the two essences and the creation of the idea 
of light is actualized simultaneously. The Demiurge separated the spirit, i.e. 
the psychic and luminous essence, from matter and it served as the 
intellectual basis for the angels as well as for the sun and the heavenly lights 
(ἡλιακὸν καὶ οὐράνιον φῶς). The psychic essence also contains epistemological 
and soteriological significance because it is created from Sophia’s longing for 
the Light. The psychic essence possesses intellectuality, albeit in a potential 
stage and therefore the psychic angels who ruled the seven heavens were 
called “intellects.”  
5.5.2 The visibility of earth and the ancient theory of diakrisis 
The Valentinian commentators saw the creation of heaven and earth in Gen. 
1.1 as the separation of the psychic and hylic essences. The psychic heaven 
consisted of the seven heavens, which were ruled by the Demiurge and his 
angels. The psychic intellects do not belong to the world of aeons, although 
they were created as images of them by Sophia. The psychic intellects were 
invisible beings, whereas the earth belongs to the visible world. The 
discussion concerning the visibility of the earth is attested in Exc. Theod. 
47.4:  
But the one that is called in the beginning “invisible” allegorically 
means “incorporeal.” It was never “invisible” to anybody or to God, 
for he made it. But he has somehow declared its absence of form, 
shape and design. 
 
The Valentinian teachers emphasized that that the term ἀόρατος does not 
depict the invisiblity of the earth but signify that the earth was unstructured 
and without form (ἄμορφον καὶ νείδεον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον). It seems that there 
were some commentators of Genesis, who argued that the creation of the 
earth in Gen. 1.1 describes the creation of the invisible cosmos because the 
earth was “unseen” (ἀόρατος). The Valentinian allegorists explicitly rejected 
this view. They say that the earth has never been unseen, but “invisibility” 
refers to the “formlessness” of matter. This is also attested in Iren. Haer. 
1.5.2, according to which matter was in a stage of confusion before the 
Demiurge began to make bodies out of incorporeal substance (ἐξ ἀσωμάτων 
σωματοποιήσαντα). The term ἀσωματός can be interepreted also in this context 
as denoting matter, which is formless or in a stage of confusion.  
It is rather likely that the criticism in Exc. Theod. 47.4 is directed towards 
a Platonizing reading of Genesis, which saw Gen. 1:1-5 as a description of the 
creation of the invisible and intelligible realm. It was actually a counter-
argument to Philo, who maintained that the earth in Gen. 1:1 refers to the 
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intelligible earth.370 Philo’s view, however, was rather rare within patristic 
writings. Clement quotes a part of Gen. 1.2 in Strom. V.93.5- 94.5 and says 
that the words of Genesis have inspired Plato and Aristotle to postulate the 
existence of matter, but the “invisible earth” was according to Moses a part of 
the archetypical monadic world.371 It is not clear, whether Exc. Theod. 47.4 
was directed to Philo or those Christian Platonists such as Clement who 
followed Philo’s theory about the creation of the intelligible cosmos during 
“the day one” (Gen. 1:1-5). Evidently, the Valentinian teachers were aware of 
the teaching attested in Philo’s exegesis concerning the creation during “day 
one,” but they explicitly rejected it because they saw the creation narrative in 
Gen. 1:1-5 as a description of the creation of the visible cosmos.  
The creation of the visible lights of heaven is not explicitly described in 
the Valentinian accounts. In the light of the allegorical commentary on Gen. 
1:1-5 mentioned above, it seems that the Valentinian interpreters followed 
the temporal order of Genesis according to which the firmament and the 
visible lights of heaven were created during the second and fourth day. In 
Opif. 36-38 Philo explains how during the second day (Gen. 1:6-8) God made 
heaven, i.e. the firmament, which was the first among the visible things to be 
made. The earth and water were still in a confused stage before God began to 
form the earth during the second day of creation: 
And after this, as the whole body of water in existence was spread 
over all the earth, and had penetrated through all its parts, as if it 
were a sponge which had imbibed moisture, so that the earth was 
only swampy land and deep mud, both the elements of earth and 
water being mixed up and combined, like one confused mass into one 
undistinguishable and shapeless nature…372 
 
The origin of this “watery matter” is not explained. It is simply supposed in 
Opif. 36 as the “raw material” for the Demiurge. Philo maintained that earth 
and water were mixed with each other, and they form “one undistinguishable 
and shapeless substance” (μίαν ἀδιάκριτον καὶ ἄμορφον φύσιν). The heaven is 
set as a boundary that separates pre-existent confused matter from the 
higher cosmic spheres. This is also mentioned in Plant. 3-4: 
For, when the Framer of the World, finding all that existed confused 
and disordered itself, began to give it form, by bringing it out of 
                                                 
370 Opif. 29, 34. 
371 In addition to Clement’s Strom. V.93.5ff. the other explicit reference to the “Mosaic theory of 
ideas” is attested in Eusebius Praep. Ev. 11.24.7-12. Whether Clement was the source of Eusebius or 
whether he had read this statement directly from Philo is not sure. Cf. Van den Hoek, Clement of 
Alexandria, 196-197. Cf. also Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 189-192. 
372 Opif. 36. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ σύμπαν ὕδωρ εἰς ἅπασαν τὴν γῆν ἀνεκέχυτο καὶ διὰ πάντων αὐτῆς 
ἐπεφοιτήκει τῶν μερῶν, οἷα σπογγιᾶς ἀναπεπωκυίας ἰκμάδα, ὡς εἶναι τέλματα καὶ βαθὺν πηλόν, ἀμφοτέρων τῶν 
στοιχείων ἀναδεδευμένων καὶ συγκεχυμένων τρόπον φυράματος εἰς μίαν ἀδιάκριτον καὶ ἄμορφον φύσιν. 
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disorder into order, out of confusion into distinction of parts, He 
caused earth and water to occupy the position of roots at its center; 
the trees, that are air and fire, He drew up from the center to the 
space on high; the encircling region of ether He firmly established, 
and set it to be at once a boundary and guard of all that is within. 
Apparently, its name “Heaven” is derived from the former word. 
 
Philo describes here how God began to shape the pre-cosmic matter and 
bring it from a state of “confusion” into a state of “separation”: ἐκ συγχύσεως 
εἰς διάκρισιν ἄγων ὁ κοσμοπλάστης μορφοῦν ἤρξατο. Heaven is not separated 
out of matter, but God set it as a boundary between the visible and the 
invisible world. Heaven, i.e. the firmament, is arranged as a boundary and 
“container” that divided the material creation and the regions of earth, water, 
air and fire from the divine world (τὸν δὲ αἰθέριον ἐν κύκλῳ τόπον ὠχυροῦτο τῶν 
ἐντὸς ὅρον τε καὶ φυλακτήριον αὐτὸν τιθείς ἀφʼοὗ καὶ οὐρανὸς ὠνομάσθαι δοκεῖ). 
The separation of matter and the formation of the cosmic bodies (earth, 
water, air, fire) was not described in detail in Opif. 36 or Plant. 3-4, but in 
Her. 133-236, which investigates the principle of equality in the creation and 
the role of Logos. In Her. 136 Philo explains how the Logos divides matter 
according to its physical characteristics into four cosmic elements.373  
The subject of division into equal parts and of opposites is a wide one, 
and discussion of it essential. We will neither omit not protract it, but 
abridge is as far as possible and content ourselves with the vital 
points only. Just as the great Artificer divided our soul and limbs in 
the middle, so too, when He wrought the world, did he deal with the 
being of all that is. This he took and began to divide as follows. First 
he made two sections, heavy and light, thus distinguishing the 
element of dense from that of rare particles. Then again He divided 
each of these two, the rare into air and fire, the dense into water and 
land, and these four he laid down as first foundations, to be the 
sensible elements of the sensible world.374  
 
The proof-text for the separation of the cosmic elements out of pre-existent 
matter is Gen. 15:7-21, which describes dividing up the “covenant animals.” 
Philo allegorizes the phrase “and he divided them in the middle” (διεῖλεν αὐτὰ 
                                                 
373 For diakrisis-cosmogonies cf. W. Spoerri, Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und 
Götter, Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1959, cf. also Thomassen and Painchaud, Le Traité Tripartite (NH I,5), 
368-69; Thomassen, “The Derivation of Matter,” 16-17 and Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 124-125. 
374 Πολὺν δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὄντα λόγον τὸν περὶ τῆς εἰς ἴσα τομῆς καὶ περὶ ἐναντιοτήτων οὔτε παρήσομεν 
οὔτε μηκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔστιν ἐπιτέμνοντες ἀρκεσθησόμεθα μόνοις τοῖς καιρίοις. καθάπερ γὰρ ἡμῶν τὴν 
ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ μέλη μέσα διεῖλεν ὁ τεχνίτης, οὕτως καὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν, ἡνίκα τὸν κόσμον ἐδημιούργει. 
λαβὼν γὰρ αὐτὴν ἤρξατο διαιρεῖν ὧδε· δύο τὸ πρῶτον ἐποίει τμήματα, τό τε βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον, τὸ παχυμερὲς ἀπὸ 
τοῦ λεπτομεροῦς διακρίνων· εἶθ’ ἑκάτερον πάλιν διαιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν λεπτομερὲς εἰς ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, τὸ δὲ παχυμερὲς 
εἰς ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, ἃ καὶ στοιχεῖα αἰσθητὰ αἰσθητοῦ κόσμου. 
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μέσα) and says that God divides in this way all the bodies and the cosmic 
element according to equality (περὶ τῶν ἴσων). The birds flying on high are left 
undivided, which means that heaven, i.e. the firmament, and human reason 
are left undivided because they are the representations of the dividing Logos 
itself.375  
Philo’s theory of separation is based on the well-known ancient theory of 
diakrisis. The Logos first divided up the heavy (τὸ βαρύ) and light (τὸ κοῦφον) 
essences of matter. After that, both of these essences were divided in turn 
into subtle portion (τὸ λεπτομερές) and a dense portion (τὸ παχυμερές). In that 
way, fire was separated from air and earth from water and the four cosmic 
elements were created according to the divine model. Heaven was not 
divided or separated from matter, but God placed it as a boundary between 
the earthly region and the intelligible cosmos.376  The following drawing will 
illustrate the diakiris -theory used by Philo in his allegorical exegesis.377  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
375 Cf. also Her. 227-236. 
376 Plant. 3-4. 
377 In Gig. 22 Philo presents another theory of the separation of matter. “But the spirit of God is 
spoken of in one manner as being air flowing upon the earth, bringing the third element in addition to 
water. In reference to which, Moses says, in his account of the creation of the world, ‘The Spirit of God 
moved upon the face of the Waters.’ Since the air, as it is very light, is raised and borne aloft, having 
water, as it were, for its foundation; and, in another manner, unalloyed knowledge is said to be so, 
which every wise man naturally partakes of.” (Translated by David Winston). In this passage, Philo 
maintains that the spirit, which refers to the cosmic element of air, has its basis in the element of water 
(ὕδατι βάσει χρώμενος). It seems that air is separated from the watery earth through evaporation and 
tends upwards. This passage differs from Opif. 26-35 according to which Gen. 1:2 describes the 
contents of the intelligible cosmos. Also, the spirit is not in Opif. 29-30 an archetype of air, but an idea 
of the life of all living beings and the idea of air has its biblical basis in the creation of darkness. Philo is 
therefore in Gig. 22 dependent on some exegetical tradition, which differs from Opif. 26-35, but may 
be compatible with Prov. 1.22 according to which water, darkness and the abyss form besides God the 
first principle from which the world came into being. These notions indicate that Philo was working 
with an exegetical tradition and in some cases it is impossible to form a coherent view if all conflicting 
teachings are brought together. Cf. Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 119. 
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                 INTELLIGIBLE REALM = LOGOS 
Heaven/Ether = boundary as a cosmic manifestation of Logos 
 
    
fire                                   
λεπτομερές  
                air      
                  
            κοῦφον (air-fire)                     
    
                                           MATTER 
 
                         βαρύ (earth-water)  
                 
                          water   
 
παχυμερές (earth)                
 
 
It is of note that the Valentinian teachers used the same theory of diakrisis in 
describing the separation of matter by the Demiurge.  
 
Iren. Haer. 1.5.2. 
Accordingly, they assert that he became Father and God of all things 
outside the Pleroma since he is the Maker of all psychic and hylic 
beings. For he distinguished the two substances that were confused 
and made corporeal out of incorporeal things. He made the heavenly 
and earthly things and became the Maker of the material and psychic 
beings, of the right-handed and the left-handed, of the light and 
heavy, of those that tend upwards and of those that tend 
downwards.378  
 
Exc. Theod. 47-48 
“And the Spirit of God was superimposed upon the water.” This 
speaks of the engagement of the two essences made by him; the pure 
and unmixed was superimposed and the heavy and hylic, the dirty 
and coarse were put under it […] As the Demiurge discriminates pure 
things from the coarse (heavy), since he perceives each nature, he 
made light, that is he manifested and brought forth the idea of light, 
                                                 
378 Πατέρα οὖν καὶ Θεὸν λέγουσιν αὐτὸν γεγνέναι τῶν ἐκτὸς τοῦ πληρώματος, ποιητὴν ὄντα πάντων 
ψυχικῶν τε καὶ ὑλικῶν· διακρίναντα γὰρ τὰς δύο οὐσίας συγκεχυμένας, καὶ ἐξ ἀσωμάτων σωματοποιήσαντα, 
δεδημιουργηκέναι τά τε οὐράνια καὶ τὰ γήϊνα, καὶ γεγονέναι ὑλικῶν καὶ ψυχικῶν, δεξιῶν καὶ ἀριστερῶν 
δημιουργὸν, κούφων καὶ βαρέων, ἀνωφερῶν καὶ κατωφερῶν. 
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but the heavenly light of the sun (i.e. physical sun) was made much 
later.379  
 
The terms used in the accounts of Philo, Irenaeus and Exc. C concerning the 
essences of the elements of the world are as follows (the terms “unmixed” 
and “pure” do not appear in Her. 133, but I include them in the table for the 
sake of comparison, because these terms appear in Opif. 31, and parallels 
with Exc. Thed. 48.1 are handled later in this chapter). 
 
Philo Her. 133 (Opif. 
31) 
Iren. Haer. 1.5.2 Exc. Theod. 47-48  
(εἰλικρινής, καθαρά) 
αἰθέριον 
 
psychic 
εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν  
psychic 
image of light; 
heavenly 
minds 
λεπτομερές ἀνωφέρειν  subtle: fire 
κοῦφον κοῦφον                   hylic light: air 
βαρύ βαρύ       heavy: water 
παχυμερές κατωφέρειν παχυμερές dense: earth 
 
It is likely that the accounts in Exc. Theod. 47-48 and Iren. Haer. 1.5.2 were 
dependent on the same kind of diakrisis –theory that is attested in Philo. The 
source used by Irenaeus contains a more detailed version of the separation of 
matter than that attested in the allegorical commentary of Exc. C. Irenaeus 
may have omitted some parts of that account, which explains the differences 
between Exc. Theod. 47-48 and Iren. Haer. 1.5.2.  
In Irenaeus’s account pre-cosmic matter − out of which the psychic 
essence was already separated − was divided by the Demiurge firstly into 
heavy (βαρύ) and light (κοῦφον) and after that into the elements which tend 
upwards (ἀνωφέρειν) and tend downwards (κατωφέρειν). Although the cosmic 
elements are not mentioned in this passage, it is rather evident that the 
elements which tend upwards refer to fire, which is distinguished from air. 
The element tending downwards refers to the earth, which the Demiurge 
separated from the water. This description of the separation of matter fits 
nicely with the diakrisis -theory attested in Philo.  
                                                 
379 “Καὶ Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τῶν ὑδάτων,” κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τῶν δύο οὐσιῶν τῶν αὐτῷ 
πεποιημένων, τὸ εἰλικρινὲς “ἐπιφέρεσθαι” εἰπών, τὸ δὲ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ ὑλικὸν ὑποφέρεσθαι, τὸ θολερὸν καὶ 
παχυμερές […] (48) Διακρίνας δὲ ὁ Δημιουργὸς τὰ καθαρὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμβριθοῦς, ὡς ἂν ἐνιδὼν τὴν ἑκατέρου 
φύσιν, φῶς ἐποίησεν, τουτέστιν ἐφανέρωσεν καὶ εἰς φῶς καὶ ἰδέαν προσήγαγεν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἡλιακὸν καὶ οὐράνιον 
φῶς πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐργάζεται.  
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It is noticeable that the terms used in Clement’s and Irenaeus’s accounts 
differ from each other, but both of them have parallels in Philo’s theory of 
discrimination. Exc. Theod. 47-48 distinguishes the psychic essence from 
matter, which is depicted as the dense (παχυμερές) portion of thick (θολερόν) 
matter. The term παχυμερές is used by Philo to distinguish the earth from the 
water. Strikingly, in Exc. C the luminous psychic essence is called pure 
(καθαρά) and unmixed (εἰλικρινές), which in Philo’s Opif. 31 refers to the pure 
light of heavenly bodies created in Gen. 1:3. 
5.6 The creation of the essence of light and cosmic 
intellects in Philo and Valentinian accounts 
Philo says in Opif. 36-37 that the first thing to be created in the visible 
cosmos was heaven, which is called the firmament.  In Plant. 3-4 it is also 
called the “boundary” which separates the visible cosmos from the ideal 
world. In Opif. 45-61 Philo describes the creation of the visible lights of 
heaven, i.e. the sun, the moon and the stars, during the fourth day. Philo says 
that heavenly bodies are not only substances but “mind of the purest kind,” 
“through and through immaculate and divine” and “insusceptible of evil.”380 
Although Philo describes the cosmic intellects as “without bodies,” they are 
not totally incorporeal. They only lack an earthly body similar to human 
bodies.381 In Opif. 55 Philo says that God made the bodies of the heavenly 
intellects from the purest part of a bodily substance (καθαρωτάτῳ τῆς 
σωματικῆς οὐσίας), which refers to the essence of ether.382 Philo follows 
Plato’s teachings in the Timaeus by saying that God located “divine images” 
(ἀγάλματα θεῖα) in heaven “as though in the Temple” (ὥσπερ ἐν ἱερῷ), which 
refers to the firmament created during the second day.383 In Spec. 1.66 Philo 
declares that heaven was the Sanctuary of the visible cosmos, which was 
called the highest and true Temple of God.  
The highest and true Temple of God is, we must believe, the whole 
universe, having for its sanctuary the holiest part of all existence, 
                                                 
380 Gig. 8; Opif. 27, 73; Somn. 1.135; Spec. 1.39-40. Cf. Winston, Logos, 33-34 
381 Conf. 176-177; Somn. 1.135; Sac. 5; QE 2.13. 
382 The purest kind of substance out of which the stars and other cosmic bodies were created may 
refer to the fire or ether. In Plant. 3-4 and Her. 227-236 Philo evidently distinguishes heaven as the 
boundary from the realm of the four cosmic elements, which means that heaven was made from some 
other substance. In Somn. 1.14-39, however, Philo speculates that the “the well of the oath” (Gen. 
28:12) is an allegory of the fourth cosmic element, i.e. fire, and could be identified with heaven. Philo 
says, however, that the essence of heaven is incomprehensible. Therefore, it is as fruitless to seek their 
substance as it is to understand the essence of the human mind. This may refer to the “essence” of the 
intellect, not the essence of the heavenly bodies. Cf. Tobin, The Creation of Man, 82-84; Winston, The 
Logos, 64-65; Runia, The Creation of the Cosmos, 174-175. 
383 Runia, On the Creation, 204, ibid. Philo of Alexandria, 224. 
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namely heaven, for its votive offerings the stars, for its priests the 
angels, who are servitors of his powers, unbodied souls, not mixtures 
of rational and irrational nature as ours are, but with the irrational 
eliminated, completely mind, pure intelligences, in the likeness of the 
Monad.384 
 
Philo stressed, however, that heaven and the planetary gods should not be 
worshipped, but only God, who is the ruler of the heavenly spheres. As I 
noted in the previous chapter, Philo interpreted Gen. 1:3 in Opif. 31 as 
denoting the creation of light, which served as the source for the heavenly 
lights. Opif. 31 does not fit particularly well into Philo’s allegorical oeuvre in 
Opif. 26-35, and it may go back to some pre-Philonic exegetical tradition. The 
passage in Opif. 31 is as follows: 
That invisible and intelligible light (τὸ δὲ ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν φῶς) has 
come into being as the image of the divine Logos, which 
communicated its genesis. It is a star that transcends (ὑπερουράνιος 
ἀστήρ) the heavenly realm, the source of the visible stars, and you 
would not be off the mark to call it “all-brightness” (παναύγειαν). From 
it, the sun and moon and other planets and fixed stars draw the 
illumination that is fitting for them in accordance with the capacity 
they each have. But that unmixed and pure gleam (τῆς ἀμιγοῦς καὶ 
καθαρᾶς αὐγῆς) has its brightness dimmed when it begins to undergo a 
change from the intelligible to the sense-perceptible (ἐκ νοητοῦ πρὸς 
αἰσθητὸν μεταβολήν), for none of the objects in the sense-perceptible 
realm is absolutely pure (εἰλικρινές). 385 
 
Philo explains in Opif. 31 that Gen. 1:3 refers to the creation of light as an 
image of the Logos. This heavenly light is pure (καθαρά) and unmixed 
(εἰλικρινής), although its brightness weakens when it begins to undergo a 
change from the intelligible to the sense-perceptible.386 Although Opif. 26-35 
describes the creation of the intelligible cosmos during the first day, it seems 
that Philo is in Opif. 31 dependent on the exegetical tradition according to 
                                                 
384 Translated by Winston in Philo of Alexandria, 279. The earliest reference in Greco-Roman 
literature to the notion of the cosmos as a Temple is in Ps.-Plato Epinomis 983E-984B. Cf. also 
Plutarch’s Moral. 477C and Seneca Ep. 90.28.   
385 Translated by David Runia in On Creation, 53. 
386 The term εἰλικρινές (sometimes in the form εἱλικρινές) appears 30 times in Philo in various 
contexts.  In some cases εἰλικρινές refers to the pure human mind that alone can comprehend God (Leg. 
1.88; Post. 134; Ebr. 101,189; Her. 98; Praem. 46) or the pure mind that is not infected by the senses 
(Leg.All 3.111). In these instances, Philo was clearly influenced by Plato. The term εἰλικρινές is used in 
Phaedo 66a3 (cf. also 67b1) in a sense of pure thought that is not mixed with the senses. In Tim. 45b7 
the term is related to the mechanism of pure vision that involves the pure fire of the sun without any 
admixing with the other primary bodies. In some instances the term εἰλικρινές refers to the pure 
intellect of God (Opif. 8-9; Praem. 40; Contempl. 2) or the stars (Spec. 1.39-40). 
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which Gen. 1:3 describes the creation of the invisible intellects of the visible 
lights.  
Philo makes two important distinctions concerning the essence of light. 
Firstly, he makes a distinction between visible light and intelligible light. The 
former depicts light through which sense-perceptible objects can be seen. 
The latter refers to the intelligible light through which God’s presence in the 
world can be comprehended. In Mut. 6 Philo says that God is the fountain 
(πηγή) of the purest light through which the human mind can comprehend 
God’s powers.387 In Abr. 157 Philo makes another distinction between 
perishable and everlasting lights. According to Philo, the visible light is two-
fold. Perishable light proceeds from fire, whereas everlasting light descends 
from heaven as if the stars pour down their beams from an everlasting spring 
(ὥσπερ ἀπ᾽ ἀενάων πηγῶν).388  
I suggest that the creation of light in Opif. 31 is related to the creation of 
the essence of the invisible and intelligible light, which served as the 
intellectual basis for the visible and everlasting lights of the heavenly bodies. 
The pure light in Opif. 31 belongs, however, to “the world of becoming” to be 
distinguished from the light in “the world of being,” i.e the realm of God, the 
Logos and the Ideas. The creation of the firmament and the heavenly bodies 
during the second and third day describes the creation of the luminous soul-
bodies for the cosmic intellects. Thus, the everlasting and visible lights of 
heaven served as a soul-bodies for the invisible and pure light, which is 
created as an image of the Logos. Strikingly, the terms that are related to the 
pure and intelligent light in Opif. 31 appear in the aforementioned 
Valentinian allegory of the creation of light (Gen. 1:3) in Exc. Theod. 47-48.  
“Καὶ Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τῶν ὑδάτων”, κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τῶν 
δύο οὐσιῶν τῶν αὐτῷ πεποιημένων, τὸ εἰλικρινὲς “ἐπιφέρεσθαι” εἰπών, τὸ δὲ 
ἐμβριθὲς καὶ ὑλικὸν ὑποφέρεσθαι, τὸ θολερὸν καὶ παχυμερές […] Διακρίνας 
δὲ ὁ Δημιουργὸς τὰ καθαρὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμβριθοῦς, ὡς ἂν ἐνιδὼν τὴν ἑκατέρου 
φύσιν, φῶς ἐποίησεν, τουτέστιν ἐφανέρωσεν καὶ εἰς φῶς καὶ ἰδέαν 
προσήγαγεν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἡλιακὸν καὶ οὐράνιον φῶς πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐργάζεται.  
 
In Exc. Theod. 47-48 the psychic (= spirit) and hylic (= watery earth) 
essences were intertwined with each other before the Demiurge separated 
them. The psychic essence differs from the rest of matter, because it was not 
mixed, but intertwined with matter. According to Irenaeus’s account the 
psychic essence was distinguished from other matter because it had its origin 
in Sophia’s longing for light and immortality. When the Demiurge separated 
the psychic essence from matter, he made light, which means that the idea of 
light came into being (φῶς ἐποίησεν, τουτέστιν ἐφανέρωσεν καὶ εἰς φῶς καὶ ἰδέαν 
προσήγαγεν). The idea of light is depicted as “pure” (καθαρά) and “unmixed” 
(εἰλικρινής), which parallels Philo’s description of light in Opif. 31. It is also 
                                                 
387 Cf. also Somn. 1.115-116. 
388 Abr. 157. 
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mentioned that the visible lights of heaven will be created later (τό γε ἡλιακὸν 
καὶ οὐράνιον φῶς πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐργάζεται), which most likely refers to the 
creation during the fourth day (Gen. 1:14).  
In the Valentinian account, the pure light, which came into being through 
separation, was the intelligible basis for the visible and cosmic lights of 
heaven. The term “idea” does not refer to a “paradigm” or an “archetype” in 
the Platonic sense of these terms, but it depicts the form of light, i.e. the 
psychic essence, which serves as the basis for the luminous intellects (νοητοί) 
of the heavenly realm including the sun and the stars. The psychic and 
luminous essence can be compared with Philo’s pure light in Opif. 31, which 
is clothed in the everlasting light of heaven. This may refer to ether, which is 
also referred to as the finest essence of the cosmos in Valentinus’s psalm 
Harvest.389 
In the Valentinian system, Sophia made the psychic intellects in honor of 
the aeons of the Pleroma. The archetype of the Demiurge was the Father of 
the Pleroma. The psychic Christ was equated with His Only-Begotten Son. 
The psychic angels − and possibly the intellects of the heavenly bodies − were 
images of the rest of the aeons. Thus, the psychic realm was ruled by the 
intellects, who had their archetypes in the Pleroma.390 Although the 
Demiurge thought that he was the Father (Πατήρ) and Maker (Ποιητής) who 
constructed the seven heavens and the angelic intellects, it was Sophia who 
made these things through the instrumentality of the Demiurge.  
The theory concerning the visible heaven as an image of the intelligible 
world goes back to Plato’s Timaeus in which the Father and Maker of the 
world made a cosmic sanctuary (ἄγαλμα) for the everlasting gods, which are 
called the “gods of gods” (θεοὶ θεῶν). The term ἄγαλμα is a common phrase for 
the cult -statue, shrine or objects of worship in which the gods dwells. The 
eternal gods that dwell in the cosmic sanctuary are evidently the planetary 
gods who obeyed the motions of the ideal world.  The sanctuary in question is 
not the visible world as such but the celestial sphere, the living and moving 
ἄγαλμα.391  
Some Platonists understood the phrase “gods of gods” in the Timaeus as a 
reference to the Ideas, which served as archetypes for the planetary gods.392 
The accounts in Iren. Haer. 1.5.1 and Exc. Theod. 47-48 describe the creation 
of the intellects, which were the rulers of the seven heavens. The essence of 
                                                 
389 Cf. chapter 6.4. 
390 Iren. Haer. 1.5.1; Exc. Theod. 47. 
391 Tim. 37c-d; 41a-d. See Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 99-101. 
392 Plotinus maintains that the intellectual level consists of “divine beings” and he makes a 
distinction between celestial gods and the gods of the intellectual realm, i.e. divine ideas. Cf. Plot. Enn. 
I 8,2; III 5,6; V 8,3,5. Proclus says that the cosmos is ἄγαλμα of the everlasting gods. The presence of 
gods in the cosmos channels the radiance which emanates from the intelligible gods, i.e. the Ideal 
world. Proclus calls the Demiurge ἀγαλματοποιὸς τοῦ κόσμου.  For heaven as a shrine for the heavenly 
gods, see also Seneca Ep. 90.28 and Ar. De Phil. Fr. 14, 18 discussed in Runia, On the Creation, 204. 
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these heavenly intellects was based on Sophia’s longing for incorporeal light 
and immortality. This would mean that also in the Valentinian system the 
human mind can reach some knowledge from the Pleroma through the 
contemplation of the visible heaven, because it reflects the world of aeons. 
The Tripartite Tractate describes the etymology of the term “aeon” in the 
light of the order of the annual seasons: 
For just as the present aeon is single, yet divided into ages, ages into 
years, years into seasons, seasons into months, months into days, 
days into hours and hours into moments, in the same way, the true 
aeon also is single yet multiple.393  
 
According to the Tripartite Tractate, the order of the seasons of the year was 
seen as an image of order in the intelligible realm. This idea was a 
commonplace in the Platonic-Aristotelian world view and it is also attested in 
Philo, who says that the annual seasons were an outcome of the rational 
circuits of the heavenly bodies, which reflect the harmony of the intelligible 
cosmos.394 Philo, however, did not make a distinction between the intelligible 
cosmos, heaven and the material realm, because the power of God’s Logos 
sustained all of creation. Philo interpreted the Logos of God as being the 
cosmic bond, which unites all things to God. The Valentinians limited the 
sympathy of the cosmos to the realm of the psychic heaven. The order of the 
annual seasons and the circuits of the heavenly bodies reflected the harmony 
of the Pleroma. This would mean that the heavenly spheres were not ruled by 
malevolent archons, but by rational intellects, who imitated the harmony of 
the Pleroma. It was only the material creation which was made from Sophia’s 
bad emotions that lacked a relation to the divinity. The parallelism between 
the intelligible cosmos and the visible cosmos is also attested in Valentinus’s 
fragment, which describes the creation of the visible cosmos according to the 
heavenly model.  
As much as the image is inferior to the living person (ἡ εἰκων τοῦ 
ζῶντος προσώπου), so is the world inferior to the living aeon (ὁ κόσμος 
                                                 
393 Tri. Trac. 73.18-74.18. Translated by Einar Thomassen. 
394 Opif. 47, 55, 112-117. See Runia, On the Creation, 284-285. For Philo, the cosmic heaven was a 
living image of the intelligible cosmos. God created it on the fourth day, which is according to 
numerological mysticism related to the sacred number ten (1+2+3+4 = 10). Although there are beings 
whose essences are mixed with imperfection and evil, the heavenly sphere represents perfection, 
harmony and beauty in the cosmos. Philo did not accept, however, the common Hellenistic cosmic 
religion which can be found in the Hermetic writings and theology of Stoa and even in the transcendent 
theology of the Middle Platonic tradition. For Philo, the divination of the heavenly bodies should not 
lead to the worship of the cosmos. The visible gods, i.e. the heavenly bodies, are servants of one God 
apprehended only by the intellect (Spec. 1.13-20). For Hellenistic cosmic religion, see Runia, On the 
Creation, 207-209 and Franz Cumont, Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans (New 
York and London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912), 101-138. 
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τοῦ ζῶντος αἰῶνος). What is the cause of the image? The greatness of 
the person who provided the model for the painter, so that he might 
be honored through his name. For the form was not regarded as 
equal to the original, but the name filled out what was lacking in the 
artifact. For the invisibility of God as well contributes to faith in the 
created work.395 
 
The Platonic two-world model obviously influenced the parallelism between 
the visible cosmos and its intelligible model in Valentinus’s fragment.  It has 
a parallel in Plato’s creation myth in the Timaeus in which the Father and 
Maker of the world gazes at the eternal model (πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν) in order 
to fashion the cosmos that contains visible copies of the intelligible living 
beings (τὰ νοητὰ ζῶα).396 Although Valentinus stated that the cosmos is an 
inferior copy of the intelligible world, it should be honored for the sake of its 
divine archetype.397 The term “aeon” in Valentinus’s fragment is in the 
singular, which evokes the common Middle Platonic usage of the term “idea” 
as a substitute for all ideas.398 It is not clear whether Valentinus portrayed 
the whole cosmos as a copy of the living aeon or only the most refined 
element, i.e. the psychic heaven, as in the Valentinian accounts described 
above. It possible, however, that also in Valentinus’s fragment the cosmos, 
which was compared with the image of the living model, refers not to the 
cosmos in totality but to the heavenly spheres as a cosmic image or shrine in 
which the psychic gods were located.399  
5.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have investigated issues related to the creation of matter in 
Philo and in Valentinian sources which become comprehensible in the light 
of Neo-Pythagorean theories concerning the creation of matter. Eudorus of 
                                                 
395 Fragment of Valentinus in Clement of Alexandria Strom. IV 89:6- 90:1. Translated by Einar 
Thomassen. 
396 Tim. 28c-30c. The comparison between a real model and painting vs. ideas and the cosmos is 
also Platonic. For the discussion concerning the Ideas, earthly representations and paintings, cf. Plato’s 
Republic 596ff. 
397 Thomassen maintains that although the Platonic two-world model obviously influences 
parallelism between cosmos and the transcendent world, the choice of the word “living” was reasoned 
in Valentinus’s fragment by the analogy with the painting and its living model. The model for the 
cosmos is designated as “living” for the sake of the analogy with the “living” model of the painting. See 
Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 465-466.  
398 It was a part of the doxological pattern in the Middle Platonic systems to describe the three 
ἀρχαί: God, the Idea and the matter. The Idea is mentioned in the singular form e.g. in Timaios of 
Locri 94c, Alc. Didaskalos 9-10, 14, Numenius fr. 16, and Aetius’ Placita. 
399 The planetary spheres as a cult sanctuary for the heavenly gods can be compared with the 
statues made by Daedalus mentioned in Plato’s Euthryphro 11b, 15b and Meno 97d. 
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Alexandria was probably the first to present a detailed theory concerning the 
derivation of matter from the transcendent One. Eudorus’s protological 
innovations became the standard view among the second-century Middle 
Platonic teachers, although there were some prominent teachers who 
continued the dualist tendencies and postulated the pre-existence of matter 
as the second arche besides God. While Philo’s theory concerning the 
creation of matter is compatible with Eudorus’s view, the Valentinian 
teaching (Exc. C and Iren. Haer. 1.1.1-3) was closer to the theory of 
Moderatus of Gades who postulated a theory concerning the creation of 
matter through deprivation.  
It is notable that the multiple relations between Wisdom and Plato’s 
Receptacle were in an initial stage present already in Philo’s cosmological 
allegories, even though they do not fit perfectly well with his overall Logos -
theology. In some cases, Philo associated the Platonic Receptacle with the 
feminine and dyadic aspect of Wisdom. The Gnostics and the Valentinian 
theologians elaborated these Platonizing speculations and incorporated them 
into the myth of Sophia’s fall and restoration. The stages of Sophia’s salvation 
formed not only the origin of matter, but also served as the paradigm for the 
salvation of human beings. 
 The Valentinian commentary on Gen. 1:1-5 in Exc. C explicitly rejects the 
Philonic view that Gen. 1:1 depicts the creation of the invisible and 
intelligible earth. This means that the commentator must have known a 
similar kind of interpretation that is attested in Philo’s Opificio Mundi. 
Strikingly, he also knew an interpretation of Gen. 1:3 signifying the creation 
of the pure light, which parallels Philo’s interpretation in Opif. 31. It is not 
clear, however, whether the Valentinian teachers knew this intepreation 
through Philo, or whether they were dependent on some pre-Philonic 
tradition which was still influential among Alexandrian Platonists during the 
time of these Valentinian teachers.  
The Valentinian accounts in Exc. Theod. 47-48 and Iren. Haer. 1.5.2 were 
dependent on the physical theory of diakrisis, which describes the division of 
matter into four cosmic elements (earth, water, air, fire) according to their 
physical characteristics. Philo also used this same theory in his description of 
the separation of matter by the Logos, the cutter. In the Valentinian 
accounts, the cosmic elements were linked also with the myth of Sophia and 
her emotions, which served as the basis for the creation of the cosmos.  
Taking into account all these parallels, the derivation of matter, its 
association with Wisdom, the interpretation of Gen. 1:3 as denoting to the 
creation of the unmixed essence of the heavenly lights, and the separation of 
matter on the grounds of the theory of diakrisis, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the Valentinian teachers were working in the allegorical tradition in 
which many of Philo’s interpretation were adopted, rejected and reformed. 
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6 THE CREATION OF THE FIRST HUMAN BEING: 
THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF GEN. 1:26-27 
AND GEN. 2:7 
Valentinian anthropology is fundamentally connected to the protological and 
cosmological accounts presented in the previous chapters. The threefold 
cosmic structure and the division between hylic and psychic essences are 
incorporated as part of the interpretation of the creation of the first human 
being. The creation of Adam is, however, the reverse of the creation of the 
visible cosmos. Whereas the creation described in Gen. 1:1 is seen as a 
“separation” of the hylic and psychic essences, the creation of Adam (Gen. 
1:26-27, 2:7) depicts how these essences – the spiritual, psychic and hylic − 
are brought together in Adam and his descendants.   
The passages in Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7 describe how the Demiurge 
created the hylic soul-body of Adam out of incorporeal matter into which he 
breathed the likeness of himself, i.e. the psychic essence. At the same time, 
Sophia deposited into the psychic soul a seed of her own, which she produced 
as an image of the Savior’s angels. Thus, the first human being contained all 
the cosmic elements in his soul. In the end, Adam was clothed in the 
garments of skin which denoted the sense-perceptible earthly body.  
In Valentinian anthropology the three-fold structure of the soul of the 
first human being forms the basis for the tripartite division of humankind 
into hylic, psychic and spiritual categories of human beings. In Exc. C the 
division of humankind is based on the fact that Adam could not distribute all 
three essences equally to his descendants, but only the physical body and the 
hylic soul. The higher essences of Adam’s soul must be activated by 
philosophical practices. I will argue in this chapter that Valentinian 
anthropology drew upon Philo's, although the Valentinians reformulated 
these teachings in the light of the myth of Sophia.  
6.1 The philosophical background to Valentinian 
anthropology 
Valentinian anthropology drew upon Middle Platonic theories of the human 
soul which were strongly influenced by Aristotelian transcendental 
psychology. The origin of these theories was evidently in Plato’s dialogues, 
especially in the Timaeus, which describes the human soul as a fragment 
from the world soul. In the famous passage of Tim. 41d-e Plato describes how 
the Demiurge shaped the rational part of the human soul out of the same 
“substance” as the world soul but it was “second or third in the degree of 
purity.” The creation of the body and those mortal parts of the soul which 
were connected to the bodily life were left for the “younger gods,” who 
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imitated the creative activity of the Demiurge. It is the rational part of the 
human soul only that the Demiurge creates by himself and is immortal.400 
Thus, the human soul was a mediating principle between the purely rational 
world of Ideas and the material creation, because it was a fragment of the 
world soul which was a harmonious composition of Indivisible (“being”) and 
Divisible (“becoming”) kinds of Existence, Sameness, and Difference.401  
The discussion concerning Plato’s anthropology began already during the 
Old Academy. The most famous critic for Plato’s anthropological conceptions 
was Aristotle, who found the relation between the physical body and the non-
physical soul problematic. In De An. 412b 4-6 Aristotle maintained that the 
soul is not an ontologically different entity from the body but is its “first 
actuality of a natural body possessed of organs” (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος 
φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ). The soul is an inseparable, functional principle of an 
individual body. Aristotle illustrates the relation between body and soul by 
comparing it with an eye and with sight. If an eye were the body, the faculty 
of “seeing” would be its soul. And as there is not a faculty of seeing without 
an eye, there is no soul without a body.  
Aristotle solved the problem of causation in Plato’s psychology by 
postulating a mediating “soul-body” between the non-physical soul and the 
physical body. The soul-principle does not contact with the body and its 
organs directly, but there is a middle entity called pneuma between the soul 
and the body. It is a vehicle, instrument or shell of the soul, which is 
contained in the male semen before any bodily organs were produced.402 
Pneuma functions as a mediator of the desire of the soul: it reacts to the 
powers proceeding from the soul and affects in turn to body. 
Although Aristotle’s psychology paved the way for the hylomorphistic 
views of the mind-body relation, there are tenets in his writings which imply 
that he was still working within a dualistic world view.403 While the sensible 
and reasoning parts of the human soul together with its instrumental soul-
body decay together with the body, the highest part of the human soul, the 
intellect, “seems to come about in us as being a sort of substance and seems 
                                                 
400 Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 139-147. 
401 Tim. 35a. Cf. Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology, 59-66. 
402 Ar. Motu anim. 10, 703a4-b2; De Anima III, 10, 433b19. Cf. Abraham P. Bos, “Aristotelian and 
Platonic Dualism in Hellenistic and Early Christian Philosophy and Gnosticism,” VC (56), 2002, 278. 
403 For the physicalistic and non-physicalistic dimensions of Aristotle’s psychology cf. Jonathan 
Barnes, “Aristotle’s Conception of Mind,” in Articles on Aristotle (ed. Barnes and Schofield et.al. 
London: Duckworth, 1979), 32-41. Abraham P. Bos has argued against the standard hylomorphic 
interpretation of Aristotle’s De Anima. He suggests that Aristotle was still working with the dualistic 
framework although he made crucial alterations in Plato’s teaching. Cf. Abraham P. Bos, The Soul, and 
Its Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature (Leiden: Brill, 
2003); Abraham P. Bos, “Aristotelian and Platonic Dualism,” VC (56), 2002, 273-291, esp. 276-284. 
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not be destroyed.”404 This distinction is based on Aristotle’s distinction 
between passive and active intellects.405 Aristotle maintained that every 
object of thought consists of passive matter and active form. This distinction 
is also applied to operations of the human mind.406 The reasonable human 
soul is capable of reasoning, planning, and imagination, but it also has the 
capacity to become conscious of itself as thinking. These two aspects – the 
mind as thinking and the mind thinking itself as thinking − refer to the 
passive and active parts of the human mind. The active intellect gives form to 
the passive mind “as the light that makes potential colors into actual 
colors.”407  
The active mind not only gives intuitive knowledge for the logical 
reasoning of the soul, but it has the capacity to separate itself from the sense-
perceptible world and contemplate the transcendent world.408 There is, 
however, one crucial difference between the passive and active minds: while 
the reasoning of the passive mind functions naturally as the human being 
grows and learns, the active intellect comes from outside.409 The human 
intellect must be “awakened” by the “cosmic mind” through the power of 
                                                 
404 De An. 408b18. Plato suggested already in Tim. 30b-c that nous was an ontologically 
independent entity from the soul. He maintained that the Demiurge set “an intellect (nous) within the 
soul and the soul within the body” as he fashioned the cosmos as an “ensouled living being with an 
intellect” (τὸν κόσμον ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν). At the microcosmic level, however, nous in Plato’s texts is 
identified mainly with the rational part of the soul. Aristotle elaborated the distinction between the 
soul and the intellect as an independent psychological entity which formed the basis for Middle 
Platonic anthropology. 
405 De An. III 5. Cicero reports that Aristotle considered that immortal part of the soul consisted of 
a special divine, fifth element (quinta essentia) similar to that of the celestial bodies. As pneuma is the 
vehicle of the soul, ether is a vehicle for the eternal mind. For the essence of the heavenly bodies, cf. Ar. 
De Caelo 269a31; 270a12, b10; 289a15. 
406 Victor Caston argues that the chapter in question “concerns two separate species of mind, and 
not divisions within a mind.” When comparing the attributes of the mind described in De An. III,5 with 
the cosmic Mind in Met. XII 7-9 the list of the attributes does not differ much. It is the cosmic Nous 
which is described in De Anima III,5 not a separate essence of the human mind. Cf. Victor Caston, 
“Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal,” in Phronesis (XLIV/3; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 199-225. 
407 De An. 430a10-25. 
408 The relation between the passive mind, i.e. logos, and the active mind, i.e. nous, is not exclusive. 
Active thinking cannot exist without logical reasoning based on the sense perceptions and vice versa. 
The nous is able to be logical and logos is able to be noetic. The multi-dimensionality of nous and logos 
in Aristotle’s epistemology is described by Richard A. Lee and Christopher P. Long, “Nous and Logos in 
Aristotle,” in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologia (54.3), 348-349. 
409 P. Merlan, “Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek 
and Early Medieval Philosophy (ed. A. H. Armstrong; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 
42-43. 
THE CREATION OF THE FIRST HUMAN BEING: THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF 
GEN. 1:26-27 AND GEN. 2:7 
148 
attraction and love.410 Therefore, Aristotle says that the active intellect is not 
a part of the soul, but “seems to be a different genus of the soul.”411 
Aristotle made a distinction between two stages of the human soul: a state 
of sleep and a state of being awake.412 When the soul is sleeping it possesses 
higher intellectual capacities potentially (nous-in-potency), but when it is 
awakened these potencies are actualized (nous-in-action). These two modes 
of intellect do not depict two different intellects, but one intellect in two 
stages. In the Middle Platonic tradition, the awakening of the soul goes back 
to Aristotle and it also takes the form of awakening the World Soul by the 
cosmic Mind.413 In the Valentinian teachings the awakening of the individual 
mind has its paradigm in the salvation and awakening of Sophia. The 
awakening of the individual soul is mentioned in Exc. Theod. 3.1-2: 
When the Savior came, he awakened the soul and kindled the spark. 
For the words of the Lord is power. Therefore, he said: “Let your light 
shine before men.” And after the resurrection, by breathing the Spirit 
on the apostles he was blowing off and removing dust like ashes, but 
kindling and giving life to the spark. 
 
This model of spiritual awakening of the soul is also mentioned in the Gospel 
of Truth (29-30): 
Until the moment when they who are passing through all these things 
− I mean they who have experienced all these confusions − awake, 
they see nothing because the dreams were nothing. It is thus that they 
who cast ignorance from them as sleep do not consider it to be 
anything, nor regard its properties to be something real, but they 
renounce them like a dream in the night and they consider the 
knowledge of the Father to be the dawn. It is thus that each one has 
acted as if he were asleep, during the time when he was ignorant and 
thus he comes to understand as if he were awakening. And happy is 
the man who comes to himself and awakens. Indeed, blessed is he 
who has opened the eyes of the blind.414 
 
                                                 
410Met. ? 7, 1073a6-8; Physics 8.10, 266a25; 29; b5; b14; b19; 267b22; Politica H 4, 1326a32-34. 
Cf. Bos, The Soul and Its Instrumental Body, 226-229 and Bos,”A Platonist in the Likeness of 
Aristotle,” 73-73. 
411 De An. II 2, 413b24-27. 
412 De An. II 1. 
413 The awakening of the World Soul was a common idea in Middle Platonism (e.g. Alc. Didask. 
XIV; Pl. Procr. anim. 1026EF). The awakening of the individual soul is also mentioned in the Hermetic 
sources: “cease your inebriation intoxicated as you are by an irrational sleep” (C.H. I 27, X 5).  
414 Translated by Bentley Layton in The Gnostic Scriptures. 
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Philo also considers the salvation of the soul as an awakening. He compared 
the rejection of the false doctrines of “Chaldean philosophy” with awaking 
from a deep sleep:415 
In this creed Abraham had been reared, and for a long time remained 
a Chaldean. Then opening the soul’s eye as though after profound 
sleep, and beginning to see the pure beam instead of the deep 
darkness, he followed the ray and discerned what he had not beheld 
before. 
 
Also, Aristotle’s speculations concerning the different kinds of soul-bodies 
and two-fold intellect had a great impact on Middle Platonic teachers.416 
While the passive mind perishes together with the body and its pneumatic 
soul-body, the active mind is eternal as it contemplates the supra-cosmic 
mind, i.e. God.417 It became common in the Middle Platonic tradition to think 
that the soul experiences a sort of “double liberation” during death. In the 
first stage, the soul together with its pneumatic body is liberated from the 
body. In the second stage the active mind, i.e. the intellect, is separated from 
the pneumatic soul-body. These notions concerning the afterlife can be found 
in different versions in the Middle Platonic sources, Gnostic schools, and the 
Hermetic tradition.418 
                                                 
415 Abr. 70. See Bos, “Aristotelian and Platonic Dualism,” 289-291; ibid., “Philo of Alexandria,” 66-
86. 
416 The strict distinction between the soul and the intellect is also found in Plutarch, who not only 
made a distinction between rational and the irrational parts of the soul but also between the rational 
soul and nous (Pl., De Fac. 943A ff). Plutarch maintained that there were two conjunctions: the first is 
about the soul and the body but the second is about the soul and the mind. There were according to 
Plutarch three classes of humankind. The first group lacked the mind altogether, and they were mixed 
with bodily passions. The second group had a mind, but they struggle with passions and divine 
impacts. The third group possessed the mind in perfect fashion, which lifted them above all bodily 
passions. Plutarch criticized those who regarded the mind as a part of the soul. In reality, the mind is a 
demon that exists externally outside the soul and the body and whose task is to guide the human soul 
towards its home in heaven (Pl., On the Demon of Socrates 591D ff.) The association of the nous with a 
daemon comes from Plato, who says in Tim. 90A that a daemon is “the most authoritative element of 
soul” whose task is to raise the human soul to heaven. For the analysis of Plutarch’s view, cf. Dillon, 
The Middle Platonists, 211-212. 
417 Aristotle talks in his lost dialogue Eudemus about the soul’s return home after death. This 
means that at least some part of the soul continues to exist after the death of the individual. It is not 
clear, however, whether the immortal part of the soul is able to keep its individuality after death. Cf. 
Eudemus fr. 1 and 6 in Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, recog. brevique adnotatione instruxit W.D. Ross 
(Oxford, 1955; repr. 1964). 
418 For the double liberation of the soul in the Hermetic tradition, cf. CH X 16-17. Aristotle’s theory 
of the soul formed the basis for the Middle Platonic theories concerning different kinds of soul-bodies 
and it became also popular among Early Christian teachers. Irenaeus supposes in the light of 1 Cor. 
15:44 the existence of two-fold soul bodies, the animal ones, which remain in life after death and 
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 In Plato’s Timaeus, the rational part of the soul imitates the world soul, 
being a fragment from it.  Plato’s view concerning the rationality of the soul 
was rather optimistic and it could not give a logical answer to the reality of 
human suffering and erroneous choices. There emerged, thus, different 
theories among the Platonic teachers concerning the relation of the 
individual soul and the world soul, which were supposed to explain the 
reality of suffering. Some Platonists, like Numenius and some gnosticizing 
Platonists, taught that the reason for human suffering and erroneous choices 
was the pre-cosmic fall of the world soul. The imperfection of the human soul 
can be derived from the fact that it was a fragment of the fallen soul of the 
world. Some other Platonists taught that the suffering of the human soul 
resulted from the embodiment, because the soul lost its rationality 
periodically as a result of incarnation. There was, however, also the third 
option according to which some part of the soul was seen as undescended. 
This view became dominant in the school of Plotinus. The theory of the 
undescended soul was commonly seen as Plotinus’s own innovation and 
deviation from the pure doctrine of Plato. Plotinus taught that even above the 
rational part of the soul existed “the second self,” which could not sin and 
served as a paradigm for the “earthly self.” Human suffering was an outcome 
of the fact that the rational soul could not integrate itself into the higher 
self.419 Gregory Shaw presents these different views as follows:420 
 
1. Gnostics (as described in Ennead II,9) 
a) The suffering of individual souls is due to the fall of the World 
Soul 
b) Individual souls (collectively) = the World Soul 
2. Plotinus (A) (against the Gnostics) 
a) The suffering of individual souls is not due to the fall of the 
World Soul because the World Soul cannot fall [Enn. II, 9, 7, 
9-19]. The relation of individual souls to their bodies included 
a temporary period of suffering and confusion [Enn. II, 9, 
7ff.], which can be overcome by education and an increasing 
mimesis of the gods [Enn. II, 9, 18, 32-35]. 
b) The World Soul is not equal to the sum of individual souls 
[Enn. II, 9, 8, 36-29]. 
3. Plotinus (B) 
                                                                                                                                          
spiritual bodies, which are put on after the resurrection (Iren. Haer. 5.7.1-2). In addition to the 
Valentinians, the idea of the luminous, instrumental soul-body of the intellect is attested in the 
writings of the Alexandrian theologians Origen and Didymus the Blind (cf. Orig. Cels. II 60; In Mt. 
XVII 30). 
419 John M. Rist, “Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus,” in The American Journal of 
Philology (88), 1967, 410-422. 
420 Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, 65. 
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a) The World Soul does not fall and neither do individual souls. 
The suffering of individual souls, therefore, is merely the 
suffering of their “images”; in truth, individual souls remain 
above, at the level of the World Soul. 
b) The World Soul = unfallen individual souls.   
 
The anthropological teaching in the Valentinian sources contains features 
that link it to the first and third positions, which were fused together on the 
grounds of Aristotelian psychology. Although the irrationality of the soul was 
an outcome of the fall of Sophia, the rational and spiritual parts of the soul 
were connected to Sophia’s repentance and enlightenment. Sophia created 
the spiritual seed as images of the Savior’s angels after she has been purified 
of her erroneous thoughts and pernicious emotions. The spiritual seed had 
their divine archetype in the “ecclesia above” but these supra-cosmic 
spiritual identities did not incarnate. They remained intact in the realm 
below the Pleroma together with Sophia. The relation between the spiritual 
seed and their divine archetypes can be understood on the grounds of the 
Aristotelian theory of “passive” and “active” intellects. In Valentinian 
anthropology, the passive intellect becomes active when it is integrated to its 
heavenly self, i.e. its angelic archetype. 
6.2 The creation of the first human being and the three-
fold structure of the human soul in Valentinian 
sources 
I will next present the description of the creation of the first human being 
according to Exc. C which is included in Clement’s Excerpta ex Theodoto. 
The main section is in Exc. Theod. 50-51, which has a parallel in Iren. Haer 
1.5.5. The sequence of the creation of Adam is as follows:  
 
1. Sophia generates the spiritual seed as images of the angels of the Savior 
(Gen. 1:27). 
2. The Demiurge and his assistants create the irrational and hylic soul of 
Adam out of matter (Gen. 1:26/2:7).  
3. The Demiurge breathes the likeness of himself into the hylic soul, which 
serves as a soul-body for the rational soul. (Gen. 2:7)  
4. Sophia inserts the spiritual seed into the psychic soul of Adam.  
5. The Demiurge clothes the hylic-psychic soul together with the seed of 
Sophia with the garments of skin, which refers to the fleshly body (Gen. 
3:21).  
 
The creation of humankind began at the supra-cosmic level as the Savior 
descended to the suffering Sophia.  After the Savior had purified Sophia from 
her erroneous thoughts, she began to contemplate the angels who 
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accompanied the Savior.421  It was this joyful contemplation which formed 
the basis for the creation of the spiritual seed as images of the angels. This is 
attested in Irenaeus’s account as follows: 
They teach, too, that when Achamoth had been freed from passion 
and had with joy received the contemplation of the lights which were 
with him, that is, of the Angels that were with him, and had yearned 
after them, she brought forth fruits after their image, a spiritual 
offspring, born after the likeness of the Savior’s bodyguards.422 
 
There is some confusion concerning the biblical proof -text in this passage. It 
seems that the creation of the seed of Sophia is based on Gen. 1.26 (“she 
brought forth fruits after their image, a spiritual offspring, born after the 
likeness of the Savior’s bodyguards”). The same text is used, however, as a 
proof -text later in Iren. Haer. 1.5.5 when the Demiurge creates Adam’s soul-
body (cf. below). It is rather unlikely that the same biblical text (Gen. 1:26) 
would have served as the basis for the creation of the spiritual seed of Adam 
and his material-psychic soul as well. I suggest that Irenaeus paraphrased his 
source material carelessly. The biblical allusion to Gen. 1:26 may come from 
Irenaeus himself. It is also noteworthy that Gen. 1:26 does not fit well in the 
description of the creation of the seed of Sophia. Although there was a 
multiplicity of models, i.e. angels, there were not a plurality of creators. The 
spiritual seed was created by Sophia alone. It is more likely that the original 
proof text in Iren. Haer. 1.4.5 was Gen.1.27, which was commonly found in 
other Valentinian sources.  
The creation of the seed of Sophia as images of the Savior’s “army” is also 
attested in the Tripartite Tractate.423 As the Savior revealed himself to the 
Logos-Sophia, he was filled with inexpressible joy and she brought forth 
living images of the living beings that accompanied the Savior.424 The proof -
text for the creation of the spiritual seed is evidently Gen. 1:27 and it was 
stressed that the spiritual offspring of Logos-Sophia were male beings.425 
Clement has also preserved in Exc. Theod. 21.1 information about teaching 
                                                 
421 In the Pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo, the power of God is diversified into a multitude of 
subordinate executive powers called “bodyguards” (δορυφόροι). This has a close parallel in Philo who 
states that the powers accompanied God as “bodyguards” (Sac. 59). Strikingly in Irenaeus’s account 
(Iren. Haer. 1.4.5) the angels who were created together with the Savior Jesus as representatives of the 
aeons are called “bodyguards” (δορυφόροι).  It is possible that the Valentinian teachers were dependent 
on the same Aristotelian tradition. Cf. Bos, “A Platonist in the Likeness of Aristotle,” 77-78.    
422 Iren. Haer. 1.4.5. Epiphanius’s Greek text is close to Irenaeus’s Latin version in this passage. 
There is only a slight difference in the Greek wording “after their image,” which in Latin is “after his 
image.”   
423 In Tri. Trac. 86,23-87 the aeons produce not only the Savior as an expression of the Father but 
an army of beings who were images of themselves. 
424 Tri. Trac. 90,14-91. 
425 Tri. Trac. 94.10-95.16. Cf. Thomassen, The Tripartite Tractate, note 37. 
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that describes the creation of the seed of Sophia explicitly on the ground of 
Gen. 1:27:  
The Valentinians say that the finest emanation of Sophia is spoken of 
in “He created them in the image of God, male and female created he 
them.” Now the males from this emanation are the election, but the 
females are the calling, and they call the male beings angelic and the 
females themselves the dispersed spirit [or seed].426 
 
The creation of the spiritual seed was depicted in this passage as Sophia’s 
finest emanation (προβολή ἡ ἄριστη). This would mean that there were some 
other emanations of lower rank by Sophia. Although the temporal order in 
the light of Theodotus’ fragmentary passages is difficult to explain, it is likely 
that the lower beings were the powers on the left, which Sophia created 
earlier from the powers on the right.427 The finest emanation of Sophia is 
depicted as “images” but angels as archetypes of Sophia’s production are not 
mentioned. It is stated, however, that the seed of Sophia is split into two 
parts, the male and the female seed, and it is the former part of the seed that 
is depicted as “angelic.” Therefore, this passage does not describe the 
creation of the seed of Sophia as images of the angels, but the creation of 
angels themselves, which were separated from the unitary seed before its 
incarnation.428  
                                                 
426 Τὸ 'κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς, ἄρσεν και θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς' τὴν προβόλην τὴν ἀρίστην 
φασιν οἱ Ούαλεντινιανοῦ τῆς Ζοφίας λέγεσθαι, ἀφ᾽ ἧς τὰ μὲν ἀρρενικὰ ἡ ἐκλογή, τὰ δὲ θελυκὰ ἡ κλῆσις, καὶ τὰ 
μὲν ἀρρενικὰ καλοῦσι, τὰ θελυκὰ δὲ ἐαυτούς, τὸ διαφέρον πνεῦμα [σπέρμα]. Exc.Theod. 21.1. The first 
sentence contains an interesting textual variance compared with the text of Septuagint: the first 
pronoun αὐτόν in the sentence “He created him…” (LXX) was supposedly intentionally changed to 
αὐτούς (“He created them…”) The generation of the sexes in Gen. 1:27 was seen as a biblical typology 
for the twofold emission of the seed by Sophia. The sexes were not understood biologically, but as an 
allegory of the spiritual rupture within Sophia’s seed, which was sowed into the earthly soul. In the 
passages which go back to Theodotus, the female seed, depicted as dispersed seed, was compared with 
an aborted fetus (Exc. Theod. 67-68). For the relationship of the Valentinian myth with ancient 
conceptions of sexual intercourse, birth and embryology cf. Richard Smith, “Sex Education in Gnostic 
Schools” in Images of the Feminine in Gnosticism (ed. by Karen L. King; Harrisburg: Trinity Press 
International, 2000), 345-369. 
427 Exc. Theod. 34.1-2. 
428 The female part of the seed was sowed into the world, while the angelic male part of the seed 
was drawn together with the Logos, i.e. the Savior. The angelic seed of Sophia formed the spiritual 
body of the Savior as he emptied himself and descended to the world to save the dispersed seed Exc. 
Theod. 26.1-3.Thomassen points out that the accounts in Theodotus and the Tripartite Tractate are in 
accord in that the seed of Sophia-Logos is divided into two parts. Some part remains in the realm of 
Sophia-Logos while the other part is incarnated into the world. The remaining part will be incarnated 
later together with the Savior during his baptism as his spiritual body. See Thomassen, The Spiritual 
Seed, 29-58.  
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It is not explained in Exc. C how Sophia produced her offspring. In Exc. 
Theod. 50-51 the angels as archetypes for Sophia’s offspring are not explicitly 
mentioned. It is stated, however, that the Savior was accompanied by male 
angels as he visited the suffering Sophia.429 The male angels are also 
mentioned in the context of the implantation of the spiritual seed into 
Adam’s soul.430 It is rather likely, then, that Sophia produced her seed as 
images of the male angels of the Savior or the Savior himself. The biblical 
proof-text may have been Gen. 1:27, because Gen. 1:26 was used as the basis 
for the creation of the hylic-psychic soul of Adam.  
The consensus among Valentinian theologians in these sources seems to 
be that Sophia produced the spiritual seed, which had the Savior’s angels or 
some other living beings as heavenly archetypes. In Ireanaeus’ account the 
seed of Sophia is depicted as the “inner man” and an image of the “ecclesia 
above,” which refers to the last pair of the Ogdoad in the Pleroma, i.e. the 
man-ecclesia.431 Thomassen has pointed out that rather than a separate 
member of the Pleroma, the aeon “man-ecclesia” may be seen as an aspect of 
the Pleroma as a whole.432 “Man-ecclesia” was also included in the Savior, 
because the whole Pleroma dwelled in the Savior that is referred in Col 2:9 
(ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς).433 We can conclude 
that in the Valentinian model the Savior and his angels served collectively as 
an archetypical man for Sophia’s spiritual emanation.434 After the creation of 
the spiritual seed by Sophia in the realm below the Pleroma, the focus is 
shifted to the creation of the first human being by the Demiurge. This process 
of creation is described in Iren. Haer. 1.5.5 and Exc. Theod. 50-51.1: 
 
Exc. Theod. 50-51    Iren. Haer. 1.5.5 
Taking dust from the earth: not of the 
dry land but a portion of matter 
varied constitution and color, he 
fashioned a soul, earthly and 
material, irrational and 
consubstantial with that of the 
beasts. This is the man “according to 
the image.” But the man who is 
according to the likeness of the 
Creator himself is he whom he has 
breathed into and inseminated into 
Having thus formed the world, he 
also created the earthly [part of] 
man, not taking him from this dry 
earth, but from an invisible 
substance consisting of fusible and 
fluid matter, and then afterward, as 
they define the process, breathed into 
him the psychic part of his nature. It 
was this latter which was created 
after his image and likeness. The 
hylic part, indeed, was very near to 
                                                 
429 Exc.Theod. 44.1. 
430 Exc.Theod. 53.3.  
431 Iren. Haer. 1.5.6. 
432 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 441.  
433 Iren. Haer. 1.3.4; Col. 1:15. 
434 For the relation between the heavenly ecclesia, the Savior and the hidden identities of the saved 
in the Tripartite Tractate, cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 52. 
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the former, placing in him by angels 
something consubstantial with 
himself. Since he is invisible and 
immaterial, he called his substance 
“the breath of life,” but that which 
was given form became a “living soul” 
and he confesses that it is so in the 
prophetic writings.435 
God as far as the image went, but not 
of the same substance with him. The 
psychic, on the other hand, was so in 
respect to likeness; and hence, his 
substance was called the spirit of life 
because it took its rise from a 
spiritual outflowing.436 
 
In both of these accounts the creation of the soul of an earthly human being 
is interpreted in the light of a combination of Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7. The 
human being created “according to the likeness” of the Demiurge is breathed 
into the material soul (Gen. 2:7), which is depicted as the human being 
“according to the image.” In Exc. Theod. 50-51 the angels are mediators of 
the psychic element, which may refer to the plurality of the creators in Plato’s 
Timaeus to whom God delegated the creation of the lower parts of the human 
soul.437 In Irenaeus’s version, the collectivity of the creators is not explicitly 
mentioned. However, the Demiurge is called in Irenaeus’s account 
Hebdomad.438 This may refer to a personification of the collective planetary 
powers, which are also depicted as angels. It is thus possible that in 
Irenaeus’s account there is an allusion to the collectivity of the creators of the 
                                                 
435 “Λαβὼν χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς”, —οὐ τῆς ξηρᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῆς πολυμεροῦς καὶ ποικίλης ὕλης μέρος, — ψυχὴν 
γεώδη καὶ ὑλικὴν ἐτεκτήνατο ἄλογον καὶ τῇ τῶν θηρίων ὁμοούσιον· οὗτος [ὁ] “κατ’ εἰκόνα” ἄνθρωπος.  Ὁ δὲ 
“καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν,” τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὃν εἰς τοῦτον “ἐνεφύσησέν” τε καὶ ἐνέσπειρεν, 
ὁμοούσιόν τι αὐτῷ δι’ Ἀγγέλων ἐνθείς. Καθὸ μὲν ἀόρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀσώματος, τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ “πνοὴν ζωῆς” 
προσεῖπεν· μορφωθὲν δέ, “ψυχὴ ζῶσα” ἐγένετο· ὅπερ εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ταῖς προφητικαῖς γραφαῖς ὁμολογεῖ.  
436 Δημιουργήσαντα δὴ τὸν κόσμον, πεποιηκέναι καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν χοϊκόν· οὐκ ἀπὸ ταύτης δὲ τῆς 
ξηρᾶς γῆς, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀοράτου οὐσίας, ἀπὸ τοῦ κεχυμένου καὶ ῥευστοῦ τῆς ὕλης λαβόντα· καὶ εἰς τοῦτον 
ἐμφυσῆσαι τὸν ψυχικὸν διορίζονται. Καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν γεγονότα· κατ’ εἰκόνα μὲν 
τὸν ὑλικὸν ὑπάρχειν, παραπλήσιον μὲν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοούσιον τῷ Θεῷ· καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν δὲ τὸν ψυχικὸν ὅθεν καὶ 
πνεῦμα ζωῆς τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἰρῆσθαι, ἐκ πνευματικῆς ἀποῤῥοίας οὖσαν.  
437 The psychic soul was infused into the soul of Adam by the Demiurge with the help of angels (cf. 
Exc. Theod. 50.2). This may refer to the idea of a plurality of creators in Gen. 1:26 that goes back to the 
teaching attested in Valentinus’s fragment in Strom. II 36.2-4. The idea of a plurality of creators of the 
human soul is also mentioned in the Tripartite Tractate (105-106). The powers were co-creators of 
God, and they have a similar role in the creation of human beings as the younger gods in Plato’s 
Timaeus. The powers imitated the creative activity of the Logos. While the powers created the hylic and 
psychic souls, the “living soul” was produced by the Logos. The role of the powers differs in the 
Tripartite Tractate from Philo’s account in Opif. 69-70. In the Tripartite Tractate, the powers are 
archons that lust for power, but in Opif. 69-70 God’s assistants are positive cosmic powers. Philo 
maintains that the moral vagueness of the earthly soul is the motif for the use of assistants in the 
creation process: God alone is the creator of the good. This motif is lacking in the Tripartite Tractate. 
438 Iren. Haer. 1.5.2. 
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hylic and psychic parts of Adam’s soul.439 It is noteworthy that it is the 
creation of the hylic soul of Adam that is described in these accounts, not that 
of Adam’s corporeal body. It is explicitly mentioned that unlike the physical 
body, the hylic-psychic soul of Adam was created in the fourth heaven.440 
 
  Exc. Theod. 51.1   Iren. Haer. 1.5.2 
Therefore, he was created in the 
Paradise in the fourth heaven. There 
the earthly flesh does not ascend, but 
it served as hylic flesh for the divine 
soul.441 
Likewise, Paradise is above the third 
heaven and is the fourth Archangel 
with power. From him, Adam 
received something [or his 
substance] while he dwelt in it.442  
 
In Exc. Theod. 51.1 χοϊκὴ σάρξ and σὰρξ ἡ ὑλική are synonyms. The “hylic 
flesh” (σὰρξ ἡ ὑλική) depicted the material body, which could not ascend to 
the fourth heaven, where the immaterial hylic-psychic soul was created. The 
hylic soul was also referred to as the “flesh,” which served as the body (σῶμα) 
for the psychic and divine soul, referred as the “bone.”   
This is the meaning of “This is now bone of my bones,” – he mentions 
the divine soul which is hidden in the flesh firm and hard to suffer and 
very potent, − and “the flesh of my flesh” – the hylic soul which is the 
body of the divine soul.443 
 
According to Irenaeus’s account, the hylic soul of Adam was not taken from 
the “dry earth” (ξηρᾶ γῆ) but from an “invisible substance consisting of 
fusible and fluid matter” (ἀπὸ τῆς ἀοράτου οὐσίας, ἀπὸ τοῦ κεχυμένου καὶ 
ῥευστοῦ τῆς ὕλης λαβόντα).444 Clement’s account says practically the same 
thing: the Demiurge did not take matter for the hylic soul from the dry land 
                                                 
439 Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 432-433. 
440 The distinction between the terms χοϊκός and ὑλικός is possibly based on the “double-reading” of 
the text, which says: καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπο τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον 
αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχήν ζῶσαν (LXX; Gen. 2:7). The Valentinian 
commentators made a distinction between the earthly man (τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν) and the human being 
which was made out of earth (ἀπο τῆς γῆς). The former describes the human being consisting of the 
fleshly body and the latter refers to the hylic soul. In Irenaeus’s account, Adam was created above the 
third heaven, where he received “something” (τι) which refers to the essence of the Demiurge.  
441 Ὅθεν ἐν τῷ Παραδείσῳ, τῷ τετάρτῳ οὐρανῷ, δημιουργεῖται. Ἐκεῖ γὰρ χοϊκὴ σὰρξ οὐκ ἀναβαίνει, ἀλλ’ 
ἦν τῇ ψυχῇ [τῇ] θείᾳ οἷον σὰρξ ἡ ὑλική 
442 ὡς καὶ τὸν Παράδεισον ὑπὲρ τρίτον οὐρανὸν ὄντα, τέταρτον Ἄγγελον λέγουσι δυνάμει ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἀπὸ 
τούτου τι εἰληφέναι τὸν Ἀδὰμ διατετριφότα ἐν αὐτῷ. 
443 Exc. Theod. 51.2. Ταῦτα σημαίνει· Τοῦτο νῦν ὀστοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὀστῶν μου” τὴν θείαν ψυχὴν αἰνίσσεται 
τὴν ἐγκεκρυμμένην τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ στερεὰν καὶ δυσπαθῆ καὶ δυνατωτέραν, καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ τῆς σαρκός μου” τὴν 
ὑλικὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα οὖσαν τῆς θείας ψυχῆς.  
444 Iren. Haer 1.5.5. The term “invisible” may refer to the unstructured essence of matter (cf. the 
discussion concerning term “invisible” in the preceding chapter). 
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but from a “portion of matter varied constitution and color” (τῆς πολυμεροῦς 
καὶ ποικίλης ὕλης μέρος).  The hylic soul was made out of confused matter to 
be distinguished from the dry earth in its present stage. The Demiurge 
breathes the likeness of himself, i.e. the psychic essence, into the hylic soul of 
Adam, but at the same time, he unknowingly mediates the spiritual seed. 
This is described in the following passages: 
 
     Exc.Theod. 53:2-3   Iren. Haer. 1.5.6 
But Adam had in his soul the 
spiritual seed, which was sown by 
Sophia. He says: “Established 
through angels by the hand of a 
mediator. And the mediator is not of 
one, but God is one.” Therefore, the 
seed is assisted through the angels 
that are put forth by Sophia.445 
 
Furthermore, they declare that the 
Demiurge himself was ignorant of the 
offspring of Achamoth, their Mother, 
which was conceived by virtue of her 
contemplation of the angels who 
surround Savior and which were 
spiritual like the Mother. Secretly 
without his knowledge, she deposited 
this [offspring] in him that through 
him it might be planted as a “seed” in 
the soul which came from him, and 
thence in this material body; and 
having been borne in them as in a 
womb and grown, it might become fit 
for the reception of perfect 
knowledge.446 
 
There is a slight difference between these accounts. Firstly, in Iren. Haer. 
1.5.6 it is not the “spiritual seed” (σπέρμα τὸ πνευματικόν) as in Exc. Theod. 53, 
but “the offspring of the mother” (κύημα τῆς μητρός) that is deposited into the 
soul of Adam through the instrumentality of the Demiurge. There is no 
difference between these statements because it is also stated in Irenaeus that 
the offspring of Sophia is of the same substance as the mother, i.e. spiritual. 
Secondly, in Iren. Haer. 1.5.6 the spiritual seed was deposited by Sophia into 
the Demiurge, who was used as an instrument by her. It is the breath of the 
                                                 
445 Ἔσχεν δὲ ὁ Ἀδὰμ ἀδήλως αὐτῷ ὑπὸ τῆς Σοφίας ἐνσπαρὲν τὸ σπέρμα τὸ πνευματικὸν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, 
“διαταγείς”, φησί, “δι’ Ἀγγέλων, ἐν χειρὶ Μεσίτου· ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν”. ”Δι’ 
Ἀγγέλων” οὖν τῶν ἀρρένων τὰ σπέρματα ὑπηρετεῖται, τὰ εἰς γένεσιν προβληθέντα ὑπὸ τῆς Σοφίας, καθὸ ἐγχωρεῖ 
γίνεσθαι 
446 Τὸ δὲ κύημα τῆς μητρὸς αὐτῶν τῆς Ἀχαμὼθ, ὃ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Σωτῆρα ἀγγέλων 
ἀπεκύησεν, ὁμοούσιον ὑπάρχον τῇ μητρὶ, πνευματικὸν, καὶ αὐτὸ ἠγνοηκέναι τὸν Δημιουργὸν λέγουσι· καὶ 
λεληθότως κατατεθεῖσθαι εἰς αὐτὸν, μὴ εἰδότος αὐτοῦ, ἵνα δι’ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν σπαρὲν, καὶ εἰς τὸ 
ὑλικὸν τοῦτο σῶμα, κυοφορηθέν ἐν τούτοις καὶ αὐξηθέν ἕτοιμον γένηται πρὸς ὑποδοχεὴν τοῦ τελείου [λόγου]. 
In Epiphanius’ Greek text there is only …ἕτοιμον γένηται πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ τελείου < Λόγου>. The Latin 
version has perfactae rationis and Tertuallian sermoni perfecto (Adv.Val. 25.2). Cf Unger&Dillon, 
Against the Heresies, 163.  
THE CREATION OF THE FIRST HUMAN BEING: THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF 
GEN. 1:26-27 AND GEN. 2:7 
158 
Demiurge which mediated the spiritual seed to Adam. In Exc. Theod. 53 the 
seed of Sophia was deposited directly into the psychic soul of Adam, without 
mentioning the instrumentality of the breath of the Demiurge, but only the 
angels.447 Although the breath of the Demiurge may be the most logical 
means of the mediation of the seed of Sophia, it is not excluded that it was 
inserted into the soul of Adam during his sleep.448 Be that as it may, in both 
accounts, the soul of Adam finally consisted of hylic, psychic and spiritual 
elements. In the end, the Demiurge clothed Adam with the garments of skin 
(τὸ δερμάτινον χιτῶνα), which was also depicted as a sense perceptible body 
(τὸ αἰσθητὸν σαρκίον).449  
The three essences of Adam were distributed to his descendants, which 
forms the basis for the anthropological division of humankind into hylic, 
psychic and spiritual human beings. Irenaeus mentions this in Iren. Haer. 
1.7.5: “these three natures [of Adam] are no longer found in one person, but 
constitute various kinds [of men].” Irenaeus does not give us any explanation 
why the three essences of the first human were distributed unequally and 
caused the division of all humanity.450 The account in Exc. Theod. 55-56.2 
gives a more detailed description.  It is stated that the higher essences of the 
soul, i.e. the psychic and spiritual elements, were mediated through Adam, 
but not by him. This means that Adam was only an instrumental cause (δι’ 
αὐτοῦ) concerning the psychic and spiritual essences, not an efficient cause 
                                                 
447 Exc. Theod. 53.2-3.  
448 In Exc.Theod. 2.1-2. the Logos implants the male seed (σπέρμα ἀρρενικόν) into the psychic soul 
of Adam while he is sleeping. The term “male seed” does not appear anywhere in Clement’s account 
and it seems to be a sort of combination of the terms τὸ διαφέρον σπέρμα and τὰ ἀρρενικά mentioned in 
Exc.Theod. 21.1-2, which both depict different kinds of seeds by Sophia. Although the name Logos may 
be a variant for Sophia, as in the Tripartite Tractate, Logos is not here a synonym for Sophia, but 
represents besides Sophia, another agent in the creation of Adam. Also, the idea of Sophia as an agent 
of the creation of the material parts of a human being is not mentioned in any other Valentinian 
sources. It is therefore likely that these discrepancies are an outcome of Clement’s careless 
paraphrasing of the source material. It is possible, however, that the idea of Adam’s sleep as a place for 
the implantation of the spiritual seed is authentic. That kind of view is mentioned in the Gospel of 
Philip (70:22-34) in which the soul that was given to Adam through breath was replaced with the spirit 
of the Mother:  “Adam’s soul came from a breath. The soul’s companion is spirit and the spirit given to 
him is his mother. His soul was [taken] from him and replaced with [spirit]. When he was united with 
spirit, [he] uttered words superior to the powers and the powers envied him. They [separated him from 
his] spiritual companion…hidden…bridal chamber…” (Translated by Marvin Meyer in The Nag 
Hammari Library). 
448 In Hippolytus’s account, the Demiurge fashioned bodies out of material essence which can be a 
domicile for the soul or souls and demons or souls and the logoi. The logoi represented the spiritual 
seed which was created by Sophia and Jesus in the Ogdoad. It is not explicitly mentioned when and 
how the logoi were inserted into the material soul-body. 
449 Iren. Haer. 1.5.5; Exc. Theod. 55:1. 
450 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 138. 
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(ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ).451 Only the hylic soul of Adam was capable of mixing with the 
semen of Adam to be mediated to the later generations. The psychic and 
spiritual essences were not mediated by Adam but through him, which 
means that they were only potentially present in the hylic soul of his 
descendants.452  
Valentinian anthropology can be located quite easily in Middle Platonic 
views about different kinds of soul-bodies and the role of the intellect as a 
distinct element of the soul. The hylic soul of Adam (Gen. 2:7) served as an 
instrumental soul-body for the psychic soul (Gen. 1.26), which contained an 
element of the higher essence, i.e. the spiritual seed. The highes part of 
human soul was created by Sophia as an image of the Savior’s angels (Gen. 
1:27) and it is depicted as the marrow of the psychic bone or fetus inside the 
psychic womb, which must be nurtured to gain its perfection.453 The 
distinction between the psychic soul and the spiritual seed parallels the 
Aristotelian theory about “nous in potency” and “nous in action.” The psychic 
soul is only potentially spiritual because it contains the seed of Sophia, which 
is not yet perfectly integrated to its higher self, i.e. the angelic archetype. The 
psychic soul serves as an instrumental body for the spiritual seed:  
For just as the Demiurge moved by Sophia without his knowledge 
thinks that he is self-motioned (αὐτοκίνητος) so also do human beings. 
Therefore, Sophia put forth first the spiritual seed into Adam that the 
bone – the reasonable and heavenly soul – would not be empty but 
full of spiritual marrow.454  
 
The psychic soul is not self-motioned, which resonates with the Aristotelian 
criticism of the Platonic theory of the self-moving soul. As the cosmic 
intellect, i.e. the Demiurge, is put into motion by Sophia, the psychic soul is 
put into motion by the spiritual “marrow” of the soul. It is noteworthy that 
                                                 
451 The “metaphysics of the prepositions” goes back to Aristotle’s definitions of causes which were 
elaborated by Middle Platonic and Stoic teachers. See H. Dörrie, “Präpositionen und Metaphysik: 
Wechselwirkung zweier Prinziepienreihen,” MH 26 (1969), 217-228; Wolfson, Philo I, 261ff; Tobin, 
The Creation of Man, 67-70, Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 171ff, Sterling, “Platonizing Exegetical 
Traditions,” 127-130. 
452 Exc. Theod. 55-56.2 has a parallel in Philo’s Cher. 128. The distribution of the essences of Adam 
to the later generations is investigated in the next chapter in the context of the division of humankind. 
453 Iren. Haer. 1.5.6. 
454 Exc. Theod. 53.4-5. Casey’s translation is misleading. He translates that the spiritual seed is the 
bone, although it is explicitly stated earlier in the text that the psychic soul was the bone of Adam while 
the hylic soul is the flesh. The spiritual element is not the bone, but the “marrow” of the bone. “At first 
Sophia put forth the spiritual seed so that the bone, i.e. the reasonable and divine soul, would not be 
empty but full of spiritual marrow” (…ἵνα ᾖ τὸ ὀστοῦν, ἡ λογικὴ καὶ οὐρανία ψυχή, μὴ κενή ἀλλὰ μυελοῦ 
γέμουσα πνευματικοῦ). Casey also translates the bone in Exc. Theod. 62.3 as though it referred to the 
spiritual nature of Christ, although it evidently says that the spiritual element is inside the bone (τὸ δ’ 
ἐν τῷ ὀστέω). 
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both the psychic soul and its spiritual component are divine. The spiritual 
seed is not an independent entity, but it is breathed into Adam together with 
the psychic soul, and it is also inherited by Adam’s descendants within the 
psychic soul. We can conclude that the implantation of the psychic-spiritual 
element into the hylic soul of Adam’s descendants occurs simultaneously 
with physical procreation through divine providence, although human beings 
are unable by themselves to mediate the divine parts of their souls to later 
generations.455 
Each of the elements of Adam’s soul contains epistemological and 
soteriological significance, which can be comprehended in the light of 
Valentinian protological myth. The fall and salvation of Sophia do not only 
form the origin of the creation of the cosmos but the soteriological paradigm 
for all human beings. The psychic soul-substance has its origin in Sophia’s 
conversion and seeking for the light. This innate movement must be 
perfected through the awakening of the spiritual seed hidden in the psychic 
soul, which transforms the potential intellect into actuality. The hylic soul, on 
the other hand, which served as a body for the psychic soul, has its origin in 
the hylic passions of Sophia after she was exiled into the darkness of 
ignorance. It is irrational and consubstantial with the beasts while the 
psychic soul was luminous and similar to the angels, who rule the planetary 
spheres together with the Demiurge. The psychic soul is not labeled as a 
negative entity, but it is a necessary means to receive the seed of Sophia and 
reach perfection.456  
There was, however, different opinions among the Valentinian teachers 
concerning the degree of the incarnation of the seed of Sophia. In Iren. Haer. 
1.5.5 and Exc. Theod. 50-51 the spiritual seed did not incarnate into the flesh, 
but only into the level of Adam’s psychic soul.457 In Theodotus and the 
                                                 
455 Theodotus says in Exc.Theod. 67.1-3 that the seed of Sophia (Gen. 1:27) was reckoned before the 
foundation of the world, and childbirth lasts until all the spiritual seed has been incarnated in the 
world. In Tri. Trac. 104:18-106:25 the Demiurge and the two ranks of powers created souls of their 
own which are incarnated into the world. Therefore, humankind was divided in the beginning into 
three categories. Some human beings contained the spiritual seed in their soul while some others 
possessed only the psychic and hylic or only the hylic soul.  
456 For the same kind of Aristotelian background of anthropology in the Gnostic Apocryphon of 
John see, Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revisions of Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions 
(Leiden: Brill, 2006), 37-42. 
457 Hipp. Haer. 6.34:3-4 may represent another Valentinian teaching, which differs both from Iren. 
Haer. 1.5.5 and Exc. Theod. 50-51 as well as from Theodotus and the Tripartite Tractate. Hippolytus 
describes how Sophia and the Savior produced seventy logoi “which are heavenly angels who live in the 
Jerusalem above, which is in heaven.” The angels of heaven were not called images, but the offspring of 
Sophia and the Savior, and they have been “set right” (διόρθειν) already before their incarnation. In 
addition, the creation of the first human being is presented solely in the light of Gen. 2:7. The 
Demiurge fashioned bodies from the hylic and “devilish essence” for the souls to be breathed into the 
hylic body by the Demiurge. Dunderberg is of the opinion that the body mentioned in Hippolytus’s 
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Tripartite Tractate, the seed was incarnated fully into the flesh of Adam. 
There was no mediating psychic soul, as in the accounts of Irenaeus and Exc. 
C, which would have served as the soul-body for the spiritual seed. In these 
accounts, the condition of the spiritual seed seed can be compared with the 
condition of the hylic soul in Irenaeus and Exc. C. In Thedotus’s fragments 
the seed of Sophia was depicted as “abortion” (ἔκτρωμα), which had lost its 
rationality completely.458 The different opinions concerning the degree of 
incarnation evidently caused some soteriological differences among these 
Valentinian teachers. In Theodotus and the Tripartite Tractate, the seed 
must be saved from the fleshly existence by the Savior, which means that the 
Savior had to adopt a real body. In Tri. Trac. 113:31-114:22 the Savior was 
not recognized because he was clothed in flesh, and “all the instruments 
necessary for entering into life and with which he descended.”459 In Iren. 
Haer. 1.1-7 and Exc. C, it was the seed itself, which saved the soul as it was 
awakened and integrated to its “second self” through the knowledge. The 
seed of Sophia was a fetus as in a womb and it had capability to receive form 
through gnosis, which means that all human souls contained within 
themself, as copies of Adam’s soul, the needed power to achieve immortality, 
although this gift was not taken in advance by many.  
6.3 The traditions of exegesis concerning the creation 
of Adam in Philo and Valentinian sources 
Philo’s anthropological teachings contain elements from various 
philosophical and exegetical traditions.460 Philo mentions explicitly some 
other interpreters and occasionally criticizes their views. In some cases, Philo 
has modified and refined his interpretations in different texts. The 
anthropology in the Opificio Mundi is apparently different compared with 
the theories attested in his allegorical commentaries. Therefore, there are 
some difficulties in forming a coherent view about Philo's teaching 
concerning the creation of the first human being if all these traditions are put 
together and interpreted as a whole.  
Thomas Tobin has made an attempt to define the pre-Philonic 
philosophical and exegetical traditions which Philo adopted and readjusted 
in order to create his “allegory of the soul.”461 Although Tobin’s method helps 
to form a reasonable picture on the grounds of Philo’s anthropological 
                                                                                                                                          
account depicts the earthly body drawn together from material and diabolic essence because the 
garments of skin as a symbol of the earthly body are not mentioned. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond 
Gnosticism, 141. 
458 Exc. Theod. 68. 
459 Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 52-58.  
460 D. M. Hay, “Philo’s References to Other Allegorists,” in Studia Philonica 6:41-75, 1979-80. 
461 Tobin, The Creation of Man, 20-35.  
THE CREATION OF THE FIRST HUMAN BEING: THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF 
GEN. 1:26-27 AND GEN. 2:7 
162 
teachings, it cannot be used as an absolute guide.462 Philo may have 
intentionally changed his teaching depending on the level of his audience. As 
I have noted earlier in this study, Philo was a proponent of multiple exegesis. 
Therefore, the discrepancies in his writings do not necessarily indicate the 
use of different kinds of preceding traditions. The teachings of the higher 
allegorical level can even conflict with those teachings, which Philo directed 
to a more literal-minded audience. I will, however, use Tobin’s study in my 
research as a working tool to categorize hermeneutical approaches in Philo’s 
works.   
Tobin detects two main theories concerning the creation of the first 
human being in Philo’s writings. These theories are the single creation 
theory and the double creation theory. In the single creation theory the 
biblical narratives Gen. 1:26-27 and Gen. 2:7 describe the creation of a single 
human being philosophically from two different points of views. Gen. 1.26-27 
represents a Platonic view in which the first human being is created 
according to the image of God. Philo stressed, however, that it was not the 
visible body which God created according to the image of God, but the ruling 
part of the soul, namely the rational mind.463 Moreover, the archetype for the 
human mind was not God, but his Logos, which was itself an image of God. 
Therefore, the human mind was “an image of an image.”464  
The other branch of the single creation theory made use of Gen 2:7 and 
presented the creation of Adam in the light of Stoic theories about the 
rational soul as a divine fragment (ἀπόσπασμα). The Stoics maintained that 
the human soul parallels the cosmos as a living being that has ether for its 
ruling part (ἡγεμονικόν).465 Philo could say that God breathed the ethereal 
spirit (αἰθέριον πνεῦμα) into the ruling part of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν), which was 
the divine fragment (ἀπόσπασμα θεῖον).466 Philo was not, however, pleased 
with Stoic materialism, and he modified Stoic anthropology on the grounds 
of Platonic view. For Philo, the human mind is a non-material intellect, 
because it is an image of the cosmic non-material intellect, i.e. the Logos.  
Therefore, Philo says that the human mind is not only a fragment of ether but 
something better, even a radiance (ἀπαύγασμα) of the thrice-blessed nature of 
the Godhead.467  
According to the single creation models Gen. 1:26-27 and Gen. 2:7 could 
be seen as complementary descriptions of the creation of the same human 
being from philosophically different point of views.468 In many cases Philo 
                                                 
462 For criticism of Tobin’s research cf. Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 556-559; On the Creation, 19-
20. 
463 Opif. 69. 
464 Opif. 24-25, Leg. All. 3.95-96, Her. 230-1, Spec. 1.80-1, Spec. 3.83, Spec. 3.207, Q.G. 2.62. 
465 D.L. 7.138-139. 
466 Leg. All. 1.36-40, Leg. All. 3.161, Her. 281-83, Somn. 1.33-34, Spec. 4. 123, Q. G. 2.59. 
467 Spec. 4.123. 
468 Tobin, The Creation of Man, 77. 
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combined these views with each other. This means that it was the image of 
God (Gen. 1:26-27) which was breathed into Adam’s soul, although the image 
was not mentioned in Gen. 2:7.469 The double creation theory was based on 
the fact that Genesis contains two creation narratives of Adam, which was 
easily integrated into a Platonic two-world model. In this model Gen. 1:26-27 
and Gen. 2:7 were no longer compatible descriptions of a single human 
being, but the former was seen as the archetype for the latter.470 The opposed 
characteristics of these “two human beings” can be presented as follows.471  
 
Gen. 1:26-27  Gen. 2:7 
object of thought  object of sense perception 
idea or genus or seal  participating in quality 
incorporeal   composed of body and soul 
neither male nor female472 either man or woman 
by nature immortal  by nature mortal 
 
The relation between these two human beings is not clear. Runia is of the 
opinion that the human being created “according to the image” hardly 
represents an idea of a human being in a strict “Platonic” sense being a 
model for countless earthly human beings. The term seal (σφραγίς) is used 
conventionally as a technical term for the relation of model and copy in the 
Platonic tradition. Runia maintains, however, that Philo’s expression “a kind 
of idea” (ἰδέα τις) implies that Philo did not locate the human being created in 
Gen. 1:26-27 in the realm of Ideas.473 That would have contradicted Philo’s 
hermeneutical oeuvre according to which the Ideas were created during day 
one (Gen. 1:1-5), but the intelligible pattern of the humanity was created 
during the sixth day (Gen. 1:26-27). 
                                                 
469 Opif. 139, Her. 55-57, Det. 80-90, Plant. 13-27, Mut. 223. 
470 Opif. 134-35, Leg. All. 1.31-32, Q.G. 1,4; 8a. 
471 Tobin, The Creation of Man, 109; Runia, On the Creation, 321.  
472 Baer suggests that the most natural interpretation for the expression οὔτʼ ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ in 
Opif. 134 is that the rational soul created after the image of God is asexual and lacks according to Philo 
the characteristics of the sexes. See Richard Baer, Philo’s Use of Categories of Male and Female, 21; 
Tobin, The Creation of Man, 109-110 and Runia, On the Creation, 325.  
473 Runia, On the Creation, 322-323; Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 336-338. Plato did not mention 
in his dialogues the idea of a human being or the idea of the soul. It was rather common, however, 
within Middle Platonic tradition to postulate the idea of a human being within the intelligible cosmos 
(cf. the fragment of Arius Didymus On the Doctrines of Plato attested in Eusebius’s Praep. evang. 
11.23). It is not impossible that Philo could have accepted in his teaching the idea of a human being 
within the intelligible realm. Philo may have expanded the hermeneutical model according to which 
the ideas were created during day one in Gen. 1:1-5. The demarcation between “day one” (Gen. 1:1-5) 
and the days that follow (Gen. 1:5/6) is compensated by a new demarcation in Gen. 2:5/6. This would 
mean that the whole of Gen. 1 describes the creation of the ideal world. Cf. Tobin, The Creation of Man, 
114-119, 125-132 and also Winston, Logos, 29-30. 
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These various pre-Philonic exegetical traditions – the single creation 
theory and the double creation theory − could not be easily harmonized with 
each other. Philo did not solve the discrepancies within previous exegetical 
traditions by modifying them in a strictly literal manner, but by creating 
above them a higher allegorical level in which the conflicts could be solved. In 
this model, the heavenly man, who was born as an image of the Logos, was not 
an archetype of the earthly soul in a strict Platonic sense, but he became an 
ethical goal for the earthly mind or the personification of the virtuous soul.474 
Strikingly, the Valentinian accounts in Iren. Haer. 1.5.5 and Exc. Theod. 50-
51 contain the closest parallels in those sections which are related to Philo’s 
exegetical working on the grounds of preceding exegetical traditions 
concerning the creation of the first human being.  
6.3.1 The creation of earthly mind and the garments of skin 
Philo made some hermeneutical innovations to combine the preceding 
allegorical traditions of the creation of Adam with his allegorical framework. 
Firstly, he distinguished Gen. 1:27 and Gen. 1:26 from each other. This is 
attested in Fug. 71-72. 
Wherefore also, while in the former case the expression used was “let 
us make man,” as though more than one were to do it, there is used 
afterward an expression pointing of One, “God made the man.” For 
the real man, who is absolutely pure Mind, One, even the only God, is 
the Maker; but a plurality of makers produce man so-called, one that 
has an admixture of sense-perception. That is why he who is the man 
in the special sense is mentioned with an article. The words run “God 
made the man,” that invisible reasoning faculty free from the 
admixture. The other has no article added; for the words “let us make 
man” point to him in whom an irrational and rational nature are 
woven together.  
 
Philo remarks that Gen. 1:27 is mentioned with an article (ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον), whereas the human being mentioned in Gen. 1:26 does not have 
an article (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον). This gave room for an allegorical view that 
they did not describe the same beings, but two distinct beings. The former 
was created as an image of God and identified with the heavenly man, 
whereas the latter refers to the earthly human being, who was a mixture of 
rational and irrational faculties. Secondly, Philo combined Gen. 1:26 and 
Gen. 2:7 with each other as complementary descriptions of the creation of the 
earthly mind. It was not the creation of the body, but the creation of the 
earthly mind that was a mixture of rational and irrational impulses. The 
physical body was not made until Adam was clothed with the garments of 
                                                 
474For Philo’s allegory of th soul, cf. Leg. All. 1.42, 53-55, 88-96, Plant. 44-46, Q. G. 1.8b, Conf. 41, 
62-63, 146. 
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skin in Gen. 3:21. The creation of the heavenly man and of the earthly mind is 
attested in Leg. All. 1.31-32: 
“And God formed the man by taking clay from the earth and breathed 
into his face a breath of life and the man became a living soul” There 
are two races of men; the one a heavenly man, the other an earthly. 
The heavenly man being made after the image of God is altogether 
without any participation with corruptible and earthlike essence; but 
the earthly one was made of matter scattered here and there, which 
he calls clay. For this reason, he says that the heavenly man was not 
molded, but was stamped with the image of God; while the earthly is 
molded work of the Artificer, but not His offspring. We must account 
the man made out of earth to be “mind” mingling with, but not yet 
blended with the body. But his earthlike mind is in reality also 
corruptible, were not God to breathe into it a power of real life; when 
he does so, it does not any more undergo molding, but becomes a 
soul, not an inefficient and imperfectly formed soul, but one endowed 
with mind and actually alive; for he says “man became living soul.”  
 
Philo distinguished the heavenly man from the human being created in Gen. 
1:26. The heavenly man (ὁ οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος) does not participate with any 
corruptible essence, whereas the human being created in Gen. 1.26 was a 
mixture of rational and irrational impulses. In addition, Philo says that the 
earthly man in Gen. 2:7 does not refer to the earthly body, but to the earthly 
mind (νοῦς γεώδης), which God created out of dispersed matter (ὁ δὲ γήϊνος ἐκ 
σποράδος ὕλης). It is supposed to be infused into the body, although it is not 
yet infused (νοῦν εἰσκρινόμενον σώματι, οὔπω δʼ εἰσκεκριμένον).  
Tobin suggests, however, that the mind in question refers to a composite 
of the soul and the body. This would mean that the mind is blended with the 
body, but is not yet absolutely blended.475 It is notable that the term 
εἰσκρινεῖν appears three times in Philo’s texts. In all cases, Philo uses it in 
describing the incarnation of the soul. In addition to Leg. All. 1.32, it is used 
in Plant. 14 and Somn. 1.31. In both cases, the context of the term depicts the 
mixing of the pre-existent soul and the body. In Somn. 1.31 Philo describes 
the cooling process of the soul when it is mixed with the body. In Plant. 14 
Philo speaks about incorporeal souls in the air that are infused into the 
mortal bodies and will come back after some period. It is evident that the 
mind in Leg. All. 1.31-32 refers also to the earthly mind, which does not have 
a fleshly body yet. It was not given to Adam until he was clothed with the 
garments of skin.  
Thus, Philo fused Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7 as complementary descriptions 
of the creation of the earthly soul of Adam, which is a mixture of rational and 
irrational impulses. Therefore, God could not create the human soul in Gen. 
1:26 directly, but only through his assistants. Evidently, Philo followed 
                                                 
475 Tobin, The Creation of Man, 111.        
THE CREATION OF THE FIRST HUMAN BEING: THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF 
GEN. 1:26-27 AND GEN. 2:7 
166 
Plato’s description in the Timaeus in which the creation of the irrational soul 
and the mortal parts of a human being was left for the “younger gods.” Philo 
says that the assistants were needed because it was not suitable for God’s 
goodness to create by himself a human mind which is dominated by morally 
vicious irrational impulses. However, Philo’s explanation of the co-creators is 
not found in Plato.476 These Philonic innovations parallel the Valentinian 
accounts, which describe the creation of the hylic-psychic soul of Adam in the 
light of the combination of Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7. It was not the physical 
body of Adam, which the Demiurge created in Gen. 2:7, but his fine-material 
soul-body.  
Exc. Theod. 50 
Taking dust from the earth: not of the dry earth but a portion of 
matter varied constitution and color, he fashioned a soul, earthly and 
material, irrational and consubstantial with that of the beasts. 
”Λαβὼν χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς,” —οὐ τῆς ξηρᾶς, ἀλλὰ τῆς πολυμεροῦς καὶ 
ποικίλης ὕλης μέρος, —ψυχὴν γεώδη καὶ ὑλικὴν ἐτεκτήνατο ἄλογον καὶ τῇ 
τῶν θηρίων ὁμοούσιον. 
 
 
 
                                                 
476 Opif. 69-70. Philo says that Moses is speaking philosophically (ἐφιλοσόφει) in Gen. 1:26. It is 
rather likely that Philo had specifically in mind the cosmic myth described in Plato’s Timaeus. The 
plurality of the creators in Gen. 1:26 can be easily combined with Plato’s “younger gods” to whom the 
Demiurge delegated the task of creating the irrational soul and the material body. The “conversation 
with his powers” (διαλέγεται μὲν οὖν ὁ τῶν ὅλων πατὴρ ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεσιν) parallels Plato’s statement 
about the “speech” of the Demiurge to the younger gods. In his speech, the Demiurge delegates the task 
of creation of all the mortal genera, including the body and the irrational part of the human soul, to his 
assistants. In Philo’s account the motif of imitation of God’s skill (μιμουμέναις τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην) by the 
assistants of God comes from Plato’s cosmic myth where the “younger gods” imitated the Demiurge’s 
power in their creation (μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν). Philo’s teaching differs, 
however, from Plato’s cosmological myth. Firstly, in Plato’s system the creator God delegates a large 
part of the creative task to the “created gods” who create not only the irrational soul but all the mortal 
genera. In Philo, the powers have only a marginal role in the creation of the mortal part of the soul. 
God created the human body without any assistance. Secondly, the reason for making use of powers 
was according to Philo the fact that God cannot be the creator of the human soul, which can choose 
evil. God is according to Philo the source of good alone. In Plato’s cosmic myth there was no moral 
reasoning for the use of assistants of the creator. Thirdly, Philo maintained that the soul that was 
created by the powers of God contained both rational and irrational faculties, not only irrational ones 
as in Plato. Fourthly, the conception of the “powers” as co-creators of God is not explicitly mentioned 
by Plato. However, this can be deduced rather easily from Plato’s text in the Timaeus, which says the 
younger gods imitated the power of the Demiurge.  
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Iren. Haer. 1.5.5 
Having thus formed the world, he also created the earthly [part of] 
man, not taking him from this dry earth, but from an invisible 
substance consisting of fusible and fluid matter. 
Δημιουργήσαντα δὴ τὸν κόσμον, πεποιηκέναι καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν χοϊκόν· 
οὐκ ἀπὸ ταύτης δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς γῆς, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀοράτου οὐσίας, ἀπὸ τοῦ 
κεχυμένου καὶ ῥευστοῦ τῆς ὕλης λαβόντα· 
 
The term “earthly soul” (ψυχὴν γεώδη) attested in Exc. Theod. 50 parallels 
Philo’s earthly nous (νοῦς γεώδη), which was created from “dispersed matter” 
(σποράδος ὕλη). The term σποράς refers to “confusion” and “disorder.” Matter 
out of which the “earthly mind” was created was in a stage of confusion. In 
the conventional Platonic view, matter was in confusion before the cosmic 
elements were separated out of it by the Demiurge. This also parallels with 
Valentinian accounts which maintain that matter out of which the material 
soul was created was in a fusible stage. In Philo and Valentinian sources, 
Adam did not have a corporeal body until the female part of his soul was 
separated out of him and he was clothed with the garments of skin (Gen. 
3:21).477 The allegory of the “garment of skin” is mentioned by Philo in QG 
1.53: 
Accordingly, the tunics of skin, if we judge truly, are to be considered 
a more precious possession than varicolored sides and purple stuff. 
So much, then, for the literal meaning. But according to the deeper 
meaning the tunic of skin is the natural skin of the body. For, when 
God formed the first mind, He called it Adam; then he formed the 
sense, which he called Life; in the third place, of necessity He made 
his body also, calling is symbolically a tunic of skin, for it was proper 
that the mind and sense should be clothed in the body as in a tunic of 
skin, in order that His handiwork might first appear worthy of the 
divine power.  
 
The garment (χιτών) refers according to Philo to the “physical skin of the 
body.” The same allegory is attested in the Valentinian accounts of Clement 
and Irenaeus. The leather garment is mentioned in Exc. Theod. 55.1 in the 
list of categories of humans, i.e. the spirituals, psychics, and hylics. In 
addition to these, there is the fourth element of human beings, i.e. the 
garments of skin, which refers to the earthly body. In Irenaeus’s account, the 
garment of skin is mentioned at the end of the description of the creation of 
the first human being, which depicts the visible body.  
 
                                                 
477 Leather as a synonym for the body is attested in Leg. All. 3.69 (”a leather mass which covers us 
namely the body”), Post. 137 (”a leather bag of reasons that is to say the body”). 
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Exc. Theod. 55.1  
 
Τοῖς τρισὶν ἀσωμάτοις ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ 
τέταρτον πενδύεται ὁ χοϊκός, τοὺς 
“δερματίνους χιτῶνας”. 
Iren. Haer. 1.5.5 
 
Ὕστερον δὲ περιτεθεῖσθαι λέγουσιν 
αὐτῷ τὸν δερμάτινον χιτῶνα· τοῦτο δὲ 
τὸ αἰσθητὸν σαρκίον εἶναι λέγουσι. 
 
The allegory of the garments of skin as a reference to the corporeal body is 
also attested in Hipp. Ref. 10.13.4 as a saying from Valentinus, although the 
authenticity of the saying is not sure: “He [Valentinus] supposes that flesh 
will not be saved and calls it ‘the garment of skin’ and ‘the corrupt human 
being.” Also, Origen knew the same allegory, and it is mentioned in some 
rabbinic sources as well.478 It is rather likely that Origen got to know the 
allegory of the garment of skin from Philo’s writings, and there is no reason 
to suggest that the Valentinian teachers would have any other source for their 
teaching.  
It is notable that in Philo the separation of the sexes, i.e. the separation of 
the mind and the sense perceptions, was not the reason for the embodiment 
of the soul, but Adam’s assimilation with the irrational soul, i.e. Eve. The 
embodiment was not the fall but the result or punishment of the fall of the 
rational soul. The return to pre-lapsarian unity was the reverse of the 
embodiment when the mind stops following the fleshly passions. This 
general framework parallels Valentinian anthropology in that the salvation 
was not seen as a return to the pre-lapsarian bodily existence but as a return 
to the pre-lapsarian non-bodily existence. The human soul was not saved in 
the body but from the body, when the rational soul is integrated to its 
heavenly counterpart.   
6.3.2 The heavenly man and the allegory of the soul in Philo 
Philo of Alexandria is the first ancient author who mentioned the heavenly 
man (ὁ οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος) as an archetypical human being. It is not likely, 
however, that Philo would have invented the idea of the heavenly man, but 
got to know this teaching from the preceding Hellenistic Jewish tradition.479 
In Philo’s writings both the heavenly man and the Logos were located within 
the intelligible cosmos as paradigms for the earthly mind and both of them 
                                                 
478 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 66-67, note 62. 
479 The Jewish heavenly man -tradition had its basis in the mystical speculations of the throne 
vision in Ezek. 1:26, 28 according to which on the heavenly throne sat a figure “like that of a man” 
(εἶδος ἀντθρώπου) representing the likeness of the glory of the LORD. This led to a belief by some Jews 
of the anthropomorphic second power in heaven. See Ian K. Smith, Heavenly Perspective: A Study of 
the Apostle Paul’s Response to a Jewish Mystical Movement at Colossae (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 
42-47. For the Jewish Merkabah-tradition see Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1995). 
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were not made, but born.480 This created some tension concerning the status 
of the heavenly man alongside of the Logos. The heavenly man was born as 
an image of the Logos, which means that also the Logos was “the archetypical 
man,” as explicitly stated in Conf. 146: 
But if there be any as yet unfit to be called a son of God, let him press 
to take his place under the First-Born Logos, who holds the eldership 
among the angels, their ruler as it were. And many names are his, for 
he is called “Beginning,” and the Name of God and his Logos, and the 
Man after his image and “he that sees,” that is Israel. 
 
Philo says that it was the Logos of God who is the “man” according to the 
image of God. He is also called “God’s man,” and the “Logos of the eternal 
God.”481 Therefore, the image of the Logos is also “man,” because the 
archetypical pattern, i.e. the Logos, was the “man” as well. Philo maintains, 
however, that the heavenly man was not a paradigm or archetype for the 
earthly soul, but “anagogic, that is, the guiding divine power by which the 
human mind is enabled to ascend toward God.” 482 The heavenly man himself 
remains undescended, and the soul of Adam contains only a fragrance of him 
through the breath of God, which connects the earthly mind to the heavenly 
yearning of the Logos. As the heavenly man desires and imitates his model, 
i.e. the Logos, this desiring becomes an ethical paradigm for the earthly 
mind.483 Thus, the innate desire for the heavenly model, i.e. the Logos, was 
mediated to Adam’s soul through the breath of God (Gen. 2:7). Philo says, 
however, that the spirit of God was not “air in motion but a certain 
impression and character of divine power, which Moses calls by an 
appropriate name image.” Philo made, however, a distinction between the 
spirit and the breath. While the heavenly man participated in the spirit 
perfectly, the earthly mind participated only as a breeze of the spirit or 
fragrance of the divinity.484 This distinction would imply that the image of 
                                                 
480 Philo says in Leg. All. 2.4 (cf. Leg. All. 1.31-32 above) that there are two races of men: one born 
according to an image and the other created out of earth (δύο γὰρ ἀνθρώπων γένη, τότε κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα 
γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ πεπλασμένον ἐκ γῆς). 
481 Conf. 40-41.  
482 Tobin, The Creation of Man, 141. Tobin maintains that Philo identified the heavenly man with 
the Logos. In my opinion the passages referred to by Tobin do not confirm this interpretation (cf. Conf. 
40-41, 62-63, 146-147). I suggest that the heavenly man and the Logos were two distinct beings. The 
fact that Philo also calls the Logos “man” does not mean that the Logos and the heavenly man are 
identical, but the former was an image of the latter. It is notable that in Leg. All. 1.43 Philo also 
associates Wisdom with the heavenly man. For Tobin’s argument, cf. Tobin, The Creation of Man, 102-
108, 118-119, 139-142. Dillon notices similarities between Philo’s heavenly man and the “essential man” 
in the Hermetic Tradition in Poimandres, 12-15. Cf. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 174-176.  
483 Tobin, The Creation of Man, 118-119. 
484 The metaphor of fragrance as a representation of spiritual presence is also found in Tri.Trac. 
71.35-72, which describes how the Spirit of the Father is breathed through the members of the 
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the heavenly man was not mediated through the rational spirit to Adam in its 
entirety, but it was present in the soul of Adam, and his descendants as well, 
only potentially to be perfected through learning and practice.485 
These exegetical innovations formed the basis for Philo’s allegory of the 
soul. The heavenly man, who was born as an image of the Logos, was not an 
archetype of the earthly soul in a strict Platonic sense, but he became an 
ethical goal for the earthly mind or the personification of the virtuous soul. 
Philo formulates the allegory of the soul in Leg. All. 53-55, Q.G. 1.8 and 
Plant. 44-46. In these passages, he distinguishes the human being who was 
placed in the garden to guard it (Gen. 2:15) from the one who was only placed 
in the garden (Gen. 2:8). The former was identified with the human being 
according to the image (Gen. 1:27), who “is in need of nothing, but is self-
hearing and self-taught and self-instructed.”  The latter was identified with 
the “molded mind” (ὁ πλαστὸς νοῦς), the “earthly and perishable mind” (ὁ 
γήνικος καὶ φθαρτὸς νοῦς) and the middle mind (ὁ μέσος νοῦς). He is 
progressing to become the human being according to the image, who is the 
real cultivator of the trees of wisdom in Paradise.486  
6.3.3 The heavenly man and the free speech of Adam in Valentinian 
sources 
The Valentinian accounts investigated above do not explicitly mention the 
heavenly man as an archetype for the mind of the earthly Adam. The 
Valentinian accounts mention the angels of the Savior as archetypes for the 
spiritual part of the human soul. There is, however, one fragment from 
Valentinus in which the figure of the pre-existent man appears in the context 
of creation of Adam by the angels. Clement of Alexandria has preserved this 
passage in Strom. II 36.2-4.487  
                                                                                                                                          
Pleroma. The fragrance of the Spirit gave an innate inclination for searching the source of the 
fragrance. The Father revealed himself through the spirit and presented himself as something to be 
reflected upon and sought after, but he did not want the aeons to know him perfectly. Fragrance as a 
metaphor for the children of the Father is also attested in the Gospel of Truth. 1.3.34. (cf. Dunderberg, 
“The Stoic Tradition,” 224). In 2. Cor. 2:14-16 Paul also used the metaphor of fragrance denoting the 
spiritual essence of the believers.  
485 Det. 83; Leg. All. 1.42. 
486 In Somn. 1.150 Philo compares the person who practices virtue with the person who goes up 
and down on a ladder. The wise are continually going upwards even though they may sometimes fall, 
but the wicked will receive their share in Hades “having been from their infancy to their old age 
familiarized with destruction.” The soteriological issues are handled in the next chapter. 
487 Clement says that the fragment is a direct quotation from Valentinus’s letter. Thomassen 
suggests that Valentinus is possibly referring to an already existing and well-known narrative or he 
may have explained the story earlier in the letter.  Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 431. 
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And just as in the presence of that modelled figure fear fell on the 
angels when it emitted sounds that surpassed its modelling, because 
of the one who had invisibly deposited in it a seed of the substance 
above and openly spoke, thus also among the generations of cosmic 
humans the works of humans become objects of fear for those who 
make them, as in the case of statues, images and everything that have 
been fashioned in the name of God. For having been modeled in the 
name of the Man, Adam caused fear of the pre-existent Man, since he 
in fact was present in him. So they were terrified and quickly did 
away with their work.488  
 
The biblical context of this teaching is evidently Gen. 2:7 which describes the 
creation of a human being out of earth. Neither the plurality of the creators 
nor of angels is mentioned in this passage. This implies that Gen. 2:7 is 
connected to the creation narrative of Gen. 1:26, where the plurality of the 
creators (“Let us create….”) appears.489 It seems, thus, that Valentinus’s 
teaching parallels with the teaching attested in Exc. Theod. 50-51 and Iren. 
Haer. 1.5.5, which connects Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7 as complementary 
descriptions of the creation of the earthly soul.490 There are, however, some 
elements in Valentinus’s fragment that distinguish it from these accounts. 
Firstly, Valentinus does not mention the Demiurge as the creator of Adam, 
but the angels alone. Secondly, the generation of the seed of the higher 
essence is not mentioned, and it is not told, how the seed was inserted into 
the soul of Adam and who was in charge of the implantation of the seed.491 
                                                 
488 Translated by Einar Thomassen in The Spritual Seed, 430-431 with slight modifications. 
489 In the accounts of Clement and Irenaeus, the co-creators of the Demiurge are not explicitly 
mentioned. In Irenaeus’s version, the Demiurge is called the Hebdomad, which refers to the ruler of 
the seven heavens, also depicted as angels (Iren. Haer. 1.5.2; Hipp. Haer. 6.32.7.) It is, then, possible 
that the Demiurge created the human hylic-psychic soul of Adam together with his planetary powers. 
In Exc. C the angels are mentioned as mediators of the psychic essence, but not its creators. In the 
Tripartite Tractate (105-106) the two ranks of powers, the ones on the right and the ones on the left, 
created the soul of Adam together with the Demiurge, but it was the Logos who breathed life into the 
soul. In addition to Adam, who possessed all soul-elements within himself, the Demiurge created 
human beings of his own as well as those on the left according to imitation, which may refer to the 
motif of “imitation” of the younger gods in Plato’s Timaeus. 
490 It is not clear what Valentinus meant by saying that the angels “did away” their work (τὸ ἔργον 
ἠφάνισν). The most probable interpretation would be that the angels sent their psychic protoplast into 
the lowest region of matter, which means that Adam was clothed with a body made out of elements of 
the world. This parallels not only the Valentinian accounts of Irenaeus and Clement but the 
corresponding creation account in the Sethian Apocryphon of John.   
491 Although the context of Valentinus’s fragment is evidently Gen. 2:7, the breath of the Demiurge 
is not mentioned. The seed is inserted in Adam’s soul by the male agent, which quite likely refers to the 
pre-existent man himself. Thomassen suggests that Valentinus’s fragment parallels Exc.Theod. 2-3 
according to which a male figure – not Sophia – is the one who deposits the seed into Adam’s soul. Cf. 
Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 434-435, especially note 18.  
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Thirdly, in the later Valentinian tradition, the motifs of fear, envy or any 
hostile reaction toward Adam by the Demiurge or his co-creators faded away 
as well as the role of the angels in the formation of Adam’s earthly soul-
body.492  
Valentinus’s fragment can be interpreted according to the double creation 
model attested in the writing of Philo. Although the angels were unable to 
create the copy of the pre-existent man, their task was perfected by the man 
himself, who deposited the seed of the higher essence in angel’s protoplast. 
In Philo’s double creation theory, the comparison is made between two 
categories of human beings (διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη): the heavenly man (ὁ 
οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος) that is not made (οὐ πεπλάσθαι), and the earthly man (ὁ 
γήινος). The latter is a protoplast which is not born but is instead created by 
the maker (τὸ πλάσμα, ἀλλ' οὐ γέννημα, εἶναι τοῦ τεχνίτου).  In Valentinus’s 
fragment, the comparison is made between the human being that is made in 
the name of “man” (ὄνομα ἀνθρώπου πλασθείς) and the pre-existent man 
(προόντος ἄνθρωπος) who has his existence in Adam through the seed of 
higher essence (σπέρμα τῆς ἄνωθεν οὐσίας).493 
Although Valentinus’s fragment lacks most of the characteristics of the 
Valentinian anthropological accounts in Iren. Haer. 1.1-7 and Exc. C, it is, 
however, compatible with them. It is rather easy to notice that the pre-
existent man in Valentinus’s fragment parallels the Savior and his angels, 
which served as archetypes for the seed of Sophia. The Savior himself was an 
offspring of the Pleroma and he can be considered together with his angels as 
                                                 
492 The expression “to model in the name of man” does not refer to creation according to the image 
of man, but to make something in honor of somebody. Whereas works and statues are made in the 
honor of God, the angels made the protoplast in honor of the pre-existent man. This would mean that 
the angels knew the existence of the pre-existent man, but they were not aware of his spiritual 
substance as the pre-existent man revealed himself in the angels’ creation. The modeling of the 
protoplast and the depositing of the seed of the higher essence was actualized simultaneously. 
Although Valentinus compares the idols and their makers, it is not likely that he would have meant that 
the cult statues contain spiritual power. Valentinus’s intention was to show that the objects of the 
statues are higher than those who made them. Therefore, an awe can be felt before them, not because 
of the statues themselves, but because of the gods they represent. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 
48; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 435-436. 
493 According to Schenke’s analysis, the Gnostic texts can be divided into two groups in terms of the 
conception of the Primal Anthropos. In some texts God is regarded as Primal Anthropos and the 
earthly human beings are fashioned as copies of it. In some other texts there is in addition to these 
figures the “second” Primal Anthropos that serves as an archetype for the earthly anthropoi. H-M 
Schenke, Der Gott “Mensch” in der Gnosis, 23 and the discussion in Tobin, The Creation of Man, 102-
108. For the Jewish origin of the idea of Primal Anthropos, cf. C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1934), 146; R. McL. Wilson, “The Early History of the Exegesis of 
Gen. 1:26,” Studia Patristica I (eds. K. Alan and F. L. Cross; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1957) 420-437. 
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an image of the aeon “man-ecclesia.”494 The Savior and his angels 
represented collectively the “archetypical man” who served as an archetype 
for Sophia’s emanation. The aeon “man-ecclesia” represented the whole 
Pleroma, which dwelled in the Savior as he descended to the suffering 
Sophia. It can be said that the Pleroma is a multiple entity, which manifests 
itself simultaneously as one and many and in some Valentinian systems the 
Pleroma is depicted simply as Man.495 In Irenaeus’s account the spiritual 
seed is called an “inner man” and an “image of the ecclesia above” and it can 
be equated with the seed of the higher essence in Valentinus’s fragment. 
The patterns of interpretation in these Valentinian accounts parallel 
Philo, who considered the heavenly man as an image of the Logos, which is 
also depicted as Man. In the Valentinian system, the Savior and his angels 
can be equated with Philo’s heavenly man, and the aeon “man-ecclesia” with 
the Logos. As in Philo, the presence of the heavenly man, i.e. the Savior and 
his angels, was mediated to Adam’s soul through the breath of the Demiurge. 
In Philo’s system, the breath of God mediates the fragrance of the spirit, 
which means that the image of the heavenly man was only partially present 
in Adam’s soul. This parallels the Valentinian model according to which the 
breath of the Demiurge mediates only an image of the heavenly man, i.e the 
spiritual seed, which must be perfected through knowledge. Both in Philo 
and Valentinian sources, the archetypical identities, i.e. the heavenly man 
and the angels of the Savior, were undescended but remained in the heavenly 
realm as higher identities for the earthly minds.  
In addition to the affinities with the Jewish heavenly man –traditions, 
Valentinus’s fragment parallels the creation of Adam in the Sethian 
Apocryphon of John.496 It is rather likely that both Valentinus and the author 
of the Apocryphon of John made use of a similar kind of Jewish exegetical 
tradition which taught that Adam was spiritually superior to the angels that 
fashioned his body.497 There are, however, noticeable differences about the 
                                                 
494 Exc. Theod. 43.2-5; Iren. Haer. 1.2.6. The joint fruit of Pleroma is Jesus, but he is also called the 
Savior, the Christ, the Logos and the All. In Tri. Trac. 66.10-12 the Savior is the image of the Father 
and the whole.  
495 Iren. Haer. 1.4.5; 1.5.6. Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 437-442. 
496 A similar kind of account concerning Adam’s creation is found in the Gospel of Philip 70:22-30. 
In both Ap.John and Gos.Phil. the creator angels became envious of Adam. In Ap.John, the reason for 
envy was Adam’s intelligence, whereas in Gos.Phil. the reason was the fact that Adam’s words were 
superior to their powers. In both cases, it was not Adam’s frank speech as such which created fear, but 
the intelligence or intellectual nature of his speak which caused envy. It is quite likely that these motifs 
circulated in the Hellenistic Jewish exegetical tradition, which were taken over both Gnostic and 
Valentinian groups without literal dependency. The motif of the fear of the angels in the creation of 
Adam is also attested in Orig.World II 115:11-30. The reason for fear was not, however, Adam’s 
intelligence or his speech, but his ability to move. Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 445-447.   
497 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnoticism, 51-52; Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 450-451. It is highly 
unlikely that the Apocryphon of John would have been dependent on Valentinus. There are some 
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reason for the angels’ malevolent acts in Valentinus’s fragment and the 
Apocryphon of John. In Valentinus’s fragment, the angels feared Adam, 
while in the Sethian narrative they were jealous. Furthermore, in the 
Apocryphon of John the jealousy was caused by Adam’s better 
understanding, while Valentinus maintained that it was Adam’s “free 
speaking” that caused the fear of angels.498  
Ismo Dunderberg has pointed out that the differences between Valentinus 
and Sethian mythology can be explained as Valentinus’s modifications that 
go back to the vindication of the righteous in the Book of Wisdom (5:1-2). 
The righteous people speak boldly in the presence of those who suppress 
them, which parallels the idea of frank speech in Valentinus’s fragment.499 
There is not, however, a notion of frank speech in front of suppressors as in 
the Book of Wisdom, but it is the frank speech itself that caused the fear and 
suppression of Adam.  
The motif of parrhesia is also frequently mentioned in Philo’s writings. In 
Philo, frank speech is a divine virtue that belongs to God (Sac. 66), whose 
“words can outstrip and overtake everything,” but it also characterizes a 
virtuous soul who is “filled with the graces of God” (Ebr. 150). Philo 
maintained, however, that frank speech is not so much about speaking boldly 
in front of enemies but speaking freely among friends of God. (Her. 6, 21, 
24). Philo says that it is not wise to speak boldly or arrogantly in front of 
suppressors. It is wise to be silent in front of enemies (Somn. 2. 83-85, 92). 
Philo maintains that it is the lack of fear that made Abraham capable of free 
speech when he asked boldly from God: “what do you give to me” (Gen. 15:1-
2).  Noble souls possess something authoritative within them, which is not 
obscured even before those who are high in rank. Philo mentions Calanus, a 
gymnosophist, and Choereas, a zealous follower of Diogenes the cynic, as 
examples of freedom of speech and human equality (Prob. 95, 125-126).  
It is possible that Valentinus elaborated the Gnostic creation narratives in 
the light of the Hellenistic Jewish Wisdom theology attested in the Book of 
Wisdom and Philo’s writings. However, Valentinus might have known a 
somewhat different kind of Gnostic myth, which predated the Sethian 
version of it in the Apocryphon of John and related texts. In particular 
Valentinus expounded the motif of the fear of the creator angels, which the 
“free speech” of Adam caused. The parrhesia of Adam caused fear among the 
creator angels because they were not equal to the pre-existent human, who 
                                                                                                                                          
striking conflicting themes and motifs in Valentinus’s fragment and Arocryphon of John, which make 
their literal dependency unlikely. Cf. Logan, Gnostic Truth and Christian Heresy, 55.  
498 Dundeberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 49-52. It is not clear who was the agent of the “free speaking”. 
The two possibilities are the seed and the one who was charged with the implantation of the seed. 
Thomassen suggests that the latter option is the most probable (cf. Thomassen, The Spritual Seed, 
443). I would suggest that the former view is more likely: the agent of free speaking was the molded 
human being, who possessed higher authority as a result of his spiritual essence.  
499 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 50. 
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was present in Adam and who could speak as freely with God as if he were 
with friends. Adam’s speech was not directed to the creator angels, but he 
talked friendly with the highest God which caused fear among the angels. 
Free speech was a mark of divine virtue and co-substantiality with the 
supreme God who was present in Adam’s soul. This kind of free speech 
revealed the inferior rank of the angels and caused fear. They were fearful 
before God, but at the same time they were jealous of Adam, who possessed 
the seed of higher essence in his soul.  
6.4 Valentinus’s psalm Harvest and its intellectual 
background 
There is still one further fragment from Valentinus which should be handled 
in an anthropological context and which indicate the use of Hellenistic 
Jewish exegetical traditions. It is the fragment called Harvest, which was 
composed by Valentinus and is in Hipp. Ref. VI 37:7.500    
Θέρος 
πάντα κρεμάμενα πνεύματι βλεπω, πάντα δ’ ὀχούμενα πνεύματι νοῶ· σάρκα 
μὲν ἐκ ψυχῆς κρεμαμένην, ψυχὴν δ’ ἀέρος ἐξεχομένην, ἀἐρα δ’ ἐξ αἴθρης 
κρεμάμενον· ἐκ δὲ βυθοῦ καρποὺς φερομένους, ἐκ μήτρας δὲ βρέφος 
φερόμενον 
Harvest 
All things hanging in Spirit I see. All things carried in Spirit I know. 
Flesh from soul hanging. Soul from air proceeding. Air from ether 
hanging. Fruit borne from the deep. Child borne from the womb. 
 
As a literary work, the composition of the psalm reflects artistic skill and the 
conventions of Greek meter.501 The consensus is that the psalm itself is an 
authentic literary work of Valentinus. According to patristic evidence, 
Valentinus wrote psalms and the author of the Canon Muratori mentions 
                                                 
500 The translation of Valentinus’s psalm is taken from Andrew McGowan, “Valentinus Poeta: 
Notes on ΘΕΡΟΣ,” VC 51 (1997), 159. 
501McGowan has pointed out that the “mouse-tailed” verses indicate a somewhat inspirational 
intensity or, at least, a certain spontaneity. It is possible that the psalm was an outcome of prophetic 
inspiration experienced within communal service or composed to be used in that kind of context.  
(McGowan, “Valentinus Poeta,” 159). The spirit mentioned in the opening two lines must be 
interpreted as an instrumental dative, but it is not clear whether it depicts the bond described in lines 
3-5 or a mode of “seeing” and “understanding” in lines 1-2.  I suggest that the former alternative is 
more credible. The author of the psalm describes how things are (“I see all things are carried 
in/through spirit”), not the way he sees them (“I see in spirit”). Layton interprets the sentence 
according to the latter option: “I see in spirit…I know in spirit.” Cf. Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 246-8. 
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Valentinus’s psalm book, which was banned from the list of canonical 
Scriptures.502 It is not clear, however, whether the commentary that follows 
the psalm comes from Valentinus. It may come from the followers of 
Valentinus or from Hippolytus himself.503 In the commentary the “growing of 
the fruits” and “generation of a child” depict allegorically the generation 
within transcendent reality. Valentinus’s psalm would parallel the Tripartite 
Tractate in which the themes of “womb,” “fruits” and a “child” are used as 
metaphorical descriptions of the generation of the aeons of the Pleroma.504 I 
suggest, however, that the main message of the psalm is fundamentally 
anthropological. Rather than describing the generation of the aeons within 
the transcendental level, Valentinus’s psalm describes the condition of the 
human soul which is associated with the structure of the cosmos.505 The 
closest parallels with Valentinus’s psalm are Philo’s allegories of the Temple 
and the High Priest in which the human soul is seen as a microcosmic 
representation of the cosmos. As the cosmos is harmoniously bound together 
through the Logos, at an anthropological level the same function has been 
                                                 
502 Thomassen, “Going to Church with the Valentinians,” 185-186.  
503 Einar Thomassen suggests that it is difficult to believe that Valentinus or anyone within his 
school could have confused the immaterial Pleroma with the ether as is the case in the commentary 
that follows Valentinus’s psalm (cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 480, note 124). Dunderberg does 
not rule out the possibility that someone within the school of Valentinus may have written the 
commentary that follows the psalm. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 62-63; McGowan, 
“Valentinus Poeta,” 166-167. 
504 The expression ἐκ δέ at the beginning of lines 6-7 indicates that they are contrasted with the 
preceding text (cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 484-485). Also, the change of the term κρεμαννύναι 
to φέρειν implies that there is an ontological difference how the certain elements depended on each 
other.  While the flesh and air were both “hanging” from the “higher” elements and the spirit carries all 
the elements, the fruits from the depth and a child from the womb were “brought forth” as a process of 
generation. McGowan suggests that the verbs used in the opening lines 1-2 describe the ontological 
shift between lines 5-6. The participle κρεμάμενα implies suspension from above (lines 3-5), whereas 
ὀχούμενα describes support from below (lines 6-7). These two modes of “dependency” necessitate 
different kinds of intellectual activity: the author of the psalm sees the things that are hanging (βλέπειν) 
while he knows the things carried (νοεῖν). The latter phrase refers to the intelligible realm which can be 
known, although it is not perceptible. Although this interpretation may contain some credibility, it is 
noticeable that the verbs κρεμάμενα and ὀχούμενα are closely connected with each other in the account 
of Philo in Mos. 2. 121 – as Thomassen correctly observes (cf. also McGowan, “Valentinus Poeta,” 161-
163). Although these notions indicate that the last two sentences describe something different than the 
previous lines, it does not refer necessarily to transcendent reality. It is just as possible that the end of 
the psalm is grammatically distinguished from the other part of the text to separate the ethical 
cultivation of human soul (lines 6-7) from the speculation of the bond within the elements of human 
beings (lines 3-5). 
505 For a similar interpretation cf. Ismo Dunderberg, “Stoic Traditions in the School of Valentinus,” 
in Stoicism in Early Christianity (eds. Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen & Ismo 
Dunderberg; Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2010), 223. 
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reserved for the Spirit. The bearing of fruit and producing offspring does not 
depict the generations within the transcendent realm, as is suggested in the 
commentary that follows the psalm, but they can be understood in the light 
of Philo’s allegories concerning the cultivation of trees of wisdom within the 
human soul, producing fruits and bearing children by the spirit.  
6.4.1 The cosmic sympathy of the soul 
Although Valentinus’s psalm contains some well-known cosmic elements, it 
is not likely that he would have intended to describe solely the structure of 
the cosmos. This would have meant that Valentinus had changed the ancient 
theory of the cosmic elements significantly. Flesh takes the place of water 
and earth, and the world soul is set below air and ether. It is difficult to find 
any reason for such a confusion. It is unlikely that Valentinus would have 
mistakenly confused these elements.506 
The key elements in Valentinus’s psalm are the flesh, the soul, ether, and 
the Spirit. It is noticeable that the flesh and air both hung (κρεμάννυμι) from 
higher elements – the flesh from the soul and air from ether − but the soul is 
not hanging, but it is proceeding (ἐξεχομένη) from air.507  It is unlikely that 
Valentinus thought that the essence of the soul is air from which it comes. It 
is more likely that air in Valentinus’s psalm refers to the cosmic region of air. 
Valentinus may have been influenced by the theory mentioned in Philo’s 
writings according to which the location of pre-natal souls before their 
incarnation was not the firmament as in Plato (Tim. 41d) but the region of air 
(Plant. 14; cf. also Somn. I 135-136).508  
                                                 
506 Ismo Dunderberg has pointed out various similarities between Valentinus’s psalm and some 
Hermetic passages that describe the cosmic bond that is carried by the spirit. In CH 12.14 “the finest 
matter is air, the finest air is soul, the finest soul is mind, and the finest mind is god.” It is likely that 
Valentinus may have had some knowledge of Hermetic cosmology in addition to Philo’s teachings that 
he used for his poetic vision of the structure of the world and its microcosmi representation. Cf. 
Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 66. 
507 The term ἐξέχειν in Valentinus’s psalm is used e.g. for the shining of the sun (cf. McGowan, 
“Valentinus Poeta,” 175 note 51). In Philo, it is used to describe how the branches of the Menorah 
project out on each side (Her. 218) and for Onan’s spilling seed upon the ground (Post. 180).  
508 The region of air as an abode of spiritual beings is also attested in some Stoic sources. David 
Winston points out that Sextus Empericus (Math. 9.87) also reports that the Stoics were of the opinion 
that if there are living beings in the air, there must also be living beings in the ethereal realm as well, 
and it is from the ether that human beings derive their intellectual power. Sami Yli-Karjanmaa points 
out that the notion of the air being filled with souls may be originally Pythagorean. The idea was known 
already during the Old Academy, but it seems not to have attained a position of an essential doctrine. 
Cf. Yli-Karjanmaa, Philo and Reincarnation, 134. It was common in the Platonic tradition to suggest 
that the soul adopts different kinds of instrumental bodies during its prenatal descent into the world 
(cf. Plot. Enn. IV 3:15). The “body” of the soul becomes heavier and visible when it descends from the 
firmament through the regions of ether and air into the corporeal body. During the incarnation, the 
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Of twofold kind were the beings which the great Maker made as well 
in the earth as in the air. In the air He made the winged creatures 
perceived by our senses, and other mighty beings besides which are 
wholly beyond apprehension by sense. This is the host of the bodiless 
souls. Their array is made up of companies that differ in kind. We are 
told that some enter into mortal bodies, and quit them again at 
certain fixed periods, while others, endowed witha diviner 
constitution, have no regard for any earthly quarter, but exist on 
high nigh to the ethereal region itself. These are the purest spirits of 
all, whom Greek philosophers call heroes, but whom Moses, 
employing a well-chosen name, entitles “angels,” for they go on 
embassies bearing tidings from the great Ruler to His subjects of the 
boons which He sends them, and reporting to the Monarch what His 
subjects are in need of. 
 
In Valentinus’s psalm the Spirit is not dependent on any of the cosmic 
elements, but it binds all things flesh, soul, air, and ether together. This 
parallels Philo’s anthropological teachings according to which the intellect of 
the soul, i.e. its rational Spirit (λογικοῦ πνεύματος), rules human beings, the 
body and the soul, and binds the elements of the soul into a harmonious 
whole. For Philo, the spirit is a synonym for the intellect, because it is able to 
generate thoughts.509 In the human soul the task of the Spirit is to vivify the 
                                                                                                                                          
soul experiences a cooling process when it mingles with the air. The Greek word for the soul (ψυχή) can 
be derive from the word “cold” (ψῦχος) or “to make cool” (ψυχεῖν). The theory of the cooling down of the 
soul is also attested in Philo (Somn. 1.31) and Origen (Princ. 2.8.3). Cf. Dunderberg, “The Stoic 
Traditions,” 223 
509 In Det. 82-84, Philo divides the soul of human beings into two parts according to the sacred 
number two. On the one hand, human beings possess an irrational soul similar to that of the animals. 
On the other hand, they have a rational soul, which is an image of God’s mind. While the irrational part 
is related to the vivifying (ζωτική) power and it has blood for its essence, the rational (λογική) faculty is 
spiritual and it is associated with ether. In QG 2.59 Philo divides the soul into three parts. The soul has 
nutritive, sensitive and rational parts. The nutritive and sensitive soul parts are related to the flesh and 
blood, which contain the senses and passions. These lower elements of the soul lack intellectuality and 
thoughts, which belong to the rational soul alone. The blood of the flesh contains air, which is mingled 
with blood in different degrees. The amount of air in the blood has an influence on the temperament of 
human being. Philo explains that there are different kinds of blood vessels through which the blood is 
mingled with the air. The veins with a pulse, i.e. the arteries, contain less blood and more pure and 
unmixed air, whereas the veins that lack the pulse contain less breath, i.e. air, and more blood. The 
differences concerning the amount of air in the blood also have an ethical dimension. Courage is 
related to the warm and fiery blood, which contains more air. The soul which is full of courage despises 
all food and the luxuries of life. The one who has a low amount of spirit in the blood is a wanderer, who 
becomes lazy and inactive because of an interest in the luxurious life. The same kind of teaching is 
attested in the Hermetic passage in CH 10.13 according to which it is erroneous to think that the soul is 
the blood, but it is “the breath passing through veins, arteries and blood that sets the living being in 
motion and in a manner supports it.” Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 65. 
 179 
mind, which in turn vivifies the subordinate parts, i.e. the irrational soul and 
body.510 In Leg. All. 3.161 Philo say that the soul is of ether, being a fragment 
(ἀπόσπασμα) of the Deity. It was common among Middle Platonic 
philosophers to suppose that the intellect of the human soul was made out of 
quinta essentia, i.e. ether, out of which also the heavenly bodies were 
made.511 In most cases Philo adopted this view. The soul-bodies of the cosmic 
intellects, i.e. the stars and planets, were made out of ether.512 Also the 
intellect of the human soul was clothed with the ethereal soul-body similar to 
that of the heavenly bodies.513 Thus, the sympathy of the soul has an 
equivalent in the sympathy of the cosmos. While the soul is ruled by the 
Spirit, the cosmos is ruled by the Logos. These notions can be found in 
Philo’s allegories of the Tabernacle and the High Priest, which signify 
allegorically the structures of the cosmos and the human soul.   
6.4.2 The soul as a Temple of God 
Philo maintained that the creation of the Tabernacle was a symbolic re-
enactment of the creation of the world.514 Philo says in Spec. 1.66 that the 
highest and truest Temple of God is the whole universe. The sanctuary, i.e. 
the Holy of Holy, is heaven, the votive offerings are the stars, and priests are 
the angels, who are pure intelligences in the likenesses of the Monad.515 In 
                                                 
510 Leg. All. 1.40. 
511 Merlan, “Greek Philosophy,” 40ff; Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revisions, 37-39. The identification of 
the essence of the intellect of the soul with the quinta essentia of the celestial gods is mentioned by 
Cicero: “If there is a kind of fifth nature, first introduced by Aristotle, this is the nature of gods and 
souls” (Tusc I 10,22; 26, 65-66). 
512 In addition to the four cosmic elements (earth, water, air and fire) Philo supposed the existence 
of a fifth element, ether, although, according to Philo the exact essence of that element is mysteriously 
hidden from humans. The old Stoa parted from Aristotle by suggesting that ether was not a cosmic 
element of its own, but simply a purer form of fire. It became, however, common within Middle 
Platonic circles since Antiochus of Ascalon to regard ether as quinta essentia that forms the 
substratum of the soul or nous. For Philo, ether was the substance of the visible heaven, the boundary 
that separates the intelligible world from the visible cosmos. The heaven and the cosmic bodies were 
made out of pure and unmixed ethereal essence (cf. Cher. 21-24; Opif. 27). Althought Philo taught that 
the moon is made out of ether, the black – or dark blue – spots consist of air. Cf. Winston, Logos, 64-
65, note 3; Tobin, The Creation of Man, 82-84; Wolfson, Philo I, 394-395. 
513 Philo says, however, that the rational spirit as the effulgence of the nature of God himself was 
something even more divine than ethereal substance (Spec. 4.123). Cf. Tobin, The Creation of Man, 92. 
514 Mos. 2.74-76. Cf. Stefan Nordgaard Svendsen, Allegory Transformed. The Appropriation of 
Philonic Hermeneutics in the Letter to the Hebrews. Ph.D. Dissertation, Biblical Studies Section, 
Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, 2007, 158-162. 
515 Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 279, cf. also notes 640-641. Although Philo did not neglect the 
importance of the cultic observances in the Temple, it is evident that it became rather common among 
the Jewish communities in Diaspora to regard prayer and virtuous life as a replacement for the 
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Her. 112-113 Philo explains that the Tabernacle is a representation of the 
soul. Philo interprets the phrase “the tabernacle was set up in the midst of 
our uncleanness” to mean the purification of the soul “after washing off and 
purging away all that sullies our life.” The highest part of the human soul can 
become an animate Shrine of the Father if he is properly initiated. 
Accordingly, Philo states in QE 2.54 that the inner part of the Ark of the 
Covenant in the Holy of Holies is equated with the rational mind, which 
adorns and controls the outer, i.e. the body and sense perceptions. 
In Fug. 72 Philo says that the High Priest is the representation of the 
Logos that is clothed with the elements of the world, being the bond of 
everything that holds all things together and prevents them from being 
loosened.516 Philo also compares the pure mind to the High Priest, whose 
physical perfection refers to the purity of the soul. The High Priest is a 
symbol of the perfect sage, who is free from grief and any other passions and 
who worships the “Truly Existent” on behalf of the whole world. Philo 
equates the High Priest with the angels who are pure intellects serving 
God.517 Philo maintains that everyone who obeys right reason has the 
potential of becoming the High Priest of his own soul.518 
Valentinus’s psalm can be understood in the light of Philo’s allegories of 
the Tabernacle and the High Priest in which the sympathy of the soul and the 
sympathy of the cosmos are intertwined. In Mos. 2.121-127 Philo explains 
that the vestments of the High Priest depicts the harmony of the cosmos. The 
tunic of the High Priest symbolizes the element of air, being the color of the 
hyacinth. In the hem of the tunic is attached a fringe of pomegranates, and 
flowers and bells, which symbolize earth and water. The mantle over the 
tunic is a representation of heaven, i.e. ether, and the breast-plate (τὸ λογεῖον) 
is a symbol of the firmament and an emblem of reason, which regulates the 
whole universe. In Philo’s allegory of the vestments of the High Priest, the 
lowest cosmic elements, earth and water, hang from air, for air is their 
chariot (καὶ ἀπʼ ἀέρος τρόπον τινὰ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκκρέμανται, τὸ γὰρ ὄχημα τούτων 
ἐστὶν ἀήρ). This is reflected in Valentinus’s psalm in which “flesh hangs from 
the soul” (σάρκα μὲν ἐκ ψυχῆς κρεμαμένην), which proceeds from the region of 
air (ψυχὴν δ’ ἀέρος ἐξεχομένην). Air, in turn, hangs from ether (ἀέρα δ’ ἐξ 
αἴθρης κρεμάμενον). The Spirit is not a separate essence of the soul, but it 
                                                                                                                                          
sacrifices of the Temple. The human mind can be in contact with the Creator without entering into the 
Temple of Jerusalem by contemplating himself and the universe. Cf. Wolfson, Philo II, 237-252. Philo 
is not consistent in his allegories, because in QE 2.68-69 the Holy of Holies does not depict heaven as 
in Spec. 1.66, but is a symbol of the world of Ideas. The Holy Place refers to heaven and the outer 
section the world below the moon. 
516 Fug. 72, 108-112.   
517 Spec. 1. 80, 82; Spec. 4.192. Q. G. 3.44; 4.25-27, 76. Cf. Wolfson, Philo II, 340-341; Jean 
Laporte, “The High Priest in Philo of Alexandria,” in The Studia Philonica Annual. Volume III (1991), 
78-81.  
518 Spec. 2.164; Fug. 116-118. Cf. Svendsen, Allegory Transformed, 183-187. 
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carries the flesh and the soul into harmony like the High Priest, who clothes 
the whole cosmos through his vestments.  
Although Valentinus’s psalm does not explicitly mention the Temple, it is 
attested in Heracleon’s allegory concerning the purification of the Temple by 
the Savior.519 For Heracleon, the Temple of Jerusalem serves as an image of 
the human soul which is seized by bodily passions. The purification of the 
Temple means annihilation of bodily passions through the Spirit and 
entering into the Holy of Holies, where the union with the Pleroma will be 
actualized. This parallels the passage in the Gospel of Philip according to 
which the Holy of Holies refers to the Bridal Chamber, where the soul is 
married to her angelic counterpart.520 These notions parallel Philo who 
maintained that the virtuous soul can become the Shrine of the Father when 
it controls fleshly passions through the enlightened intellect. It is rather 
likely that Heracleon draws from similar kinds of allegorical traditions which 
saw the structure of the Temple as an image of the soul and the ruling part of 
the soul as an image of the High Priest. It is not contrary to reason to suggest 
that Valentinus’s psalm was also composed in the light of these Hellenistic 
Jewish archetypes attested in Philo’s works or it can at least be interpreted 
rather succesfully in that way.   
6.4.3 The Spirit as a bond of the human soul and the cultivator of the 
trees of virtue 
Philo divides the functioning of the Logos into two realms. The division was 
based on the creation of the intelligible cosmos in Opif. 30 according to 
which the intelligible light and intelligible spirit were given predominance 
                                                 
519 Orig. In Jo. X; fragments 11-16 Vö. Heracleon taught that the resurrection of the Savior was a 
symbol of the spiritual resurrection of the ecclesia, which replaced the psychic Temple in Jerusalem. 
Thomassen stresses that “it would not be justified to infer that Heracleon attributes to the resurrection 
of Jesus only a symbolic significance, with no redemptive effect in itself ... In fact we have already seen 
how the incarnation, the passion and the death of Jesus possess a salvific effect for Heracleon by virtue 
of a logic of mutual participation.” Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 103-115. 
520 GPhil 69-70. Strikingly, the Temple is not divided in this passage into two sections (the Holy 
building and the Holy of Holies) as usual, but there are three chambers, which refer to baptism (the 
Holy Building), ransom (the Holy of the Holy) and the bridal chamber (the Holy of Holies). It is likely 
that the porch is counted here as a separate room. Philo also mentions three sections in Mos. 2. 101, 
but he describes the Tabernacle, not the Temple in Jerusalem, like the passage in the Gospel of Philip. 
In Exc. Theod. 38 the allegory of the Temple is related to the ascent of the pneumatics to the Pleroma. 
Jesus is identified with the High Priest who is allowed to enter into the Holy of Holies. Strikingly, the 
Holy of Holies does not depict the Pleroma, but the throne of the Demiurge, which has a veil so that the 
spiritual human beings are not destroyed by the sight of it. The task of the Savior is to subdue the 
flames and to provide an entrance for the pneumatics to the Pleroma. For the allegory of the Temple in 
the Gospel of Philip, see Ronald McL. Wilson, The Gospel of Philip. Translated from the Coptic Text, 
with an Introduction and Commentary (London: A. R. Mowbray & Co., 1962), 139-141. 
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(προνομία) in the world. This distinction refers to the role of the Logos in the 
heavenly sphere and the human mind. While the intelligible light rules the 
heavenly spheres, the intelligible spirit controls human souls. Both of them 
were created as images of the eternal Logos, which binds all the elements of 
the world firmly together, being the bond of the all (δεσμός τοῦ παντού) in the 
cosmos and the human soul.521  
In Valentinus’s psalm, the spirit not only carries and brings together the 
faculties of human beings but its role is connected to making the soul fertile 
and producing fruit. This idea has a parallel in Philo, who maintains that the 
spirit of God is a teacher of wisdom and the source of good works. Philo calls 
the Spirit of God “the divine spirit of wisdom” (τὸ σοφίας πνεῦμα θεῖον) and 
depicts it as “wise, the divine, the invisible, the good spirit that is diffused to 
fill all” (πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ σοφόν, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ ἄτμητον, τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, τὸ ἀστεῖον, τὸ 
πάντῃ διʼ ὅλων ἐκπεπληρωμένον). The spirit of God also has a role as a 
prophetic spirit through which the the soul frees itself from all bodily 
influences and becomes filled with the knowledge of God.522 The spirit 
mediates, thus, the presence of the Logos in an earthly mind and makes it 
virtuous and productive. Therefore, Philo uses the metaphors of producing 
fruit and generating children as descriptions of the cultivation of the human 
mind through the spirit of wisdom. Philo interprets the verse “God planted a 
Paradise in Eden” as referring to the plantation of trees of virtue within the 
human mind.523 
                                                 
521 Einar Thomassen has proposed that Valentinus’s psalm combines some Greek cosmological 
notions with the “widespread Jewish and Christian idea of the divine Spirit as a creative agent, in 
which role the Spirit is, moreover, frequently identified with Wisdom.” Furthermore, the spirit in 
Valentinus’s psalm can be consistently identified with “the demiurgic and world-sustaining figure of 
Sophia, who residing in the Ogdoad, exerts her spiritual power on the orderly organization of the lower 
world, although it is uncertain whether Valentinus intended his psalm to be understood in that way” 
(cf. Thomassen, The Spritual Seed, 484). It is uncertain, however, whether there was any widespread 
Jewish idea of the Spirit as a creative agent in the macrocosmic scale. Strikingly Philo does not give any 
role for the spirit as an instrument in cosmic creation. The role of the spirit in creation was limited to 
the creation of human beings (Gen. 2:7). Philo interprets the spirit in Gen. 1:2 as denoting the “idea of 
the principle of life of the living beings” (Opif. 29). In addition, Philo connects the Spirit and Wisdom 
only in the context of ethical cultivation when the spirit takes the form of “the Spirit of Wisdom” or “the 
Spirit of prophecy.” It is likely that the identification of Wisdom/ Logos and the Spirit as an instrument 
of creation were innovations of later Christian theologians. Although the Spirit and Wisdom are 
identified in some Valentinian sources, there is no consensus regarding the identification of Wisdom 
with the Spirit mentioned in Gen. 1:2. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the spirit that is moving 
upon the waters in Gen. 1:2 does not refer to Wisdom or the Spirit but it designates allegorically the 
intertwining of the psychic (“spirit”) and hylic (“water”) essences before the Demiurge separates them.     
522 Gig. 22, 27, 47. See Wolfson, Philo I, 24-36. 
523 Plant. 37-38; par. Leg. All. 1.43-47 
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And these can be no growths of earthly soil, but must be those of the 
reasonable soul, namely its path according to virtue with life and 
immortality as its end, and its path according to evil ending in the 
shunning of these and death. We must conceive therefore that the 
bountiful God plants in the soul as it were a garden of virtues and of 
the mode of conduct corresponding to each of them, a garden that 
brings the soul to perfect happiness.  
 
Philo maintains that God placed the first human being in Paradise, which 
means allegorically that trees of Paradise, i.e. trees of wisdom and virtue, are 
planted in the human soul through the spirit.524 The bodily influences and 
irrational impulses should be guarded and cultivated to produce good fruit. 
Philo also says that the works of the human being are the offspring, or fruit, 
of the soul. He explains in Gig. 4 that those who failed to cultivate their soul 
become parents of female children, whereas the fruits of the “tree of virtue” 
are “male beings.”525 The metaphors of “depths” and “womb” can be 
integrated rather consistently with the ethical interpretation of Valentinus’s 
psalm.526 The metaphor of the womb is also attested in Iren. Haer. 1.5.6 
according to which the spiritual seed of Sophia is deposited into the psyhic 
soul of Adam as in a womb in order to reach perfect rationality. Fruit and 
children are thus metaphors for ethical cultivation which are brought forth 
when the spirit rules the essence of the human soul. It would seem that if 
someone tried to compose a psalm on the ground of Philo’s anthropological 
allegories, it would be a fairly similar kind of literary work as we have in 
Valentinus’s Harvest.  
                                                 
524 QG 1.6. 
525 Gig. 4. The idea of the human intelligence as a plantation in Paradise is also attested in the 
Valentinian Gospel of Truth. The perfect human beings are verbal expressions of the Father’s thoughts 
that are planted in Paradise “He is acquainted with His plants, for it is He who has planted them in His 
paradise garden. Now His paradise is His realm of repose: it is the perfection within the Father’s 
thought, and they are the verbal expressions of His meditation. Each of His verbal expressions is the 
product of His will and the manifestation of His speaking.” Cf. Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, 262. 
526 The term “depths” is in the plural, and the offspring that is brought forth from the womb is in 
the singular form, which makes the association with the unitary source of and the connection to the 
multitude of aeons that are produced from this source problematic. The terms “depths” and “womb” 
serve as metaphors for the spiritual darkness and lack of understanding that is contrasted with 
producing the fruit of the spirit. In Plato, the human soul lost all its cognitive capacities when it was 
bound in a mortal body (Tim. 43b). It is possible that the womb is a metaphor for forgetfulness that is 
corrected through education as the child grows. Also, the ground out of which the harvest is gathered is 
dark and deep, and it is light as a metaphor for “wisdom” that makes the ground fertile. 
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6.5 Conclusions  
The anthropological comparison between Philo and the Valentinians has 
revealed some of the closest parallels in these texts. Both Philo and the 
Valentinians were dependent on Plato’s anthropology in the Timaeus and on 
Aristotelian psychology, which suggested the existence of the fine-material 
soul-body in which the intellect was enclosed. The intellect of the soul was 
not a part of the soul but a distinct genus which must be awakened through 
the contemplation of the transcendent reality.  
The closest parallels between Philo and the Valentinian sources can be 
found especially in those sections which are related to Philo’s allegorical 
innovations. Firstly, Philo made a distinction between Gen. 1:27 and Gen. 
1:26. The former describes the creation of the heavenly man, while the latter 
describes the earthly mind, which is a mixture of rational and irrational 
impulses. Secondly Gen. 2:7 was no longer a description of the creation of the 
body of the earthly man, but the creation of the earthly mind, a sort of soul-
body for the intellect. Thus, human beings in Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7 
represented the same earthly soul, which was a mixture of rational and 
irrational essences. The physical body was not created until Adam was 
clothed with the garments of skin (Gen. 3:21). 
These Philonic hermeneutical innovations are found in the Valentinian 
anthropological accounts in Exc. Theod. 50-51 and Iren. Haer. 1.5.5. In these 
accounts the term “earthly soul” parallels Philo’s “earthly mind,” which was 
not taken from the earth in its present stage, but from “dispersed matter.” 
Adam did not have a corporeal body until he was clothed with the garments 
of skin. In the Valentinian accounts, the image of the Savior was breathed 
into Adam’s earthly soul by the Demiurge, which parallels the implantation 
of the fragment of the heavenly man in Adam’s soul in Philo’s accounts. The 
heavenly man was not an archetype of the earthly soul in a strict Platonic 
sense, but he became an ethical idealization of the earthly mind. The 
Valentinian exegetes elaborated these Philonic exegetical innovations and 
combined them with their protological myth of Sophia.  
 In this chapter, I also discussed two fragments of Valentinus. The first 
fragment dealt with the creation of Adam’s body by the angels. Valentinus 
was evidently dependent on the Hellenistic Jewish heavenly man –traditions 
and Gnostic anthropology but he reformulated the distinctively Gnostic 
motifs in the light of the concept of “free speech” mentioned in the Book of 
Wisdom and in Philo’s writings as well. Ptolemy’s disciples elaborated these 
traditions and associated the “archetypical man” with the Savior and his 
angels as a collective representation of the Pleroma. At the same time, the 
Gnostic motifs of fear, envy or any hostile reaction toward Adam by the 
Demiurge faded away as well as the role of the angels in the formation of 
Adam’s earthly soul-body. 
The second fragment was Valentinus’s psalm Harvest, which describes 
the structure of the human soul in a way which has a close parallel in the 
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anthropological speculations in the writings of Philo. Valentinus’s psalm can 
be interpreted in the light of Philo’s allegories of the Tabernacle and the High 
Priest in which the sympathy of the soul and the sympathy of the cosmos are 
intertwined. Valentinus may also have been influenced by Philo’s theory 
according to which the location of pre-natal souls was not the firmament as 
in Plato but the region of air. The metaphors of fruit and children can be seen 
in Valentinus’s psalm as allegories of the cultivation of the soul and 
producing good works. It would seem that if someone tried to compose a 
psalm on the ground of Philo’s anthropological allegories, it would be a fairly 
similar kind of literary work as we have in Valentinus’s Harvest. 
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7 THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF CAIN, ABEL 
AND SETH AND ISRAEL AS A SPIRITUAL 
HUMAN BEING WHO SEES GOD 
The focus in this chapter is on soteriology, which is based on the protological, 
cosmological, and anthropological teachings handled in the previous chapter. 
In Valentinian soteriology, the history of salvation consists of subsequent 
chains of creation processes and their corrective operations, which began 
when the Father of All started to create intelligent beings in order to be loved 
and known. At the lowest level of intelligent beings was Adam, whose 
descendants were only conditionally immortal. Adam did not have the 
capability to create copies of himself, but only to procreate. This means that 
he could mediate only the body and the irrational soul to his descendants, 
whereas the psychic and spiritual parts of the soul were mediated through 
divine providence. The divine essence must be activated, but this option was 
not taken in advance by many, which led to the division of humankind into 
hylic, psychic and spiritual categories of human beings. 
Philo and the Valentinians were dependent on Aristotelian transcendental 
psychology, which was integrated into Platonic anthropology. In this model, 
the intellect is present in the human soul only potentially, and must awaken 
and be integrated into the “higher self” through the meditation of the 
transcendent mind. Aristotle declares that the contemplative life (θεωρία) is 
related to self-sufficiency, which is the main characteristic of happiness.527 
The contemplative life is the exercise of wisdom, and it fulfills the criterion of 
self-sufficiency because the sages could always turn their notions to the 
objects of contemplation. Therefore, the sages were not in need of aid from 
anybody or anything to be perfectly happy.528  
These Aristotelian ideals of the contemplative life and self-sufficiency 
were taken over by the Stoics and the Middle Platonic teachers. It seems, 
however, that the ideal of the wise man as self-taught and self-sufficient came 
to Philo through the Stoic teachers, because Philo’s portrait of the wise man 
was identical with the Stoics’ description.529 While some perfect human 
beings were born as sages, like Isaac, some others were re-born as sages after 
                                                 
527 Ar. Nich. 1 1097b6–20 
528 Ar. Nich. 1177a27–b1. According to the definition of perfection, a thing’s perfection corresponds 
to the extent to which it is chosen for its own sake (Ar. Nich. 1097a30–b6). See Anthony Kenny, 
Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 87-102. 
529 David Winston, “Sage and Supersage in Philo of Alexandria,” in Pomegranates and Golden 
Bells: Studies in Jewish and Near Eastern Ritual, Law and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom (D. 
P. Wright, D.N. Freedman, and A. Hurvitz; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 815-24.; Winston, 
Philo of Alexandria, 24-30. 
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a long and laborious spiritual journey, as with Abraham and Jacob. The 
distinction between perfect and progressive humans forms the basis for the 
various allegories concerning biblical names, themes and stories in Philo and 
the Valentinian sources, which are dealt with in this chapter. 
7.1 Philo’s mystical theology  
According to Philo, the contemplative life and knowledge of God are the 
highest goal of human life.530 This fundamental goal was not derived from 
the Jewish Scriptures, but from Platonic mystical monotheism.531 Philo 
frequently stressed in his writings that the human mind can achieve 
knowledge only about God’s existence, but not his essence, which remained 
unknowable even to the perfect soul.532 The doctrine of the unknowability of 
God goes back to Plato’s Parmenides according to which the supreme 
principle, the One, is unknown.533 The unknowability of God comes clear in a 
passage where Philo discusses the answer of God to Moses’s petition that he 
may see the glory of God (Ex.33:18): 
Do not, then, hope to be ever able to apprehend Me or any of My 
powers in our essence. But I readily and with right goodwill will 
admit you to a share of what is attainable. That mean that I bid you 
come and contemplate the universe and its contents, a spectacle 
apprehended not by the eye of the body but by the unsleeping eyes of 
the mind.534 
 
Although God’s essence remains hidden, the impressions of his acts and 
powers in the creation can be experienced and perceived. The knowledge of 
God’s existence is based on the realization of the Logos in the cosmos and the 
human mind, which is a fragment of the cosmic mind.535 There are, however, 
two different ways of achieving knowledge of God, which are the way of 
                                                 
530 Decal. 81, Det. 86, Abr. 58, Praem. 14, QE 2.51. Cf. Winston, Logos, 54. 
531 Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 21. I use the term “mysticism” in the sense Winston defines as a 
“timeless apprehension of the transcendent through a unifying vision that gives bliss or serenity and 
normally accrues on a course of self-mastery and contemplation.” 
532 Praem. 44; Post. 168-169; Cher. 77. The intention to comprehend the essence of God is 
according to Philo absolutely “silly.” There is, however, at least, something, which can be told about 
God’s essence. Philo states that God’s essence is single and one. In addition, Philo reduced God’s 
property to one single property, i.e. acting. Unlike the human being, whose thinking and acting are two 
distinct things, God’s thinking and acting are simultaneous, and it comprises all creation. 
533 This view was adopted also by Clement of Alexandria, who evidently was dependent on Platonic 
transcendental monotheism and Philo (Strom. 2.6.1; 4.156.1; 5.65.2; 5.71.5; 5.81.4; 5.82.4). Cf. Lilla, 
Clement of Alexandria, 212-226. 
534 Spec. Leg. I.47-48 
535 Leg. All. I 34, 38; Det. 86 
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philosophy (reason) and the way of wisdom (faith). The way of wisdom is 
associated with prophecy, which refers to the direct knowledge of God. The 
distinction between philosophy and wisdom was also known in Hellenistic 
philosophical schools. Wisdom represents intuitive knowledge while 
philosophy stands for discursive reasoning.536 Philo maintained that the 
latter type is to gain knowledge of God from the created things through the 
natural capacities of the human soul “as one may learn the abiding thing 
from the shadows (σκιαί).” The former type refers to intuition as the mind 
rises “above and beyond creation and obtains a clear vision.” Philo refers to 1 
Sam. 9:9 and says that the sages are prophets and seers.537  
They then do but make a happy guess, who are at pains to discern the 
Uncreated and Creator of all from His creation, and are on the same 
footing as those who try to trace the nature of the monad from the 
dyad, whereas observation of the dyad should begin with the monad 
which is the starting-point. The seekers for truth are those who have 
a vision of God through God, light through the light.538 
                                                 
536 The distinction between philosophy and wisdom was common among many Stoic teachers (cf. 
e.g. Seneca Ep. 89.4-9). Winston suggests that when Philo defines philosophy as devotion to wisdom 
he means that philosophy is identical with the revelation of the Torah. Philo does not mean that 
philosophy is something inferior compared with the Law, but the distinction was made between 
imperfect and perfect (= wisdom) modes of knowledge. Philo writes in Leg.All. 1.22: “And what is more 
godlike…than reason, which once it is full grown and brought to perfection is rightly called wisdom”. 
Cf. Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 25. Philo’s view concerning the union of philosophy and gnosis was 
adopted by Clement of Alexandria, although he taught that the ultimate perfection could be achieved 
only through Christ. Cf. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 169-173. 
537 Leg. All. 3.99-103; Her. 78; Gig. 60. Wolfson, Philo II, 7-11, 83-84, 92. Harry Wolfson points 
out that Philo’s terms related to the direct and indirect ways of knowing God evoke the vocabulary used 
by Plato in his “parable of the cave” (Republic VIII, 514 A ff.; 532 B). Plato suggests that the indirect 
knowledge rests upon the “shadows” perceived by the senses. Direct knowledge is based, instead, on 
the vision of the Ideas when the mind ascends above the subterranean cave. Philo differs, however, 
from Plato in that he called direct knowledge a prophecy whereas in Plato it was ἀνάμνησις. Erwin 
Goodenough suggests that these two types of knowledge, philosophy and wisdom, reflect two kinds of 
mysteries, the lesser and the higher. The former represents the mystery of Aaron and it is connected to 
the worship of God through the creation represented in the cult of the Temple. The latter represents 
the mystery of Moses which was based on direct knowledge of God through God’s Logos (Goodenough, 
By Light Light, 95ff.). Although these two ways of knowing God can be found in Philo’s texts, there is 
no historical evidence that there had been corresponding institutionalized cults, as Goodenough 
suggests. 
538 στοχασταὶ μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γεγονότων τὸν ἀγένητον καὶ γεννητὴν τῶν ὅλων σπεύδοντες θεωρεῖν, 
ὅμοιόν τι δρῶντες τοῖς ἀπὸ δυάδος μονάδος φύσιν ἐρευνῶσι, δέον ἔμπαλιν ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὕτη δυάδα 
σκοπεῖν· ἀλήθειαν δὲ μετίασιν οἱ τὸν θεὸν θεῷ φαντασιωθέντες φωτὶ φῶς (Praem. 46) David Winston has 
pointed out that the formula “seeing light by light” is the same as that used by Plotinus in Enneads 
5.3.17.34-37; 5.5.10. Winston suggests that both Philo and Plotinus were dependent on Plato’s sun 
image in Republic 507c-509b. See Winston, Logos, 43-44 note 8. 
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That is why we are told not that the sage saw God, but that God 
appeared to the sage. For it was impossible that anyone should by 
himself apprehend the truly existent, did not He reveal and manifest 
Himself.539 
 
This intuitive knowledge was based on the “analytical illumination of the 
human mind” in which one realized that all human mental capacities come 
from God, and that human beings are themselves fragments of the divine 
mind. While discursive philosophy contemplates the visible cosmos, mental 
self-examination offers perfect knowledge. These methods of knowledge were 
not in contrast with each other, but intuition made the philosophy and the 
contemplation of the cosmos perfect.  
In the allegory of Abraham’s wives, Hagar represents knowledge through 
philosophy and Sarah signifies the knowledge through prophecy. The 
offspring of these unions represent the result of these methods: Ishmael is a 
sophist, whereas Isaac is a God-born man, a true friend of God, who sees 
God.540 Philo explains that Abraham must first be in union with Hagar, i.e. 
encyclical studies and philosophy, and purify himself from the passions of 
the flesh and errors of philosophy before he was ready for the union with 
Sarah, i.e. the wisdom of God. Philo says that just as encyclical studies were 
the handmaiden of philosophy, philosophy was the handmaiden of wisdom. 
Philosophical knowledge is like milk for babes, allowing human beings to 
drink directly from the fountain of wisdom.541 
The intuitive knowledge and vision of God can be achieved only through 
laborious preparations, which purify the soul of the bodily passions. For 
Philo, the passions are the greatest enemy of the human mind because they 
prevent mental self-examination and intuition. Therefore, one must achieve 
the state of apatheia, a freedom from bad emotions, by converting them into 
rational ones. The battle with passions forms the prerequisite for the mystic 
experience of God. Philo maintained that all human beings were able to live a 
virtuous life and reach happiness “even if the employment that good is 
                                                 
539 διὸ λέγεται, οὐχ ὅτι ὁ σοφὸς εἶδε θεόν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι “ὁ θεὸς ὤφθη” τῷ σοφῷ· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἀδύνατον 
καταλαβεῖν τινα διʼ αὑτοῦ τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὄν, μὴ παραφήναντος ἐκείνου ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιδείξαντος (Abr. 80). 
540 Cher. 8, Sobr. 8, Fug. 208. Goodenough, Introduction, 178-181. Wolfson stresses the distinction 
between wisdom and philosophy. He argues that the revelation of the Scriptures and the Law of Moses 
supersedes philosophy. At the same time, Wolfson made a distinction between faith and reason. It was 
the former that gives the human mind perfect knowledge, while reason provides mere shadows and 
images. Wolfson, Philo I, 149-51. 
541 Congr. 79-80 Philo maintained that the human mind can gain knowledge directly through 
“prophetic intuition,” which is not based on the use of obscure, empty, plausible arguments or 
unreliable assumptions. There is, thus, the “safer way” to God and knowledge, which does not have the 
errors and shortcomings of discursive philosophy, but derives knowledge from intuition. Leg. All. 
3.228-229; Praem. 28-30; QG 4.125. 
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beyond the reach of some people.”542 There is, however, in all human souls 
the inclination to evil and bodily passions, which are able to annihilate 
rationality and destroy one’s life.543  
According to Philo, the first step in the process of salvation was to confess 
one’s nothingness and devote oneself to God. This involves the realization 
that it is God alone who acts and is the power underlying the mind’s mental 
capacities. For Philo, nothing can be more impious than to think that virtues 
and the human cognitive capacities were our own achievements and gifts.544 
Philo criticized philosophers for regarding the human faculties as their 
property. The ancient saying “Know thyself” refers to knowing that the 
external senses and the human cognitive dispositions (senses, speech, 
memory, and reasoning) were gifts of God and were guided by the Logos.545  
The nothingness of the soul is associated with its passivity and femininity. 
Philo sees the rational soul which receives the seed of virtue to be feminine, 
because it is passive and “it is put in motion by another and is instructed and 
benefited, and, in short, is altogether the patient, as its passive state is its 
own safety.” Virtue, on the other hand, even though grammatically feminine, 
is seen as masculine, because “it puts things in motion, and arranges them, 
and suggests good conceptions of noble actions and speeches.”546 Philo says 
that unlike a man, who makes a virgin a woman, the Father of All makes a 
woman, which means a soul polluted by passions, again a virgin, by sowing 
the seed of wisdom.547  
After the confession of one’s nothingness, devotion to God and extirpation 
of the passions the human mind can be engaged in intellectual prayer, a sort 
of analytical meditation of God’s presence firstly in the mind and secondly in 
all creation. Abraham’s migration from Chaldea to Harran − which means 
“holes” − was seen as an allegory of the soul’s migration from the vain 
thoughts of philosophy to the meditation of one’s inner self. Instead of 
meditating the visible cosmos, one must meditate one’s sense organs and 
their function to understand that there is a mind in us, which is distinct from 
the sense organs, and this mind rules and controls the sense perceptions just 
as the divine Mind controls the whole creation without assimilating to it.548  
                                                 
542 Leg. All. 1.34-41. 
543 Leg. All. 1.45. 
544 Leg. All. I 49, 45-52; Sac. 56-58. 
545 Her. 105-110; Fug. 46 
546 Abr. 102; Leg. 2.38. 
547 Cher. 49. 
548 Migr. 184-195. The etymological basis for Harran is not clear. According to Philo the term 
“holes” refers to the sense organs which are in “holes” (eyes, nostrils, ears, mouth). Bad emotions (fear, 
distress, desire, and delight) come from these “holes,” i.e. from the sense perceptions and therefore it is 
important to learn that there is a mind in us, whose task is to control and convert these bad emotions 
into good ones.  
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In that way, one learns to control the passions and experience timeless 
union with the divine mind, which is full of passionless joy.549 There are, 
however, only a few perfect human beings who have succeeded in their path 
to salvation already during their lifetime. Most humans are those who are 
making progress just like Philo himself.550 Philo makes thus a difference 
between human beings who are perfect and those still making progress 
towards perfection. The perfect men have eliminated the fleshly passions 
completely, whereas those making progress, are merely controlling them.551 
In the end, after the soul has departed from the body, the human mind is 
transformed into the likeness of the angels, even though the perfect ones may 
have died to the body before their physical death.552 Although Philo’s use of 
different metaphors can be seen as an innovative elaboration on Platonic 
discourse concerning the body-soul relation, Philo suggested that not only 
the body, but the human soul too, can die if it loses contact with its heavenly 
archetype, i.e. the heavenly man.553 
The Christian Platonists of Alexandria belonged to the same tradition of 
Platonizing mystical monotheism as Philo. For them, the Platonic philosophy 
and gnosis revealed by Christ were practically the same thing.554 The 
Valentinians maintained that the Father of All wanted to be known and loved 
through the “Spirit of knowledge” and the “Spirit of love,” although the 
knowledge of his essence is beyond all understanding.555 The “Spirit of 
knowledge” does not only provide information about the divine realm, but it 
has the power to transform the essence of the soul. Just as Sophia was re-
formed through knowledge, knowledge makes the potential mind in the soul 
active and integrates it into one’s higher self, i.e. the archetypical angel. The 
“Spirit of knowledge” also heals the passions of the soul. As a result, the soul 
becomes joyful, which is the greatest spiritual gift, and it makes the soul 
productive.  
In Valentinian anthropology, the highest part of the human soul was 
created as an image of the ecclesia in the Pleroma. Valentinians saw salvation 
as a unification of the soul with one’s angel, which was a distinctively 
Valentinian idea among teachers in Early Christianity. The unification with 
an angel denotes the assimilation of the soul among the Aeons of the 
Pleroma. The angelic part of the human soul is only potentially present in the 
psychic soul as it is in the womb. It must be awakened and strengthened in 
order to make it capable of the final unification with the Pleroma. Therefore, 
                                                 
549 Abr. 236. 
550 Her. 275. 
551 Leg. 3.140; Somn. 2.234. Satlow, “Philo on Human Perfection,” 504-506. 
552 Sac. 5. 
553 Leg. All. 1. 107-108. For Philo’s conception of soul-death, cf. Emma Wasserman, The Death of 
the Soul in Romans 7 (WUNT 256; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 60-67. 
554 Lila, Clement of Alexendria, 56-59. 
555 Exc. Theod. 6-7. 
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human beings exist in different phases in their process of salvation. There are 
those who are perfect since their birth, some others, who have made 
themselves perfect during their lifetime and those still making progress and 
waiting to be made perfect after their death. The material human beings will 
be destroyed during their physical death together with their bodies.  
7.2 The embodiment of the soul and the school for 
controlling passions 
The myth of Sophia was the basis for Valentinian ethics and soteriology. The 
healing of the emotions of Sophia was paradigmatic for all humans. The 
origin of the Sophia myth is not clear. A similar kind of myth was evidently 
taught in other Gnostic schools. It is reasonable to suggest that some 
Platonizing myth of Sophia preceded both the Valentinian myth of Sophia 
and the one attested e.g. in the Apocryphon of John.556 While the author of 
the Apocryphon of John linked the four primary emotions (distress, delight, 
desire, and fear) to four primary demons, the Valentinian teachers moved the 
discussion of emotions to the tale of Sophia, where the emphasis is placed on 
the therapy of emotion.557 In the Valentinian version of the myth the role of 
the healing of emotions is a distinct feature of the myth. The analysis of the 
emotions was also prominent in the three major Hellenistic philosophical 
schools, although the most influential theory of emotions comes from 
Stoicism. Ismo Dunderberg has pointed out “that what the Valentinians had 
to offer in the intellectual marketplace of their time was a distinctly Christian 
theory of how desire can be cured. For them, Christ was the healer who came 
to restore the emotions of the soul.”558  
There was no consensus among the Valentinian teachers regarding the 
categories of emotions that Sophia felt after her exclusion from the Pleroma. 
The description of Sophia’s emotion in Exc. Theod. 48 parallels the one 
attested in Iren. Haer. 1.5.4. In these accounts the emotions of Sophia were 
distress (λύπη), fear (φόβος), perplexity (ἀπορία), ignorance (ἄγνοια) and 
consternation (ἔκπληξις/πλῆξις).559  The counter emotion for these bad 
emotions was the conversion or will to turn back (ἐπιστρόφη).560 In addition, 
Sophia began to experience “joy” (χαρά) when the Savior visited her and 
healed her emotions through knowledge. In the Valentinian anthropology the 
                                                 
556 For details, cf. chaper 1.2. 
557 Ap. John (NHC II;1) 18. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 110-111. 
558 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 95 ff. 
559 For a detailed analysis of the emotions of Sophia in the Valentinian sources, see chapter 5.3. 
560 Dillon translates ἐπιστρόφη as “amendment.” The term ἐπιστρόφη became a key technical term 
in Neoplatonism. It means that all things came into being from the One, and they have a desire to 
revert to that from which they proceeded. Cf. e.g. Proclus, Elements of Theology 31-32; Simplicius 
Physics 147.9. 
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various emotions of Sophia were related to the corresponding parts of the 
soul of the first human being. Fear, distress and perplexity belonged to the 
hylic soul and their counter-emotion “conversion” to the psychic soul. Joy 
was the essence of the spiritual part of the soul. 
The Valentinian teachers were evidently influenced by the Stoic theories 
of the emotions of the soul. There are, however, some striking differences 
compared with the main categories of the emotions in the Stoic sources. 
Although the emotions of fear (φόβος) and distress (λύπη) are found in the 
Stoic four-fold category of emotions, the other two main emotions, desire 
(ἐπιθυμία) and delight (ἡδονή), are not mentioned in the Valentinian sources. 
It is noticeable, however, that joy (χαρά), which Sophia felt after her 
enlightenment, was also one of the good emotions in the Stoic analysis of the 
emotions.561 Therefore, the Valentinian theory of emotions comes rather 
close to Stoic theories of emotions and the ideal of apatheia, which is based 
on the correct knowledge.562 Sophia’s passions and bad emotions resulted 
from the erroneous opinion that the Father of All can be comprehended and 
she is able to be created by herself without consort like the Father. These bad 
emotions were corrected by right knowledge, which made Sophia a spiritual 
and joyful being. 
Philo was also dependent on Stoic theories of emotions. Philo maintained 
that a sage must achieve a state of apatheia because he imitates God, who is 
free from irrational emotions. For Philo, the only divine emotion was joy. 
Philo was apparently confused with the anthropomorphic descriptions of 
God in the Bible. He says that the anthropomorphic language is for the 
masses, who cannot comprehend God otherwise. However, Philo did not 
hesitate to apply the emotion joy to God, although wise man’s joy is never the 
equal of God’s pure emotion. Philo states that the angels, the stars, and the 
whole cosmos shares a portion of the divine joy, which is not mixed with 
sorrow or fear.563 All irrational passions must be converted to rational 
emotions (εὐπάθειαι). There was, however, a difference between the perfect 
man and those who are still making progress regarding control of the 
emotions.564 Those who have not yet reached perfection, have not totally 
eradicated their passions but are merely controlling them. They behave in a 
                                                 
561 Exc. Theod. 45.1-2. For the fourfold division of the passions in Valentinian, Stoic and Sethian 
source, see Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 112 
562 Dunderberg, “Stoic Traditions,” 226-227. 
563 Q.G. 4.188; Her. 88-89; Fug. 173-174; Abr. 201-207. Winston, Philo of Alexandria, 30; Ibid., 
“Philo’s Conception of the Divine Nature,” 23-28.  
564 Leg. All. 3.7; Plant. 53; Leg. All. 3.129. Dillon suggests that it is not clear whether Philo taught 
the Stoic extirpation of the passions (apatheia) or merely Aristotelian control of the passions 
(metriopatheia). Antiochus of Ascalon, for example, interpreted the Stoic ideal of apatheia in the light 
of the Peripatetic ideal of metriopatheia. If a certain passion is under the control of moderation, it is no 
longer an immoderate passion. Cf. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 77-78; also Baer, Philo’s Use of the 
Categories of Male and Female, 89-93. 
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moderate manner because of the commandments of the Law. The perfect 
ones have transformed their passion into good states of mind without being 
prompted by any command to do so.565  
In the categorizing of the passions, Philo followed the Stoics, who 
maintained that there were four generic passions (desire, fear, pleasure, 
grief) which were contrary to nature. For Philo, the passions were not merely 
unhealthy mental states but were God’s punishments for the mind’s 
idolatry.566 In describing Cain’s punishment, Philo uses Stoic categorization 
of passion, although God increases Cain’s torment by removing the 
pleasurable false opinions in pleasures.567 Philo follows the Stoics, also 
suggesting the three corresponding “good emotions” (εὐπάθειαι) for “bad 
emotions,” which were “the will,” “caution” and “joy.”568 These notions are 
explained in a passage where Philo explains Gen. 9:3 (“Every reptile that 
lives shall be to you for food”):  
The passions resemble unclean reptiles, equability (εὐπάθεια/ 
εὐφροσύνη) the clean. And answering to the passion of delight (ἡδονή), 
there is joy (χαρά) and happiness; answering to desire (ἐπιθυμία), 
there is will (βούλησις) and counsel; answering to distress (λύπη), 
there is compunction (δηγμός) and irritation; and answering to fear 
(φόβος), there is caution (εὐλάβεια).569 
 
Philo made a distinction between “unclean” and “clean” passions. For every 
unclean passion a corresponding clean passion exists. Philo differs, however, 
from the conventional Stoic theory in that he also postulates a corresponding 
emotion for distress. The Stoics were of the opinion that there cannot be a 
reasonable form of distress. Philo maintains, however, that δηγμός, i.e. 
compunction, is a positive form of distress, because it “bites” the soul and 
recommends it to seek the virtuous life. Compunction is a necessary emotion 
for those who are making progress because it indicates that the human being 
is not yet perfect. The perfect ones do not experience sorrow or irritation 
because they are free from any form of distress.  
It is noteworthy that the Valentinian teachers also postulated a counter-
emotion for distress, fear, perplexity and ignorance, which is repentance or 
conversion (ἐπιστροφή). This counter-emotion is depicted not only as a 
mental disposition (διαθέσις) but as a strong emotion (ἐμπαθή).570 This good 
                                                 
565 Leg. All. 3.140-144. Philo maintained that while Moses practiced absolute freedom from 
passions, Aaron practiced only their moderation. 
566 Conf. 23-25. 
567 Praem. 71-72. Cf. Wasserman, The Death of the Soul, 126-128. 
568 For the analysis of Stoic theory of emotions cf. F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (Bristol: The Bristol 
Press, 1989), 24-27. 
569 QG 2.57. Translated by Dillon in The Middle Platonists, 151 with slight modifications taken from 
Winston’s translation in Philo of Alexandria, 252. 
570 Iren. Haer. 1.4.1; 1.4.5. 
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emotion appeared after Christ had abandoned Sophia and she was prevented 
from following him by the Limit. The emotion of conversion was associated 
with the condition of the psychic soul, which was not yet perfect, but was 
praying and seeking for the light.571 The emotion of conversion was not, 
however, labeled a negative stage of the mind, but a necessary condition for 
the vision of God and the healing of the emotions by the Savior. As in Philo, 
distress had a positive role in the ethical progress, because it causes a good 
emotion that “bites” the soul and forces it to seek immortality.  
The theory of the passion forms the background for Philo’s allegory of the 
separation of the sexes in Gen. 2:21-23. Philo did not interpret the separation 
biologically, but allegorically as a description of the division of male reason 
(the rational part of the soul) and female sense perceptions (the irrational 
part of the soul). Philo says that the literal interpretation would have been 
absurd and, therefore, the allegorical interpretation was not only possible but 
obligatory.572  
Philo interpreted the phrase “filling the space with the flesh” in Gen. 2:21 
as denoting a process in which the soul of Adam becomes passionate. Philo 
maintains that “bone of my bones” means “power of my power” because the 
bone is a symbol of strength and domination. The saying “flesh of my flesh” 
means according to Philo “suffering of my sufferings” because all suffering 
caused by the senses also affects the mind, which is the basis of the senses:  
For he says, “This now is a bone of my bone”; that is power out my 
powers; for bone is here used as power and strength. And “passion of 
my passions”; that is “flesh out of my flesh.” For not without the mind 
does the perceptive faculty bear anything that if suffers, for the mind 
is to it a fountain-head and a basis on which it rests.573 
 
A strikingly similar kind of allegory is attested in the Valentinian account 
attested in Exc. Theod. 52.2: 
This is the meaning of “This is now bone of my bones,” – he hints as 
the divine soul which is hidden in the flesh firm and hard to suffer and 
                                                 
571 The Tripartite Tractate mentions prayer and repentance as means to conversion. The Logos 
repented that his presumptuous thought had produced evil powers. The Logos turned away from evil 
toward the good. He prayed and remembered his brothers in the Pleroma and these prayers produced 
a new order of psychic powers, who realized that something greater than themselves existed before 
them. The psychic powers and all they produced were made out of the good intention of the Logos, and 
they had the ability to seek what is glorious (Tri.Trac. 80.11-83.33). 
572 Leg. All. 2.19. 
573 τοῦτο” γάρ φησιν “ἐστὶν ὀστοῦν ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν ὀστῶν” τουτέστι δύναμις ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ γὰρ 
δυνάμεως καὶ ἰσχύος νῦν παρείληπται τὸ ὀστέον καὶ πάθος ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν παθῶν· “καὶ σὰρξ” φησίν “ἐκ τῆς 
σαρκός μου”· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα πάσχει ἡ αἴσθησις, οὐκ ἄνευ νοῦ ὑπομένει, πηγὴ γὰρ οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτῇ καὶ θεμέλιος 
ᾧ ἐπερείδεται (Leg. All. 2.41) 
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very potent, − and “flesh of my flesh” – the hylic soul which is the 
body of the divine soul.574 
  
In both accounts, the “bone” is a symbol of power. In Philo the “bone” is 
powerful and has strength (δυνάμεως καὶ ἰσχύος), and in the Valentinian 
account the “bone” is firm and very powerful (στερεὰν καὶ δυνατωτέραν). 
Although flesh is not explicitly referred to as a symbol of suffering as in Philo 
(πάθος ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν παθῶν), the “bone” is contrasted with the “flesh” as an 
essence that is not capable of suffering (δυσπαθῆ). In both accounts, the bone 
of Adam is understood allegorically as a symbol of power and domination 
and the flesh as a symbol of suffering and passions.  
Philo made a distinction between the existence of the irrational faculties 
of Adam’s soul according to habit (καθʼ ἕξιν) and according to actualization 
(κατʼ ἐνέργειαν).575 Philo maintains that the irrational faculty was habitually 
part of the mind before the separation of the sexes. The irrational faculty was 
made active as the female part of the soul, i.e. the sense perceptions were 
separated out of Adam. The sense perceptions are not good or bad 
themselves, but they become bad if the rational mind loses control over 
them, and pleasures attach to them. It is noticeable that Philo interpreted 
God’s speech to Adam in Gen. 2:24 as denoting the negative condition of 
human existence. Philo explains that when the mind (Adam) leaves his 
father, i.e. God, and mother, i.e. Wisdom, and cleaves to his wife (Eve), he 
will be dissolved into flesh and passions: 
For the sake of sense perception the Mind, when it has become her 
slave abandons both God the Father of the universe and God’s virtue 
and wisdom, the Mother of all things, and cleaves to and becomes one 
with sense-perception and it served into sense-perception so that the 
two become one flesh and one passion.576 
 
According to Philo, the separation of the mind from its divine origin was the 
cause of misery and mortality because it causes the dissolving of the mind 
into the flesh. The freedom from passion is achieved again when Eve, i.e. 
sense perception, is brought back to the dominion of Adam, i.e. the mind. 
Then the mind is no longer divided and corrupted by the sense perceptions, 
but the mind controls the senses and it will be integrated into its original 
unity.577 This same logic of separation and unification as soteriological 
paradigm is attested in the Valentinian Gospel of Philip:  
                                                 
574 Τοῦτο νῦν ὀστοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὀστῶν μου” τὴν θείαν ψυχὴν αἰνίσσεται τὴν ἐγκεκρυμμένην τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ 
στερεὰν καὶ δυσπαθῆ καὶ δυνατωτέραν,”καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ τῆς σαρκός μου” τὴν ὑλικὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα οὖσαν τῆς θείας 
ψυχῆς. 
575 Leg. All. 2. 35 ff, esp. 45. (cf. also Leg. All. 2.19ff.) 
576 Leg. All 2.49; Leg. All. 1.50; Opif. 151-152 
577 Leg. All. 2.50. 
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When Eve was still with Adam, death did not exist. When she was 
separated from him, death came into being. If he enters again and 
attains his former self, death will be no more. [--] If the woman had 
not separated from the man, she should not die with the man. His 
separation became the beginning of death. Because of this, Christ 
came to repair the separation, which was from the beginning, and 
again unite the two, and to give life to those who died as a result of 
the separation, and unite them. But the woman is united to her 
husband in the bridal chamber. Indeed, those who have united in the 
bridal chamber will no longer be separated. Thus, Eve separated 
from Adam because it was not in the bridal chamber that she united 
with him.578 
 
Although the passage in the Gospel of Philip does not explicitly mention the 
allegory of Eve as a symbol of sense perceptions, the teaching follows mainly 
the same logic as in Philo’s parallel passage. It was the woman who must be 
joined to her husband, whereas God’s order before the fall in Gen. 2:24 was 
seen in a negative light. The separation of the woman from the man and the 
command for man to unify with his wife was seen as the source of death. 
Instead, if the woman once again unites with her husband, death will be 
reversed. The unification of the sexes is also handled in Gos. Phil. 65,1-26, 
which describes the activity of the unclean spirits. As long as the human soul 
is solitary it can be polluted by the unclean spirits, which are male and female 
in form. But when they see husband and wife together, the unclean spirits are 
powerless. The unification will take place when the image is united with its 
angel. 
Gos. Phil. 70 refers to the “bridal chamber” in which the reunification 
takes place. It is not clear whether the bridal chamber mentioned in the 
Valentinian sources refers to a specific ritual such as baptism or anointing or 
a combination of them or whether it only depicts the inner mental process 
through which the human being will be unified with his spiritual 
archetype.579 However, the idea of unification of the sexes as a metaphor for 
salvation parallels Philo’s allegory of Gen. 2:24. If the rational soul unites 
                                                 
578 Gos. Phil. 70. Translated by Bentley Layton in the Gnostic Scriptures.  
579 The unification of the female and male partners can also be understood as the unification of the 
spiritual seed with her angelic image. In this interpretation Eve does not refer to the irrational soul, but 
to the spiritual seed, i.e. the highest part of the human soul, which is depicted as the female part of the 
pre-existent seed. The separation of Adam and Eve is seen allegorically as the separation of the 
spiritual seed from its male counterpart in the intelligible realm. The metaphor of the “bridal chamber” 
is related to the mysterium coniunctionis in which the spritiual seed is united to her angelic 
counterpart. It is not clear whether this unification took place in some ritual or whether it simply 
depicted an inner mental process. It is noticeable that in Exc. Theod. 21-22 the unification of the 
female seed with its male counterpart is not actualized in a conventional water baptism, but in a proxy 
baptism for the death described by Paul in 1. Cor 15:29. For the analysis of the passage in Exc. Theod. 
21-22, cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 377-383. 
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with the Logos-Savior, according to which it has been created, it will 
dominate the passions generated by the sense perceptions and the woman is 
brought to her man.  
In Philo and the Valentinian accounts the salvation was seen as returning 
to the pre-lapsarian ideal state before the separation of the sexes. This ideal 
state of mind provides the power over the unclean spirits and passions of the 
soul. In Exc. Theod. 53.1 the fleshly passions are like “tares” (ζιζάνιον) 
growing together with the “good seed” (τὸ χρηστόν σπέρμα). They are the 
“seed of the Devil” (σπέρμα τοῦ διαβόλου), which should not be nourished, but 
destroyed altogether and put to death. In Exc.Theod. 2.1-2 the spiritual seed 
is described as a leaven, which unites what seemed to have been divided, soul 
and flesh. The seed of Sophia is an effluence of the angelic power (ἀπόρροια 
τοῦ ἀγγελικοῦ) so that there may be no deficiency (ὑστέρημα) in the soul. In 
the Tripartite Tractate those who will achieve salvation need to be trained as 
in a school to experience ignorance and its pains and taste the things that are 
evil. It even seems that the suffering caused by erroneous opinions was the 
pre-condition for the reception of the knowledge of the Father of All.580  
7.3 The division of humankind in the Valentinian myth 
and Philo 
The three-fold division of humankind into spiritual (οἱ πνυματικοί), psychic 
(οἱ ψυχικοί) and material (οἱ ὑλικοί) categories is one of the main features of 
Valentinian teaching.581 The division within psychic and spiritual human 
beings is already attested in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians. Paul made a 
distinction between two levels of the members of the ecclesia. The psychics 
lack the perfect understanding of divine things, whereas the spiritual human 
beings recognize all things.582 Some scholars have proposed that the 
Valentinians derived their anthropological division from Paul.583 It is 
noticeable, however, that Paul did not divide the whole of humankind into 
the aforesaid soteriological classes. While the Valentinian anthropological 
division concerned the whole of humankind since the creation of human 
beings, the Pauline division concerned only the members of the ecclesia. 
Birger Pearson maintains that the terminology of Paul’s opponents in 
                                                 
580 Cf. Tri.Trac. 122.3-123.22; 125.24-127.25 
581 Dunderberg follows Brakke in translating the term ψυχικός as “animated ones.” Dillon and 
Unger use the term “ensouled” in their translation of Irenaeus’s Against Heresies, book 1. Cf. 
Dunderberg, “Valentinian Theories of Classes of Humankind” 139, note 2; Brakke, The Gnostics, 116. I 
use the term “psychic” because it is difficult to find an exact translation for the term. The category of 
the psychics becomes comprehensible as a part of Valentinian myth and it does not have an exact 
parallel in other philosophical systems. 
582 1 Cor. 2:14–15. 
583 Dunderberg, “Valentinian theories,” 138.  
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Corinth derived from the Hellenistic Jewish exegesis of Gen. 2:7, which 
distinguishes “spirit” (pneuma) and “soul” (psyche) and consequently those 
who are living according to “spirit” (pneumatikoi) in contrast to those who 
live according to their lower “soul” (psychikoi). While some teachers in the 
Corinthian community taught that all humans possessed an immortal 
element (pneuma) in them on the grounds of creation, Paul interpreted Gen. 
2:7 eschatologically: Christ is the last Adam whose resurrection is the basis of 
of possession of the life-giving spirit (1 Cor. 15:44-47).584 Thus, the 
Valentinian view was closer to Paul’s opponents in Corinth, whose terms Paul 
may have adopted for rhetorical purposes. 
Dunderberg has pointed out that although Paul may have been conscious 
of the Hellenistic Jewish division of humankind into psychic and spiritual 
beings, this does not necessarily mean that Paul was dependent on the 
anthropological mythology of his opponents in Corinth. The distinction 
between “psychic” and “spiritual” members of ecclesia may reflect the 
common Greco-Roman philosophy which realizes the potential threat of the 
soul being assimilated with the irrationality and bodily impulses. The 
psychics are in constant danger of being assimilated into the flesh, whereas 
the spiritual ones have made their psychic essence firm. They are no longer 
in need of preliminary teaching, but they obey the law of Christ in the 
Spirit.585 
I suggest that the tripartite division of humankind in the Valentinian 
sources has its basis in the Hellenistic Jewish allegorical tradition, even 
though it was linked to the myth of Sophia and the terms related to these 
categories may have been derived from Paul’s letters. In the Valentinian 
accounts the division of humankind is enlightened on the grounds of an 
allegorical exegesis of Gen. 1:26-27 and Gen. 2:7, and the three sons of Adam 
– Cain, Abel, and Seth – who represent hylic, psychic and spiritual human 
beings. These allegories are also found in Philo’s writings and they are 
related to the division of humankind into the perfect ones and those who are 
still making progress.  
Ismo Dunderberg has pointed out that the Valentinian sources do not 
present the three-fold division of humankind consistently. In some cases, the 
Valentinian division of humankind is related to ethnic and religious 
boundaries. In the Tripartite Tractate the hylics follow the vain thoughts of 
Greek and Barbarian wisdom, the psychics obey the Law of the Hebrews, and 
                                                 
584 Birger A. Pearson, The Pneumatikos-Psychikos Terminology in First Corinthians: A Study in 
the Theology of the Corinthian Opponents of Paul and Its Relation to Gnosticism (SBLDS 12; 
Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1973), 10-11. Pearson mentions also The Teaching of Silvanus which 
contains a three-fold division of human soul and an idea of the natural capability to live according to 
ones mind-spirit (Teach. Silv. 92,10-94,29). Cf. Pearson, Gnosticism, Judaism, and Egyptian 
Christianity. 
585 See Dunderberg, “Paul and Valentinian Morality,” 158-159.  
THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF CAIN, ABEL AND SETH AND ISRAEL AS A 
SPIRITUAL HUMAN BEING WHO SEES GOD 
200 
the spiritual ones possess the perfect knowledge of the Father of All.586 This 
model of division parallels Heracleon who says that the group of hylics refers 
to the Gentiles, the psychics to the Jews and the pneumatics worshiped the 
Father in spirit and truth.587 Irenaeus maintained, however, that the 
distinction between psychic and spiritual categories describes the distinction 
between ordinary Christians and the Valentinians themselves.588 
In Valentinian anthropology, the emotions of Sophia which she 
experienced after her removal from the Pleroma formed the protological 
basis for the three-fold structure of the soul of Adam. The hylic, psychic and 
spiritual elements of Adam’s soul each have epistemological and 
soteriological significance, which is connected to the emotions of Sophia.589 
The hylic soul is related to irrationality and the fleshly passions, whereas the 
two higher essences, i.e. the psychic and spiritual elements, contain the 
potentiality for salvation. These categories of the soul of the first human 
being became categories of humankind. Irenaeus describes this division in 
Iren. Haer. 1.7.5 as follows: “these three natures [of Adam] are no longer 
found in one person, but constitute various kinds [of men]”  
It is noteworthy that Irenaeus does not give us any explanation how the 
three essences of the first human being caused the threefold division of the 
whole of humanity. He intended to portray Valentinianism as a deterministic 
system according to which the categories of humankind are fixed.590 In Exc. 
C there is, however, one passage which brings some light to the division of 
humankind into hylic, psychic and spiritual groups of beings. It is namely 
maintained in Exc. Theod. 55-56.2 that Adam could not mediate the spiritual 
seed and the seed which was breathed, i.e. the psychic seed, to the following 
generations, but only to the hylic soul and the body:  
Therefore, Adam neither seeds from the spirit nor from that which 
was breathed into him, for both are divine, and both are put forth 
through him but not by him. But his material nature is active toward 
seed and generation as though mixed with seed and unable to stand 
apart from the same harmony in life. Therefore, our father Adam is 
“the first earthly human being of the earth” and if he had seeded from 
psychic and spiritual as well as from material substance, all would 
have become equal and righteous and the teaching would have been 
                                                 
586 Tri.Trac. 118-119. For the Valentinian myth and ethnic boundaries, cf. Dunderberg, Beyond 
Gnosticism, 174-188 
587 Heracleon, Frag. 21 on John 4.22. 
588 Iren. Haer. 1.6.2,4. It is not clear whether the division between ordinary Christians and the 
Valentinians came from Valentinian sources or whether it was part of Irenaeus’s rhetorical strategy to 
draw boundaries.  
589 Iren. Haer. 1.6.1,  
590 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 138. 
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in all. Therefore, many are material but not many are psychic, and 
few are spiritual.591 
 
It is noticeable that psychic and spiritual seeds are mediated through Adam, 
but not by him (δι’ αὐτοῦ μέν, οὐχ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ). It seems that behind these 
Valentinian speculations lies a similar kind of theory of metaphysics of 
prepositions as in Philo’s discussion concerning the birth of Cain in Gen.4:1: 
“I have gotten a man by means of God.” Philo argued that God was not an 
instrumental cause of Cain’s birth, but the effective cause.  
Because God is the cause, not the instrument; and that which comes 
into being is brought into being through an instrument, but by a 
cause. For to bring anything into being need all these conjointly, the 
“by which,” “from which,” “through which,” and “for which?” Now he 
“by which” is the cause, “from which” matter; “through which” 
instrument; and “for which” the object.592  
 
Philo’s description in Cher. 125 is based on the well-known metaphysics of 
prepositions.593 In Cher. 128 Philo explains that the human being is only an 
instrument (ὄργανον) through whom (δι’ ὧν) the energies of the soul are 
developed, both in states of tension and relaxation. It is God who makes the 
“percussion” (πλῆξις) for the “potentialities of the body and soul” and by 
whom (ὑφ’ οὗ) all is put in motion (πάντα κινεῖται).594 The distribution of the 
natures of Adam in Exc. Theod. 55-56 can be comprehended in the light of 
discussion in Philo’s Cher. 125-128. This would mean that concerning the 
psychical and spiritual essences Adam is only an instrumental cause (δι’ 
αὐτοῦ), not an efficient cause (ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ). Only the hylic and irrational soul of 
Adam is capable of mixing with his semen and proceeding to later 
generations.595 Adam can only be an instrumental cause for the two higher 
                                                 
591 Οὔτ’ οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματος, οὔτ’ οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμφυσήματος, σπείρει ὁ Ἀδάμ· θεῖα γὰρ ἄμφω, καὶ δι’ 
αὐτοῦ μέν, οὐχ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ δέ, προβάλλεται ἄμφω. Τὸ δὲ ὑλικὸν αὐτοῦ ἐνεργὸν εἰς σπέρμα καὶ γένεσιν, ὡς ἂν τῷ 
σπέρματι συγκεκραμένον, καὶ ταύτης ἐν ζωῇ τῆς ἁρμονίας ἀποστῆναι μὴ δυνάμενον. Κατὰ τοῦτο, πατὴρ ἡμῶν ὁ 
Ἀδάμ, “ὁ πρῶτος [δ’] ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός.” Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ ψυχικοῦ ἔσπειρεν καὶ ἐκ πνευματικοῦ, καθάπερ ἐξ 
ὑλικοῦ, πάντες ἂν ἴσοι καὶ δίκαιοι ἐγεγόνεισαν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἂν ἡ διδαχὴ ἦν. Διὰ τοῦτο πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ ὑλικοί, οὐ 
πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ ψυχικοί · σπάνιοι δὲ οἱ πνευματικοί.  
592 τί δήποτε; ὅτι ὁ θεὸς αἴτιον, οὐκ ὄργανον, τὸ δὲ γινόμενον δι’ ὀργάνου μὲν ὑπὸ δὲ αἰτίου πάντως γίνεται. 
πρὸς γὰρ τήν τινος γένεσιν πολλὰ δεῖ συνελθεῖν, ¦ τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ, τὸ ἐξ οὗ, τὸ δι’ οὗ, τὸ δι’ ὅ· καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν ὑφ’ οὗ 
τὸ αἴτιον, ἐξ οὗ δὲ ἡ ὕλη, δι’ οὗ δὲ τὸ ἐργαλεῖον, δι’ ὃ δὲ ἡ αἰτία. (Cher. 125) My translation. 
593 For the “metaphysics of the prepositions” in Middle Platonism, see the discussion in H. Dörrie, 
“Präpositionen und Metaphysik: Wechselwirkung zweier Prinziepienreihen,” MH 26 (1969), 217-228; 
Wolfson, Philo I, 261ff; Tobin, The Creation of Man, 66-71; Runia, Philo of Alexandria, 171ff. 
594 Cher. 128. ὄργανα γὰρ ἡμεῖς, δι’ ὧν αἱ κατὰ μέρος ἐνέργειαι, ἐπιτεινόμενα καὶ ἀνιέμενα, τεχνίτης δὲ ὁ 
τὴν πλῆξιν ἐργαζόμενος τῶν σώματός τε καὶ ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, ὑφ’ οὗ πάντα κινεῖται. 
595 This parallels Aristotle’s view according to which human parents are not capable of mediating 
the mind in its active stage to their children. The mind is present already in the human semen, but only 
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soul parts, although the spiritual seed must be put in motion and activated 
through teaching (διδαχή).596 It is namely stated that if Adam had seeded 
both psychic and spiritual elements as he seeded the hylic soul, then “the 
teaching would have been in all” (ἐν πᾶσιν ἂν ἡ διδαχὴ ἦν). The most logical 
interpretation would be that that the spiritual seed within psychic soul was 
activated through knowledge and teaching. 
In Valentinian soteriology the activation of the spiritual soul parallels the 
phases of salvation of Sophia. Firstly, Sophia was given form by Christ, who 
bestowed the promise of light and immortality on Sophia. Secondly, the 
Savior formed Sophia according to knowledge through which she became 
spiritual and began to procreate. As descendants of Adam, all humans are by 
nature born in a similar stage as Sophia outside the Pleroma and they have 
the capability of activating their spiritual potentialities through teaching, 
which contains the promise of better things. The psychic soul includes the 
spiritual seed as in a womb and it longs for immortality, but it must be 
formed and activated by spiritual teaching (sermoni perfecto).597 It seems, 
thus, that all human beings begin their life in a psychic condition and they 
have a spiritual intellect in a potential stage within their soul.598 Therefore, 
the categories of humankind were not fixed according to one’s nature, but 
according to one’s choice. The flexibility of these soteriological categories of 
humankind is mentioned in the following accounts. 
                                                                                                                                          
potentially. The mind must be activated through contemplation. Ar. De Gen. An. II 3. Luthikuizen, 
Gnostic Revisions, 40-41; John M. Rist, The Mind of Aristotle: a Study in Philosophical Growth 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 180-181.  
596 This seems to parallel Aristotle, who says that “a man begets a man” (ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον 
γεννᾷ), which means that all the mental capacities are mediated to the later generations through 
natural procreations. The form of the body, i.e. the soul, does not exist independently, but it is 
mediated through the natural generation (Ar. Met. Z, 8:1033b20-34a). The higher capacities of the soul 
(reason and the mind) must be activated through education and contemplation because they are 
present only potentially in the material soul.  
597 In Epiphanius’s Greek text there is only …ἕτοιμον γένηται πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ τελείου < Λόγου>. 
The Latin version has perfactae rationis and Tertuallian sermoni perfecto (Adv.Val. 25.2). See Unger 
& Dillon, Against the Heresies, 163. 
598 Thomassen is of the opinion that according to Heracleon’s fragments all humans were psychic 
before the advent of the Savior. Human beings fall into three categories (hylic, psychic and spiritual 
categories) through their responding to the gospel.  Heracleon rejects the idea that those who acted in a 
material way did so according to their nature (φύσις). One is not material by nature, but they become so 
through their behavior. As in the Tripartite Tractate, unhesitating recognition of the Savior was 
characteristic of the pneumatics. The psychics hesitated, while the material ones rejected the Savior 
completely (Tri.Trac. 118-119).  Thomassen says that there may have been an inner-Valentinian debate 
concerning the status of human beings before the advent of the Savior. Cf. Einar Thomassen, 
“Heracleon,” in Legacy of John: Second-Century Reception of the Fourth Gospel (Leiden, Brill: 2010), 
182-183, 190-193).   
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Exc. Theod. 56.2  
The pneumatics are saved by nature, but the psychics are 
independent and have the capability for faith and indestructibility as 
well as unbelief and destruction according to their choice. But the 
hylics perish by nature.599 
Iren. Haer. 1.6.1 
There are, thus, three essences, the material, which they call “the left 
ones,” which must of necessity perish, inasmuch as it is incapable of 
receiving any breath of incorruption. The psychics, whom they call 
“the right ones,” are in the middle of the material and spiritual 
[beings], and pass to the side according to their inclination. But the 
spirituals are sent to form a union with the psychics and teach them 
conversion.600  
 
There are two opposite categories of human beings, the spiritual ones and the 
hylics, whose positions are defined according to their nature. The psychics 
belong to the middle category, having a free power (αὐτεξούσιον) and 
capability (ἐπιτηδειότητα) for both destruction and faith. It is noticeable that 
although there are three categories of human beings, there are only two 
options for the choices. The soul can either choose salvation or destruction. 
There is no such choice in becoming a psychic, but the human soul is psychic 
because it has capability of making a choice between two options.601 Irenaeus 
maintained, however, that not all souls have an equal possibility of choosing 
and receiving the spiritual seed.602  
 
 
                                                 
599 Τὸ μὲν οὖν πνευματικὸν φύσει σῳζόμενον· τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν, αὐτεξούσιον ὄν, ἐπιτηδειότητα ἔχει πρός τε 
πίστιν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν, καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ φθοράν, κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν αἵρεσιν· τὸ δὲ ὑλικὸν φύσει ἀπόλλυται. 
(Exc. Theod. 56.2) 
600 Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὑλικὸν, ὃ καὶ ἀριστερὸν καλοῦσι, κατὰ ἀνάγκην ἀπόλλυσθαι λέγουσιν, ἅτε 
μηδεμίαν ἐπιδέξασθαι πνοὴν ἀφθαρσίας δυνάμενον· τὸ δὲ ψυχικὸν, ὃ καὶ δεξιὸν προσαγορεύουσιν, ἅτε μέσον ὂν 
τοῦ τε πνευματικοῦ καὶ ὑλικοῦ, ἐκεῖσε χωρεῖν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ τὴν πρόσκλισιν ποιήσηται· τὸ δὲ πνευματικὸν 
ἐκπεπέμφθαι, ὅπως ἐνθάδε τῷ ψυχικῷ συζυγὲν μορφωθῇ, συμπαιδευθὲν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ἀναστροφῇ (Iren. Haer. 
1.6.1). 
601 This double orientation of the soul is also mentioned in Hippolytus’s account in which the soul 
is the locus where the choices between demons and logoi are made. The logoi cannot exist in the soul 
where demons dwell. Therefore, the soul must make a decision between two options (Hipp.Ref. 
6.32.9). Cf. Dunderberg, “Valentinian Theories,” 146-147; ibid. Beyond Gnosticism, 140-141. 
602 The Gospel of Philip (64:22-31) refers to those who have been baptized but have not received 
anything. It is likely that this refers to some people mentioned in Iren. Haer. 1.7.1 who are never able to 
receive the seed.  
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Iren. Haer. 1.7.5 
And again, they divide the souls by saying that some are by nature 
good and others by nature evil. The good are those who become 
capable of receiving the seed; the evil by nature are those who are 
never able to receive the seed.603 
 
Irenaeus describes here, not the category of psychics but the souls of human 
beings in general. The good souls can receive the seed within the psychic soul 
while the bad ones are never able to receive the seed. Therefore, the hylics, 
who are doomed according to their nature, consist of two kinds of human 
beings. They are those who are not able to receive the seed and those who 
have once received the promise of salvation, but have lost the battle against 
their fleshly passions. It seems that the hylic nature has gradually taken a 
dominant position in humankind because the gift of spirituality was not 
taken in advance by many.604 Therefore, there are only a few spiritual human 
beings, although there were many of them, who were called into life and 
immortality. 
Although there were some hylics who were predestined to damnation, in 
most cases the hylics were simply disillusioned psychics. They were 
annihilated according to their nature because they had not succeeded in the 
activation of the spiritual potentialities within their soul. The spiritual ones 
are good psychics, who have made a choice for the better and succeeded in 
their process of regenerating of self. It is not excluded, however, that there 
were some exceptional human beings who without any choice possessed the 
spiritual seed perfectly and knowledge of the divine things since their birth. 
They parallel the super-sages in the writings of Philo, such as Isaac or Moses. 
They are sent into the world to form a union with those who are making 
progress towards salvation and to teach them conversion. Paul the Apostle 
may for the Valentinians have been the same kind of super sage as Moses was 
for Philo.605  
It seems that the Valentinian theologians did not adopt the division of 
humankind from Paul, who divided the members of the ecclesia the psychics 
and the pneumatics. The basis for the anthropological division was not in 
Christ, as it is in Paul, but in the creation of Adam. This model was closer to 
the division of humankind and the allegory of the soul in Philo’s writings.  
                                                 
603 Καὶ αὐτὰς μὲν τὰς ψυχικὰς [ψυχὰς] πάλιν ὑπομερίζοντες λέγουσιν, ἃς μὲν φύσει ἀγαθὰς, ἃς δὲ φύσει 
πονηράς. Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀγαθὰς ταύτας εἶναι τὰς δεκτικὰς τοῦ σπέρματος γινομένας· τὰς δὲ φύσει πονηρὰς 
μηδέποτε ἂν ἐπιδέξασθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ σπέρμα. 
604  Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 139.  
605 Clement has preserved a legend according to which Valentinus learned his doctrine from 
Theudas, who was a disciple of Paul (Strom. 7.106.4). Paul may have been regarded as the founding 
father of the Valentinian school of thought. Paul’s status in the Valentinian tradition was prominent. In 
some sources he is simply called “the Apostle” without mentioning his name (Exc. Theod. 22.1) and his 
mission was associated with the sending of the “Paraclete” (Exc. Theod. 23:2-4). 
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Philo taught that the creation of a human being in Gen. 1:27 depicts the 
creation of the heavenly man who serves as an ethical goal for the earthly 
souls. The heavenly man represents the perfect man who is not in need of 
instruction, but is self-taught and self-instructed.606 Philo’s allegory of the 
soul served as the basis for the allegory of humankind, which means that 
whole of humankind can be divided into perfect ones and those who are 
making progress. Philo explains this in Her. 56-57: 
For the “Maker of all,” he says, “breathed into his face the breath of 
life and man became a living soul,” just as we are also told that he 
was fashioned after the image of his Maker. So we have two races of 
men, one that of those who live by reason, the divine inbreathing, and 
the other of those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh. This 
last is earthly creation while the other is the faithful impress of the 
divine image.607 
 
In this passage, the two races of human beings do not refer to the heavenly 
man and earthly man but to two categories of earthly men.608 The bipartite 
division of humankind is based on the allegorical reading of the 
anthropological creation narratives of the Bible. Just as the Creator breathed 
the spirit into the earthly mind, so the humankind is divided into those who 
live by the spiritual reason and those who obey the pleasures of the flesh. The 
former category refers to those whose mind imitates the divine mind, i.e. the 
Logos, while the latter group consists of those who have lost their potentiality 
for a virtuous life.  Philo elaborated this distinction in Post. 78-79 by saying 
that those who are living according to the Logos are divided into two sub-
categories, i.e. the perfect ones and those who are still making progress 
towards perfection. Therefore, there are three classes of human beings: 
material, progressive and perfect groups of humans.  
Not without purpose have the differences between these cases been 
recorded in the lawgiver’s pages. For to those who welcome training, 
who make progress, and improve, (τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀσκηταῖς προκόπτουσι) 
witness is borne of their deliberate choice of the good that their very 
endeavour may not be left unrewarded. But the fitting lot of those 
who have been held worthy of a wisdom that needs no other teaching 
and no other learning (τοῖς δ’ αὐτοδιδάκτου καὶ αὐτομαθοῦς σοφίας 
ἀξιωθεῖσιν) is, apart from any agency of their own, to accept from 
God’s hands Reason as their plighted spouse, and to receive 
                                                 
606 Leg. All. 1.53-55, 92-95; Leg. All. 3.140-144; Q.G. 1.8. 
607 “ἐνεφύσησε” γάρ φησιν “ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν,” ᾗ καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ποιητοῦ λόγος ἔχει τυπωθῆναι. ὥστε διττὸν εἶδος 
ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὲν θείῳ πνεύματι λογισμῷ βιούντων, τὸ δὲ αἵματι καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονῇ ζώντων. τοῦτο τὸ εἶδός ἐστι 
πλάσμα γῆς, ἐκεῖνο δὲ θείας εἰκόνος ἐμφερὲς ἐκμαγεῖον. (Her. 56-57). 
608 For the distinction between the heavenly and the earthly races, cf. also Leg. All. 1.31-32 and Leg. 
All. 2.4.  
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Knowledge, which is partner in the life of the wise. But he that has 
been cast away from things human, the low and grovelling Lamech, 
marries as his first wife Ada, which means “Witness.” He has 
arranged the marriage for himself, for he fancies that the prime good 
for a man is the smooth movement and passage of the mind along the 
line of well-aimed projects, with nothing to hinder its working 
towards easy attainment. 
 
Philo maintains that humankind is divided not into two but into three 
categories. The first category of humans is those progressing towards virtue 
while the second represents those who have reached perfection. The third 
category consists of those who have lost their intellectuality absolutely and 
are devoted to earthly things.609 The tripartite division of humankind in the 
Valentinian accounts parallels the division in Philo. Although the idea of 
progress is not explicitly stated in the Valentinian source material described 
above, it is not farfetched to suggest that the psychic humans can be equated 
with this category.610 The psychics are in the middle of the material and the 
spiritual categories and their status depends on their choice. The pneumatics 
are saved according to their nature, which means that they have transformed 
and stabilized their intellect according to the image of the angels. They are 
not in need of instruction or commandments, because they obey the spirit 
spontaneously. 
It is plausible to suggest that the Valentinian teachers did not derive the 
division of humankind from Paul, but from the Gnostic myth, which they 
refined in the light of the anthropologocial allegories attested in Philo’s 
writings. Although the names of the categories of humankind may have been 
derived from Paul’s writings, the allegorical pattern itself comes from the 
Hellenistic Jewish exegetical tradition similar to that of Philo. The division of 
humankind was also related to the allegory of the descendants of Adam − 
Cain, Abel, and Seth – which is found both in Philo and in Valentinian 
sources.  
7.4 Cain, Abel and Seth – the division of humankind and 
Seth as “the seed of human virtue” 
In the allegory of Cain, Abel, and Seth, Philo maintains that Cain and Abel 
represent two attitudes towards God and the virtuous life.611 They are no 
longer distinct persons, but they represent qualities of the same soul. The 
battle between these qualities refers to the mental conflict between self-
                                                 
609 The marriages of the patriarchs were symbols of the unification wisdom. While God arranged 
the marriages of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the marriage of Lamech was arranged by himself.   
610 The idea of progress is mentioned in the Valentinian text the Interpretation of Knowledge (cf. 
below).  
611 Sac. 1-3. 
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loving Cain and God-loving Abel. Although they are both brought forth from 
the same root − as the offspring of Adam − they are enemies of each other 
and combat with each other till some of them finally gain domination.612   
It is a fact that there are two opposite and contending views of life, 
one which ascribed all things to the mind as our master, whether we 
are using our reason or our sense, in motion or at rest, and the other 
which follows God, whose handiwork it believes itself to be. The first 
of these views is figured by Cain who is called Possession because he 
thinks he possesses all things, the other by Abel, whose name is “one 
who refers to God. Now both of these views or conceptions lie in the 
womb of the single soul. But when they are brought to the birth they 
must need to be separated, for enemies cannot live together forever. 
Thus so long as the soul had not brought forth the God-loving 
principle in Abel, the self-loving principle in Cain made her his 
dwelling. But when she bore the principle which acknowledges the 
Cause, she abandoned that which looks to the mind with its fancied 
wisdom.  
 
Philo’s etymological explanation for the name of Cain is “possession” 
(κτῆσις), which means that Cain is a symbol of the self-loving human being 
who takes the honor for himself.  Abel’s name, on the other hand, means 
“referring to God” (ἀναφέρων ἐπὶ θεόν), which means that he gives honor to 
God for all his works. According to Philo, the professions of Cain and Abel 
reflect the basic characteristics of these persons. Abel is a shepherd and Cain 
is a tiller of the ground.613 Allegorically this means that Abel is the shepherd 
of the outward senses while Cain devotes his attention to earthly and 
inanimate objects. The impulses of irrational sense perceptions are equated 
with “cattle,” and it is the task of every wise human being to guide this “herd” 
to reach perfection.614 
The battle between Cain and Abel refers to an ongoing spiritual conflict 
within the human soul. The murder of Abel by self-loving Cain refers to the 
demolition of the God-loving principle of the soul. The Abel-principle depicts 
                                                 
612 Sac. 2-3. It is likely that Philo’s interpretation here presupposes the conception attested in the 
Apocalypse of Moses I 1-3 according to which Cain and Abel were twins. In Genesis Rabbah XXII 3 it is 
stated that Cain and Abel were born simultaneously. The phrase “…and she again bore” implies an 
additional birth, not an additional pregnancy. See Klijn, Seth in Jewish, Christian, and Gnostic 
Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 6-7, 18-19. Philo may have used this assumption in his interpretation 
that the murder of Abel was the destruction of the better part of the same human soul. This parallels 
the birth of the twins in the case of Jacob and Esau, which is used by Philo as an allegory for the 
combat between rational and irrational impulses of the soul (cf. Leg. All. III 88 ff). This would mean 
that Philo saw conflict between Cain and Abel as an analogy with the fight between the twins Jacob and 
Esau.  
613 Sac. 45; QG 1.59 
614 Sac. 104. 
THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF CAIN, ABEL AND SETH AND ISRAEL AS A 
SPIRITUAL HUMAN BEING WHO SEES GOD 
208 
the rational mind, which lost the battle against the fleshly passions at the 
moment it failed to recognize its nothingness and total dependence on God. 
Despite the mental weakness of the human soul, Philo says in Post. 173 that 
the Abel-principle can never be completely killed, because after his death 
Abel only departed to a better abode. This would mean that Philo did not 
require perfection for those who were saved.615 Although the figures of Cain 
and Abel in Philo’s allegory are rather easily understood, Seth is a more 
shadowy figure. In Post. 124 Philo begin to explain the verse in Gen. 4:25 as 
follows:  
Let us consider what may be called the new birth (ὥσπερ 
παλιγγενεσίαν) of the murdered Abel. “Adam,” it says, “knew Eve his 
wife, and she conceived and bare a son, and called his name Seth 
saying: God hath raised up to me another seed in the place of Abel 
(σπέρμα ἕτερον ἀντὶ Ἄβελ), whom Cain slew.”  
 
It unlikely that the “rebirth” (παλιγγενεσία) of Abel in Philo’s commentary 
refers to Abel’s reincarnation in the person of Seth, because it is explicitly 
stated that Seth is another seed instead of Abel (σπέρμα ἕτερον ἀντὶ Ἄβελ). It 
is evident that Philo knew the Platonic meaning of the term as 
“reincarnation,” but he used it metaphorically (…ὥσπερ παλιγγενεσίαν) in his 
allegorical reading of Gen. 4:25.616  In Philo, the term παλιγγενεσία refers 
usually to the liberation of the ruling part of the soul from the fleshly passion 
and its unification with the Logos. It describes the migration of the soul 
towards immortality and apart from some exceptional humans, such as 
Moses or Isaac, it is a lifelong process, which will not be made perfect until 
the final separation of the soul and body in death.617  
Philo gives an allegorical explanation for Seth’s name, which means 
“watering” (ποτισμός).618 This name means that Seth is a symbol of the 
human being whose sense organs are “watered” through the rational spirit. 
                                                 
615 Det. 47-51; Post. 170-173. 
616 Sami Yli-Karjanmaa interpretes παλιγγενεσία in Post. 124 as a sort of hidden reference to 
reincarnation, although he maintains that “the possibility of Philo’s meaning that Seth’s soul had 
actually been Abel’s would also be anomalous given that the later entity is inferior to the earlier one.” 
Cf. Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation in Philo of Alexandria (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015), 162-167.  
617 In Cher. 113-115 Philo says that the human soul should not proceed to irrational passions but to 
its regeneration (παλιγγενεσίαν ὁρμήσομεν). For analysis of the term παλιγγενεσία in Philo see Fred. W. 
Burnett, “Philo on Immortality: A Thematic Study of Philo’s Concept of παλιγγενεσία,” in CBQ 46 
(1984), 447-470. Cf. also Wolfson, Philo I, 405. 
618 The etymology of the name of Seth is attested in Post. 10, 124, 126 and 170. In QG, I 78 Philo 
gives another explanation and says that Seth means the “one who drinks water.” There is not 
necessarily a contradiction between these etymologies, it is merely that the point of view is different. In 
Post. 173 the focus is on the principle of virtue, i.e. the “heavenly Seth,” but in QG I 78 the focus is on 
the earthly representation of Seth, a perfect human being, who is constantly living in the presence of 
the wisdom of God. 
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Philo also pondered what Moses meant by saying that God has raised Eve 
another seed (σπέρμα ἕτερον). Philo defines that it was the seed that 
superseded all the mortal seed, including the seed of Abel, being a sort of 
seed above. Abel’s seed was connected to the mortal body and after having 
quitted the mortal body, it departed to the better existence in heaven. The 
seed of Seth was different, because it was the seed of human virtue, and it 
will never quit the race of mankind (ὁ δὲ Σὴθ ἅτε σπέρμα ὢν ἀνθρωπίνης ἀρετῆς 
οὐδέποτε τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολείψει γένος). Thus, Seth represents the seed of 
virtue, which forms the basis for the growth of the virtuous generations of 
Noah, Abraham, and Moses. There was a sense of progression among these 
generations. Noah was more virtuous than Seth and Abraham continued 
where Noah ended, but Moses was the “hierophant of the sacred way of life” 
(ὥσπερ ἱεροφάντης ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις ποιούμενος τὰς διατριβάς).619   
In Philo, the seed of Seth represented the collective “personality” of all 
wise humans. It was not a distinct race, but a collective representation of the 
virtuous mind. A. F. J. Klijin has pointed out that Philo is probably the first 
Jewish author who mentions the idea of Seth as a symbol of human virtue 
and a representative of righteous human beings.620 Philo does not connect 
the figure of Seth with some historically known group or ethnically distinct 
race, but he was a symbol for all those who were striving for the virtuous life 
or symbolized the seed of virtue itself. In Sethian Gnosticism Seth was seen 
as a historical progenitor of a distinct “spiritual race.”621 In the Gnostic 
sources, it was usual to think that Cain and Abel were born as a result of the 
defilement of Eve. This motif is absent in Philo’s writings.622 Strikingly the 
                                                 
619 Post. 173-174 
620 Klijn, Seth, 26-27. 
621 In the patristic documents an early Christian group called the Sethians is mentioned by 
Irenaeus (Iren. Haer. 1.1.30) as Sethian-Ophites, by Pseudo-Tertullian (Against All Heresies) as 
Sethians, by Hippolytus (Ref. V 20) as Sethians and by Epiphanius (Pan.39-40) as Sethians or 
Archontics. In the Nag Hammadi library, there are many documents where Seth and his race play a 
dominant role. The most important of these texts is a book called the Apocalypse of Adam, where 
Adam gives a testamentary revelation to his son Seth. The Gospel of Egyptians contains a highly 
articulated doctrine of Seth and his role as a Savior figure. The book called Allogenes is also regarded 
as a Sethian document because, according to Epiphanius’s report, the Sethians possessed a book of that 
name. Cf. Pearson’s article “The Figure of Seth in Gnostic Literature,” in Birger Pearson, Gnosticism, 
Judaism and Egyptian Christianity, 473-478 and Klijin, Seth, 90-107.     
622 For the generation of Cain, Abel and Seth in the Gnostic writings, cf. especially Hyp. Arch. 
91:11-92:2 and the longer recession of the Ap. John 24:15-36. In these texts, Cain or both Cain and Abel 
are the offsprings that resulted from the union of Eve and the archons. Pearson suggests that these 
speculations are based on the earlier Jewish haggadic traditions according to which Cain and Abel were 
the sons of the devil rather than of Adam. Pearson refers to Targum Ps. –Jonathan, which contains a 
tradition according to which Eve was made pregnant by Sammael, the angel of death. Cf. Pearson, 
“Seth in Gnostic Literature,” 478-479. Klijn also refers to the stories in Genesis Rabbah and Pirke de 
Rabbi Eliezer according to which Cain was not Adam’s son and Adam did not have intercourse with 
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allegory of Cain, Abel and Seth is found in the Valentinian accounts, which 
parallel Philo’s allegory. 
 
Exc. Theod. 54.1-3 
From Adam, three natures were begotten. The first was irrational 
which was Cain’s, the second the rational and righteous, which was 
Abel’s, the third the spiritual, which was Seth’s. Now that which is 
earthly is “according to the image,” that which is psychical according 
to the likeness of God, and the spiritual is the seed of his own; and 
with references to these three, without the other children of Adam, it 
was said, “This is the book of the generation of men.” And because 
Seth was spiritual he neither tends the flock nor tills the soil but 
produces a child as the spiritual beings do. And him who “hoped to 
call upon the name of the Lord” who looked upward and whose 
“commonwealth is in heaven” – him the world does not contain.623 
 
Iren. Haer. 1.7.5 
They conceive, then, of three kinds of men, spiritual, material and 
animal, represented by Cain, Abel, and Seth. These three natures are 
no longer found in one person but constitute various kinds of men. 
The material goes, as a matter of course, into corruption. The animal, 
if it makes choice of the better part, finds repose in the intermediate 
place; but if the worst, it too shall pass into the worst.624 
 
The allegory of Cain, Abel and Seth is connected in these passages to the 
threefold division of humankind. In Exc. Theod. 54.1 it is stated that from 
Adam three natures (τρεῖς φύσεις) were born, which formed the “book of 
generations of men” (ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων).  The irrational nature of 
the soul refers to Cain, the reasonable and just nature to Abel, and the 
spiritual nature to Seth. The earthly soul is created according to the image, 
                                                                                                                                          
Eve before he begot Seth. The speculation concerning Seth’s presence during Adam’s burial and his 
astrological knowledge in Vita Adae et Evae and Josephus (Ant. I 60-65) are according to Klijin 
isolated stories that should be distinguished from aforesaid Jewish Haggadic literature. Cf. Klijin, Seth, 
6-10, 119.   
623 Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ τρεῖς φύσεις γεννῶνται· πρώτη μὲν ἡ ἄλογος, ἧς ἦν Κάιν· δευτέρα δὲ ἡ λογικὴ καὶ ἡ 
δικαία, ἧς ἦν Ἄβελ· τρίτη δὲ ἡ πνευματική, ἧς ἦν Σήθ. Καὶ ὁ μὲν χοϊκός ἐστι “κατ’ εἰκόνα”· ὁ δὲ ψυχικὸς “καθ’ 
ὁμοίωσιν” Θεοῦ· ὁ δὲ πνευματικὸς κατ’ ἰδίαν· ἐφ’ οἷς τρισίν, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων παίδων τοῦ Ἀδάμ, εἴρηται· “Αὕτη 
ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων.” Ὅτι δὲ πνευματικὸς ὁ Σήθ, οὔτε ποιμαίνει, οὔτε γεωργεῖ, ἀλλὰ παῖδα 
καρποφορεῖ, ὡς τὰ πνευματικά. Καὶ τοῦτον, ὃς “ἤλπισεν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸ Ὄνομα Κυρίου,” ἄνω βλέποντα, οὗ “τὸ 
πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανῷ,” τοῦτον ὁ κόσμος οὐ χωρεῖ. 
624 Ἀνθρώπων δὲ τρία γένη ὑφίστανται, πνευματικὸν, χοϊκὸν, ψυχικὸν, καθὼς ἐγένοντο Κάϊν, Ἄβελ, Σήθ· 
καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰς τρεῖς φύσεις, οὐκέτι καθ’ ἓν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος. Καὶ τὸ μὲν χοϊκὸν εἰς φθορὰν χωρεῖν· καὶ τὸ 
ψυχικὸν, ἐὰν τὰ βελτίονα ἕληται, ἐν τῷ τῆς μεσότητος τόπῳ ἀναπαύ[σ]εσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ χείρω, χωρήσειν καὶ 
αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ ὅμοια.  
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whereas the psychic soul is created according to the likeness of God (Gen. 
1:26). The spiritual part of the soul is distinct (κατ’ ἰδίαν) from these lower 
elements of the soul, because it has been created according to the Savior’s 
angels and implanted secretly into Adam’s earthly soul (Gen. 1:27; 2:7). It 
was then Seth only who activated the spiritual nature inherited from his 
father, Adam.  
The seed of Seth in the Valentinian accounts parallels Philo’s conception 
of it as another seed (σπέρμα ἕτερον) or the seed virtue (σπέρμα ἀρετῆς). The 
figure of Seth is a symbol of those who have activated their spiritual 
potentialities. In Philo, the seed of Seth became both one and many. On the 
one hand, it refers to the spiritual mind of Seth, but its presence expanded to 
the later generations (Noah, Abraham, Moses, etc.), who participated in the 
same seed of virtue. In the Valentinian system, the spiritual seed is both an 
inner man and an image of the ecclesia above, which means that the seed is 
both one and many.625 It is implanted in the soul of Adam and mediated to 
Seth, who is a symbol of the perfect man.626 The spiritual humans participate 
in the same seed of Seth, which was created as an image of the angels of the 
Savior.627   
In Exc. Theod. 54 the natures of the descendants of Adam are related to 
their professions: Cain tills the soil and Abel tends the flock. As in Philo, the 
profession of Seth is not mentioned. It is only mentioned that Seth was 
spiritual and, therefore, he neither tends the flock nor tills the soil, but 
produces a child as the spiritual beings do (Ὅτι δὲ πνευματικὸς ὁ Σήθ, οὔτε 
ποιμαίνει, οὔτε γεωργεῖ, ἀλλὰ παῖδα καρποφορεῖ, ὡς τὰ πνευματικά). Seth 
represents a perfect human being who does not work like those who are still 
progressing (Abel) or who are attracted to fleshly things (Cain), but instead 
produces spiritual offspring. The term καρποφορεῖν resemblances the 
expression in Valentinus’s psalm Harvest, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter. Valentinus writes that the Spirit produces a harmonious 
soul which is depicted as begetting children and producing fruit from the 
depths (ἐκ δὲ βυθοῦ καρποὺς φερομένους, ἐκ μήτρας δὲ βρέφος φερόμενον).628 
                                                 
625 Iren. Haer. 1.5.4. 
626 It is likely that the view that Seth was the first perfect man, who could activate the spiritual 
potentialities inherited from his father was based on Gen. 5:3: “When Adam had lived 130 years, he 
had a son in his own likeness, in his own image; and he named him Seth.” Seth was a perfect copy of 
Adam’s soul and therefore, he possessed all the essences of his father, including the spiritual nature.  
627 Iren. Haer. 1.4.5. 
628 It is not clear, however, whether producing fruit refers to producing good works or winning 
converts.  Paul compared the good character with the fruits of the Spirit: “But the fruit of the Spirit (ὁ 
δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματός) is love, joy, peace, forbearance, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, 
and self-control. Against such things, there is no law.” (Gal. 5:22-23). In the Gospel of John producing 
fruits was also used as a metaphor for making converts. “You have not chosen me, but I have chosen 
you. I have appointed you to go and produce fruit (καρπὸν φέρητε) that will last, so that whatever you 
ask the Father in my name, he will give it to you.” (John. 15:16). According to Irenaeus, the Valentinian 
THE ALLEGORICAL EXEGESIS OF CAIN, ABEL AND SETH AND ISRAEL AS A 
SPIRITUAL HUMAN BEING WHO SEES GOD 
212 
In Philo’s allegory, Seth represents the mind, which “waters” the bodily 
organs in harmony with the cosmic mind, i.e. the Logos. Seth is a perfect 
man who controls his sense perceptions and gives honor to God for 
everything. Although Seth in the Valentinian allegory is also a symbol of a 
perfect man, the metaphor of his profession is somewhat different. Seth does 
not “water” the lower soul parts, but he “produces fruit.” In both cases, 
however, the metaphor of Seth’s essence is related to natural growth. It 
reflects the ancient ideal of the perfect human being who obeys right reason 
intuitively, “by nature”, without any command or instruction.629  
While Seth represents perfection, Abel in Philo’s allegory belongs in the 
middle category. He is not perfect, but he is struggling against passions and 
making progress in the virtuous life. In the Valentinian account, Abel is 
referred to as a psychic human who can reach salvation according to his 
choice. He is equal with those in Philo’s teaching who are making progress in 
virtue being on the boundary between two extremes. They frequently go up 
and down as on a ladder, whereas the wicked, i.e. those who are similar to 
Cain, will go to Hades.630 
The Valentinian allegory of Cain, Abel and Seth is thus closer to Philo’s 
symbolic view than to the Gnostic speculation of Seth’s race. In the 
Valentinians accounts Cain, Abel, and Seth are allegorical symbols of the 
categories of humankind, not progenitors of distinct “races.” Seth is 
associated with the spiritual seed, which is distinct from the seed of Cain and 
Abel. This parallels Philo’s depiction of Seth as “another seed.” Both accounts 
can be interpreted in the light of Aristotelian theories concerning the 
generation of the “mind,” i.e. the intellect, which is another genus compared 
with the rational part of the soul.631 Although the intellect is inherited – in 
most cases – simultaneously through natural procreation by God’s 
providence, it must be awakened and made active through philosophy and 
contemplation.632 
                                                                                                                                          
teachers were active in initiating ordinary Christian, i.e. the psychics, into the mysteries of Achamoth 
(Iren. Haer. 1.6.1-4). Cf. the analysis of Valentinus’s psalm Haervest (Hipp. Ref. 6. 37:7) in chapter 6.  
629 Ismo Dunderberg, Gnostic Morality Revisited (WUNT 347; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 81-
86. 
630 Somn. 1.151 
631 De Anim. II, 2. 
632 It seems that later on the symbolical and mythical merged in the Valentinian and Sethian 
Gnostic traditions. Hippolytus (Ref. 5.20) describes some Gnostic groups which developed the role of 
Seth in a more symbolical direction. Seth functions as a symbol of Light that is contrasted with 
Darkness (Cain) and the Intermediate Spirit (Abel). Cf. Pearson, “Seth in the Gnostic Literature,” 490-
491. Although the illicit generation of Cain and Abel is absent in the accounts of Irenaeus and Clement, 
it is attested in Val. Exp. 38:22 according to which the Devil begot Cain and Abel. Cf. Geliahu A. G. 
Stroumsa, Another Seed: Studies in Gnostic Mythology (Leiden: Brill, 1984, 33-34.) 
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7.5 The allegory of the patriarchs and the allegory of 
Israel  
Philo says that all humans share the same spiritual goal. According to Philo, 
“God has created no soul absolutely barren of good, even if the employment 
of that good be beyond the reach of some people.”633 However, only a few 
persons can reach perfection during their lifetime. Some of them are born as 
sages and some others re-born as sages. The majority of people are those who 
are making laborious progress and will not achieve regeneration 
(παλιγγενεσία) until they have left behind their earthly life. The 
transformation of the self and perfection can be reached according to Philo in 
different ways.634 The historical journeys of the patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob) represent the methods of spiritual growth, and their marriages 
are symbols of devotion to divine Wisdom.635  
Philo maintains that the triad of the patriarchs represents the common 
ancient pedagogical method through which one can reach the virtuous life 
and freedom from the fleshly passions. The perfection of the soul can be 
reached “through nature, learning and practice” (διὰ φύσεως καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ 
ἀσκήσεως). Philo calls these methods “gifts” (χάριτες) because they are divine 
means for perfecting the soul and achieving excellence.636 In this pedagogical 
                                                 
633 Leg. All. 1.34. 
634 Wolfson, Philo II, 7-11, 83-84, 92. While the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob offer models 
for human perfection, the virtues of Moses, however, superceded the capabilities of ordinary humans. 
Moses was according to Philo, the greatest and most perfect of men (Mos. 1.1). The virtues of Moses 
went beyond what any Stoic sage could ever possess. Cf. David Winston, “Sage and Supersage,” 815-24; 
Ian W. Scott, “Is Philo’s Moses a Divine Man?” Studia Philonica Annual 14 (2002), 87-111. Sandmel 
maintains that although Moses was greater than the other patriarchs, his spiritual goal was the same as 
all other humans. The only differentiation made is only, how he reached the goal, for the goal is the 
same. Cf. Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 24-26, 56-62, 84-88; also Burket, “Philo on Immortality,” 455. 
I suggest, however, that Moses was exceptional and the final destiny of Moses also differed from that of 
other sages. The difference between Moses and other human beings did not concern only the method 
through which the perfection was achieved, but its quality. 
635 Philo’s allegories of the patriarchs parallel with Neoplatonists, who saw the adventures of 
Odysseus as descriptions of the soul’s journey to its true homeland in heaven. Thomas Tobin points out 
that this kind of allegorical interpretation is also attested in Numenius (Fragment 33). The closest 
parallel comes, however, from Plutarch. In Quest. Conv. 9.14.6 Plutarch’s teacher M. Annius 
Ammonius talks about the interpretation of the encounter between Odysseus and the Sirens. The 
music of the Sirens attracts the soul upward after its death. The event in the physical world of the myth 
has become an archetype of the soul’s ascent into heaven. Tobin suggests that this Homeric allegory of 
Plutarch is quite similar to Philo’s allegories of journeys of the patriarchs, which depict the soul’s 
journey to heaven. Cf. Tobin, The Creation of Man, 150-151; Winston, Logos, 36-37.  
636 Praem. 27-51; Abr. 54. The three elements necessary to the acquisition of virtue go back to 
Aristotle, and it was adopted in the Platonic tradition of Alexandria. In the Pythagorica, the triad is 
mentioned in the form physis, ascesis, and eidesis. See Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 152.  Wolfson 
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triad Abraham represents “learning” through faith (πίστις). Isaac is a symbol 
of virtue, which is based on “nature” and spiritual joy (χαρά). Jacob 
represents virtue which was based on “practice” and rewarded by the vision 
of God (ὅρασις θεοῦ). Philo maintained, however, that these methods were not 
three distinct means to the virtuous life, as some philosophers taught, but 
they instead formed a unified whole.637 
But indeed, we must not fail to note that each possesses the three 
qualities but gets his name from that which chiefly predominates in 
him. For teaching cannot be consummated without nature or 
practice, nor is nature capable of reaching its zenith without learning 
and practicing, nor practice either unless the foundation of nature.638 
 
Although all these methods were needed for the virtuous life, the intuitive 
knowledge, represented by Isaac had a special role in the pedagogical triad. It 
was based on one’s innate character and served as a root (ῥίζα) for the other 
two methods. Philo says that any practice or learning is of no use without a 
good character. Although all humans possess to some degree an innate 
capacity for virtuous life, this capacity must be strengthened by education 
and practice to reach its perfection.  
There being, then, three methods by which wisdom increases, it is the 
first and third that are most intimately connected; for what comes by 
practice is the offspring and product of that which comes by learning; 
whereas that which comes by nature is, to be sure, kin with them, 
being like a root at the bottom of all three.639  
 
Michael L. Satlow suggests, however, that Isaac is not “imitable” because he 
possessed perfection from his birth, like Moses. Only the two other methods, 
the way of Abraham (learning) and the way of Jacob (practice) are open to 
“ordinary humans.” Satlow maintains that learning, i.e. philosophy, is the 
superior path because it changes the ontological status of the human soul, 
whereas the way of Jacob, i.e. ascesis, leads to “non-linear progress.” 
Although Abraham evidently reached perfection during his lifetime, Jacob’s 
                                                                                                                                          
has pointed out that there was disagreement between the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions of 
philosophical paideia, and Philo was actually closer to the Peripatetic tradition. Cf. Wolfson, Philo II, 
196-199. 
637 Satlow sees that these two paths, philosophy and practice, were exemplified in two ancient 
communities described by Philo: the Therapeutae followed Abraham’s model in their contemplative 
life, whereas the Essenes represented the path of Jacob. See Michael L. Satlow, “Philo on Human 
Perfection,” JTS 59 (2008), 511-512, 515-518. 
638 Abr. 53. 
639 Somn. 1.169. 
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character remained vague. It is doubtful whether he reached perfection at 
all.640 
According to Philo, all patriarchs represented the spiritual Israel, 
although the name Israel was given first to Jacob as he wrestled with the 
angel of God.641 Philo states that the name Israel means allegorically “a 
human being who sees God.”642 Philo’s allegory of the pedagogical triad is not 
mentioned in the Valentinian sources. However, the allegory of “Israel as the 
one who sees God” is mentioned in Exc. Theod. 56.5.643 The context of the 
allegory of Israel is the eschatological gathering of the psychics and 
pneumatics in the light of Paul’s metaphor of the olive tree in Romans 11:23-
26.   
When, then, the psychics “are engrafted on the olive tree” into faith 
and incorruptibility and share “the fatness of the olive tree” and when 
“the Gentiles come in,” then “thus shall all Israel be saved.” But Israel 
means allegorically a pneumatic one, who sees God, the legitimate 
son of faithful Abraham, he who was born of the free woman, not he 
who was born according to flesh from the Egyptian slave. Therefore, 
it happens from the three categories the formation of the pneumatic 
and a change of the psychic from slavery to freedom.644 
 
The allegory of Israel also appears in Clement’s writings. Clement mentions it 
in Paed. 1.57.2 and in Strom. 1.31.4.645 It is noteworthy that the allegory of 
                                                 
640 Mut. 83-86. The names of the patriarchs reflect their regenerated self. Philo notices that Jacob 
is occasionally called in the Bible by his former name. This may mean that the change of Jacob’s 
ontological status was vague. 
641 Mig. 125; Abr. 56-57; Praem. 44. 
642 Congr. 146-147; Somn. I 170-171. The allegory of Israel is attested twelve times in the writings of 
Philo: Fug.139, 208, Conf. 92, 146, Heres 78, Mut. 82-83, Somn. 1.171, Somn. 2.173, Praem. 44, Congr. 
51, Abr. 57, Mig.125. Philo mentions many times the faculty of seeing as a characteristic of the perfect 
human being, but it is not always related to the allegory of Israel. Generally, Philo compared knowing 
with seeing: God’s voice was not heard, but seen.  
643 Exc. Theod. 56.5. 
644 Τὸ μὲν οὖν πνευματικὸν φύσει σῳζόμενον· τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν, αὐτεξούσιον ὄν, ἐπιτηδειότητα ἔχει πρός τε 
πίστιν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν, καὶ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν καὶ φθοράν, κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν αἵρεσιν· τὸ δὲ ὑλικὸν φύσει ἀπόλλυται. 
Ὅταν οὖν τὰ ψυχικὰ “ἐγκεντρισθῇ τῇ καλλιελαίῳ” εἰς πίστιν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν, καὶ μετάσχῃ “τῆς πιότητος τῆς 
ἐλαίας,” καὶ ὅταν “εἰσέλθῃ τὰ ἔθνη,” τότε “οὕτω πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ [σωθήσεται].” Ἰσραὴλ δὲ ἀλληγορεῖται ὁ 
πνευματικός, ὁ ὀψόμενος τὸν Θεόν, ὁ τοῦ πιστοῦ Ἀβραὰμ υἱὸς γνήσιος ὁ “ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας,” οὐχ ὁ ”κατὰ 
σάρκα,” ὁ ἐκ τῆς δούλης τῆς Αἰγυπτίας Γίνεται οὖν, ἐκ τῶν γενῶν τῶν τριῶν, τοῦ μὲν μόρφωσις τοῦ 
πνευματικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ μετάθεσις τοῦ ψυχικοῦ ἐκ δουλείας εἰς ἐλευθερίαν.  
645 In Paed. 1.57.2 the allegory of Israel is related to the interpretation of Jacob’s wrestling with an 
angel, in which the context was the naming of Jacob. It is noteworthy that the angel who wrestled with 
Jacob was according to Clement the Logos, God, the “teacher” (ὁ θεός, ὁ λόγος, ὁ παιδαγωγός). Philo calls 
the Logos an angel in Mut. 87, which is quite likely behind Clement’s interpretation. In Strom. 1.31.4 
the allegory of Israel is related to the discussion of the wives of the patriarchs and the change of Jacob’s 
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Israel in Strom. 1.31.4 is part of one of the four main blocks where Clement 
mentions Philo by name: “ἑρμηνεύει δὲ ὁ Φίλων …” (1.31.1). Therefore, it is 
sure that this allegory goes back to Philo. In addition to Strom. 1.31.1, 
Clement mentions Philo by name in Strom. 1.72.4, 1.153.2 and 2.100.3. It is 
therefore highly plausible to suggest that the Valentinian variant of the 
allegory in Exc. C also goes back to Philo. It is noteworthy that in Exc. Theod. 
56.5 the allegory of Israel is related to Isaac, who is depicted as “a lawful son” 
of Abraham.  Significantly, there is only one occasion in Philo, in Fug. 208, 
where he connects the allegory of Israel to Isaac:   
For so doing thou shalt give birth with easy travail to a male 
offspring, Ishmael by name, since thou shalt have been chastened by 
hearkening to words of God; Hearing takes the second place yielding 
the first to sight, and sight is the portion of Israel, the lawful and 
firstborn son; for “seeing God” is the translation of Israel. It is 
possible to hear the false and take it for true because hearing is 
deceptive, but sight, by which we discern what really is, is devoid of 
falseness.646 
 
The term used by Philo for Isaac is γνήσιος υἱός, which appears 14 times in 
Philo. It is used five times as a designation for Isaac (Abr. 110, 132, 168 and 
254), but Philo uses it only once in the allegory of Israel. It is noteworthy that 
Isaac is not called “lawful son” in Septuagint or other surviving Hellenistic 
Jewish material. It is rather likely that Philo himself invented the term.647 
The term “lawful son” is not restricted in Philo to Isaac only. Also, Jacob’s 
sons with Leah are called “lawful sons” and Moses is contrasted with his 
father’s “lawful sons.”648 In these cases the term “lawful son” refers to the 
offspring who are born in a legal marriage and it does not have distinctively 
spiritual meaning. The spiritual connotation of the term is, however, quite 
evident in the case of Isaac. Philo says that the holiest mystery for those who 
have been initiated into the allegorical mysteries of Torah is that it was God 
                                                                                                                                          
name. It is likely, then, that the allegory in Strom. 1.31.4 is a combination of Philo’s Congr. 51 and Her. 
36 where Philo declares that Jacob is finally initiated into the “seeing race” (διορατικῷ γένει). Cf. van 
den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria, 181. 
646 οὕτως γὰρ πραϋτόκοις ὠδῖσιν ἄρρενα γενεὰν ἀποκυήσεις, ὄνομα Ἰσμαήλ᾽ἀκοαῖς θείαις σωφρονισθεῖσα· 
ἑρμηνεύεται γὰρ Ἰσμαὴλ ἀκοὴ θεοῦ. ἀκοὴ δ’ ὁράσεως τὰ δευτερεῖα φέρεται, ὅρασιν δὲ ὁ γνήσιος υἱὸς καὶ 
πρωτόγονος Ἰσραὴλ κεκλήρωται· μεταληφθεὶς γάρ ἐστιν ὁρῶν θεόν. ἀκούειν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψευδῶν ὡς ἀληθῶν 
ἔνεστιν, ὅτι ἀπατηλὸν ἀκοή, ἀψευδὲς δ’ ὅρασις, ᾗ τὰ ὄντα ὄντως κατανοεῖται. 
647 The term “lawful son” has a spiritual meaning in Corpus Hermeticum (CH 13) where Tat wants 
an explanation for the regeneration and begs: “Do not refuse me, father; I am your true son (γνήσιος 
υἱός); tell me fully the way of rebirth?” (Translation by Salaman, Van Oyen, Wharton, Mahé, New 
Translation of the Corpus Hermeticum (Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2000), 13. The term γνήσιος υἱός 
appears once in Clement (Quis Dives Salvetus IX) as a designation for Christ. This might have been 
caused by Clement’s tendency to equate Isaac and Christ. 
648 Leg.All. 2.94; Deus. 121. 
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who begat Isaac.649 The name Isaac means “laughter,” because God is the 
creator of joy and is Isaac’s real father. In Fug. 208 Isaac is called not only 
“lawful son” but also a first-born (πρωτόγονος) son, which depicts the divine 
origin of Isaac as a son of God (υἱὸς θεοῦ). Thus, Isaac is an earthly image of 
the Logos, whom Philo calls the archetypical first-born (πρωτόγονος) son of 
God.650 
Strikingly, the two passages in Exc. Theod. 56.5 and Philo’s Fug. 208 are 
the only surviving instances where Isaac as a “lawful son of Abraham” and 
the allegory of Israel are explicitly brought together. It is therefore evident 
that the Valentinian teachers knew a similar kind of teaching as in Philo’s 
Fug. 208 which they incorporated into the allegory of the olive tree in Paul’s 
letter to the Romans. It is specifically the category of the psychics that is 
engrafted onto the olive tree, i.e. Israel, who represents a spiritual human 
being who sees God. Therefore, the passage in Exc. Theod, 56.5 is the clearest 
evidence of the Valentinian teaching according to which the psychics are 
explicitly said to be changed into the pneumatics. The psychics, “who are 
born according to the flesh from the Egyptian slave,” experience a change 
“from slavery to freedom.” In the end, the psychics will become the children 
of the free woman and share the same salvation as those who are spiritually 
lawful sons. 
It is not clear whether the Valentinian allegory of Israel speaks about the 
coming together of two groups, i.e. the psychics and pneumatics, or whether 
it depicts the transformation of the mind. Ismo Dunderberg has argued that 
the latter option is the most probable view. He maintains that the 
transformation of the psychics into pneumatics “can be understood as a 
description of the ideal state of mind in which the soul has made the right 
choice – it has chosen the spirit instead of matter – and the spirit and the 
soul now reside together in perfect harmony.”651 Dunderberg’s interpretation 
means that becoming the children of free women depicts the transformation 
of the self, not necessarily the unification of two groups of humans. The 
collective interpretation is, however, also possible, which would mean that 
                                                 
649 Leg. All. 2.218; Mut. 137.  
650 Conf. 146-147. The allegory of Israel as the firstborn who sees God also appears in the Gnostic 
document On the Origin of the World (NHC II, 5). The allegory is linked to the creation of a 
congregation of angels, a firstborn called Israel, and Jesus, before the creation of earthly human beings 
(Orig. World 105, 20-106, 19). In this passage Israel does not refer to the earthly human being, the 
legitimate son of Sarah and Abraham, but he is merely seen as a divine being together with the angels 
and Jesus. It is unlikely, then, that the author of the Orig. World would have been dependent on Philo 
but he may have been familiar with the Valentinian teaching where the allegory of Israel appears. 
There also are some other Valentinian motifs in Orig. World, such as the tripartite division of 
humankind into spiritual, psychic, and earthly categories (Orig. World 121, 27-123, 2). Cf. Birger 
Pearson, Gnosticism and Christianity in Roman and Coptic Egypt (New York; T&T Clark, 2004), 69. 
651 Dunderberg, “Paul and Valentinian Morality,” 166. 
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the salvation of the psychics means engrafting oneself onto those who are 
perfect. The idea of collective salvation is also attested in the Gospel of Philip. 
In this world, slaves serve the free. In heaven’s kingdom, the free will 
serve the slaves and the attendants of the bridal chamber will serve 
the wedding guests. The attendants of the bridal chamber have only 
one name, and that is rest. When they are together they need no other 
form, [for they are in] contemplation…perception. They are 
superior…among those in…the glories of glories…652 
 
In this passage, the task of those who are free is to serve and unite with those 
who are slaves. Although the categories of “psychics” and “pneumatics” are 
not mentioned in this passage, it fits rather well with the soteriological vision 
attested in Exc. Theod. 56.5. The salvation of the psychics is dependent on 
the union with the perfect ones. The pneumatics are the salt and light of the 
world and they are supposed to form unions with the psychics.653 It seems, 
however, that the unification of the psychics and the pneumatics in 
Valentinian soteriology was a process which may already begin during one’s 
earthly life, but it will be made perfect in the eschatological salvation.  
7.6 The immortality of the soul and the practice of dying 
In Valentinian soteriology the ultimate telos of the immortal soul involved 
assimilation with the aeons of the Pleroma. Although some souls were not 
capable of receiving spiritual enlightenment, in most cases the 
transformation of the soul was based on one’s choice. There may have been 
some exceptional human beings who were perfect since their birth, like Isaac 
or Moses in Philo’s writings. They were super-sages, whose intellectual 
capability superseded the level of any other sages. For those who were 
progressing towards the virtuous life, perfection was related combating 
bodily passions. In the allegory of Adam and Eve, the separation of the sexes 
was seen as a distinction between the divine and the irrational soul. Salvation 
meant a return to the pre-lapsarian unity of the soul. In Philo, the re-
unification of the sexes was seen as an archetype for controlling one’s 
emotions by reason, which can be understood as an allegorical elaboration 
based on Plato’s teachings concerning the cultivation of the soul (cf. e.g. Rep. 
4.430e-431b). Philo describes enlightenment of the soul as dying for the body 
and this world, which also was a Platonic commonplace. The “practice of 
dying” was the sign of the wise human being because it returned the soul to 
the stage before the separation of the sexes and the fall. This same idea is also 
attested in the fragment of Valentinus, which is preserved by Clement of 
Alexandria in Strom. 4.89:1-3.   
                                                 
652 Gos.Phil. 72:17-29. Translated by Marvin Meyer. 
653 Iren. Haer. 1.6.1. 
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And Valentinus writes in some homily, word for word: “From the 
beginning you are immortal, and children of eternal life, and you 
wished to divide death between you, that you might consume and 
dissolve it, and death might die in you and through you. For when 
you dissolve the world and yourselves are not dissolved, then you will 
rule over the creation and over all of corruption.”654 
 
There have been attempts to interpret Valentinus’s fragment in the light of 
Pauline and Johannine views. The dying of death may refer to baptism.655 In 
some cases, it has been seen as criticism towards martyrdom656 or the 
Christian Eucharist.657 It is also possible to interpret Valentinus’s fragment in 
connection with the later Valentinian systems in Theodotos’s fragments and 
the Tripartite Tractate. Clement’s comment which follows Valentinus’s 
quotation may support that interpretation. The phrases “from the beginning” 
and “children” may refer to the beginning of the existence of the seed of 
Sophia and their descent into the realm of death, i.e. the sense perceptible 
world.658  
The phrase “death will die” (ἀποθάνῃ ὁ θάνατος) in Valentinus’s fragment is 
evidently an allusion to Gen. 2:17, which contains God’s warning to Adam 
and Eve not to eat from the tree of knowledge, because they will “die by 
death” (θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθε) on that day. It seems, however, that Valentinus 
has converted the meaning of Gen. 2:17: it is no longer death which will cause 
dying, but death itself is going to die. The closest parallels with Valentinus’s 
fragment come from Hellenistic Jewish wisdom theology and the theory of 
immortality in Philo, who distinguished between physical death and the 
death of the soul.659 Philo clarifies the distinction between two deaths in Leg. 
All. 1.105. 
                                                 
654 Οὐαλεντινῖνος δὲ ἔν τινι ὁμιλίᾳ κατὰ λέξιν γράφει· ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς ἀθάνατοί ἐστε καὶ τέκνα ζωῆς ἐστε αἰωνίας 
καὶ τὸν θάνατον ἠθέλητε μερίσασθαι εἰς ἐαυτούς, ἵνα δαπανήσητε αὐτὸν καὶ ἀναλώσητε, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ θάνατος 
ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ δι᾽ ὑμῶν. ὅταν γὰρ τὸν μὲν κόσμον λύητε, ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ καταλύησθε, κυριεύετε τῆς κτίσεως καὶ τῆς 
φθορᾶς ἁπάσης. Translated by Einar Thomassen in The Spiritual Seed, 460. Clement continues the 
summary: “Now, like Basilides he supposes that there are people that by its very nature are saved; that 
this race, indeed, has come down to us for the destruction of death; and that the origination of death is 
the work of the creator of the world. Accordingly, he understands the scriptural passage (Ex. 33:20): 
‘No one shall see that face of God and live’ as though God were the cause of death.” Cf. also Layton, The 
Gnostic Scriptures, 240. 
655 Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus?, 131-136. 
656 Jens Holzhausen, “Valentinus and Valentinians,” in Dictionary of Gnosis and Western 
Esotericism (ed. J. Hanegraaf et al; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 2:1144-1157. 
657 For the summary of different interpretations, cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 35-37, esp. 
notes on page 217. 
658 Thomassen, The Spriritual Seed, 460-465.  
659 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosicism, 37-45. 
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And further, he says, “In the day in which you eat of it you shall die 
the death.” And yet, after they have eaten, not merely do they not die, 
but they beget children and become authors of life for others. What 
then is to be said to this? That death is of two kinds, one that of the 
man in general, the other that of the soul in particular. The death of 
the man is the separation of the soul from the body, but the death of 
the soul is the decay of virtue and the bringing in of wickedness.660 
 
Philo explains that there are two kinds of death. The phrase θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖν 
does not refer to the death of the body, which is natural death, but to the 
death of the soul or spiritual death. The natural death waits for everybody, 
whereas the death of the soul is the punishment for the wicked. This means 
that some humans may have experienced soul-death even before their 
physical death.661 According to Philo, natural death, which is the separation 
of the soul from the body, is actually a good thing for the virtuous soul, and it 
should be “practiced” through philosophical study. Those who have died to 
the life in the body have separated themselves from the body even before 
their physical death. They are kings and rulers of the body as they 
contemplate the divine realm “through the eye of the soul.”662  
For Philo, the contemplative life is a way of dying to the body and 
renouncing the bodily passions which will lead to wickedness. Emma 
Wasserman summarizes Philo’s view: “Wickedness is personified as a being 
that works together with passions to entomb the soul, because passions are 
the root cause of wickedness and vice.”663 Philo describes how souls have 
descended to the body as in the river. They are at one time carried away and 
swallowed up by the voracity of a most violent whirlpool and, at another 
time, they strive with all their power to resist its power. Virtuous souls must 
practice dying to the life of the body through philosophy to attain 
immortality and should resist the passions of the body. 
These last, then, are the souls of those who have given themselves to 
genuine philosophy, who from first to last study to die to the life in the 
body that a higher existence immortal and incorporeal, in the 
presence of Him, who is Himself immortal and uncreated, may be 
their portion.664  
                                                 
660 λέγει γε μήν· “ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ φάγητε ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθε” καὶ φαγόντες οὐχ οἷον οὐκ 
ἀποθνῄσκουσι ἀλλὰ καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται καὶ ἑτέροις τοῦ ζῆν αἴτιοι καθίστανται τί οὖν λεκτέον; ὅτι διττός ἐστι 
θάνατος, ὁ μὲν ἀνθρώπου, ὁ δὲ ψυχῆς ἴδιος· ὁ μὲν οὐν ἀνθρώπου χωρισμός ἐστι ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ὁ δὲ ψυχῆς 
θάνατος ἀρετῆς φθορά ἐστι κακίας δὲ ἀνάληψις.  
661 QG 1.16, 45, 51. 
662 QG 1. 86; Somn. 2.244. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 40-41. 
663 Wasserman, The Death of the Soul, 63. 
664 αὗται μὲν οὖν εἰσι ψυχαὶ τῶν ἀνόθως φιλοσοφησάντων, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους μελετῶσαι τὸν μετὰ 
σωμάτων ἀποθνῄσκειν βίον, ἵνα τῆς ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου παρὰ τῷ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ ζωῆς μεταλάχωσιν. 
(Gig. 14).   
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Philo is evidently dependent on Plato who says in Phaed. 64a, 67d that the 
philosophical way of life is “to study nothing but dying and being dead” 
(οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι). Salvation is the 
separation of the soul from the body. Therefore, the practice of the 
philosophers is to separate the soul from the body (τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό 
ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος). In Det. 32-34 
Philo says that virtuous men even pray for diseases in their practice of dying 
(μελετῶντες ἀποθνῄσκειν).665 Valentinus’s interpretation of Gen. 2:17 can be 
understood in the light of Philo’s teaching concerning spiritual death and the 
practice of dying. Human beings possess immortality, and they must 
consume the physical death so that it will die. Valentinus stressed that his 
disciples wanted death to be divided to them. This parallels Philo’s teaching 
according to which virtuous men may even pray for diseases when practicing 
dying.666 The ruling of the entire corruption refers to the annihilation of the 
bodily passions.667 As in Philo, kingship means self-control and ruling the 
body and its pleasures as well as the senses and speech. This could happen as 
the human mind “knows himself” and gives the honor of everything to God 
alone.668 For Philo, the archetype for the perfect sage was Moses, who can be 
equated with the philosopher-king who spent his life mediating on dying to 
the bodily life. The purpose of the philosophical life was assimilation with the 
Logos, i.e. the cosmic Mind, which Philo understood as an “immortal” 
(ἀφθάρτος) and bodiless (ἀσωμάτος) existence alongside the unbegotten and 
incorruptible God.669 The exhortation of the High Priest not to enter a place 
where there is a dead body (Lev 21:11) was interpreted as an exhortation to 
stay away from the passions and wickedness, which can pollute and destroy 
the soul.670  
According to Valentinus’s teaching immortality as a way of contemplative 
life was based on the principal immortality of the human soul. It is similar to 
the teachings attested in the Gospel of Thomas, which supposed that the 
divine image was not lost in humankind, but is still present.671 The phrase ἀπ᾽ 
                                                 
665 Yli-Karjanmaa points out that Philo uses the expression “the practice of dying” both in the 
Platonic form (Gig. 13-14) but also in further developments (e.g. Det. 34). Cf. Yli-Karjanmaa, Philo and 
Reincarnation, 122-123. 
666 Det. 32-34. 
667 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 42-43.  
668 Migr. 7-12. 
669 Gig. 14. Cf. M. David Litwa, “The Deification of Moses,” in The Studia Philonica Annual XXVI 
(Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014). 
670 Fug. 113-114. 
671 Gos.Thom. 11, 85. Cf. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 44-45; Elaine Pagels, “Exegesis of 
Genesis 1 in the Gospel of Thomas and John,” in JBL 118 (1999), 477-496; Stevan Davies, “The 
Christology and Protology of the Gospel of Thomas,” JBL 111 (1992), 663-682. The relation between 
Philo of Alexandria and the Gospel of Thomas cannot be handled thoroughly in this study. It is not 
contrary to reason to suggest that the Gospel of Thomas was written in the scholarly circles of 
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ἀρχῆς may have a double meaning in Valentinus’s fragment: it is a temporal 
expression (“since the beginning”), but it also refers to immortality as the 
principal condition of the soul at its present stage (“basically”). Philo 
maintains, however, that the first human being was spiritually superior to the 
present race of humankind. Just as sculptures are inferior imitations of the 
original model or the degree of magnetic attraction weakens from iron to 
iron, so the human soul has lost its original power through the 
generations.672 Despite this degeneration of humanity, the rational spirit of 
the human soul is a fragment of the divine intellect, which is potentially 
inherited from the parents and it can be still found and vivified as one begins 
to live a contemplative life and die to the bodily passions. 
It is probable that Valentinus was dependent on the Hellenistic Jewish 
anthropological theology according to which the potentiality of salvation was 
present since the creation of the first human being, and it was inherited 
through natural procreation to the later generations. Potential immortality 
required, however, the external impetus to become active. The Valentinian 
teachers suggested that only a few human beings have taken up the 
possibility of acquiring spiritual gifts. Most human beings have lost their 
spirituality and dissolved into the fleshly passions. It is possible that this 
view was based on the fact that the essences, which were once deposited into 
Adam’s soul have gradually weakened, as Philo taught.  
It is noticeable that Valentinus does not connect immortality to 
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus or the baptism or any ritual practices of 
early Christianity. Immortality is a gift that has been implanted in the soul of 
Adam and his descendants, although it must be actualized through correct 
teaching. This soteriological view parallels the Valentinian myth in Iren. 
Haer. 1.1-7 and Exc. C which does not contain any etiology of the sacraments, 
but an etiology of the emotions and how they can be healed through 
knowledge.673 
7.7 The eschatological wedding feast and the 
unification with the angels 
The Valentinian allegory of the spiritual Israel contains a vision of the 
unification of the psychics and pneumatics. In the light of Philo’s division of 
humankind, the allegory can be seen as a unification of the perfect ones 
                                                                                                                                          
Alexandria, which owed much to the intellectual heritage of Platonizing Judaism, which was similar to 
that of Philo’s. The relation between Philo and the Gospel of Thomas is discussed in Ivan 
Miroshnikov’s newly published dissertation The Gospel of Thomas and Plato: A Study of the Impact 
on the “Fifth Gospel” (Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty 
of Theology at the University of Helsinki; Unigrafia), 2016. 
672 Opif. 140-141. 
673 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 96-97. 
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(τέλειοι) and those who are making progress (προκόπτων) in the community of 
the believers. While the pneumatics have made the transformation of the 
soul firm, the psychics were still making progress in their fight against bodily 
passions. Irenaeus complained that Valentinian disregarded the ordinary 
Christians and called them psychics, “who possessed the grace for loan 
only.”674 In reality, Valentinians did not evaluate the psychics negatively 
because the existence of the different groups was a part of soteriological 
dynamics. Unlike the psychics, who were still progressing on the spiritual 
path, the pneumatics steadfastly possessed grace. Thus, some members have 
not yet made their calling firm, some others have stopped their spiritual 
development and possibly some have lost their calling altogether. The 
division among the believers did not lead, however, to two separate 
communities, but a mixed community, where the “have-nots” can benefit 
from the advanced ones.675 The allegory of Israel can be understood both as a 
description of individual mental transformation and as a collective event in 
which the pneumatics were united with the psychics. It is not clear, however, 
whether this unification takes place in the presence of or the eschatological 
fulfillment of salvation. 
Philo discusses the afterlife in the commentary on the death of Abraham 
in Her. 280-283 and evaluates some popular opinions concerning the destiny 
of the soul after death. Philo tries to find a proper interpretation of the 
expression that Abraham was taken to his fathers. Philo rejected the literal 
interpretation of the “fathers” and enumerated three alternative explanations 
about the place to which Abraham departed. Firstly, the destiny of Abraham’s 
soul may have been the realm of the sun, the moon, and the other stars. 
Secondly, it may refer to the intelligible cosmos and the commonwealth 
among the incorporeal Ideas (ἀσωμάτων ἰδεῶν πολιτείᾳ). Thirdly, the fathers 
may refer to the elements of the world out of which the body and the soul are 
made (earth, water, air, fire, and ether). The first and the third option were 
ruled out by Philo. After death, the souls of the sages will be integrated into 
the intelligible cosmos from which the human intellect is a fragment.676 In 
Gig. 61 Philo says that those who are born of God are priests and prophets. 
They have quitted existence of the sense-perceptible world and perceived the 
                                                 
674 Iren. Haer. 1.6.4. 
675 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 147-148, 156-158. The relationship between the perfect and 
the progressive ones in the Valentinian community is described in the Interpretation of Knowledge: 
“Rather, by laboring with one another, they will work with one another, and if one of them suffers, they 
will suffer with him, and when each one is saved, they are saved together.” 
676 Leg. All. 1.36-40, Leg. All. 3.161, Her. 281-83, Somn. 1.33-34, Spec. 4. 123, Q.G. 2.59. Although 
both the intellects of the heavenly bodies and human intellects were created as images of the Logos, it 
unlikely that the realm of the ethereal cosmic bodies would have been the final place for the saved. 
Philo stressed that the rational spirit of the human soul is not only a fragment (ἀπόσπασμα) of the 
ethereal spirit but something better, even a radiance (ἀπαύγασμα) of the blessed thrice-blessed nature 
of God. 
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world which is perceptible only by the intellect. They have settled themselves 
in the kosmos noetos and are reckoned among the incorruptible incorporeal 
Ideas. 
Philo identified the intelligible cosmos as the final place for the righteous 
souls with the abode of angels. Philo says in QG 3.11 that “the fathers” 
indicate “the incorporeal substances and inhabitants of the divine world, 
whom in other passages he is accustomed to call angels.” For Philo, the 
angels were incorporeal souls (ἀσωμάτους ψυξάς), pure intelligence in the 
likeness of the Monad (δι' ὅλων νοεράς, λογισμοὺς ἀκραιφνεῖς, μονάδι 
ὁμοιουμένας) and immortal logoi (ἀθανάτοις λόγοις). 677 The angels were not 
identified with ideas, although their souls belong to the intelligible realm 
being the mediators of the knowledge of the Ideas. Philo says that the angels 
are divine intellects and ministers of the Ruler of all (ὕπαρχοι τοῦ 
πανηγεμόνος). Their task is to report (διαγγέλλειν) the commands of the Father 
to humankind from which their name is derived.678  
In Sac. 1-5 Philo also speculates on the destinies of the patriarchs in the 
afterlife, and he makes a distinction between λαός (Gen. 25:9) and γενός 
(Gen.35:29). Philo says that Abraham and Jacob were both added 
(προστιθέναι) to the people. They were progressing through learning and 
practice and after death they were made equal to the angels (ἴσος ἀγγέλοις 
γεγονώς). Isaac belonged to the self-taught race and he passed over 
(μεταανίστεναι) to the immortal and most perfect genus of beings (τὸ 
ἄφθαρτον καὶ τελεώτατον γένος.) In the light of Opif. 134-135, the term γένος 
refers to the heavenly man, who was created as an image of the Logos being 
“a kind of idea or genus or seal” (ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς).679  
It seems that in Sac. 1-5 the distinction between “people” and “genus” 
illustrates the difference between progressive human beings and perfect 
human beings like Isaac. While there are many progressive people, there are 
only a few perfect ones who have participated in the genus of the heavenly 
man since their birth like Isaac. Therefore, the difference between “people” 
and “genus” did not concern differences regarding the final destiny of the 
soul, but the method through which salvation and the perfection of the soul 
were accomplished. It seems, however, that the category of progressive 
human beings is divided into two sub-categories: those who reached 
perfection during their life time like Abraham, and those who remained 
imperfect like Jacob.680 
Philo maintains that the ruling part of the soul, i.e. the mind, should 
imitate the heavenly man, who desires his archetype, i.e. the Logos.681 There 
                                                 
677 Spec. 1.66; Winston, Logos, 33-34. 
678 Somn. 1.140-141. 
679 This is a difficult passage. Goodenough says: “I find it hard to take this passage seriously in its 
details.” Cf. Goodenough, “Philo on Immortality,” 104 note 73. 
680 Satlow, “Philo on Human Perfection,” 506. 
681 Leg. All. 2.4. 
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was, however, an ontological distinction between the soul of the wise man 
and the Logos. Like the heavenly man who was not identified with the Logos, 
the sages were not assimilated with the Logos, but after death they were 
made logoi, i.e. similar to the angels. There was one exception to all human 
beings, who was able to ascend even above the “species and genera” (ἀνωτέρω 
προαγαγὼν εἴδη καὶ γένη) of the patriarchs and all wise human beings.682 He 
was the all-wise Moses, who differed from every other human being 
including the self-taught race of Isaac.  
The difference between Moses and his ancestors did not concern only the 
method through which the perfection was achieved, but its quality.683 Moses 
did not have to learn to control his irrational impulses as Abraham or Jacob 
did, nor did he control the passions spontaneously like Isaac, for Moses’s 
rational soul was assimilated with the Logos without any mixture of the 
irrational impulses. While all other human beings were taken from their 
mortal bodily existence and added to the heavenly abode through physical 
death, Moses did not experience “subtraction or addition,” because he was 
already assimilated with the Logos before his death.684  
For Philo, Moses was an exceptional human being. He became a kind of 
incarnated deity or an archetypical “Savior-figure” because he ruled not only 
his body through the dominant mind, like other sages, but he controlled both 
his body and mind.685 Moses’s ascent to the intelligible cosmos on Sinai 
represented his vocation in striving to become a philosopher-king, High-
Priest, and prophet. During his ascent, Moses was metamorphosed as “god” 
and transformed from the world of becoming into the monadic existence of 
the Logos. Moses did not rule only his bodily passions but he became co-
regnant and partner in the governance of God’s creation owing to his control 
of cosmic forces.686  
At his death, Moses’s body and soul were converted into the indivisible 
Monad and into the mind, “pure as sunlight.”687 Moses could not die like the 
other sages because he had already separated from this body, which he left 
during death as a mere oyster shell. Philo maintains that nobody knows the 
place of the tomb of Moses following a widespread Jewish tradition which 
includes Moses among those who, like Enoch and Elijah, did not die a normal 
bodily death, but were simply shifted to their heavenly abode during their 
                                                 
682 Mig. 174-175. 
683 Satlow, “Philo on Human Perfection,” 506-508.   
684 Sac. 10; Mos. 2.288; Gig. 54. It is noteworthy that Philo speaks in Sac. 8 in the plural form of 
those who have advanced beyond “form and genus” to the same level as Moses. This would mean that 
Moses is not the only representative of his type of human being. It is likely that Philo has in mind those 
who have departed from the world in a similar manner as Moses, i.e. Elijah and Enoch. 
685 Goodenough, By Light, Light, 224–229. 
686 QE 2.29. Litwa, “The Deification of Moses”. 
687 Mos. 1.1; 2.288.  
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lifetime.688 It is notable that Philo presents the life and apotheosis of Moses 
in a way which parallels playwriter Ezekiel’s Ἐξαγωγή. Many verbal parallels, 
exegetical traditions, and thematic similarities demonstrate that it is likely 
that Philo knew Ezekiel’s play or similar kinds of stories which served as 
literary source material for Philo’s own portrayal of the life of the most wise 
Moses.689  
Philo does not explicitly describe the destiny of imperfect souls. Philo 
taught, however, the conditional immortality of the soul and he clearly says 
that the soul may experience death as a punishment for wickedness, which is 
distinguished from the bodily death. It seems that the soul-death was only 
reserved for the worst types of persons.690 There have been some attempts to 
integrate Philo’s soteriology with the Platonic transmigration of the soul. 
This would mean that imperfect souls must undergo further transmigrations 
to purge them before they can be added to the rank of embodied angels. 
David Winston suggests that Philo taught not only the pre-existence of the 
soul but the re-incarnation of the soul as well. The re-incarnation of the soul 
is caused by the fact that most of the human souls do not lose their love of the 
body after their death which causes their re-birth to a new body.691 The souls 
are selected for return according to the numbers and periods determined by 
nature.692 These arguments can be found in the Middle Platonic literature as 
a proof of the subsequent reincarnations of the soul.693 Most recently, Sami 
Yli-Karjanmaan has challenged the consensus of scholarly opinion in his 
thesis according to which Philo adopted the Platonic metempsychosis as an 
essential part of his soterilogical system.694  
                                                 
688 Deut. 34:6. Cf. Wolfson, Philo I, 403-404; Litwa, “The Deification of Moses”. 
689 For a detailed investigation of Philo’s relation to Ezekiel’s play, cf. Gregory Sterling, “From the 
Thick Marshes of the Nile to the Throne of God: Moses in Ezekiel the Tragedian and Philo of 
Alexandria,” in The Studia Philonica Annual 26 (2014), 115-133. 
690 Cf. Wasserman, The Death of the Soul, 65. 
691 Somn. 1. 138. 
692 Plant. 14. 
693 Winston, Logos, 34-34, 41-42. 
694 Yli-Karjanmaa regards Somn. 1. 137-139 as one of the clearest cases where Philo describes the 
phenomenon of reincarnation. Cf. Yli-Karjanmaa, Reincarnation, 129-150. Yli-Karjanmaa summarizes 
his argument as follows (pages 245-246): “In my view, although Philo is quite silent, he did want to 
communicate to his audience also the view that souls transmigrate. His vagueness is not impenetrable. 
This enables us to conclude that while he in his surviving works did not want the references to 
reincarnation to be immediately understood by anyone (Somn. 1.139 is an exception) he did not want 
to hide his position so well that nobody can find it. Indeed, the history of Philonic scholarship on this 
issue bears testimony to precisely this: some scholars have found his references, others have not—or 
they have considered them isolated or anomalous. The question then becomes, can we better 
understand Philo’s anthropology, ethics, soteriology and individual eschatology with or without 
reincarnation, and, if without, what is the more probable alternative. The reasons for Philo’s reticence 
about explicitly speaking of reincarnation would merit a study of its own.”  
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Philo evidently knew the Platonic doctrine of the transmigration of the 
souls and he used similar kinds of terminology. This does not mean, 
however, that he agreed with Middle Platonic teachers who taught 
metempsychosis. Actually, there are some critical elements in Philo’s 
anthropology which contradict the conception of reincarnation. In the 
allegory of Cain and Abel, Philo clearly says that Abel was regenerated in 
heaven after his death without mentioning any subsequent incarnations, 
even though it is clearly assumed that Abel was not a perfect man because he 
lost his “intellectual” battle against Cain’s useless argumentations. As I noted 
above, Jacob’s character also remained vague and it is not clear whether he 
reached perfection during his lifetime. He was added, however, to the realm 
of the angels after his death. Philo also stressed that perfection during one’s 
lifetime was reserved only for some exceptional human beings, who served as 
archetypes for all others. Philo says that God does not punish involuntary 
errors and imperfection if a human being is mostly making progress in a 
virtuous life.695 The ascending and descending angels in Jacob’s dream refer 
to the ebb and flow of those souls who are progressing towards the virtuous 
life. It seems that Philo converted the Platonic idea of transmigration of the 
soul to the transmigration of virtue during one’s lifetime, as the soul makes a 
laborious migration from the fleshly passion to the heavenly home. 696 Philo 
therefore writes in Immut. 75-76 (cf. also 104-108): 
And so the Psalmist said somewhere (Ps. c. [ci.] 1), “I will sing to thee 
of mercy and judgement.” For if God should will to judge the race of 
mortals without mercy, His sentence will be one of condemnation, 
since there is no man who self-sustained has run the course of life 
from birth to death without stumbling, but in every case his footsteps 
steps have slipped through errors, some voluntary, some involuntary. 
So then that the race may subsist, though many of those which go to 
form it are swallowed up by the deep, He tempers His judgement 
with the mercy which He shews in doing kindness even to the 
unworthy. And not only does this mercy follow His judgement but it 
also precedes it. For mercy with Him is older than justice, since He 
knows who is worthy of punishment, not only after judgement is 
given, but before it. 
 
With regard to the imperfect but repentant souls, the most credible view in 
Philo, in my opinion, is that they were transformed after their death into the 
rank of the angels. The perfect ones did not experience any transformation 
because they have been transformed already during their lifetime. Finally, all 
these human beings participated in the same spiritual genus of Israel who 
see God in heaven and return to the megalopolis from which they migrated 
into the body. Apparently, Clement of Alexandria followed Philo and believed 
                                                 
695 Sobr. 44-50; Mut. 185; Plant. 130-131; Abr. 128-130; QG 3.27. 
696 Somn. 1.150-152. 
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that the vision of the divine things can be achieved to some extent during 
one’s stay on earth, but it reaches its climax after the death of the body, when 
the soul is able to fly back to its original place.697 It is not clear, however, 
whether Philo taught that human souls preserved their personality after 
death. The most logical conlusion in the light of Philo’s discussion in Sac. 1-5 
is that all human beings were finally made equal with each other and 
integrated into one genus of human being, which is also depicted as the 
heavenly man. The heavenly man represents a collective personality in which 
the “races” of human beings (represented by Abraham and Isaac) were 
transformed into the single genus of human beings (represented by Isaac).698  
Speculations concerning the destiny of the perfect ones and those who 
were making progress form the basis for the Valentinian theory of the 
afterlife. In addition to the allegory of Israel and the olive tree discussed 
above, the theme of the union of the psychics and pneumatics is contained in 
the allegory of the wedding feast:  
The rest of the spiritual ones on the Lord’s day, i.e. in the Ogdoad, 
which is called the Lord’s day, is with the Mother, who keeps their 
souls, the garments, until the end. The other faithful souls are with the 
Demiurge, but at the end, they also ascend into the Ogdoad. Then 
comes the marriage feast, which is common to all saved, until all are 
equal and know each other. Henceforth, the spiritual ones having put 
off their souls, together with the Mother, who leads the bridegroom, 
also leads bridegrooms, their angels, into intellectual and eternal 
marriage with the Syzygy. They will pass into the bride chamber 
through the Limit and attain the vision of the Father having become 
intellectual aeons. And the master of the feast, who is the best man of 
the marriage and friend of the bridegroom, standing before the bride 
chamber and hearing the voice of the bridegroom, rejoices greatly. 
This is the fullness of his joy and rest. 699 
 
It seems that according to this particular passage, at the end salvation is 
given equally both to the spirituals and psychics, i.e. the other faithful souls. 
Those who are progressing are finally perfected, and the distinction between 
                                                 
697 Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 142–143. 
698 QG III, 2. Cf Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria, 116-117. 
699 Exc.Theod. 63-65. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν πνευματικῶν ἀνάπαυσις ἐν κυριακῇ, ἐν Ὀγδοάδι, ἣ Κυριακὴ 
ὀνομάζεται, παρὰ τῇ Μητρί, ἐχόντων τὰς ψυχάς, τὰ ἐνδύματα, ἄχρι συντελείας·αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι πισταὶ ψυχαί, παρὰ 
τῷ Δημιουργῷ· περὶ δὲ τὴν συντέλειαν, ἀναχωροῦσι καὶ αὗται εἰς Ὀγδόαδα. Εἶτα, τὸ δεῖπνον τῶν γάμων κοινὸν 
πάντων τῶν σῳζομένων, ἄχρις ἂν ἀπισωθῇ πάντα καὶ ἄλληλα γνωρίσῃ. Τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν, ἀποθέμενα τὰ 
πνευματικὰ τὰς ψυχάς, ἅμα τῇ Μητρὶ κομιζομένῃ τὸν Νυμφίον, κομιζόμενα καὶ αὐτὰ τοὺς νυμφίους, τοὺς 
Ἀγγέλους ἑαυτῶν, εἰς τὸν Νυμφῶνα ἐντὸς τοῦ Ὅρου εἰσίασι, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς ὄψιν ἔρχονται, Αἰῶνες 
νοεροὶ γενόμενα, εἰς τοὺς νοεροὺς καὶ αἰωνίους γάμους τῆς συζυγίας. Ὁ δὲ τοῦ δείπνου μὲν “ἀρχιτρίκλινος”, τῶν 
γάμων δὲ αράνυμφος, “τοῦ Νυμφίου δὲ Φίλος, ἑστὼς ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ νυμφῶνος, ἀκούων τῆς φωνῆς τοῦ 
Νυμφίου, χαρᾷ χαίρει.” Τοῦτο αὐτοῦ “τὸ λήρωμα τῆς χαρᾶς” καὶ τῆς ἀναπαύσεως. 
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psychic and spiritual humans will ultimately disappear. The eschatological 
wedding feast is an eschatological fulfillment of the transformation of the 
soul described in the allegory of Israel.700 There is, however, a parallel 
version of the description of the eschatology in Irenaeus, which may be a 
summary of the account in Exc. C:  
The spiritual ones, moreover, having put off their souls and having 
become intellectual spirits, will enter the Fullness without being 
apprehended or seen and will be given as brides to the angels who 
surrounded the Savior. Even the Demiurge himself will go into the 
region of his Mother, Sophia, into the middle. The righteous souls will 
also remain in the middle. For nothing of psychic essence enters the 
Pleroma.701 
 
Basically, Irenaeus’s version is compatible with Clement’s longer account. 
Eschatological salvation is accomplished in two phases.  In the first phase the 
pneumatics – i.e. those who have been made perfect already during their 
earthly life – will find rest in Ogdoad together with Sophia, who keeps their 
souls as wedding garments. This would mean that the psychic soul served as 
an instrumental soul-body for the spiritual seed. These perfect beings were 
contrasted with the “other faithful souls,” who were staying in the realm of 
the Demiurge. In the second phase, these psychic souls ascended to the 
Ogdoad, where they were made equal with the pneumatics, who have 
ascended before them. During the equalization of the saved all will be 
transformed into pneumatics, who will strip off their psychic souls, i.e. the 
instrumental soul-body, and enter the Pleroma. The mission of the 
pneumatics was to form a union with the psychics, which was finally 
actualized in the common marriage feast.702 The Demiurge, however, is left 
outside the Pleroma, and his repose is to watch the heavenly marriage feast 
common to all who were saved.703 
                                                 
700 Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 139-140; Elaine Pagels, “Conflicting Versions of Valentinian 
Eschatology: Irenaeus’s Treatise vs. the Excerpts from Theodotus,” HTW 67 (1974), 35-53. McCue has 
defended the view according to which the hylic, psychic and spiritual categories were fixed and 
salvation was for the spiritual ones alone. The psychics will receive together with the Demiurge inferior 
salvation than the spiritual ones. James F. McCue, “Conflicting Versions of Valentinianism? Irenaeus 
and the Excerpta ex Theodoto,” in Rediscovery of Gnosticism, Vol. 1, The School of Valentinus (ed. 
Bentley Layton; Leiden: Brill, 1980), 414-416.  
701 Iren. Haer. 1.7.1. Τοὺς δὲ πνευματικοὺς ἀποδυσαμένους τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ πνεύματα νοερὰ γενομένους, 
ἀκρατήτως καὶ ἀοράτως ἐντὸς πληρώματος εἰσελθόντας νύμφας ἀποδοθήσεσθαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σωτῆρα ἀγγέλοις. 
Τὸν δὲ Δημιουργὸν μεταβῆναι καὶ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Σοφίας τόπον, τουτέστιν ἐν τῇ μεσότητι· τάς τε τῶν 
δικαίων ψυχὰς ναπαύσεσθαι καὶ αὐτὰς ἐν τῷ τῆς μεσότητος τόπῳ. Μηδὲν γὰρ ψυχικὸν ἐντὸς πληρώματος 
χωρεῖν. 
702 Iren. Haer. 1.6.1. Pagels, “Conflicting Versions,” 37. 
703 Heracleon seems to think that good psychics like the Demiurge will be transformed into 
spiritual beings in the process of salvation. Cf. Thomassen, “Heracleon,” 190. In Exc.Theod. 63-65 the 
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Irenaeus comments on Valentinian eschatology by saying that nothing 
psychic can enter to the Pleroma. Irenaeus’s rhetorical strategy was to prove 
that Valentinian teaching does not give the hope of eternal reward for the 
ordinary, psychic Christians.704 However, if Irenaeus’s description is 
interpreted in the light of Exc. C, Valentinian eschatology is rather optimistic 
about the psychics and ordinary Christians. On the one hand, the salvation of 
the pneumatics is dependent on the perfection of the psychics. The 
pneumatics cannot enter the Pleroma until the “other faithful soul,” i.e. the 
psychics, ascend to the Ogdoad and are made equal with the pneumatics. On 
the other hand, the exclusion of the psychic essence from the Pleroma does 
not mean the exclusion of the psychic “persons,” but refers to the perfection 
of the psychics when their psychic soul-bodies are stripped away. The two-
fold salvation of the psychics and the pneumatics has a spiritual image in the 
crucifixion and resurrection of the Savior. The departure of the spirit from 
the Savior on the cross and the resurrection of the psychic soul-body of 
Christ after three days describe the salvation of the pneumatics before the 
psychics. Finally, also the psychics are saved together with the pneumatics as 
the psychic soul of the Savior was resurrected on the third day.705  
The terms related to the equalization of the saved in Exc. Theod. 63-65 
indicate that the unification during the eschatological wedding feast parallels 
the protological equalization of the aeons after the rupture caused by 
Sophia’s erroneous thought. It is stated that all aeons are made equal 
(ἀπισωθῇ πάντα) until they knew each other. Significantly, the verb from the 
same root is used in the account of Iren. Haer. 1.2.6, which describes the 
“equalization of aeons of the Pleroma” by the Holy Spirit: τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα τὸ 
ἅγιον ἐξισωθέντας αὐτοὺς πάντας εὐχαριστεῖν ἐδίδαξεν καὶ τὴν ἀληθινὴν ἀνάπαυσιν 
εἰσηγήσατο. The Holy Spirit brought the aeons to rest (ἀνάπαυσις) and after 
the equalization, there were no more distinct aeons, but all were Christs, 
Truths, Holy Spirits, etc. In a similar manner, the equalization of the 
pneumatics and psychics in an eschatological marriage feast refers to the 
                                                                                                                                          
Demiurge is certainly saved, but he is left outside the Pleroma in the place where Sophia dwelled before 
entering the Pleroma. 
704 Pagels has argued that Irenaeus intentionally changed the term τὰ πνευματικά into οἱ πνευματικοί 
to stress that salvation is for the spiritual persons only. I do not see the change of terminology as 
decisive. In most translations (Casey, Sagnard) the term τὰ πνευματικά is translated as “the spiritual 
element.” Grammatically, the neuter nominative plural can be understood as a group designation, 
which means, in this case, the group of spiritual beings. The same kind of grammatical phenomenon is 
attested in John. 1:11: εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν, και οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον. It would be absurd to translate 
that the Savior came into his own “elements.” 
705 Exc. Theod. 61.7. Casey translates τὰ πνευματικὰ ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνα σῴζεται as “the pneumatic receive 
salvation superior to theirs, i.e. the psychics.” It may be grammatically possible but the context 
supports the temporal meaning. This means that the pneumatic will be saved before the psychics, i.e. 
those who did not receive perfection during their lifetime. 
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process through which the boundaries between the psychic and pneumatic 
categories are finally removed and all the saved are made equal with angels. 
In Philo, the final destiny of human beings was to become a non-bodily 
intellect similar to angels and to be integrated into the collective human 
personality referred to as the heavenly man. This is also the spiritual goal of 
the saved in the Valentinian accounts. In the end, the pneumatics are united 
with the angels as they enter the Pleroma. The unification with the Pleroma 
means the transformation of the soul into an angel. Therefore, the 
transformation of the soul into an angel refers to the transformation of the 
soul into the form of intellectual aeons and integration into the Pleroma. The 
Valentinian system parallels Philo, who maintains that the saved will become 
angels and will be integrated into the intelligible cosmos as a collective 
personality. This concerns both those who have made themselves perfect 
during their lifetime (e.g. Abraham) and those who only made some 
progression (e.g. Abel and Jacob).706  
The nuptial imagery was rather common in Christian and Jewish sources 
as a metaphor for the mystical union with God. Nuptial angelogy, however, 
does not have an exact parallel in the Early Christian sources and it is quite 
likely a Valentinian invention.707 It is possible, however, that Valentinian 
angelogy may have some Hellenistic Jewish archetypes, which can also be 
found in the writing of Philo. The rational spirit of the earthly souls will be 
united with the heavenly man and integrated to the intelligible cosmos of the 
Logos. Then, the soul will become equal to angels, which also are called 
logoi.708 In Philo, there is not any notion of bridal imagery in the process of 
unification with the angels. Philo considered, however, the marriages of the 
patriarchs as symbols of the spiritual enlightenment and unification with the 
Wisdom of God. The marriage of Isaac with Rebecca was seen by Philo as a 
mystical marriage with Sophia. Rebecca comes to Isaac and comes down 
from the camel in a similar manner as Wisdom comes to the mystic and is 
veiled as are the inner secrets of the mystery (QG IV.140-146). Wisdom is 
both the mother and the wife of the wise man. It is rather likely that 
Valentinian teachers combined the Hellenistic Jewish ideas of the mystical 
                                                 
706 Gig. 31; Q.G. 3.61. Strikinly, in Exc. Theod. 27 Clement describes the soul’s journey to heaven 
which parallels the Valentinian view described above. Lilla suggests that this paragraph in Theodotus’ 
excerpts may belong to some gnostic author, possibly to Theodotus himself, rathan than to Clement. It 
seems, however, that Clement was heavily influnenced by Gnostic theology.  Clement believed that the 
task of the angels was to watch the ascent of the soul through the heavens. Their main task was to 
prevent the ascent, if the soul was not yet properly purified and detached from the material things 
(Strom. 4.116.2). Cf. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 176-179, 182-183. 
707 Thomassen, The Spritual Seed, 377-383, 405.  
708 The unification with the angels is also attested in some apocalyptic Jewish literature. In 1 En. 
39:4 the heavenly assembly of God consists of the union of the saints with the angels. The idea of 
communion with the angels is also found in 1QS XI 7-9. Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed, 325-326. 
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marriage and the union with angels to the marriage of the Savior and the 
church, which was based on Pauline theology (Eph. 5:22-33).  
7.8 Conclusions 
The closest parallels with the Valentinian sources and Philo can be found in 
the anthropological and soteriological allegories, which were discussed in 
this chapter. The Valentinian division of humankind into hylic, psychic and 
spiritual categories goes back to Hellenistic Jewish models. In Philo’s 
allegory of the soul, the heavenly man (Gen. 1:27) and earthly man (Gen 1:26, 
2:7) no longer represent two distinct humans, but two categories of earthly 
men. The former was seen as the perfect man, who obeys the law of God 
spontaneously, whereas the latter represent the human being, who makes 
progress towards the virtuous life.  
The Valentinians integrated these anthropological teachings into their 
cosmic myth in which the healing of Sophia’s emotions through knowledge 
was paradigmatic for all humans. The progressive humans have their origin 
in Sophia’s conversion, whereas the material ones were related to Sophia’s 
pernicious emotions. The perfect ones have their origin in Sophia’s joyful 
contemplation of the angels of the Savior. In Exc. C the division of 
humankind results from Adam’s incapability to mediate his spiritual 
essences to his children. This is illustrated on the ground of the metaphysics 
of prepositions, which can be understood in the light of Philo’s teaching in 
Cher. 125-128. Adam could mediate only his irrational soul in an active stage, 
while the image of the higher self was distributed potentially within psychic 
soul to be activated through right teaching.  
Especially, the allegories of Cain, Abel and Seth and the Israelites as a 
prophetical race, which sees God, which are related to the three-fold division 
of humankind, bring Philo and the Valentinian exegetes rather close 
together. In these allegories, Seth is not regarded as a historical progenitor of 
a certain “race,” as in the Sethian Gnostic anthropology, but as a symbol of a 
virtuous person. Abel stands for the reasonable human being, who is in the 
middle and is able to make progress according to his choice. Cain in both 
Philo and Valentinian sources is a symbol of an irrational human being who 
is spiritually dead before his physical death. It is noticeable that the two 
passages in Exc. Theod. 56.5 and Philo’s Fug. 208 are the only surviving 
instances where Isaac as a “lawful son of Abraham” and the allegory of Israel 
have been brought together. It is plausible to suggest that the Valentinian 
teachers got to know these teachings from Philo.  
In Valentinian soteriology, the salvation of Sophia and the healing of her 
emotions through gnosis by the Savior was paradigmatic for the salvation of 
all human beings. The role of emotions was also essential in Philo, who was 
influenced by Stoic theories. Both Philo and the Valentinians shared the 
Aristotelian view about the perfect man, who lives contemplative life being 
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self-taught and self-instructed. The healing of the emotions was seen as an 
outcome from spiritual reversion of the separation of Adam and Eve. As long 
as the irrational soul, i.e. Eve, controls the mind, i.e. Adam, the soul is 
mortal, but when Adam converts back to his Father and Mother, i.e. Wisdom, 
the mind is integrated to his higher self, Eve is reunited with her husband 
and death and evil spirits will no longer have any power. 
Valentinian soteriology differed from the doctrines of nascent orthodoxy, 
which derived salvation from the atonement of the cross and resurrection.  
Valentinus taught that the gifts of salvation and immortality were already 
present in the creation of Adam. These gifts must be activated through the 
“practice of dying,” which refers to the annihilation of the passions through 
philosophical and contemplative way of life. Both Philo and the Valentinians 
taught that in most cases the salvation was an outcome of the laborious and 
progressive cultivation of the soul. There may have been, however, some 
exceptional human beings, like Isaac or Moses in Philo’s writings, who were 
perfect from birth. It is possible that Apostle Paul may have played the role of 
a “super-sage” among the Valentinians, which parallels the role of Moses in 
Philo.  
Philo and the Valentinians taught that the ultimate telos of the human 
soul was to be assimilated into the intelligible cosmos. Although there may 
have been different methods to reach salvation, the goal was the same for the 
perfect ones and those who were only making some progress during their 
lifetime. In the Valentinian description of the heavenly wedding feast, the 
psychics and pneumatics will be finally equal before entering the Pleroma 
and being assimilated as part of heavenly ecclesia of Aeons.  This 
assimilation was seen as the transformation into an angel. Valentinian 
theologians elaborated Hellenistic Jewish angelogy on the grounds of early 
Christian nuptial imagery and Valentinian protologial myth. At the end, all 
those who are saved will be stripped of their instrumental, psychic soul-body 
and will be united with their archetypical angelic model.  
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8 THE VALENTINIANS AND THE SURVIVAL OF 
PHILO’S WORKS: SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, I have investigated various parallels between the teachings of 
Philo of Alexandria and the Valentinians. In addition to some fragments of 
Valentinus, my analysis focused on the Valentinian source included in 
Clement’s Excerpta ex Theodoto 43.2-65 (= Exc. C). In light of the critical 
analysis of the text, we have reason to believe that Exc. C is not Clement’s 
own description of the Valentinian system, but it is the exact copy of the 
primary source itself. It is then, the oldest surviving exposition of Valentinian 
myth and it must predate the account of Irenaeus in Iren. Haer. 1.1-7, 
because Irenaeus evidently knew a somewhat elaborated version of it, which 
was made by the disciples of Ptolemy in Rome. In addition, Exc. Theod. 6-7 
and and Iren. Haer. 1.8.5 contain a protological commentary on the prologue 
of the Gospel of John, which is vital in understanding the development of the 
protological systems in the Valentinian sources. 
It is evident that Valentinus’s fragments contain some Philonic themes. 
Valentinus was dependent both on the Hellenistic Jewish heavenly man –
traditions and Gnostic anthropology, but he reformulated the distinctively 
Gnostic motifs in the light of the concept of “free speech” mentioned in the 
Book of Wisdom and in Philo’s writings as well. Valentinus’s psalm Harvest 
can be interpreted in the light of Philo’s allegories of the Tabernacle and the 
High Priest in which the sympathy of the soul and the sympathy of the 
cosmos are intertwined. It would seem that if someone tried to compose a 
psalm on the ground of Philo’s anthropological allegories, it would be a fairly 
similar kind of literary work as we have in Valentinus’s psalm. Also, 
Valentinus’s interpretation of Gen. 2:17 parallels the theory of immortality in 
Philo, who distinguished between physical death and the death of the soul. 
The annihilation of the bodily passions, i.e. the “practice of dying,” was the 
sign of the wise human being because it returned the soul to the pre-
lapsarian stage before the separation of the sexes. 
The closest parallels with Philo’s allegorical interpretations are found in 
Exc. C (including Exc. Theod. 6-7) and related passages in Iren. Haer. 1.1-8. 
In the protological exegesis of the Valentinian theologians the biblical proof-
text for the creation of the intelligible cosmos was not Gen. 1-5 as in Philo’s 
Opificio Mundi, but the prologue of the Gospel of John. However, the 
Valentinians twisted the semantic and logical structure of the prologue of 
John’s gospel in a way which indicates that they knew some of Philo’s 
protological innovations. The prepositional metaphysics concerning the verse 
“in the beginning,” the association of the “beginning” with the Logos, and the 
creation of the “light” as referring to the intelligible cosmos, connect the 
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Valentinian protological commentary to Philo’s exegesis of Gen. 1:1-5.  It is 
also noticeable that in Philo the intelligible cosmos already contains a conflict 
between intelligible light, i.e. the Logos, and its rival, i.e. the intelligible 
darkness. Although Philo did not associate the darkness explicitly with 
matter, as the Valentinians did, he maintained that intelligible darkness must 
be controlled in order to sustain the harmony of the intelligible realm.  
In the Valentinian accounts, Wisdom has manifold associations as the 
rebellious heavenly being in the Pleroma, the mother of the visible world and 
the mother of the human soul, which are related to the dyadic and monadic 
aspects of pre-cosmic Wisdom. These associations are found in an initial 
stage in Philo’s texts. It is of note that the Valentinians and Philo identified 
the Platonic Receptacle with the dyadic aspect of Wisdom. In addition, the 
Valentinian teachers and Philo were evidently dependent on the same kind of 
theory concerning the separation of the cosmic matter into four cosmic 
elements by the Demiurge on the grounds of its physical characteristics, 
although the the essence of the cosmic elements was linked in the 
Valentinian accounts to the emotions of Sophia. Taking into account all these 
protological and cosmological parallels, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
Valentinian teachers were working in the allegorical tradition in which many 
of Philo’s interpretations were adopted, rejected and reformed. 
The closest parallels with Philo are found in the anthropological 
interpretations of Genesis, which form the basis for soteriology and ethics. 
Philo and the Valentinians interpreted the creation narratives of Adam in the 
light of Middle Platonic anthropological theories. It became common among 
Middle Platonic teachers to postulate a mediating soul-body which served as 
an instrumental body for the intellect. The Valentinians and Philo can also be 
located in the philosophical tradition according to which nous is 
undescended and it is only the image of nous, which incarnates into the soul. 
In this model, salvation was seen as an awakening of the image of the 
undescended nous, which Philo depicts as the heavenly man and the 
Valeninians as archetypical angels. According to Philo and the Valentinians, 
the human soul was only conditionally immortal, which was a deviation from 
purely Platonic anthropology. Both Philo and the Valentinians thought that 
the soul can die, which is not only an existential experience but an 
ontological desolation. 
In the exegesis of Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7, Philo’s innovation was to 
interpret these texts as complementary descriptions of the creation of the 
earthly soul by the assistants of God into which God breathed the image of 
the heavenly man. The Valentinian accounts contain the same hermeneutical 
pattern. The Demiurge created the soul-body together with his assistants into 
which the image of the angelic archetype was breathed. Both Philo and the 
Valentinians distinguished the soul-body created in Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 2:7 
from the physical body which was created when Adam was clothed with the 
garment of skin. In the Valentinian accounts, Gen. 1:27 describes the creation 
of the images of the Savior’s angels by Sophia. These images are depicted as 
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the “spiritual seed” or the “inner man” or the “image of the ecclesia above.” 
The archetypal angels in the Valentinian accounts can be equated with 
Philo’s heavenly man, who was created as an image of the Logos (Gen. 1:27). 
The angels and the heavenly man did not incarnate, but their images did 
when they were inserted into the earthly soul of Adam and his descendants to 
be integrated into their angelic archetypes and monadic realm of the 
heavenly man through knowledge.  
The Valentinian anthropological allegories can be understood in the light 
of Philo’s ethical theory according to which the heavenly man created in Gen. 
1:27 was not an archetype for the multitude of the earthly minds in a strict 
Platonic sense, but the former was an ethical idealization of the latter. Also, 
the Valentinian tripartite division of humankind into hylic, psychic and 
spiritual categories goes back to the Hellenistic Jewish models attested in 
Philo’s writings. Philo maintains that the heavenly man (Gen. 1:27) and 
earthly man (Gen. 1:26, 2:7) no longer represent two distinct humans, but 
two categories of earthly human beings. The former was seen as the perfect 
man, who obeys the law of God spontaneously, whereas the latter represent 
the human being, who makes progress towards the virtuous life. The 
Valentinians integrated these anthropological teachings into the cosmic myth 
in which the healing of Sophia’s emotions through knowledge was 
paradigmatic for all humans. The progressive humans have their origin in 
Sophia’s conversion, whereas the material ones were related to Sophia’s 
pernicious emotions. The perfect ones have their origin in Sophia’s joyful 
contemplation of the angels of the Savior.  
The division of humankind forms the background for Philo’s allegory of 
Cain, Abel, and Seth and the allegory of Israel as a spiritual human being who 
sees God. In the former allegory, the figure of Seth is a symbol of virtue and 
of all those who have reached perfection, while Abel represents an imperfect 
human being whose spiritual progression is suspended. Cain stands for the 
material human being who fights against reason. The Valentinian version of 
the allegory parallels Philo. Seth is not regarded as a historical progenitor of 
a certain “race,” as in the Sethian Gnostic anthropology, but as a symbol of a 
virtuous person. Abel stands for the reasonable human being, who is in the 
middle and is able to make progress according to his choice. Cain in both 
Philo and Valentinian sources is a symbol of an irrational human being who 
is spiritually dead before his physical death. Philo’s allegory of Israel as a 
spiritual human being who sees God has an exact parallel in Exc. C.  It is 
noticeable that the two passages in Exc. Theod. 56.5 and Philo’s Fug. 208 are 
the only surviving instances where Isaac as a “lawful son of Abraham” and 
the allegory of Israel have been brought together. It is plausible to suggest 
that the Valentinian teachers got to know these allegories from Philo. 
In Exc. C the division of humankind resulted from the fact that Adam 
could not distribute the essence of his soul equally to his descendants. While 
the body and the hylic soul were inherited through natural procreation, the 
image of the higher self was distributed in a potential stage within the 
 237 
psychic soul to be activated on the grounds of one’s choice. It is not excluded, 
however, that there were some exceptional human beings, like Isaac or 
Moses in Philo, who were perfect since their birth. Although some spiritual 
humans may have been born as sages and obey the will of God 
spontaneously, most pneumatics were psychics, who were re-born as sages as 
a result of laborious cultivation of the soul. There may also have been some 
material human beings, who were born without any possibility of salvation. 
In most cases, however, the hylics were disillusioned progressive human 
beings whose spiritual growth was suspended. At the end, however, all will be 
made equal, both the progressive psychics, those who have reached 
perfection during their lifetime and those who were perfect since their birth. 
This parallels Philo’s eschatological allegory according to which the race of 
the progressive ones (e.g. Abraham and Jacob) were integrated into the 
genus of the perfect ones (e.g. Isaac), which was referred to as the heavenly 
man. 
On the grounds of comparison with Philo’s writings, it is reasonable to 
suggest that there was a historical relationship between Philo and the 
Valentinians. The relation was restricted, however, to one group of 
Valentinians whose teachings can be derived from the accounts in Exc C 
(including Exc. Theod. 6-7) and related sections in Iren. Haer. 1.1-8. 
Although Exc. C apparently goes back to the Valentinian traditions in 
Alexandria, it was elaborated by the disciples of Ptolemy in Rome before 
Irenaeus got to know of it. In addition, Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora contains the 
division of Mosaic Law and the spiritual interpretation of its cultic 
commandments which link Ptolemy to the Hellenistic Jewish traditions 
attested in Philo’s works. We can conclude, thus, that the Valentinian texts 
that contain the closest parallels with Philo go back in one way or another to 
Ptolemy and his disciples. 
It is not clear whether the Valentinian teachers in the school of Ptolemy 
got to know of Philo’s allegories directly by reading Philo’s works, or 
indirectly through notebooks or oral transmission. Although the use of 
notebooks as a part of intellectual paideia was a widely-known method of 
transmission of literary traditions, I suggest, however, that the first option is 
the most probable one. Irenaeus got to know an elaborated version of Exc. C 
in Rome, which was among his source material in his work Against Heresies. 
This means that this particular Valentinian document must have been 
written at the latest about 180 CE or possibly some years earlier in 
Alexandria. We do not have any information about the sources at that time, 
which would have contained borrowings from Philo’s teachings and served as 
source material for the Valentinians, except the extant works of Philo. The 
most reasonable conclusion would be that some Valentinians participated in 
the intellectual circles of Alexandria where Philo’s works were studied and 
Ptolemy may have been one of them before his arrival to Rome, where he 
possibly met Valentinus and founded a school of his own.  
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The similarities between Philo and the Valentinian teachers do not only 
raise the question of historical relation but they may also serve as a lens 
through which the Valentinian tradition can be seen in a new light. This 
study reveals that the Valentinian teachers not only shared a common Middle 
Platonic worldview with Philo, but they also adopted some of his allegorical 
innovations and incorporated them into their system. Philo’s allegories were 
not chosen accidentally, but they provided valuable hermeneutical strategies 
which were useful in Valentinian allegorical exegesis. On the one hand, the 
Valentinians interpreted the allegories attested in Philo’s writings in the light 
of the myth of Sophia. On the other hand, the Valentinian exegetes reformed 
the preceding Gnostic myth in the light of teachings that they found in Philo’s 
writings. The Valentinian teachers downplayed the Gnostic mythopoiesis and 
motifs, such as the denigration of the creator God and the radical rupture 
between the Ideal world and the visible world, which were dominant 
elements in the Sethian Gnostic traditions.  
The findings of this study are important not only concerning the 
development and elaboration of Gnostic traditions but they can at least 
partially resolve the question concerning the preservation of Philo’s writing. 
David Runia has proposed that it was Pantaenus, the head of the Catechetical 
School of Alexandria, who rescued Philo’s writings from the ruins of the 
Jewish community of Alexandria and deposited them in the library of the 
school. Clement of Alexandria would thus have had access to Philo’s writings 
when he started his career as the head of the school.709 This is a solution that 
does not explain who acquired Philo’s works before Pantaenus, who came to 
Alexandria in about 180 CE, possible from Sicily and how they were 
preserved for over 100 years.  
It is possible that the writings of Philo were already the property of the 
catechetical school of Alexandria before Pantaenus’ arrival.710 This would 
mean that librarians and scribes of the Catechetical School of Alexandria 
saved and preserved the writings of Philo after the Jewish revolt in Egypt. 
The main problem with this thesis is that we do not have any reliable 
evidence that the Catechetical School of Alexandria was functioning before 
the time of Pantaenus. It is more likely that the school was founded at the 
end of the second century, although Eusebius tries to give the impression 
that the school of Alexandria had existed “from ancient custom.”711 There was 
not, thus, any institutionalized ecclesiastical authority that would have been 
in charge of the preservation of Philo’s library.  
                                                 
709 Runia, Philo in Early Christianity, 22-23. 
710 Annewies van den Hoek, “The ‘Catechetical’ School of Early Christian Alexandria and Its 
Philonic Heritage,” HTR 90:1 (1997), 79-85.  
711 It seems that the Catechetical School of Alexandria was founded at the same time when 
Demetrius was nominated Bishop of Alexandria.  Cf. Wilfred Griggs, Early Egyptian Christianity from 
its Origins to 452 C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 61, 66-67. 
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The most probable context for Philo’s group was a private school in his 
home or a personally owned structure for advanced students who could carry 
out extended philosophical study of the Bible.712 Philo had his private library, 
probably in his home, in which his works became an essential part. After his 
death, Philo’s writings became a part of the private library of some of his 
students.713 It is unlikely, however, that the works of Philo would have been 
owned by any Jewish student of Philo after the revolt in 115-117 CE. The fact 
that Philo’s writings survived after the revolt implies that some group of early 
Christian intellectuals in Alexandria possessed them already before the 
revolt.714 The Valentinian traditions investigated in this study can be located 
in mid-second-centry Alexandria, which was during that time supposedly the 
only environment where the contacts to Philo’s writings may have been 
possible before Origen took the copies of Philo’s works and went to Palestine 
in the beginning of the third century. It is probable that some Valentinian 
teachers belonged to the circle of Alexandrian Christian Platonists who saw 
Philo’s works as valuable and preserved them after the revolt before they 
became the property of the Alexandrian Catechetical School, that is, at the 
end of the second century. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
712 Sterling, “The School of Sacred Laws,” VC (53) 1999, 149-151. 
713 Sterling, “The School of Sacred Laws,” 159-161. Eusebius reports in Hist. eccl. 2.16-17 that 
some writings of Philo have been deposited in the public library in Rome when Philo was visiting the 
city during the reign of Claudius. This information is commonly considered unreliable.  
714 Sterling, “The School of Sacred Laws,” 163-164. 
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